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Abstract
The transition to a digital, knowledge-based economy has seemingly
thrown the study of industrial spatial strategy into disarray: theory
rooted in the analysis of material ﬂows appears insuﬃcient for the study
of informational ones. However, this work will argue that many of the
basic, historical aspects of ﬁrm location identiﬁed by the pioneers of
spatial analysis remain profoundly relevant today because these enable
us to place the modern ﬁrm in an appropriate spatial and economic
context. We may then combine these fundamental insights with more
recent work on infrastructure ﬂexibility, transactions, types of knowl-
edge, and the importance of face-to-face interaction to ﬂesh out a
portrait of industrial location in the telecommunications age.
Direct evidence of these strategies in action has been diﬃcult to
collect because so many of the inputs to, outputs from, and interac-
tions between ﬁrms are invisible. Moreover, traditional social science
approaches to data collection and analysis are unable to cope with the
ﬂood of information that characterises advanced service economies.
The direct study of telecommunications data promises a new and mas-
sively scalable way to visualise and explore these crucial connections,
but as yet there is little consensus on how to approach such data.
Using very large, but ﬁne-grained data sets from a major British
telecommunications company and a large American telecommuni-
cations company, and drawing upon the ‘eigenplace’ methodology
developed in collaboration with Francesco Calabrese of the able
City Lab at ... (Reades et al., 2009; Calabrese et al., 2010), this work
explores the extent to which telecommunications ﬂows—in terms of
their timing, volume, and geography—can be correlated with ﬁrm lo-
cation and industrial clustering. The ﬁnding of industrial ‘signatures’ in
telecommunications data provides evidence of informational strategies
at work, and sheds light on the likely future shape of urban and regional
economies.
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British Data
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the month of August 2005. Data was provided under the terms of a
contractual research agreement between ... and the British telecom-
munications company.
American Data
A major American telecommunications company provided aggregate
data representing September 2008 telephone calls to and/or from the
New York City metro area. Data was provided under the terms of
a contractual research agreement between ... and the American
telecommunications company, and were accessed while the author was
a visiting researcher at ...
Population Data (U.K.)
Population ﬁgures used in the U.K. analysis were drawn from the
‘Mid-2005 Quinary Estimates for  wards (experimental)’. These
data were selected as they are the closest match for the data supplied
by the British telecommunications company (August 2005). They are
available for download from the Oﬃce for National Statistics () at:
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=13893
This data is covered by Crown Copyright.
Employment Data (U.K.)
Employment ﬁgures used in the U.K. analysis were drawn from the
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average sectoral employment for each ward using the ﬁve-year time
period between 2003 and 2007. The average masks sensitive values and
addresses the issue that the sampling methodology may miss an entire
sector in a given ward for any given year. In short, each employment
value used in the  analysis was calculated using the following simple
approach: ∑iy=2003;2004;2005;2006;2007Ei/5 where Ei is the estimated
employment in sector i during year y. This data is covered by Crown
Copyright.
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and employment data for New York City wire centres, using the
boundary data ﬁles to associate each centre with the relevant socioe-
conomic variables. These ﬁgures were reported in aggregate and with-
out the exact boundary, so they cannot be independently tied back to a
given Census Block or other statistical unit.
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1Introduction
We witness today enormous displacements of economic forces, migra-
tions of capital and human labor such as no other age has ever seen. We
observe that certain regions rapidly grow poor in human beings and cap-
ital, while other become saturated. We see in metropolitan centers great
masses conglomerate, seemingly without end.
Weber, 1909 [1969], p.2
1.1 Introduction
Over the past forty years, the spread of ﬁxed and mobile telecommuni-
cations has radically reshaped the way that we interact with one another
and with our urban environments. We now seamlessly and almost un-
consciously manoeuvre between a physical ‘here’ and a digital ‘there’ on
a near-constant basis. And yet, the impact of this change remains poorly
understood: not only are the networks themselves entirely invisible, but
social science has also been unable to analyse the interactions that these
systems enable. Fourteen years aer the original publication of The Rise
of the Network Society (Castells, 1996 [2000]), the ‘space of ﬂows’ remains
largely unmapped (Pain and Hall, 2008, p.1069).
Only recently have telecommunications data begun to be applied in a
signiﬁcant way to the study of human social interaction. Driven by ad-
vances in hardware, soware, and analytical techniques, researchers have
used mobile and ﬁxed-line phone calls, as well as Instant Messaging
logs to speculate on ‘universal laws’ of human friendship and mobility
(cf. Gonzàlez et al., 2008; Leskovec and Horvitz, 2008; Onnela et al.,
2007). However, managing billions of records spanning Terabytes of
disc storage requires the social sciences to adopt entirely new processing
and analysis techniques. And while we can expect this emerging ‘com-
putational social science’ (Lazer et al., 2009) to draw on the natural and
computer sciences, which have a longer tradition of coping with ‘big
data’, we must also recognise that a good deal of early research in this
ﬁeld will also, of necessity, be heuristic in nature.
1.2 Context
Although this thesis is focussed on the impact of telecommunications
on ﬁrm location, we should not—indeed cannot (see Chapter 2 in
general and, for instance, page 86 speciﬁcally)—ignore the persistence
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of physical ﬂows: the United States Postal System (2010, p.4) alone
processed more than 177 billion letters and parcels in 2009, an average
of 405,000 million pieces each and every minute. And we should note
that this ﬁgure does not include the equally substantial ﬂows carried
by competitors such as FedEx, , , and CityPost on behalf of
businesses. However, although these are staggering volumes of post, a
signiﬁcant trend of the past decade has been the supplanting of physical
ﬂows by electronic ones: essentially costless e-mail and voice calls are
thought to account for the steady, but surprisingly slow1, decline in 1 The Universal Postal Union
(2010) reports that, following a
precipitous decline in volumes in
2008/2009 as a result of the global
economic slowdown, mail volumes
have ‘recovered’ to track pre-
crisis predictions of a 2% decline
per annum, with some growth in
developing countries oﬀsetting a
steeper decline in developed ones.
postal volumes—15% for the Royal Mail between 2006 and 2009 (cf.
Wearden, 2009), and 10% for air freight carried by Deutsche Post 
between 2008 and 2009 (2010).
Telecommunications
In spite of the obviousness of this shi in communications patterns, it
can be easy to forget just how radical the change wrought by the in-
troduction of information and communications technology on our
day-to-day lives has been, and easier still to forget how quickly all of this
change has occurred: in 1880, Britain’s ﬁrst telephone directory listed
just 248 subscribers to nineteen exchanges across the country: three
in London and sixteen ‘in the provinces’ (British Telecommunica-
tions plc., 2007). By 1905, Britain averaged one line for every hundred
households, but since this count included business numbers as well,
the number of phones in homes will have been rather lower. Slow but
steady growth throughout the ﬁrst half of the 20th Century brought
landlines to 21.6% of households by 1964, followed by a much more
rapid rise towards an all-time high of 95% of British households in
1999 (Hamill, 2007).
The uptake of wireless telecommunications, however, makes the
landline’s adoption rate look stodgy indeed. Britain’s ﬁrst mobile phone
call was made on January 1st, 1985 (BBC, 2005b), and its ﬁrst text mes-
sage was sent on December 3rd 1992 (BBC Four, 2006). Early handsets
cost as much as £3,000, and so it is hardly surprising that ten years aer
their introduction just 7% of Britons had mobile phones (Wray, 2010).
But declining handset and contract costs increased consumer uptake:
in 1998 the ‘penetration rate’ reached 25% and less than a year later it
had leaped again to 45% (ibid.). In 2002, the Oﬃce of Telecommuni-
cations (Oel) was reporting that 75% of UK adults owned a mobile
phone (Oel, 2002), and by 2005 Oel’s successor, the Oﬃce of Com-
munications (Ofcom), indicated that the count of active mobile phone
subscriptions had actually surpassed the number of men, women, and
children in the country. In 2006 the ‘penetration rate’ topped 116 mo-
bile connections per 100 population (Ofcom, 2007), and Britain was
averaging 215 million texts per day (i. e. 79 billion a year) and growing
(BBC Four, 2006).
There has been a similarly large, though less visible, increase in inter-
national communication: in 2004 alone, global demand for bandwidth
grew by an astonishing 42% (Glasner, 2005). Using data collected
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Figure 1.1: Growth in International
Calling Minutes (PriMetrica,
2006a; reproduced with permission
of TeleGeography/PriMetrica)
via surveys of global network operators, PriMetrica (2006a) reports
that, between 1997 and 2005, international Voice over IP (o) traﬃc
rose from 7.5m minutes to 42,602.8m minutes, while total interna-
tional minutes surpassed a staggering 250 billionminutes. Figure 1.12) 2  traﬃc includes all public
switched telephone traﬃc: circuit-
switched voice and fax data as well
as “international simple resale” ()
facilities.
highlights two dynamics: ﬁrst, that o growth—which here does
not include peer-to-peer systems such as Skype—is rapidly replacing
switched () traﬃc; and second, that growth in international usage is
outpacing growth in America, the traditional pace-setter.
Moreover, it is not simply a case of Europe catching up with North
America: rates in Asia, Africa and Latin America have outpaced both
regions by as much as 40% (PriMetrica, 2006a)3. Clearly, this rise in 3 Though this is obviously from a
rather lower baseusage is being fuelled by a fall in price, but the underlying driver seems
to be the need, and we might even call it the compulsion, to share
information with family, friends, and colleagues. The globalisation of
both business and migration—creating what Castells (1996 [2000])
calls the ‘space of ﬂows’—seems to require us to stay in touch with
people on the other side of the planet much as we would with those
who are just down the street. But what does this mean for our notions
of community, the nature of employment, the locations of ﬁrms, and
what do those in turn imply for the future of our cities?
Work & Home
However, we must ﬁrst place telecommunications in the fuller context
of what is happening in the realm of travel. Midas—an auto parts com-
pany—recently gave an award for the longest commute in America to
someone who travelled 372 miles, three-and-a-half hours in each direc-
tion, every day (Paumgarten, 2007). The irony of the award is that this
modern-day Odysseus works for the network ﬁrm Cisco; wasn’t the
fusion of computers and telecommunications infrastructure supposed
to free us from this ‘daily grind’? And he is not alone: the number of
Americans whose journey to work exceeds 90 minutes in each direction
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reached 3.5 million in 2006, roughly double the number in 1990, and
17% travel at least 45 minutes in each direction (ibid.).
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Figure 1.2: Growth of Passenger
Transport and Communications in
France (Graham and Marvin, 1996,
p.262; reproduced with permission
of Routledge/Taylor & Francis
Group)
Instead, we see travel and communications increasing in near lock-
step (see Figure 1.24), a trend that can only make sense if neither is fully 4 Seemingly because of data avail-
ability issues, this spectacular
historical data collection exercise
has only ever been performed
for France; however, the data set
underlying this ﬁgure has never
been properly referenced and so
the interpretation should be treated
with some care.
capable of meeting our communicational needs: “there is not a simple
substitution of the latter for the former, as so oen suggested in ‘infor-
mation age’ business rhetoric” (Graham, 2002, p.75). Perhaps the use
of one even stimulates the use of the other (Hall, 2009, p.811), the link
being, as Pain and Hall (2008, p.1068) point out, that we still only really
have two ways of moving large amounts of knowledge across long dis-
tances eﬃciently: electronically, and physically inside someone’s head.
So perhaps this trend is a reﬂection of the importance of knowledge
work, and of knowledge workers to modern economies. In the midst
of an ‘industrial revolution of data’ (Economist, 2010a), those with the
capacity to manipulate information and knowledge will be required to
do so in a wide range of contexts.
What is rather more diﬃcult to grasp is what all of this means for the
future of the city. On the one side are those who point to the growth
of edge and edgeless cities in American suburbia as a sign of the perma-
nent decline of the traditional urban core and its central business district
(); on the other side are those who point to the resurgent growth
(and extreme gentriﬁcation) of New York, London, and the other
global cities as signs that the very largest cities are the command-and-
control hubs of an increasingly complex and integrated global economy.
My argument is that to understand both of these issues, we need to un-
derstand how businesses and individuals select their preferred location
from amongst a range of options, and to determine what role telecom-
munications—and Information and Communications Technology ()
in general—play in changing those preferences.
For instance, what is the role of the traditional oﬃce when an
employee can perform many, and in some cases all, work functions
from almost anywhere on the planet? A visit to any coﬀee shop with
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WiFi connectivity will reveal the extent to which contemporary
work—preparing presentations, checking email, doing product de-
velopment—is being transformed by a combination of mobile tech-
nologies. However, the lower-than-expected uptake of telecommuting
(cf. Mokhtarian, 2003; Jarvis, 2003) suggests a surprising resilience to
the ‘virtualisation’ of the workplace. I will argue that the root cause of
this pattern is that some types of exchange, and in particular some types
of knowledge exchange, are much less amenable to ‘digitisation’ than
others, and that some sectors are therefore still very much place-bound
and very much dependent upon face-to-face interaction.
1.3 Planning for Telecommunications
The Challenge to Theory
We oen take it largely as a matter of faith that  aﬀects how and why
ﬁrms choose one site and not another, but it remains somewhat unclear
how all of this works from a theoretical standpoint since much of loca-
tion theory remains ‘stuck in the 1st industrial revolution’ (Goddard,
1975, p.22). Ultimately, the ability to retrieve, manipulate, and share
data from anywhere in the world seems bound to refashion the way that
ﬁrms use space, but urban studies and planning still seem to be work-
ing with models drawn from an earlier era when “the core of [these]
analyses were the social, economic, spatial, and environmental aspects
of cities dominated by manufacturing and the physical distribution of
goods, services, and people” (Graham, 2005, p.104).
In short, “urban telecommunications study has yet to merge into
a coherent sub-discipline like transportation did aer World War II”
(Graham, 1997, p.108). But even were such a sub-discipline to be
formed, infrastructure and  networks would remain diﬃcult to use
in an instrumental fashion since their ﬂexibility and interconnectiv-
ity makes the results, at best, unpredictable (Innes, 2005, p.60). So
the reality of the city as a ‘space of ﬂows’ raises serious challenges to
which planning—as both a theory of place and a practice of place-
making—appears ill-equipped to respond. In eﬀect, although “every-
thing to do with cities in some way involves information ﬂows, com-
munications, transactions, and representations that can be mediated, in
part at least, by s” (Graham, 2005, p.104), we nonetheless ﬁnd that
many of the ‘policy paradigms’ that once applied to the management of
infrastructure are largely irrelevant (Graham, 1997, p.109).
The Challenge of Invisibility
Batty identiﬁed the basic ‘problem’ of  networks as far back as 1990:
“Cities are becoming invisible to us in certain important ways and it
seems that this invisibility is increasing at a faster rate than our ability to
adapt our research methods to these new circumstances” (1990, p.130).
This invisibility is both literal and metaphorical: in operation, telecom-
munications are invisible and silent; in provision, they are managed by
large corporations with customers to protect and competitors to out-
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compete (Dodge and Kitchin, 2001, p.6).  is now so woven into
the physical fabric of cities that it is largely overlooked by planners who
are much more focussed on systems with obvious externalities (Gra-
ham, 2005, pp.99–100). So whereas changes in manufacturing activity
or oﬃce employment have clear knock-on eﬀects on our day-to-day
lives—more trucks on the road, more planes in the sky, more pollu-
tion in the air—an increase in informational activity has little obvious
impact.
And while researchers can count car journeys, train passengers, or
new oﬃces, it has been much harder to do so with informational ac-
tivity. Most of these electronic ﬂows are across private networks which
are not, and never will be, “part of the public domain, and restricted ac-
cess is a feature of their development…” (Batty, 1990, p.129). In many
cases, the data of interest to urban planners may not even have been
logged since it is not of interest to network operators, but even where it
has been collected there are still multiple, competing operators who will
each have a partial view of the total activity in a city or region. And yet,
without these data sources it is impossible to build any kind of picture
of the local information economy at all.
The Challenge to Analysis
A further challenge is that traditional social science methods appear
poorly equipped to cope with the analysis of electronic infrastruc-
ture. This is not, of course, to suggest that these methods are no longer
useful—in fact, their recombination with new approaches may be par-
ticularly powerful (Hall, 2009, p.808)—but that human behaviour
is increasingly informed by data retrieved from, or exchanged with,
other parts of the world, and that this dynamism is poorly captured by
traditional survey or observation techniques (cf. Pain and Hall, 2008,
p.1070). The data collected are therefore ill-suited to mapping the
informational rhythms of the city and ﬂows of mobility—one confer-
ence participant put it this way: “the census only tells me where people
sleep” (Anonymous, 2007).
However, thanks to improvements in storage capacity and comput-
ing power, Lazer et al. (2009, p.721) argue that we are on the cusp of
establishing a ‘computational social science’ that is capable of taking
advantage of our ability to collect, analyse, and exploit data of truly
breathtaking depth and extent. For instance, the issuer of Visa credit
cards recently used a distributed analysis system to process 73 billion
transactions—36 Terabytes of data—in 13 minutes, radically improving
on its previous approach, which had required nearly a month to run
to completion (Economist, 2010b). To date, however, computational
social science has been “almost exclusively the domain of private com-
panies and government agencies” (Lazer et al., 2009, p.721), and we
must ﬁnd ways to bring this ﬁeld into the research mainstream where it
can become an accepted part of social science academe.
It is now becoming possible to ‘see’ the city in both space and time
with unprecedented resolution and at surprisingly low cost. In place
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of the hundreds of observers/data collectors needed in the past, com-
muting data for an entire urban region could be collected by a single
researcher with access to the mobile phone network. This transforms
utterly the historic dynamics and costs of data collection and thereby
transforms the possibilities of evidence-based policy-making and service
delivery. Historically, informational ﬂows have been largely impossible
to measure except in grand, aggregate ways, but thanks to detailed be-
havioural data sets we can ﬁnally examine both the micro- and macro-
scales of human society at once, and begin to explore the interactions
between the two (Lazer et al., 2009, p.721).
The Challenge to Concepts of Time & Place
At the end of the 17th Century, the average Dutchman travelled just
40km/year, today they manage that in a day (Bertolini and Dijst, 2003,
p.28). So whereas the dense medieval and early-modern city “allowed
time constraints to be overcome by minimising distance constraints”
(ibid.), today’s infrastructure provide an alternative solution since they
“help to overcome distance constraints by minimising time constraints”
(ibid.). But in many ways telecommunications goes beyond mere ‘min-
imisation’, to ‘annihilation’, and Graham (1997, p.117) argues that 
actually constitutes a ‘third dimension’ of planning: space, time, and
now real-time.
The ability to reorganise activities around these dimensions is leading
to increasingly complex economic structures: where once the majority
of highly-skilled positions were concentrated in London, today there is
strong and sustained growth across the Greater South East of England
() in knowledge-intensive sectors, most notably the rise of a high-
tech ‘corridor’ that runs, roughly, between Reading and Cambridge
(Hall, 1987). This dynamic is reﬂected in increasingly complex com-
muter ﬂows: the  project found evidence that the work-related
travel was beginning to bypass central London entirely and display
strong orbital components as well (Hall and Pain, 2006).
We face an enormous challenge in trying to understand and man-
age how the geography of places intersects with the geography of ﬂows
(Healey, 2005, p.151). As Graham (1997, p.118) noted, there is a “con-
tradictory relationship between the city as a bounded piece of territory
and telematics as real-time networks which enable users, by deﬁnition,
to instantly transcend the limits of such bounded pieces of territory.”
Increasingly, we are seeing specialised, but complementary functions
distributed across vast ‘mega-city regions’ that are under the control of
no one set of plans or policies: the region as an economic entity does
not map cleanly on to the region as an administrative unit (Dawkins,
2003, p.133). This challenge requires what government has oen
termed ‘joined-up thinking’ because there is no longer a coherent,
integrated ‘territory’, but rather a ﬂuid, ﬂexible, and complex set of
space/time relations (Healey, 2005, p.150).
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1.4 Overview of Dissertation
One of the key shortcomings of the  study identiﬁed by Hall
and Pain (2006) is the absence of reliable data on information ﬂows.
Thus this research began with a deceptively simple objective: to obtain
data that would allow the mapping of informational ﬂows across the
Greater South East of England region, and I set out to obtain telecom-
munications data from a ﬁxed or mobile network operator. Phone data
has two critical advantages over most other types of relational data: ex-
tent and resolution. Unlike most infrastructure measures (e.g. traﬃc),
it is possible to sample the entire phone network over an arbitrarily long
period of time without incurring additional collection or survey costs.
And unlike Internet Protocol () traﬃc such as email or web requests,
whose resolution is quite low and locational data quite misleading (Hall,
2007a, p.71; Dodge and Kitchin, 2001, p.3), it is possible to localise
ﬁxed and mobile callers with a reasonable level of precision.
A more subtle issue is the problem of causation: there are no data sets
in existence that would enable a researcher to take a longitudinal view
of how telecommunications usage has changed in the past twenty to
thirty years—the volume of data to contend with is simply too mas-
sive—and so we are only able to demonstrate correlation. That said,
we can revisit analyses of business location strategy that predate today’s
omnipresent  environment: by turning back to such early and im-
portant thinkers as Marshall (1890 [1948]), Weber (1909 [1969]), Haig
(1926a,b), Christaller (1933 [1966]), and Lösch (1954 [1973]), we can
establish a solid foundation upon which to build a theory of transport
and telecommunications infrastructure and its complex relationship
with industrial location.
Research Limitations
There are four important limitations to this research that are worth
mentioning here: the ﬁrst is that I will not be examining in any great
depth the drivers of household locational decisions, even though these
are obviously relevant to this work. For more information on this aspect
of household preference, the reader can turn to the work of those,
such as Florida (2002a,b) and Glaeser (2006), who have made cases for
the relevance of the residential and recreational preferences of skilled
employees (particularly in cultural industries) to urban and regional
economic development. However, in this work I will largely treat the
location of labour as a given, handling it as an input in much the same
way that authors such as Weber (1909 [1969]) do.
The second limitation is that I am not considering the role of rent in
any formal way: it will be assumed that central business district ()
properties are generally more expensive than equivalent suburban ones,
and that some companies have a greater interest in, and ability to pay,
city-centre rents. What interests me is why the willingness of ﬁrms
to pay exorbitant central city rents varies so greatly at a time when so
many suburban sites oﬀer a cheaper base of operations. I will not be
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considering in any depth the mechanics of whether and how ﬁrms
outbid one another for a given location.
I will also only be considering those transportation and commu-
nications networks that are relevant to the movement of people and
information. So while our freedom to live either on top of one another
in massive conurbations or in remote parts of the Highlands or western
America also depends on a host of other networks—the most notable
being sewerage and power—these will not be examined in any detail
here. Again, their availability will be taken as precondition for oﬃce or
household relocation. Readers wishing to know more about these other
systems should read Graham and Marvin’s Splintering Urbanism (2001).
Finally, I have deliberately excluded the ‘New Economic Geogra-
phy’ () from consideration in this work. There are several reasons
for this, the most basic of which is that  is principally focussed on
equilibrium states and external shocks, to the exclusion of the ongoing
internal adaptation that I, like Garretsen and Martin (2010, p.150), feel
to be essential to regional development. A second reason is that the ba-
sic parameters, such as spillovers and transport costs, are usually assumed
to be constant in an  model (2010, p.145), and this is something
that I feel does not hold in reality. Ultimately, the basic  model (see
summary in Garretsen and Martin, 2010, p.134) and its oﬀspring simply
are not that relevant here: there is no reason to pursue formal modelling
when I am principally interested in how ﬁrms and entrepreneurs reach
locational decisions rooted in an understanding and analysis of their
own, unique mix of requirements.
Research Context
Deconcentration School Restructuring School
City and region
conceptualised
Postindustrial city (Bell, 1973; Hall, 1997);
E-topia: smart city (Mitchell, 2000);
Aerotropolis (Kasarda, 2000a)
Post-fordist city (Occelli, 2000); Informational
city (Castells, 1989); Global city (Sassen, 1991);
Network city (Clark and Kuijpers-Linde, 1994)
Scale Metropolitan and intrametropolitan Metropolitan, regional, global
Urban/digital
space
Geography of accessibility and opportunity
(Janelle and Hodge, 2000); Hybrid space
(combination of physical and virtual space);
Internet-backbone space (Moss and Townsend,
2000)
Multimodal and digital connectivity (Hepworth
and Ducatel, 1992); Space of ﬂows versus space of
places (Castells, 1996 [2000]); Synergistic
relations between urban place and electronic
spaces (Graham and Marvin, 1996)
Research
traditions
Spatial interaction models (aggregate data, urban
scale); Probability choice models (individual
behavior)
Case studies; Comparative studies of cities using
aggregate data
Planning
challenges
Congested cities: fragmentation of activity in
hybrid space and information technology
synergies with automobile society result in travel
demand that overwhelms transportation
infrastructure
Interjurisdictional bidding wars for global capital.
Congested cities: IT synergies with automobile
society and just-in-time production result in
travel demand that overwhelms transportation
infrastructure. Dominance of space of ﬂows over
space of places
Information-age
landscapes
Sprawling polycentric: (1) High in mobility, low
in accessibility, spatially mismatched; (2) con-
nected/disconnected from Internet backbone
(network of a few metropolitan cities)
(1) Polycentric and intensely extra-networked by
land, air, water, and digital means to global and
regional urban systems; (2) deeply digitally and
multimodally intra-networked, albeit all the
more socioeconomically segregated, physically
overextended, and stuck in traﬃc
Table 1.1: Deconcentration and
Restructuring Schools (aer
Audirac, 2002, p.214)
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Audirac (2002, p.212) suggests that there are two basic theoretical
approaches to the contemporary shis in patterns of economic activity:
deconcentration and restructuring. Both schools of thought recognise
the importance of technological change to urban form, but they diﬀer
in what they believe the impact of  to be (2002, p.213). The decon-
centration approach is particularly common in neoclassical economics
and generally expects  to “[dissolve] the importance of distance and
permitting footloose economic activities to relocate to lower-cost exur-
ban, rural, and oﬀshore areas” (2002, p.215). In contrast, the restruc-
turing school argues that the need to control and coordinate increas-
ingly complex spatial conﬁgurations is actually increasing the need for
managerial functions to cluster at strategic sites (2002, p.215; see also
Sassen, 2002). The principal diﬀerences between the two approaches
are summarised in Table 1.1.
A related methodological division exists within the outputs of the
‘global urban networks’ research community that is studying the rela-
tionships between ‘world cities’ (cf. Taylor and Walker, 2001; Taylor,
2005; Derudder et al., 2003). One set of approaches has tended to fo-
cus on corporate structures, while the other has relied on the analysis
of infrastructure to establish which cities sit at the heart of globalisa-
tion processes (Taylor et al., 2002, p.93; Derudder, 2008, p.561). In
the ﬁrst case, most measures of connectivity are, at best, guess-timates:
network metrics are generated by calculating the potential interaction
between cities based on the number of employees in each oﬃce and
whether such information was available on the ﬁrm’s web site (Taylor
et al., 2001; Derudder et al., 2003; Taylor, 2005). In the second case,
the architecture of the network may not adequately represent the phe-
nomena being studied: for example, although many ﬂights pass through
London, emphasising its centrality, many passengers are actually passing
through on their way to another destination entirely (Derudder, 2008,
p.564).
Theoretically and empirically, my own work sits somewhere be-
tween these two schools, though this is hardly surprising since there is
a great deal of overlap between them. My argument is that these pro-
cesses are all inter-related: that dispersion is highly selective and pred-
icated on telecommunications access, and that concentration in global
hubs is equally selective and largely rooted in what cannot be commu-
nicated via . These stresses aﬀect all ﬁrms, but to diﬀerent degrees,
and in understanding the interplay of travel and communication needs
we can ﬂesh out the locational strategies of ﬁrms across a range of in-
dustries. This argument is much in keeping with Graham’s point that
the ﬁnancial services “…do not simply decentralise to the periphery of
cities or further aﬁeld, to rely purely on electronic interaction; rather,
such processes seem to fashion complex new intra-urban geographies of
service location” (2002, p.77).
Empirically, the data upon which this work is based address some
of the critical issues identiﬁed by Derudder (2008) and Taylor et al.
(2002) with respect to current research eﬀorts. So although the data
from the British and American operators reported in this thesis are
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necessarily ‘state-istics’ (Taylor et al., 2002, p.96) by virtue of being
supplied by telecoms operators rooted in nation-states, it also supplies
us with the vital trans-national perspective of real inter- and intra-urban
links. Furthermore, not only are we able to measure the actual level
of interaction, but we can do so without regard to the risk that a route
becomes ‘unnaturally’ important through the simple expedient of its
being the only one between two sets of points (Smith and Timberlake,
2002).
Infrastructure and Regions
Chapter 2 is rooted on the idea that we cannot understand the impact
of telecommunications on locational decisions without ﬁrst contextu-
alising it amongst the variety of transport infrastructures—road, rail,
sea, and air—already in place. Parsing out of the eﬀects of the land-
line or mobile phone in today’s environment would be impossible, but
by turning to the work of Christaller (1933 [1966]) and Lösch (1954
[1973]), we can work with a simpler set of networks and use these au-
thors’ approaches as a foundation for an analysis of these infrastructural
relationships. However, running these theories forward into the present
highlights the lack of a coherent theoretical approach to the tradeoﬀs
between travel and communications in a digital era, and so bridging this
basic divide will be one of the key tasks of this second chapter.
Accessible Networks
Functional Networks
Technical Networks
Figure 1.3: Layers of Network
Analysis
Drawing on a three-tiered approach to infrastructure advanced
by Drewe (2005, pp.111–112), in Figure 1.3 I will take as a starting
point the technical networks that underpin the movement of material,
people, and data across local, national, and global scales. However,
while the operators of these networks may see themselves as operating
in competition with one another, from the standpoint of functionality
they form an integrated network of nodes and links of varying sizes,
30 the place of telecommunications
scopes, and capacities. Approaching infrastructure through the lens
of economic costs enables use to build a broader model in which it
is the accessibility and bandwidth of diﬀerent networks that constrains
ﬁrms’ locational decisions. However, we will also need to bear in mind
that any viable “theorisation of networks needs to consider the actors
and infrastructure that constitute the links in the network, rather than
simply assuming that the nodes are the only places of signiﬁcance”
(Fowler, 2006, 1437).
Firms, Markets and Risk
Accordingly, in Chapter 3 we will consider how ﬁrms conﬁgure them-
selves in space so as to manage the ﬂow of goods and information. We
will return to the foundations of ﬁrm location theory, and use the ﬁnd-
ings from Chapter 2 to reframe it in terms of multi-modal accessibility
instead of purely geographical or geometrical characteristics (Knoben
and Oerlemans, 2008, p.386). However, as we move through Chap-
ter 3, we will be keeping an eye out for the impact of information on
locational decisions since this dimension is largely missing from the cor-
nerstone text by Weber (1909 [1969]) and from subsequent work on the
role of risk in ﬁrm organisation by, for instance, Coase (1937).
By drawing on Clark and O’Connor (1997), I will show that Coase’s
underlying insight into the role of risk in the structure of the ﬁrm is
played out in space as well. Simply put, products, ﬁrms, and markets
have spatially-determined risk proﬁles to which ﬁrms can respond in
a variety of ways: the most important of these is reconﬁguration, but
the ﬂexibility of the ﬁrm to adjust its internal structure is also aﬀected
by the nature of the transactions in which it takes part. We will treat
inter-ﬁrm and intra-ﬁrm interactions as transactions with two stages:
search and execution, and see that, depending on the distribution of the
costs between these two phases and on the frequency with which these
costs are encountered, the ﬁrm will pursue very diﬀerent strategies.
Agglomerations and Clusters
From time to time, the concentration of ﬁrms in a particular area grows
to the point that it somehow becomes more than the sum of its in-
dividual parts: the unprecedented growth of Silicon Valley, and the
resurgence of the cultural markets in cities like New York and London,
point to the dynamic impact of clustering on economic development.
Taylor has suggested that we can ‘crudely’ think of spatial organisa-
tion and the structure of cities area “as the result of a combination of
two sets of materialist mechanisms: agglomeration processes creating
economic clusters within cities, and connectivity processes creating
economic networks between cities” (Taylor, 2009, p.2550). Since we
have already considered the latter case in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4
is primarily concerned with the former case and seeks to explain why
we cannot treat the ﬁrm in isolation, but must factor in its relationships
with the competing and collaborating ﬁrms around it.
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The Knowledge Economy
In Chapter 5, we turn to the growth of the knowledge economy, and
seek to connect it back to our observations about networks, ﬁrms, and
clusters. Brinkley et al. (2009, p.9) connect the rise of knowledge work
to three feedback mechanisms: ﬁrst, the increase in power and decline
in price of ‘general purpose ’; second, improvements in logistics and
travel; and third, better living standards ‘creating well-educated and
demanding consumers with voracious appetite for high value added
services’. And we will also see how the characteristics of knowledge
work are altering the market for both skilled, creative people and their
principal output: new ideas.
Methodology & Analysis
The approach of this work rests in part on what Lazer et al. (2009) term
‘computational social science’, which seeks to build models of large
social systems “using their reﬂections in massive data sets” (Kleinberg,
2008). Using unprecedented data sets supplied by major British and
American networks, I will be tracing the ways in which telecommuni-
cations serves as a marker of place and of activity, enabling us to analyse
city-regional systems on a much larger scale and with much higher res-
olution than previously possible using, for instance, commuting or em-
ployment data. I will also be using an ‘eigenplace analysis’, introduced
in Reades et al. (2009) and Calabrese et al. (2010), to explore how these
systems can be analysed according to varying similarity measures.
The novelty of the data sets, together with the challenges associated
with exploring such massive amounts of data, mean that substantially
more in the way of illustrative ﬁgures and tables than could feasibly ﬁt
into a single chapter was produced. To preserve the readability of the
analysis, supporting material that was not integral to the analysis itself,
but which nonetheless provided important supplementary context for
the ﬁndings, was placed in three appendices. The ﬁrst, Appendix A:
Aggregate Spatial & Temporal Calling Data, presents aggregate call
data on domestic and international calling. The second, Appendix
B: Location & Telecommunications Quotients, reports additional
ﬁndings from the Telecommunications Quotient () analysis, together
with ﬁgures showing the distribution of industrial activity in New
York City, London, and the Greater South East of England (). The
third appendix, Appendix C: Eigenplace Analysis, supplies additional
eigenplace analyses along with supporting material on the clustering
results. Finally, Appendix D: Data Management & Processing provides
a general overview of the storage, processing, and analysis of the data.
1.5 Summary
The ability to communicate at any time, and in almost any place, can-
not help but change the way that individuals and ﬁrms interact with
one another. Today, we work from home and catch up on social obli-
gations at the oﬃce. We ‘network’ both face-to-face and via a panoply
32 the place of telecommunications
of digitally-delivered services such as LinkedIn, Facebook, and MyS-
pace. We can already videoconference and share travel photos online
with relative ease, but more radical change is on the way: some smart-
phones—employing the combination of , a digital compass, and an
accelerometer—now enable a user to point his or her phone at a land-
mark and have the phone retrieve information about the referenced
object using its calculated location in space (Jonietz, 2007). Within
twenty years such an interface will seem quaintly limited.
Anticipating these changes, Graham and Marvin (2000) noted that
it was no longer helpful to think of telecoms networks as being distinct
from the built environment since the two are increasingly inseparable,
the one inﬂuencing the growth and adaptation of the other. Or as
Mitchell5 put it: 5 This article also contains a ret-
rospectively fascinating exercise
in ‘futurology’: “…imagine the
moment when all your personal
electronic devices are seamlessly
linked in a wireless bodynet that
functions as an integrated system
and connects to the worldwide
digital network. Your Personal
Digital Assistant will allow you to
program your , listen to pager
messages through your Walkman,
display location coordinates from
the Loran positioning system on
your smart spectacles…” (Mitchell,
1994, p.64).
[constructed] spaces will increasingly be seen as electronically-serviced
sites where bits meet the body—where digital information is translated
into visual, auditory, tactile or otherwise sensorily perceptible form and
vice versa. Displays and sensors for presenting and capturing informa-
tion will become as integral to rooms as old-fashioned windows; network
connections…will be as essential as doors
Mitchell, 1994, p.63
In a very real way, these communications networks are already so per-
vasive, and so seamlessly embedded in the fabric of everyday life that we
only become aware of their (non-)existence when they fail—as they still
do under the heavy load of an event or an emergency—or when we are
in one of a vanishingly small number of remote physical locations where
access is still impossible (cf. Burkeman, 2007).
Navigation of this blurring interface between virtual and physical
cities implies signiﬁcant change in how we use space and time to pur-
sue our personal, social, and professional interests. Until recently this
interface was largely hidden from researchers, but the need to explore
informational ﬂows across cities and nations is becoming increasingly
apparent; to put this in planning terms: “ways of seeing and under-
standing the city inevitably inform ways of acting on the space of the
city, with consequences that, in turn, produce a modiﬁed city that is
again seen, understood, and acted on” (Sandercock, 2005, p.161). How
we deal with the consequences of our newfound ability to see, under-
stand, and act will have an enormous impact on the shape of the ‘cities
of tomorrow’.
2Infrastructure and Regions
2.1 Introduction
This work begins with a fairly detailed review of two of the founding
texts in spatial economics—and although the works of Christaller (1933
[1966]) and Lösch (1954 [1973]) are principally concerned with the
physical movement of goods and, to a lesser extent, services, they pro-
vide us with the basic framework for understanding the economic costs
of transport and travel in an era when telecommunications had only
begun to reshape regional, national, and inter-national systems. Be-
ginning with these theorists helps to make two things clear: ﬁrst, that
the assumption of a ‘ﬂat plain’1 is profoundly misleading; and second, 1 In the technical jargon of eco-
nomics and planning this is oen
referred to as an ‘isotropic surface’.
that a common terminology by which to understand and compare very
diﬀerent types of infrastructure—both digital and physical—has been
largely lacking. And although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to put
forward a fully worked-out resolution to these two problems, I intend
to outline some useful ways of approaching these challenges and moving
our thinking forward in these areas.
However, that is to look ahead to the conclusions of this chapter, so
let us return to the basic question: how do telecommunications net-
works support or supplant the usage of other infrastructure networks,
and what does this imply for the evolving distribution of economic and
social activity across space? To address this issue we need to be able to
compare wildly divergent types of infrastructure simultaneously, an
important failing of many extant analyses is to treat each one in isolation
(Feitelson and Salomon, 2000, p.48). So the core aim of this chap-
ter is to develop a generic framework for the analysis of infrastructure
networks that draws on nearly one hundred years of thinking on the
relationship between markets, networks, and space.
Christaller began by asking why some towns grow into cities while
others remain small, and whether there is an order to this pattern of
growth (1933 [1966], p.2)? The essence of his theory is that some towns
become ‘central places’ for the exchange of goods and services by virtue
of economies in transport or production. The central place co-exists
symbiotically with a hinterland: less complex goods such as food are
imported to the centre, and more sophisticated goods make their way
outwards to rural and suburban consumers. In an ideal environment,
which is to say one with no natural boundaries or strong historical
33
34 the place of telecommunications
inﬂuences, this process would be expressed as an interlocking hierarchy
of markets in which every good is available from somewhere at a price
determined largely by the economic cost of transporting goods to the
consumer from a central place.
C P: The Christallerian view of hierarchical relationships
between towns and cities is a compelling one because it is simple to
grasp and implies a rational order to regional economies. Graham and
Marvin (1996, p.62) report that planners in County Durham once sug-
gested “the destruction of villages and towns so that [the] settlement
system accorded better with the theoretical perfection of central place
theory.” Thankfully, the era in which planners consider demolishing
towns that ‘did not ﬁt the theory’ is now long-passed, and a recent
review of regional development literature identiﬁed two interlinked
trends that challenge the existence of formal hierarchy: ﬁrst, the internal
coherence of regions has weakened thanks to improvements in com-
munications and transport; and second, these same improvements are
leading to increasingly complex patterns of movement which negate the
traditional regional boundary and enable employees to work from areas
‘oﬀering service or quality-of-life beneﬁts’ (Dawkins, 2003, p.133).
S C: Working from a model of inter-ﬁrm compe-
tition in space, Lösch (1954 [1973], p.122) derived a pattern of market
areas that was remarkably similar to the top-down model advanced
by Christaller even though many of the premises were fundamentally
diﬀerent. Generally speaking, the extent of any one ﬁrm’s market is
determined by ‘the combined inﬂuence of scale economies and trans-
portation costs’ (Dawkins, 2003, p.137). So if scale economies domi-
nate transportation costs then production will tend to occur at a single
point, while if transport costs are high relative to economies of scale
then ﬁrms will operate from anywhere there is a lack of competition
(ibid.).
However, the addition of demand substitution, in which consumers
replace a high-priced good with a lower-priced one that satisﬁes the
same need, as well as the detaching of production from central places,
complicates the resulting structure. In eﬀect, because the markets are
attached to ﬁrms and not to settlements, there are many overlapping
market areas and not just one hierarchy. Nonetheless, in Lösch’s model,
regions may still have a central metropolis and neighbouring areas of
more- and less-intensively used land; and as with Christaller, the in-
creasing economic costs of delivering goods and services over a distance
determine the boundaries of markets.
N F: Although both Christaller and Lösch were
profoundly interested in transport infrastructure as the ‘glue’ that holds
together a regional market, there is comparatively little explicit consid-
eration of the impact of complementarity or substitutability between
competing infrastructures. The backgrounding of transport infrastruc-
ture in regional studies becomes an important issue with the emergence
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of what Feitelson and Salomon (2000) term ‘upper-tier’ infrastruc-
tures such as High-Speed Rail () and electronic toll-highways, but it
reaches a critical point with the addition of telecommunications.
Simply put, Feitelson and Salomon (2000, p.459) note that sub-
stantial evidence exists that transport infrastructure is not simply a
reﬂection of regional economic development, but plays an active role in
shaping the location of commercial centres and the level of economic
integration between regions. However, this is not a straightforward
technologically determinist argument: the authors argue that transport
must be seen as a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition for economic
growth (Feitelson and Salomon, 2000, p.460).
Feitelson and Salomon’s model enables us to consider the tradeoﬀs
between diﬀerent transport and communication networks, and to oﬀer
up a more generalised model of infrastructure ﬂexibility as it aﬀects
accessibility. In sum, it is by examining distance within networks—not
across some abstract plain—and comparing the strengths and limitations
of each that we are able to get to grips with the underlying parameters of
spatial strategy. And it this adaptive approach to spatial analysis will set
up a more detailed exploration of ﬁrm behaviour in Chapter 3.
2.2 Theory of Central Places
The core concept of Christaller’s work is the central place, and its eco-
nomic relationship both to its hinterland (also termed its complemen-
tary region) and to the larger network of other central places beyond.
Or as Christaller (1933 [1966], p.16) puts it: “the chief profession—or
characteristic—of a town is to be the center of a region.” This relation-
ship is illustrated in Figure 2.1, but the key point to keep in mind is
that the central place is not a singular site of a speciﬁc size, but rather
a ‘developmental level’ within a functional hierarchy used for regional
analysis. For instance, we can envision a market town being simultane-
ously the central place for a rural hinterland of farms and villages, and
part of the hinterland of a much larger conurbation such as a city.
This hierarchy means that in central place theory the highly-connected
central place binds together the nodes ‘below’ it into a coherent system,
and that the centre-periphery pattern repeats at multiple scales. With
each step up the hierarchy, the centre grows increasingly sophisticated
in terms of the goods and services that it supplies to its complemen-
tary region, and its market area grows in overall extent. To put this
in network terms, the central place acts as the interface between a lo-
cal trading network of which it is the primary node, and a regional or
national ﬂow of goods and services within which it is just one node
amongst many at the same level of functional specialisation.
Simplifying Assumptions
H: Like most economists, Christaller presumes a homoge-
nous plain on which to test out his theory of central places. Taking this
approach enables Christaller (1933 [1966], p.27) to focus on the spatial
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Figure 2.1: The Hierarchy of
Central Places
characteristics of consumption and so does not preclude variation in the
distribution of population, demand, and supply. This assumption frees
Christaller to focus on the characteristics of central places, and how
their ‘completeness’ distinguishes them from specialised places such as
farms or mining and company towns (1933 [1966], p.23).
Central places are concentrations of diﬀerentiated and specialist de-
mand, and so their centrality is not purely a function of population
(1933 [1966], p.70), and this ‘localisation of functions’ decouples cen-
trality from simple measures of city size (1933 [1966], p.71). Implicitly,
however, Christaller (1933 [1966], pp.68) expects a geometric distribu-
tion of central places that would accord with similar observations about
city size made by Zipf (1946) so it is diﬃcult to see how the two could
not be related.
E C  T: What knits the hierarchy of
places together is transportation, which is essential to the division of
labour since “with limited traﬃc possibilities (Verkehrmöglichkeiten),
the division of labor is possible only to a limited degree” (Christaller,
1933 [1966], p.48). There is, for instance, comparatively little use for
a patent lawyer conﬁned to a small town by poor transport links; it is
absolutely vital that the specialist be able to reach a central place of suﬃ-
cient size to have clients with this sophisticated need, and that they also
be able to do so at a suﬃciently low economic cost. So, without cheap
transport the specialisation associated with higher-order centres simply
does not occur, and economic development is retarded in signiﬁcant
ways.
The crucial assumption in Christaller’s work is that the economic
costs of transportation increase linearly with distance (1933 [1966],
p.22). Cost needs to be understood here in an economic sense, which
means not just a monetary amount, but a full costing that incorporates
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factors such as travel time, speed, frequency, comfort and risk (1933
[1966], p.52). By way of example, an expensive, but fast and frequent
service between two places is not necessarily more costly from an eco-
nomic standpoint than a cheap, but slow and delay-prone one.
The Centrality of Goods
The centrality of places is reﬂected in the centrality of the goods that
they carry: central goods stand in contradistinction to both dispersed
and indiﬀerent goods which, as their names suggest, are either produced
outside the central place, or (potentially) in both the central place and
in the hinterland simultaneously. As Christaller (1933 [1966], p.19)
puts it: “The goods being produced at the central place, just because
it is central, and the services oﬀered at the central place, will be called
central goods and central services.”
In general, central goods seem to be synonymous with ‘higher or-
der’ goods: these may be social or cultural in nature, such as theatres or
restaurants (1933 [1966], p.34), but they would also include the output
of any tradespeople unable to ply their trade in the hinterland because of
an insuﬃcient concentration of local demand or ability to pay. Conse-
quently, the variety of goods on oﬀer in a given central place reﬂects its
position in the overall network: “[places] of lower centrality thus supply
only the lower-order functions, whereas places of higher centrality fulﬁl
these lower-order functions plus at least one service function of a higher
order” (Klemmer, 1978, pp.55–56).
There is a kind of recursive reasoning here: what deﬁnes the central
place is that it produces central goods, and central goods are the ones
that can only be produced at a central place. As a result, Christaller’s
claim that central goods are “produced and oﬀered at a few necessarily
central points in order to be consumed at many scattered points…”
(1933 [1966], p.19), while dispersed goods are produced in many places
still does not adequately deﬁne centrality in any measurable way.
The Range of a Good
However, combining the distribution of demand with the economic
cost of travel yields the idea that goods and services have a range over
which they can be proﬁtably sold (1933 [1966], p.54). The minimum
range of a good is determined by the smallest area containing enough
customers to make a proﬁt. The maximum range is the distance at
which transport costs have mounted to a level where no one is inter-
ested in purchasing it. The furthest distance from the central place
at which a good is purchased constitutes its market boundary (1933
[1966], p.58). Inverting the relationship between place and consumer,
we could also say that the maximum range of a good is the furthest that
a customer—or their ‘travel proxy’ such as a travelling salesman or post-
man—would be willing to travel in order to procure it (1933 [1966],
p.21).
Remember, however, that the range of a good is ultimately deter-
mined by economic costs, and so range may also vary with social norms
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such as lifestyle or economic factors such as income. In other words,
range has a “thoroughly subjective element” (1933 [1966], p.51) and
may be aﬀected by the distribution of demand, income and, crucially,
infrastructure. For instance, a concentration of wealthy consumers will
tend to reduce the minimum range of a costly good (1933 [1966], p.68),
but high-value goods will also tend to have greater maximum ranges
because transport costs are a smaller component of the ﬁnal price. Table
2.1 summarises the ways that diﬀerent combinations of ranges can aﬀect
overall regional development.
Minimum Range Maximum Range Eﬀect
Small Small Small places develop well; Large ones
develop poorly
Small Large All develop
Large Small All develop poorly†
Large Large Small places develop poorly; Large ones
develop well
† Meaning that the minimum range is relatively large within a framework where the
maximum range is quite modest, not that the minimum range is somehow greater than
the maximum.
Table 2.1: Interactions between
product range and central place
development (Christaller, 1933
[1966], p.121)
Because transport acts as a mediator of trade between places, changes
in the usage or distribution of routes aﬀects overall regional structure
(1933 [1966], p.47). This gives rise to the ‘traﬃc principle’ of devel-
opment, in which the existing hierarchy may realign itself around new
infrastructure, potentially producing signiﬁcant deviations from the
ideal ‘market principle’ derived from consumption alone (1933 [1966],
p.73). Thus the same good—oﬀered at comparable central places with
diﬀerent qualities of infrastructure—may have diﬀerent ranges (1933
[1966], p.50), and places able to produce or ship goods at a lower cost
can increase their market area at the expense of their neighbours.
In other words, cheaper, faster, and more comfortable modes con-
tribute to the centralisation of consumption by reducing the perceived
cost of travel; this change arises because the point at which it becomes a
matter of indiﬀerence to the consumer from which place they purchase
the good shis outwards from the more eﬃcient place (1933 [1966],
p.40). At the limit, transport network improvements may mean that a
poorly-provisioned central place ceases to be able to sell its goods prof-
itably anywhere because of competition from better-connected neigh-
bours, and the central place itself (or at least the higher-order goods
and services that it previously supplied) ceases to be viable (Beckmann,
1978, p.17).
Agglomeration & Technology
A: In Christaller’s model, agglomeration—the phys-
ical clustering of ﬁrms in space—may arise from the organisational
requirements of coordination and capital (1933 [1966], p.21). However,
supply-side agglomeration (the beneﬁts accruing to ﬁrms, not con-
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sumers) remains weakly-developed, and the central place is principally
a ‘stimulus for consumption’ (1933 [1966], p.42) since the grouping
together of a wide variety of goods and services in a single place en-
ables consumers to reduce the total economic cost of their shopping
trips. Today we might call this ‘trip chaining’, but it remains a fact that
higher-order centres enable consumers to address multiple needs with a
single journey (1933 [1966], p.43), and so higher order centres will tend
to draw customers away from lower order ones with a more limited
selection of goods (1933 [1966], p.50).
However, radical changes in infrastructure create the opportunity
for a signiﬁcant reordering of the existing hierarchy: a rail station on the
outskirts of town may undermine a once-vibrant town centre “through
the development of an auxiliary central place at the station and through
the emigration of consumption of central goods to a nearby central
place of a higher order” (Christaller, 1933 [1966], p.105). Contempo-
rary evidence of this process can be seen in the success of out-of-town
‘big box’ retailers in the U.K. such as Tesco or B&Q, and of full-service
‘malls’ like those at Bluewater or White City at the expense of tradi-
tional high-street shops (Conisbee et al., 2004). These retailers oﬀer
ample evidence of the ‘traﬃc principle’ at work: the scale of parking
provision at these centres makes it clear that this is a form of transit-
oriented, accessible development, even if we associate it with a host of
negative externalities.
The accessibility eﬀect can be seen around air and High-Speed Rail
() infrastructure: Bertolini and Dijst (2003) coined the term ‘mobil-
ity environment’ to describe the way that these locations’ multi-modal
accessibility fosters their emergence as ‘multi-functional concentra-
tions’. Airport areas in particular are increasingly used by non-travellers
for recreational purposes, and by businesspeople as a substitute for travel
downtown to a meeting (ibid.). Bertolini and Dijst (2003, p.33) note
that  (now part of Ferrovial) earns more from the management of
commercial activity at Heathrow, Gatwick, and Luton than it does
from airport taxes, while Schiphol earns more from real estate and con-
cessions than from all aviation-related activity. For airports in general,
retail can account for as much as one third of an airport’s proﬁt (BBC
Four, 2009a).
T: Technology change—and Christaller (1933 [1966],
p.101) speciﬁcally included the automobile, telephone, and radio
amongst these—not only impacts the spatial logic of production and
purchase for goods through its eﬀects on transport infrastructure, it
can also have eﬀects on the good itself through an increasing division
and specialisation of labour (1933 [1966], p.100). On the one hand,
technologies that lower transport costs cause production costs to be-
come a larger component of the ﬁnal price, and so ﬁnding the places of
cheapest production—in Christaller’s model this is usually a large cen-
tral place—becomes more important to ﬁrms. But on the other hand,
technology can also bring into play new techniques of production,
scheduling, and delivery, such that “certain types of goods which were
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previously oﬀered centrally are oﬀered dispersedly…” (1933 [1966],
p.106). Eventually, products that could at one time only be procured
at a central location become omnipresent, and their source becomes a
matter of ‘indiﬀerence’ to the consumer.
This is why Christaller argues that all examinations of regional struc-
ture need to incorporate technical progress as a factor (1933 [1966],
p.99). However, the overall pace of infrastructure change, by which
we should also understand technological improvements to the existing
infrastructure, also plays a role in the development of regions:
We may hence conclude that if the train service develops slowly, and if
long-distance lines are preferred, then the system of central places may be
able to reform itself according to the propositions of the traﬃc principle.
If the development is swi, however, or if local lines are preferred, then
the scheme of markets will remain intact.
Christaller, 1933 [1966], p.114
So during times of change, those central places that are located least
favourably relative to the ‘dominant’ developmental trend will suﬀer
most from a shi of consumer demand to alternative sources (1933
[1966], p.114). But rapid changes may actually reinforce (or least not
signiﬁcantly undermine) the existing hierarchy even if the change itself
might appear to favour dispersion or decentralisation.
How might the rollout of wired and wireless telecommunications
services ﬁt into this model? The example of call centres, which sever
the link between places of production and consumption entirely, is
one for which Christaller’s theory has no real place2. Apart from being 2 We will consider online shop-
ping, another form of distributed
consumption, later in this work.
able to state that these ‘customer service factories’ tend to make use of
an accessible out-of-town location (Breheny, 1999, p.20), there is no
obvious way to link such centres to a spatial hierarchy. Contrasting the
physical mobilities of the ‘pre-digital’ era with the virtual ones available
today, Audirac (2002, p.217) notes that “…accessibility in urban space
combines with virtual accessibility, in what is now being called ‘hy-
brid’ space.” This hybrid space seems to create an entirely new kind of
‘placelessness’ in which distance can, in principle, be sublimated.
Spatial Implications
So, changes to transport and technology should extend the market
boundary of any given centre; and in a dynamic environment, popula-
tion growth in a central place should stimulate local demand and, with
it, the specialisation that triggers further development. For instance,
a factory worker buys food from a specialist (i. e. a grocer), whereas
the farmer grew his own (Christaller, 1933 [1966], p.34). Conversely,
population growth in the hinterland may stimulate the growth of new
central places or, alternatively, generate growth amongst pre-existing
lower-order places that were once too small to support higher-order
goods but now form a central place for a newly suburbanised popula-
tion.
Similarly, income growth should stimulate the production of higher-
order goods since more income remains for consumption aer sub-
sistence goods such as food and accommodation have been purchased
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(Christaller, 1933 [1966], p.34). But as with population growth, the
distribution of income growth matters: if it occurs in the existing cen-
tral place then it will stimulate the further development of higher-order
goods there, but if it happens in the hinterland then it may stimulate
the development of a new centre that competes with the existing one.
Moreover, the social distribution of income growth plays a role since a
small number of very high incomes does not stimulate central markets
to the same degree that a large number of slightly lower incomes might
(1933 [1966], p.34).
In economic analyses, rising incomes also aﬀect the cost of travel
because the traveller’s time is relatively more valuable to him or her.
So when Lange (1978) adds the notion of ‘search costs’ to Christaller’s
model, he argues that this will favour the largest central places because
“the greater the need for information prior to the purchase of a certain
good, the more shops the consumer must visit, and the more time he
needs [to do this]…” (1978, p.65). Note, however, that Lange seems
to assume that search costs accrue linearly because the consumer must
visit each shop in turn in order to determine if the product is in stock
and suitable for purchase. Telecommunications, and in particular the
Internet, largely obliterate this approach except where products are not
searchable in this way. Consequently, the extent to which telecoms may
undermine or reinforce the existing central place hierarchy is diﬃcult
to determine and they seem to exist largely outside of any meaningful
hierarchical principle.
Summary
Christaller’s model of regional development, rooted in the growth
of central places connected by short- and long-range transportation
infrastructure, provides us with an important starting point for our
analysis, but several important gaps in this model call into question
any broader application. First, nearly all of the factors aﬀecting ﬁrms
and households are exogenous making it diﬃcult it to understand how
changes occur within the urban system (Vance, 1970, p.151). And
recent research indicates that the stability of city size distributions masks
substantial change at the level of individual cities, which may move up
or down the size ranking rather quickly (Batty, 2006, pp.592–596).
Moreover, a good case can be made that Christaller’s approach sim-
ply takes the extant situation in Germany and retroactively generates
from it a theory, while largely failing to explain the situation in coun-
tries without a history of feudalism (Vance, 1970, p.103). Vance went
on argue that other regions would develop along very diﬀerent lines and
that ‘at the beginning trade is predicated on external conditions and
lines of ﬂow to other markets’ (ibid.). He claimed that the development
of the port cities along the southern edge of England and of the City
of London could be connected to the emergence of an ‘intelligence
complex’ that allowed these areas to exploit information about remote
markets (1970, p.149) and had little to do with ‘centrality’ as Christaller
deﬁned it.
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A second issue is that there is no scope for demand substitution,
yet the idea that if a product is too expensive then you either buy it
from somewhere cheaper or you do not buy it all (1933 [1966], p.22)
does not reﬂect the reality that there is usually an array of alternatives
for many goods and services. This is also, it should be noted, ‘inimi-
cal to entrepreneurship’ (Vance, 1970, p.140), and is in many ways a
“geography of imposed order” (1970, p.166). So although Table 2.1
actually makes it possible for multiple systems of central places to coexist
at various scales, Christaller nonetheless appears to imply a degree of hi-
erarchical consistency in the structure of places and markets that negates
transformative change.
An earlier review of Christaller’s theory drew contradictory con-
clusions on the degree to which this matters: Klemmer concludes that
Christaller’s model “requires the existence of an internally consistent
hierarchical system…” (1978, p.57), but Beckmann suggests that hav-
ing a hierarchy of goods “is not the same as saying that a strict hierarchy
of central places results” (1978, p.14). To my mind there does not ap-
pear to be any basic prohibition—other than Christaller’s own—in the
deﬁnition of central goods that bars a lower-order town from special-
ising in the production of a higher-order good to be oﬀered for sale
through a ‘senior’ central place; however, the basic problem here is that
as soon as we allow this to happen, or permit factors such as demand to
vary across space (or time) then it becomes impossible to deﬁnitively
connect centrality of goods, or scale of markets, to centrality of places.
An additional issue with Christaller’s approach is that the relationship
between economic cost and physical distance, which would have been
very nearly linear in his day, has largely broken down. For instance, the
hub and spoke air travel network reinforces the dynamic by which well-
connected cities are actually closer to one another in an economic sense
than they are to their complementary regions. Hall (2005) contrasts
travel times between London and Manchester and London and Oldham
or Rochdale as an example of the way that peripheral nodes in British
regions have been excluded from the core high-speed network even
when they are quite physically close to major hubs.
In spite of these important lacunae, in some ways Christaller’s interest
in the tertiary (i. e. services) market puts him ahead of his time. Rising
incomes for many mean that we are increasingly preoccupied with
the cost of consumption, and for residents and visitors alike “cities
oﬀer ‘agglomerations of consumption’—that is, easy access to lots of
diﬀerent goods and services within a fairly small area. Many cities
are sites of the growing ‘play economy’—retail, tourism and leisure”
(Athey et al., 2007, p.17). There is also the intriguing implication in
Christaller’s ‘traﬃc principle’ that the sheer pace of telecommunications
infrastructure change may mean that it has correspondingly less impact
on our towns and cities: we are still very much stuck with our 1960s
and 70s rail and air infrastructure even as our telecommunications
networks have undergone multiple major upgrades.
In fact, a ﬂeeting reference to ‘polycentral’ development even seems
to place Christaller (1933 [1966], p.23) squarely within the much more
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recent debate on polycentric development (cf. Champion, 2001; Copus,
2001; Davoudi, 2003; Hall and Pain, 2006; Kloosterman and Musterd,
2001); however, his model does not cope particularly well with true
functional polycentricity. This issue arises because there is no way to
measure or determine centrality when the products and services on
oﬀer in central places complement one another instead of competing
with each other. For instance, the Western Crescent’s dominant role in
Information and Communications Technology () in the South East
of England (Hall, 1987), and the concomitant lack of  employment
in London—manifestly a higher-order place—shows that we seem
to ending up with highly specialised places instead of hierarchically
structured ones.
A rather remarkable commentary by Taylor (2009) in Environment &
Planning A constitutes a kind of back-handed tribute to the continuing
power of Christaller’s analysis3. Taylor is responding to a peer reviewer 3 And see also Nicolas (2009)
for another recent critique of the
persistence of hierarchical central
place thinking in theory and
practice.
who indicated that “the authors appear to be saying that inter-city rela-
tions are essentially non-hierarchical which I ﬁnd a little strange” (2009,
p.2550). Taylor is astonished to ﬁnd that the “legacy of central place
theory with its neat hierarchical placing of cities appears to continue
to be inﬂuential outside its original discipline” (2009, p.2550). While
I would concur—for reasons that will become clear over the course
of this chapter—on the limitations of hierarchical analyses, we have
nonetheless explored several aspects of Christaller’s thinking that may
still be considered relevant to speciﬁc aspects of contemporary regional
analysis.
2.3 Theory of Spatial Competition
Where Christaller adopted a ‘top-down’ analytical approach, in Lösch’s
(1954 [1973]) ‘bottom-up’ model the eﬀects of space are not expressed
solely through rising transport costs, but also through inter-ﬁrm com-
petition and demand. The focus on the ﬁrm, together with the addition
of product substitution and a movement away from the notion that all
transactions occur at a point (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.139), means that
markets cease to have the clear, hierarchical structure that they did for
Christaller and also puts Lösch’s approach more in line with contempo-
rary micro-economics.
However, a critical diﬀerence between Lösch’s model and those of
the more traditional branches neo-classical economics is that because
of spatial discontinuities (i. e. varying levels of accessibility) demand
for a particular good within a given ﬁrm’s market area may actually
exceed supply, creating surplus proﬁts indeﬁnitely (1954 [1973], p.120).
In other words, areas may exist where demand exceeds supply but
where this surplus is insuﬃciently great to permit new ﬁrms to enter
the market, and that as a result ‘excess’ or ‘leover’ proﬁts may endure
(1954 [1973], p.6).
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Simplifying Assumptions
H  U: Like most economists, Lösch presumes that
inter-ﬁrm competition takes place on a ﬂat plain across which transport
costs accrue in a linear fashion. However, unlike Christaller, Lösch
is careful to include the idea that there is variation in the distribution
of consumers, their preferences, and their willingness to pay. Here,
their willingness is a function of both economic cost—comfort, speed,
and so forth—and utility. This means that consumers also consider
such diverse factors as their social networks, the climate, and their
enjoyment of a line of work (1954 [1973], p.236). In Lösch’s view, the
inability of economics to accurately deﬁne ‘utility’ for any one person
or organisation (1954 [1973], pp.224–225) implies that an empirical
solution to the question of individual and ﬁrm location will necessarily
depart substantially from his avowedly ideal theory.
C  S: Signiﬁcantly, we also ﬁnd that both
production and consumption can depend on distance (1954 [1973],
pp.6–7). For instance, within some speciﬁed distance of a retail loca-
tion, shoppers at, say, Ikea have a choice about the ‘form of consump-
tion’ for their furniture: it may be assembled on-site by specialists or
collected in-person, but beyond that limit the furniture is only available
as ‘ﬂat-pack’. A more subtle example comes from the steel industry: it
is costly to transport poor-quality ore over long distances and the re-
turns are modest, so the ore is likely to be processed locally for use in
cheaper products. In contrast, a high-grade ore, even if it is more costly
to extract, retains suﬃcient value that it is worth shipping to high-tech
mills capable of making more advanced products. Japan’s steel mills, for
instance, are entirely dependent on ore shipped in from abroad, oen as
far away as Brazil (Engardio, 2009).
The picture becomes more complicated still with the addition of
substitutability, such as that which arises from the distinction between
ﬁnished and unﬁnished goods. Unﬁnished goods such as timber are
frequently passed through intermediaries and sold on to a wide range of
ﬁrms operating in very diﬀerent markets. Consequently there is a strong
incentive to standardise unﬁnished goods since it creates the potential
for economies of scale for both for suppliers and intermediaries. How-
ever, this process also makes unﬁnished goods more readily comparable
and, consequently, substitutable for buyers.
Spatially, substitutability is expressed as a ‘harder’ market boundary
because shipping costs are the only distinguishing feature and one might
as well buy from the closest supplier (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.169)4. In 4 Unﬁnished goods in this model
very much resemble the indiﬀerent
goods of Christaller’s model (see
page 37).
contrast, the lack of substitutability for ﬁnished goods—whose demand
may be aﬀected by sociocultural factors—means that their markets
will have ‘soer’ edges, and may even overlap substantially. So while
timber may be sourced from the cheapest supplier, we would expect
that ﬁnished furniture would not: even though they may serve the same
ultimate function, the aesthetic qualities of, say, modernist and Shaker
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designs, mean that they are clearly not equivalent (i. e. substitutable) and
that their markets can overlap.
E  S: In classical economics, excess proﬁts attract the
attention of competitors, driving net proﬁt to zero, and temporary
monopoly proﬁts only emerge when technological change gives a cost-
advantage to a single producer. But the spatialisation of economics
complicates this process signiﬁcantly since it eﬀectively permits these
proﬁts to persist indeﬁnitely. Lösch (1954 [1973], p.260) notes ﬁve
reasons why monopoly proﬁts can be maintained in a competitive
market, but the two most interesting ones for our purposes are: when
a settlement ‘discontinuity’ disrupts the entry of competitors because
it interferes with the optimal distribution of markets between them;
and when ‘skilled entrepreneurs’ are able to use economies of scale to
price their goods (of which more later) such that marginal producers are
deterred from entering the market.
In an equally counterintuitive fashion, a fall in the price of a good
obviously causes the maximum area across which it can be sold to
increase, and also causes the minimum area necessary for proﬁtable
operation to decrease (1954 [1973], p.174). We might expect this de-
crease to beneﬁt the most eﬃcient ﬁrms by extending their markets at
the expense of their less eﬃcient competitors. Instead, increased lo-
cal demand may actually permit a new ﬁrm to enter the market at a
previously unproﬁtable location, reducing the existing ﬁrms’ markets
(1954 [1973], pp.172–173). Similarly, instead of squeezing out marginal
producers, increases in production costs may actually beneﬁt less eﬃ-
cient producers because shipping costs become less important as a share
of the ﬁnal cost and reduce the advantage of the eﬃcient ﬁrm (1954
[1973], p.175). These complex interactions mean that we cannot treat
the ﬁrm in isolation (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.8), and we should also note
that these peculiar interactions between space and scale are absent from
Christaller’s analysis.
T R   G: In a sense, changes to the cost of production
or transport impact the eﬀective density of consumers, and this is before
we even consider that ﬁrms might pursue diﬀerent pricing strategies
to protect or extend their markets. According to Lösch there are at
least three ways to price the shipping costs of a transaction: the price is
negotiated on an individual and per-order basis according to volume
and distance; the price is proportional to the distance shipped; and the
price is based on the average shipping cost for all transactions (1954
[1973], p.139). The second option is what we would normally think of
as the linear costs of transport—the further something is shipped, the
more it costs us to do so—but the last option is rather interesting: it is
a form of spatial subsidy in which local customers support ‘exports’ to
more distant consumers in markets where the ﬁrm could not ordinarily
compete. This subsidised shipping model is actually quite common, as
anyone who has used a national postal system would know.
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Conceptually, the quantity of goods that a ﬁrm can sell over a dis-
tance looks like an inverted ‘cone’ (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.105) or ‘fun-
nel’ (Valavanis, 1955, p.638), but one whose shape is easily distorted
by infrastructure and demand (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.114; see Figure
2.2). By freeing ﬁrms from the Central Place, Lösch enables them to
experiment with diﬀerent strategies for positioning the sales cone to
maximum eﬀect. So instead of locating in a metropolis, a ﬁrm might
choose some central location between several of them, enabling it to
compete in multiple markets simultaneously (1954 [1973], p.121). But
clearly there is no one optimal strategy: a factory located at the centre of
its market is closer to all of its potential consumers, but it could also po-
tentially be undercut in a market by a competitor locating in (or closer
to) one of its centres of consumption5.
5 On the whole, Lösch did not have
much time for Hotelling’s (1929)
earlier work on this topic since it
assumed not only that the rival’s
pricing was ﬁxed, but also that
locational choice was conﬁned to
just one dimension, rather than two
(1954 [1973], pp.72–75).
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of Varying
‘Cone Sizes’ for Goods
Another advantage of dropping the central place as the foundation
of a regional system is that we no longer need to explain the hierar-
chy of places with a hierarchy of production—towns of the same size
can harbour diﬀerent industries and fulﬁl diﬀerent economic func-
tions (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.126). But this makes the ability to move
goods eﬃciently across long distances even more important than it
was for Christaller, and here Lösch edges towards an analysis that is
informed by each infrastructure’s unique node and link characteristics.
For instance, in the case of roads there are many possible connections
between any two points in the network, but in the case of container
ships or planes there are much more severe constraints and much greater
costs associated with the addition of new links or nodes (1954 [1973],
pp.180–183). We will see why this relationship is particularly important
to understanding the role of telecoms in Section 2.4 (see page 53).
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P: Putting these elements together, we see that it is neither the
location of minimum transport costs nor the point of maximum rev-
enue that determines the location of a ﬁrm, but the place of maximal
proﬁt at each point in the supply chain (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.27).
We can use three special cases to tie together these ideas: a ﬁrm would
choose the site with the lowest shipping costs only if production costs
were the same everywhere and if the level of demand across space were
a constant; a ﬁrm would opt for the place with the lowest production
costs only if shipping costs and personal contact with customers played
no role in proﬁts; and ﬁnally, a ﬁrm that focussed on the lowest price
(instead of the greatest proﬁt) would be subject to both sets of forces
simultaneously (1954 [1973], p.261).
Placing these issues in a transport context, we can see how costs ﬁlter
‘backwards’ from the primary market through the transport infrastruc-
ture. If we start with the net proﬁt obtained from the ﬁnal price on
a shelf (whether literal or metaphorical), then at the next link back in
the production chain the eﬀective proﬁt is the ﬁnal market price less
the distribution costs of that last link. Working back to the raw inputs,
we must subtract not only each stage’s costs of processing and produc-
tion, but also the costs of shipping the output onwards to the next stage
(1954 [1973], p.188). So an increase in transportation costs might not
only cause a market to contract, but also to become more fragmented:
production may not only cease to be proﬁtable at the least connected
locations (i. e. those with the greatest shipping costs to market), but also
at marginal sites even if they are quite close to the ﬁnal market (1954
[1973], p.189).
Lösch’s approach highlights the fact that ﬁrms must factor in not
only their own production costs, but also the way that diﬀerent loca-
tions entail diﬀerent transport costs depending on the available infras-
tructure and distances to market. For instance, in a study of container-
ised networks, Fowler found that the cargo from Asia tended to head
towards the nearest American port: so Japanese cargo accounted for the
largest volume of containers passing through the Paciﬁc Northwest,
while Chinese goods were likely to pass through Los Angeles or San
Diego (2006, pp.1439–1440). For (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.187), the
existence of such large ‘naturally-determined nodal points’ (or, more
accurately, inter-modal points) will impact the locational decisions of
ﬁrms: not only are there relatively few deep harbours where bulk goods
can be unloaded, but their position relative to ﬁnal markets within
North America is such that the destination chosen has real time and
cost eﬀects.
Agglomeration & Technology
A: For Lösch, the clustering of ﬁrms in space does not
imply—as it tends to in Christaller’s model—any necessary special-
isation of functions. Sometimes ﬁrms beneﬁt from colocation with
suppliers, competitors, or customers, but sometimes they just happen
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to have found similar advantages to a particular point in space. So,
Lösch identiﬁes four categories of propinquity: the true network, the
restricted market network, the cluster, and punctiform agglomeration
(see Figure 2.3). Confusingly, some of these terms are used in senses
that are an almost direct contradiction to the way the same terms are
used today.
None
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True network
(bakeries)
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Distrct
(coal mines)
Place
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1 2 3 4
Figure 2.3: The Concentration
of Locations (reprinted with
permission of Elsevier from Lösch,
1954 [1973], p.11)
The ‘true network’ occurs when there is no advantage to spatial clus-
tering at all. The ‘restricted market network’ is one in which localised
advantages encourage clustering in a given region but not in any nec-
essary proximity. The ‘traditional cluster’ is a conﬁguration in which
producers are clustered together spatially but operate independently of
one another. And ‘punctiform’ (i. e. point) agglomeration occurs when
producers derive particular beneﬁts from proximity to one another
(Lösch, 1954 [1973], pp.10–12).
Lösch argues that agglomeration would arise even on a perfectly fea-
tureless—i. e. homogeneous—plain with perfect transport as a result
of the advantages oﬀered by: number, association, and site and supply
(1954 [1973], pp.69–75). ‘Numbers’ means the sheer concentration of
ﬁrms and people in space, and more speciﬁcally the concentration of
infrastructure and of highly skilled workers. ‘Site and supply’ refer to
the natural advantages accruing to particularly well-connected locations
with easy access to factors of production. In some cases the supply of
a particular input is restricted—Lösch oﬀers coal, spa towns, and uni-
versities as examples—in which case ﬁrms may ﬁnd themselves more
spatially constrained than normal, but dependence on a particular class
of inputs does not necessarily imply dependence on a single location if
there are several from which to choose (1954 [1973], p.83).
In addition, sometimes agglomeration is simply driven by the im-
peratives of spatial competition, such as when there is a level of local
demand suﬃcient for multiple ﬁrms but where the transport costs from
the next nearest production centre are prohibitively high. In that case it
may be impossible to compete against the ‘incumbent’ from a distance
and the only viable strategy is to locate within the same market and
compete from a common location. However, as more and more ﬁrms
concentrate within the agglomeration, the demand curve eﬀectively
ﬂattens so that a ﬁrm able to undercut its competitors by just a few pen-
nies could theoretically conquer the market (1954 [1973], pp.69–71).
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T: As we have seen above, a lowering of transport rates
will normally increase competition between ﬁrms because the distance
things are shipped makes up a smaller proportion of their ﬁnal cost. But
the change would also tend to favour industrial concentration where
the inputs or labour supply are most favourable, resulting in a shi
from locations with the advantages of transit to those with the advan-
tages of production. Vance (1970, p.133) notes that we can think about
technological change in terms of whether it aﬀects customer access or
supply-of-goods access, and these are both analytical standpoints with
which Lösch would have been in complete agreement.
In terms of the implications for ﬁrm location, the increased ﬂexibil-
ity of the delivery truck over rail would favour ﬁrms that compete on
the basis of production costs, and would also tend to break up agglom-
erations that depend solely on transport cost advantages for their con-
tinued existence (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.23). We can see the eﬀects of
technology on transportation operating at a grand scale in today’s man-
ufacturing sector: as a share of the ﬁnal cost, transportation costs are
now so low that for many ﬁrms it is entirely logical to build products
in China for sale in America. Technology-supported standardisation of
the movement of goods mean that ‘fast intermodalism’—upon which
“teleservices, online shopping and  logistics” depend (Audirac, 2002,
p.218)—has largely done away with the high cost of transshipment
points associated with the pre-containerisation era (Levinson, 2006).
However, as Lösch would have noted, this is not a one-way process
since increases in shipping costs may also favour re-concentration: the
rise in oil prices in the mid-2000s caused transport costs to soar and
created incentives for ﬁrms to relocate factories to Mexico, or even back
to the U.S. (Engardio, 2009).
In Lösch’s analysis, the telephone and the radio act much like trans-
portation improvements, and so encourage the break-up of agglomera-
tions whose raison d’être is transportation (See: footnote in Lösch, 1954
[1973], p.115). Obviously, The Economics of Location predates the glob-
alisation of services made possible by cheap international telecoms, but
Lösch’s treatment also seems entirely consistent with the oﬀ-shoring of
services (even if the scale is rather diﬀerent) to call centres: the English-
speaking nations of the Caribbean tout beneﬁts to multi-nationals that
include ‘abundant and inexpensive labour, low turnover and high loy-
alty, and under-employed but educated workers able to communicate
in English’ (Skinner, 2004, p.219). In fact, from a purely transport cost
perspective, the question that we need to answer is not why services
have le Europe and North America, but why so few services have done
so since the cost of labour is nearly negligible and the cost of ‘transport’
even more so?
Spatial Implications
Lösch’s analysis indicates that on a ﬂat plain inter-ﬁrm competition
would generate the characteristic hexagonal network of market areas
also observed in Christaller’s model (1933 [1966], p.66). But by detach-
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ing production from central places and associating it with individual
ﬁrms instead, the way is cleared for the resulting distribution to become
much more complex, and towns of the same size can harbour entirely
diﬀerent industries and fulﬁl entirely diﬀerent economic functions
(Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.126). In fact, small towns or agglomerations
may be completely dependent on larger neighbours for most goods but
still lie at the centre of very large market in which they are a regional or
world leader (1954 [1973], p.216).
We can imagine placing three or more transparencies, each repre-
senting the unique market area pattern of a product, at random on a
table. Any point on the table where the production centres of two or
more layers overlap becomes a ‘centre of industry’. The greater the
number of overlapping centres, the greater the level of development
(1954 [1973], p.124). A point on the table where a node in every one of
the market areas overlapped would be a metropolis of sorts—a centre of
production for all manner of goods and services—while the other nodes
would develop in proportion to the number of market areas that are
focussed on that particular point in space (see Figure 2.4).
Metropolis
Product Area 1
Product Area 2
Product Area 3
Figure 2.4: How Overlapping
Market Areas may give Rise to a
Metropolis
The absence of hierarchy also means the absence of a one-to-one
relationship between sites of production and sites of consumption (1954
[1973], p.8). This is, at heart, the comparative advantage of being lo-
cated near to a major transport node—the market is more accessible to
the ﬁrm (1954 [1973], p.22). And this advantage can be compounded
“where lines of communication cross (pure situation) or traﬃc of dif-
ferent sorts meet” (1954 [1973], p.83) because it increases the ease and
ﬂexibility with which the ﬁrm can access diﬀerent markets. In fact,
Lösch predicts that a network of settlements will emerge that is based on
minimising travel distances from anywhere in the network to all avail-
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able products; the result is a ‘cogwheel’ shape6 that contains alternating
6 The fuller explanation of this
result is that we begin by placing
each product’s hexagonal market
map such that they all have one
market centre in common (the
metropolis). We then rotate the
maps so that as many other locations
as possible coincide as well, with
the idea that the maximum number
of purchases can now be made at
one local location and the cost of
travel to and from that location
is at minimum. The updated
underlying assumption—that
transport infrastructures tend to
evolve towards a balanced global
minimum covering cost, eﬃciency,
and fault tolerance—has been put
to the test using slime moulds
(and computer simulations of
their behaviour) for the Tokyo rail
system (Tero et al., 2010), and the
British motorway network in the
entertainingly titled Road planning
with slime mould: If Physarum built
motorways it would route M6/M74
through Newcastle (Adamatzky and
Jones, 2009)
areas of densely- and sparsely-connected settlements as shown in Figure
2.57.
7 The data for the maps in Figures
2.5c and 2.5d seems to have been
taken from (Ambrosius, 1881
[1930], p.198).
(a) Theoretical pattern of an eco-
nomic landscape
(b) Theoretical pattern of an eco-
nomic landscape, but without nets
(c) Indianapolis and environs within
a radius of 60 mi.
(d) Toledo and environs within a
radius of 60 mi.
Figure 2.5: How a ‘Cogwheel’
Shape Emerges from Market Net-
works (reprinted with permission of
Elsevier from Lösch, 1954 [1973],
p.125)
What sets Lösch’s analysis apart from more simplistic treatments is
his acknowledgement of the practical dimension: across larger distances
other factors may intervene to create constraints on market areas. For
instance, a ‘local’ entrepreneur may oen have a better sense of the mar-
ket in the culture or nation of which he is a native, and so national bor-
ders will oen constitute market borders as well (Lösch, 1954 [1973],
p.191). This border can be artiﬁcially maintained as well: although it
is not an entirely traditional trade barrier, Canada’s requirement for
bilingual labelling on all packaging (even for goods not destined for
sale in Quebec) is clearly designed to limit market access for American
producers and create a ‘captive’ minimum market for Canadian ﬁrms
(Export.gov, 2009).
Summary
With Lösch’s model we are moving from a structured, hierarchical
world to one in which the location of ﬁrms is mutually determined
by relationships of collaboration and competition (1954 [1973], p.8).
What makes a particular location or town attractive will diﬀer from
ﬁrm to ﬁrm, and so an areas’s ‘centrality’ in terms of its diversity and
output is no predictor of where a company will ultimately locate since
local production factors will have diﬀerent degrees of signiﬁcance for
diﬀerent industries (1954 [1973], p.81). Lösch is on the cusp of grasping
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the role of complexity and self-organisation—of the sort captured by
contemporary developments in Agent-Based Models in the complexity
sciences—in regional economic development, but he shies away from
the ‘chaotic’ elements, deeming them “insigniﬁcant” (1954 [1973],
p.219).
Lösch emphasises that there are in fact four categories of eco-
nomic costs connected to distance, of which transport is only one;
the other three are: time costs, selling costs, and business risks (Lösch,
1954 [1973], p.212). In Chapter 3, I will argue that the idea that
risk—resulting from a lack of reliable information about distant mar-
kets—increases with distance is vital to understanding the reason that
some industries (ﬁnance, for instance) continue to cluster in particularly
high concentrations in just a few parts of the world. We will see that
the price of ‘doing business’ is compounded by distance-related costs of
acquiring and exploiting knowledge from distant markets (whether this
is deﬁned in terms of geography or culture) and that these deﬁnitely do
not increase linearly with distance.
Of course, Lösch’s model does not fundamentally negate the im-
portance assigned in Christaller’s work to two key ideas: that the con-
centration of demand in cities acts as a stimulant to development, and
that places that act as nodes in a wide range of short- and long-distance
transport networks are likely to attract ﬁrms. Nor have these beneﬁts
disappeared with the growth of multi-national enterprises (s) and
the Internet: a recent publication from Britain’s National Endowment
for Science, Technology and the Art () notes that “specialised or
niche market preferences and tastes can oen be provided for on a prof-
itable basis from a city, as the market is of suﬃcient size to make this
economically viable” (Athey et al., 2007, p.20).
But, the  report goes on to say, “…case studies show that
most innovative businesses make use of urban connectivity to operate
in larger national and global arenas” (Athey et al., 2007, p.27). So
cities are important to new and innovative ﬁrms not only because they
constitute large, ready-made markets for specialised services, but also
because their long-distance transport networks give ﬁrms a platform
for accessing remote markets for goods and services that could not
be proﬁtably serviced from a less well-connected region. In short:
“urban areas still possess a major advantage over non-urban areas in the
thickness and density of their communication infrastructures and 
networks” (2007, p.17).
The ﬁnal point to note here is that Lösch’s analysis shows that a
lessening of transport costs creates a freedom to focus on production
or labour costs, while an increase in transport costs as a share of total
costs will constrain that freedom in important ways. In other words,
as a factor of production becomes relatively less expensive or more
accessible, it tends to count for less in a ﬁrm’s spatial strategy. This
relativity is an absolutely crucial point to keep in mind in the following
chapters, and it extends not only to these three broad categories but also
down, as the following section will show, to the relative ﬂexibility of
factors within each category.
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2.4 Theory of Network Flexibility
What this review has shown so far is that regional and urban economic
development is intimately connected to the availability of transport and
communications infrastructure. And although both Christaller (1933
[1966]) and Lösch (1954 [1973]) incorporated aspects of infrastructure
change, they did not explore in any depth how the usage of new infras-
tructures might be moderated by the ones already in place. Firms may
opt for anything between substitution, in which the use of one network
directly replaces the use of another, to complementarity, in which the use
of both networks increases in parallel, but how do we determine which
ﬁrm will pursue which strategy?
Furthermore, traditional network science, which has its roots in
physics and sociology, tends to focus on the importance of network
nodes—people, particles, and ports, for instance—while treating the
connections between them in a fairly unproblematic way. However,
in the case of infrastructure, the links are aﬀected by the decisions of
‘agents’—shippers, commuters, and business travellers—able to make
real choices about mode, and so the “focus on nodes has limited the
degree to which these researchers have been successful in understanding
the relations between them” (Fowler, 2006, p.1429).
It also seems that we need to explore the concept of ‘cost’ in more
depth because, as we have seen in Christaller and Lösch, this is the key
to understanding the likely impacts of telecommunications on other
infrastructure. As Graham (1997, p.112) notes: “treating telecoms
networks as ‘distance shrinking’ or ‘electronic highways’ is to apply
the same transportation-led metaphor—‘friction’ is not reduced, it is
completely annihilated by telecoms because 10km and 10,000km are
equivalent.” So from an economic standpoint, the cost of telecommu-
nications relative to other modes of interaction is such that it is strange
to imagine people travelling at all. To answer this question will take the
better part of two chapters, but this section begins to frame an answer
by focussing on the concept of ﬂexibility.
Simplifying Assumptions
In order to compare telecommunications with other forms of infras-
tructure, we need some common set of metrics by which to analyse
radically diﬀerent methods of ‘moving’ goods and services around the
globe. In fact, it seems that the best way to meet this challenge is not
to think of anything moving at all, but rather to frame the problem in
terms of communication in which the exchange of products, people,
and bits represent a kind of information ﬂow. This translation allows
us to interpret the issue in informational and organisational terms, and
to turn to literature from these ﬁelds in order to begin addressing an
issue that is fundamental to the relationship between direct and digital
communications.
Fulk and DeSanctis (1995, p.338; see also Panteli and Dibben, 2001)
propose ﬁve ways in which the changes in communications technolo-
gies are aﬀecting organisational forms, these are: increasing speed;
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declining cost; rising bandwidth; expanding connectivity; and the in-
creasing integration of communication and computing technologies.
Fulk and DeSanctis’ analysis is obviously oriented towards telecommu-
nications, but I would propose that this framework can also be applied
to to the study of physical infrastructure as well. Clearly, it is a critical
assumption here that these ﬁve dimensions describe all (or least most)
of the relevant features of infrastructure, and that we can use them to
compare transport and telecoms infrastructure along a similar scale.
Without this approach, we must treat the two sets of infrastructures
separately and cannot draw any meaningful conclusions. In eﬀect, if
we focus on transport to the exclusion of telecoms then we would be
excluding what is for most ﬁrms and households the deﬁning innova-
tion of the second half of the 20th Century. Conversely, if we ignore
the dependencies that we still have on transport infrastructure then we
slip into the mindset of the technological determinists who expected
that simply because a technology that transcends space exists, then space
is largely irrelevant. Deriving a set of dimensions across which all such
infrastructure can be compared, no matter how impressionistic the
criteria, is therefore an important ﬁrst step in this analysis.
M C: Outside the worlds of economists and planners, most
people frame their thoughts on cost in terms of monetary costs. There
is clear evidence that the monetary cost of both communication and
transport are falling in the long term for both suppliers and consumers
(Fulk and DeSanctis, 1995, p.338; Glaeser, 2006, p.313). The reduced
cost of telecommunications is the more obvious: Hamill (2000, p.59)
reports that by 1995 the cost of a three minute trans-Atlantic call has
fallen from $250 in 1930 to less than a $1 in 1990 dollars. But the
changes in air travel are no less spectacular: a blogger for the New York
Times reports ﬁnding a one-way ticket from Shannon to New York
dating from 1946 at a jumble sale: its face value in today’s dollars is
well over $3,000 (Smith, 2007). And BBC Four (2009a) notes that by
the 1950s, although the cost of a one-way ticket between London and
New York had fallen to £173 (£3,000 today) this was at a time when the
average weekly income was £12 (£210 today).
In the case of telecommunications, wholesale rates are plummet-
ing even more rapidly than they have for other infrastructure: in just
three years the median price for leased bandwidth connecting cities
such as Miami and Sao Paulo, or Los Angeles and Tokyo fell 75%, from
nearly $80,000 per month to ‘just’ $20,000 per month for -1 capac-
ity (PriMetrica, 2006b)8. Figure 2.6 (on page 55) shows some similar 8  stands for Synchronous
Transfer Module; the ‘1’ is an
increment of 155.52 Mbps, where
n currently ranges up to 64: 64 ∗
155:52 = 9:953 Gbps for STM-64
(Myles, 2009)
declines for retail users placing international calls from the U.K.The
magnitude of these drops has given license for people to predict that
communications will eventually become costless; however, this notion
shows scant regard for the fact that cheap is not free, and it most cer-
tainly will not mean free within the relevant timeframe for most policy-
and plan-making. Moreover, Lösch’s analysis should have alerted us
to the importance of relative costs, and to changes in the relationships
between costs, as well as to the diﬀerential impacts of various pricing
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schemes being made possible through  integration and data analysis:
everything from roads and rail to telecommunications can now be billed
on a ﬁxed-charge, per-use, or peak-use basis.
1994 Calling Costs to Rest of World from U.K.
1998 Calling Costs to Rest of World from U.K.
Figure 2.6: Decline in Peak
International Calling Rates (1994
& 1998) (PriMetrica, 2002a,b;
reproduced with permission of
TeleGeography/PriMetrica)
The other issue we need to consider is that these various infrastruc-
tures may not change uniformly over time: one may become faster,
while another becomes cheaper or more comfortable. This is something
that the traditional Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis () for transport projects
has tended to overlook because of its focus on easily-measured direct
and indirect costs such as: construction, travel time reductions, and
ongoing costs to users (Elhorst and Oosterhaven, 2008, p.66). New ap-
proaches have broadened this method to include factors such as journey
ambience and reliability (Department for Transport, 2004, pp.10–12),
but it is still diﬃcult to to know how to place a monetary value on what
Aberlado Carrillo, Director General of Spain’s high-speed train service,
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sees as the Ave’s principal competitive advantage over the plane on the
Barcelona/Madrid route: “Time spent in a train is time won, while in
a plane it is wasted. In a train you can work, read, talk, use the inter-
net, eat, or simply relax and enjoy the journey. With a plane, the only
objective is to arrive” (Hamilos, 2008).
For privately-funded networks there are clear incentives to focus
provision on those with the greatest ability to pay for services. Figure
2.6 also shows that changes to the cost of calling abroad from the U.K.
between 1994 and 1998 vary dramatically: the decline is far from global.
So although nowhere seems to have become more expensive, there are
many cities in Africa and Asia that remain just as inaccessible from a
telecommunications standpoint as they were four years previously. In
contrast, note how the most visible improvements are clearly linked to
what the Globalisation and World Cities group (a) term the ‘world
cites’ such as Tokyo, Johannesburg, and Hong Kong (cf. Taylor et al.,
2001; Taylor and Walker, 2001; Taylor, 2005). So from a communi-
cations standpoint the ‘digital divide’—which we can read here as the
relative diﬀerence in cost—widened during those four years even though
no region became more expensive to reach.
S: The speed of a network is typically taken to be the single most
important factor for business adoption because of its eﬀects on the
ability of a ﬁrm to coordinate activity across space and to supply it
with the physical and informational inputs that it needs to complete.
For example, the speed with which information can spread via e-mail
clearly marks a radical shi in our communicative ability and, accord-
ingly, e-mail was reckoned to have induced profound changes in the
way that we live and work (Cairncross, 1997, pp.104–105). Similarly,
digital videoconferencing has been put forward as a replacement for
long-distance business travel since it enables participants to meet ‘face-
to-face’ at short notice without ever leaving the oﬃce.
However, a focus on speed overlooks the less visible role of la-
tency—the delay between a stimulus (e.g. a request for information)
and a response—as a network characteristic. For instance, dial-up and
satellite broadband networks used by households and businesses in re-
mote areas provide very diﬀerent types of performance both in terms of
speed and latency: dial-up networks typically have low speeds and low
latencies, while satellite connections are the opposite. So although these
two infrastructures can technically provide access to the same content,
depending on the characteristics required by the user one or the other
channel may be entirely unacceptable: satellite broadband would be
appropriate for domestic users accessing media ﬁles but not for busi-
ness applications requiring real-time communications. It is also worth
noting that in some cases latency may be both deliberate and desirable:
voicemail and post-it notes may have high latencies, but they enable us
to communicate asynchronously and unobtrusively (Graham, 2004,
p.123). The set of relationships outlined in Table 2.2 helps us to see the
myriad of ways in which diﬀerent bandwidths and latencies can be used
to optimise the communications process.
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Synchronous Asynchronous
Presence Intense, multimodal, immediate
feedback, high transportation
costs, requires coordination,
requires full attention
Limited by storage and playback
capacities, no immediate
feedback, no reduction in
transport costs, no reduction in
space costs, no need to
coordinate, may allow some
division of attention
Telepresence Limited by bandwidth and
interface capabilities, retains
immediate feedback, reduces
transport costs, requires
coordination, may allow some
division of attention
Limited by storage, bandwidth
and interface capabilities, no
immediate feedback, reduces
space costs, no need to
coordinate, allows multiple
activities and transactions in
parallel
Table 2.2: Advantages & Dis-
advantages of Communications
Alternatives (aer Mitchell, 2004,
p.125)
On physical networks, latency also plays an important role, though to
my knowledge this has been less studied in the transportation literature.
For instance, Feitelson and Salomon (2000, p.475) wonder whether
 will be able to compete eﬀectively with regional air travel; but for
users facing the ongoing fallout of terror attacks on air infrastructure,
along with the increasing congestion of airports, the answer is a rather
resounding ‘yes’. Hall (2009, p.813) indicates that “experience in Eu-
rope and Japan teaches that these [] trains will take about 80–90%
of traﬃc up to about 500 kilometres and about 50% up to about 800
kilometres.” So even as the monetary cost of air travel has fallen dra-
matically, for many people its full economic costs have risen, which is
why Eurostar estimated that by 2006 it was carrying more than 60% of
traﬃc to Paris and Brussels (Department for Transport, 2006)9. Ulti- 9 And we can expect this ﬁgure to
rise with ongoing improvements to
the network as well as the addition
of uniﬁed ticketing and scheduling
through to destinations in Holland
and Germany (Hall, 2007a).
mately, with a sustained speed of 350 kph, continued lower latencies
(i. e. shorter check-in times) and greater comfort (i. e. better food and
on-board WiFi),  should be able to compete successfully with avia-
tion over travel times up to about four hours, representing a distance of
about 1,000km (Hall, 2007a, p.429).
Beyond this 1,000km threshold, however, the speed of air travel
compensates for its higher latencies, which is why only the dedicated
rail buﬀ—or the curious—would consider travel from Britain to Spain
by rail (McKie, 2008). But it is clear that further changes in either
speed or latency may again alter the cost-beneﬁt calculation employed
by travellers. More broadly, with the notable exception of telecom-
munications, for most networks it seems that the higher the speed of
movement the greater the latency due to the coordination requirements
of the system. However, given that telecoms evades this historical trade-
oﬀ, we need to ask why, for instance, businesses haven’t dropped time-
and money-intensive international air travel entirely in favour of digital
collaboration? This issue is a central consideration of the rest of this
work.
B: Bandwidth is the overall ‘data capacity’ of the network
over some arbitrary period of time. Although bandwidth is obviously
based on the interaction between speed and latency, the implications are
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quite nuanced: on a 1Mbps broadband connection, a -quality ﬁlm
of about 5 would take over 11 hours to transfer electronically, but
copying the ﬁlm to a recordable  and delivering it by hand might
take less than an hour, yielding an eﬀective bandwidth of over 11Mbps.
So although the latency of this ‘sneakernet’ (Wikipedia, 2004) is quite
high, its bandwidth is nonetheless also substantial since the entire ﬁlm is
delivered in an elapsed time of just one hour.
The interplay between competing networks at the level of bandwidth
is encapsulated in Tanenbaum’s admonition that we should “[never]
underestimate the bandwidth of a station wagon full of tapes hurtling
down the highway” (1996, p.91). The challenge for more complex
comparisons between classes of infrastructure is that there are few
situations in which we can directly compare the movement of goods,
bits, and people to establish which channel has the higher bandwidth.
For instance, research in the 1960s suggested that less than 35% of the
informational content of a conversation is conveyed orally, and that
the rest is communicated “with facial expressions and body language”
(Crockett, 2007).
Firms have long been aware of the limits of voice-only telecon-
ferences, and so companies such as HewlettPackard and Cisco have
developed and deployed video conferencing technologies that they
claim are able to mimic physical copresence with suﬃcient ﬁdelity to
oﬀer an alternative to business travel (cf. Economist, 2007a, 2009b).
The cost of these ‘telepresence’ rooms starts at $300,000 and entails an
additional monthly contract cost of nearly $20,000 (Economist, 2007a).
Moreover, the capacity required to support these technologies is not
universally available: compare in Figure 2.7 the bandwidth between the
U.S., Canada, and Europe with that available for conversations with
South America or, worse still, Africa.
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Figure 2.7: Inter-continental
Bandwidth Capacity (PriMetrica,
2005; reproduced with permission
of TeleGeography/PriMetrica)
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What both the research and the sheer cost of telepresence facilities
suggest is that face-to-face interaction has a real, but possibly unquan-
tiﬁable, ‘bandwidth’ that is much, much higher than the equivalent
transcription of a conversation. This idea will be explored in more
depth in Chapter 5, but it is clearly going to be of interest whether cor-
porate travel is, in eﬀect, a method of transferring business expertise
and experience across long distances. In short, can we consider people
to be ‘packets’ in a massive communications network operated over
transportation infrastructure?
Regardless of the answer to this question, using the concept of band-
width in this broader sense enables us to consider some diﬀerent per-
formance characteristics of networks: high speed rail and air travel are
able to process larger numbers of people at once through specially-
designed ‘nodes’, but their overall capacity pales in comparison with the
roadways. And while both road and telecoms networks have an enor-
mous overall capacity, this does not necessarily translate into an equally
enormous bandwidth between any two points in space because of con-
gestion and their limited capacity to absorb data at each end-point.
C: We can partially address this issue with the concept
of connectivity, which points to the value of adding new nodes to a
network. On digital networks—as well as retail and social networking
sites—this idea has oen been understood in terms of ‘Metcalfe’s Law’
(Hantman, 2006), which states that the value of a communications
network is proportional to the square of the number of compatibly
communicating devices or users (Simeonov, 2006). The empirical
observation underlying this claim is that while one phone is useless,
and two phones have just one possible connection, eight phones have
twenty-eight possible links, and twenty phones have 190. Rather than
growing linearly, the potential to reach out explodes exponentially and
this ‘network eﬀect’ increases its attractiveness to others not yet part of
the network.
Another way to think about connectivity is through the question:
can I reach ‘there’ from ‘here’? In other words, how easy is it to move
information in some form between any two nodes? The answer clearly
depends on the type of network. With certain important caveats, in
the digital realm every node in the network is equally accessible to
every other node, but in aviation networks some global transportation
hubs are reachable in just one or two hops from anywhere in the world,
whereas smaller airports may well be as many as six jumps away from a
local airport on another continent, and the capacity between any two
points varies dramatically (see Figure 2.810). Quite simply, nodes in
10 “The size of the nodes varies
with the total number of incoming
or outgoing passengers; the size of
the edges varies with the number
of passengers ﬂying between two
cities. For reasons of clarity, only
the most important links are
shown” (Derudder and Witlox,
2005, p.2381). I have added
colouring to further distinguish the
groupings.
some networks are more ‘connected’ or ‘linked in’ than others.
I: In Fulk and DeSanctis’ typology, integration is a mea-
sure of the extent to which telecommunications have moved beyond
a “purely connective function” to actually merge with computing
technologies as a seamless ‘whole’ (1995, p.338). One contemporary
example of successful integration by this metric (especially in combi-
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nation with good design and relative aﬀordability) would be the impact
of the iPhone on mobile network data usage in the U.S. and U.K.,
where it has caused the usage of data-driven services to soar (GigaOm,
2009). However, we should also bear in mind that for much of the past
ﬁy years the integration of telecommunications and computation has
been crucial “…in underpinning new ways of organising and manag-
ing physical ﬂows of goods and physical retailing spaces” (Graham and
Marvin, 1996, pp.155–156).
In this broader view, the linkage between computational and com-
municational power as applied to transport infrastructure is revolution-
ary. For instance, Intelligent Transportation Systems () point the way
to a future of sophisticated real-time demand management in which
infrastructure usage is coordinated around some optimal state of utilisa-
tion and ﬂow. In a sense, the integration of  enables us to manipulate
the economic cost of movement so as to deliver some desired balance
of beneﬁts to users; however, for this degree of coordination to emerge
we ﬁrst need to incorporate networking capability and a high level of
embedded ‘intelligence’.
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For the wireline and wireless telecoms services these requirements
are already achieved: even the most basic ‘smart’ mobile phone is al-
ready functionally indistinguishable from a networked computer, and
there are now vanishingly few phones available for purchase in 
countries that would not count as such. Advances in check-in technol-
ogy mean that mobile phones are already replacing e-tickets (British
Airways, 2010), but for more complex systems this level of integration
may still be far oﬀ: attempts to deﬁne a common rail signalling system
for European trains have been mired in the existence of twenty diver-
gent national standards (Wright, 2008a), causing the French operator
 to estimate costs of up to e 2 billion for ﬁtting its  trains with
the correct equipment (Wright, 2008b). Until the integration issues are
resolved, it is hard to see how high-speed rail will be able to compete
with planes over greater distances than they do today, but the potential
is clearly there.
C: Convenience incorporates factors such as frequency
(how many times per hour or day can I access the service?), availability (how
far must I travel to access the service?) and comfort (how pleasant is use of the
service?). Clearly, convenience is very much ‘in the eye of the beholder’
since there are certainly people who ﬁnd the ability to be reached by
mobile phone or Blackberry while on holiday a gross inconvenience.
And to some extent, convenience could subsume some of the other
factors presented here, but I think it important to distinguish between
characteristics of the network itself and the perceptions of the people
using it.
For instance, the road network is accessible almost anywhere and
with my own car the scheduling of departures is entirely up to me.
This is clearly a form of convenience inherent in the network itself and
largely separate from the speciﬁc appeal of travel by car. The profusion
of communications and audio-visual gadgets in vehicles suggests that
the level of ‘comfort’ inside the car is rising rapidly and that private
vehicles increasingly resemble personal ‘mobility cocoons’ rather than
modes of transport alone (Sheller, 2004, p.44). The experience of travel
is being impacted by the complementarity between travel and telecom-
munications, and mobile telecommunications is particularly radical in
its eﬀect on the inconvenience of being ‘out’ for most travellers.
We are so attached to our mobile devices that it is becoming diﬃ-
cult to recall the inconvenience cost of coordination in the ‘pre-mobile
days’11. Today, of course, we can read email, play video games, and
11 However, the transition period
at the end of the 20th Century
exposed our awareness of this
cost, and one traveller with a new
mobile phone was heard to ask her
interlocutor: “Oh, but how did you
ﬁnd me?” (Anonymous, 2010)
instant message while en route12, and it is no longer the case (if it ever
12 On a personal note, in 2008 I had
the experience of participating in
a Skype conference call from a bus
in rural Estonia—the bus provided
a 3G network link via on-board
WiFi, and Estonia has one of the
most extensive high-speed mobile
networks of any country in the
world.
was) that ‘getting there’ is the only function of the journey (Urry, 2006,
p.360). Lyons and Urry note that the blurring of the boundaries be-
tween ‘travel’ and ‘activity’ time by  may actually encourage people
to travel still more by reducing the perceived inconvenience of travel,
and ask: “to what extent are s providing substitutes for use of travel
time and to what extent are they providing enhancements?” (emphasis in
original, 2005, p.267)
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Clearly, the convenience of a network is open to manipulation by
its operators so as to provide apparent beneﬁts to users. For instance,
business-only airlines such as Eos and SilverJet touted their low check-
in times and business-friendly environments, forcing the ﬂag carriers
to lower their fares and highlight the beneﬁts of their mileage rewards
and upgrade programs. The collapse of the business-only airlines in
2008 appears to owe more to rising fuel costs, an economic downturn,
and the credit crunch that to any underlying failure of the model it-
self (Russell and Blackden, 2008) or of its appeal to the ‘kinetic elite’
(Hannam et al., 2006). Indeed, it will be interesting to see how well
British Airways’ entry into this now empty market fares—departing and
arriving from City Airport eliminates travel to and from Heathrow, but
it comes at the price of a jet that requires refuelling in Ireland and 
seems to counting on the added convenience of clearing U.S. customs
in Shannon as a suﬃcient incentive to make this layover attractive.
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Table 2.3: Aspects of Network
Usage
S: What all of these issues point towards is the idea that deter-
mining the ‘cost’ of a network is a complex process, subject to a range
of important and, oen, subjective factors. We may anticipate that users
will select a particular network or network-supplier based on a per-
ception of cost that is actually a sophisticated evaluation of the optimal
set of features required and of the trade-oﬀs between them: there are
those who refuse to ﬂy economy even though the per-mileage cost is far
lower, just as there are those who refuse to take a train even though the
drive leaves them with less time for thinking, doing work, or napping.
Within these constraints, Table 2.3 attempts to summarise the ﬁndings
so far.
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Network Flexibility
We have approached networks thus far solely in terms of their capacity
to move ‘packets’ between nodes, as if the nature and location of the
links between them were irrelevant, but as Fowler points out this is
clearly not the case (2006, p.1429). Consequently, at the very least we
need to factor in not only the topology of the network (its basic layout)
but also its ﬂexibility (the extent to which its operation and growth are
constrained in time and space). This section on ﬂexibility is anchored
in Feitelson and Salomon’s (2000) argument that the ﬂexibility of in-
frastructure networks can be described in three dimensions: node, link,
and time.
T: A proper discussion of network topology is beyond the
scope of this dissertation, but we can sketch in some of the basic features
of the relationships between nodes and links in networks (or ‘graphs’ as
they are known in mathematics) using three basic characteristics: the
shortest path, the clustering coeﬃcient, and modularity. As its name
suggests, the shortest path is simply a measure of how many links must
be traversed to get from a point A to a point B and, in aggregate, this
measure can give a sense of how well-connected parts of the network
are to one another. The clustering coeﬃcient measures the existence
of triads in a network: if point B is connected to points A and C, then
what is the probability that points A and C are also connected? Finally,
modularity gives us a sense of whether the level of interconnection is
global (everything is connected to everything else) or local (smaller parts
of the network are well-connected, but there are only a small number of
connections between networks at larger scales).
The reason these concepts matter is that “while infrastructure-
speciﬁc aspects of a network can cause networks with high graph-
theoretic properties to perform poorly, few networks with poor graph-
theoretic properties can perform well!” (Gorman and Malecki, 2000,
p.128) These abstract descriptions of networks can have signiﬁcant
real-world implications: Gorman and Malecki (2000, p.125) note that
America’s Frontier Telecommunications built a ‘fully connected and
redundant network’ (i. e. one with a low shortest path, high clustering
coeﬃcient, and low modularity) but failed to factor in the costs of
upgrading this network over time. Instead of upgrading a few key links,
Frontier had inadvertently committed to upgrading its entire network
for each new generation of technology. In a diﬀerent way, prior to
its acquisition of ’s backbone, C&W’s hierarchical, star-shaped
network increased the risk of a single point-of-failure damaging the
entire network’s performance (see Figure 2.9).
The existence of key nodes in an otherwise largely uniform network
is what creates the ‘small world’ phenomenon. Small world networks
can be characterised by a power law in the distribution of links: most
nodes have very few links, a minority have multiple links, and some
tiny number of nodes are extraordinarily well-connected (Barabási,
2003, p.71). Townsend (2001, p.43) found that just seven metro areas
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Figure 2.9: Cable & Wireless
U.S. Internet backbone network
before (top) and aer (bottom)
acquisition of  backbone
network (Gorman and Malecki,
2000, p.130; reproduced with
permission of Sage Publications)
functioned as regional nodes for America’s Internet backbone networks,
and that the smallest of these seven still had twice the capacity of the
next-largest node (2001, p.47). This conﬁguration is extremely eﬃcient
in terms of routing packets to as many destinations as possible in as few
steps at possible, and it turns out that many transport networks also have
small world characteristics, especially when we consider travel across
multiple modes (Latora and Marchiori, 2002). But the concentration
of traﬃc at just a few nodes also reduces fault tolerance if they begin to
fail in a non-random manner (i. e. because they are congested, targeted
in attacks, etc.). Figure 2.9 also illustrates how changes to a backbone
network can radically alter its connectivity and resilience.
The hub-and-spoke structure of airline operations is another small
world network and is the result of what Barabási terms ‘preferential
attachment’ (2003, p.88): as more ﬂights stop in New York, it be-
comes more attractive for other ﬂights to also stop in New York because
that is the best way to shorten the number of hops between any two
randomly-selected nodes in the ﬂight network (see Figure 2.8 on page
60). Consequently, the concentration of activity at the area’s three main
airports (John F. Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark)13 is out of all
13 And this number does not
include a host of lesser airports,
some of which (Long Island and
White Plains) are coming into
increasing use by low-cost domestic
carriers as an alternative to the main
hubs.
proportion to the number of people wishing to travel to and from this
region alone. But it is in part the global eﬃciency of routing people
through a small number of hubs that has enabled international passenger
numbers to rise from just 25 million in 1950 to more than 700 mil-
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lion today (Sheller and Urry, 2006, p.207). However, the eruption of
Eyjaallajökull in Iceland demonstrates just how quickly non-random
failures can have dramatic knock-on eﬀects on the rest of the network,
and so this network eﬃciency comes at a price (cf. O’Brien, 2010).
N F: We can think of nodes as the points where packets,
be they human beings, physical goods, or ephemeral signals enter, leave,
or are relayed through the network. So nodal ﬂexibility is the ease with
which these points can be added to the system. According to Feitelson
and Salomon, ﬂexibility “can be measured… by the time it takes to
plan, approve and implement the development of a node and the cost of
such development. From a network perspective this cost is the marginal
cost of expanding the network by one node” (2000, p.463).
Some of the other parameters for nodal ﬂexibility identiﬁed by Fei-
telson and Salomon include: the physical size of a node; externalities
such as noise or other types of environmental impact; interface re-
quirements to other networks such as rail connections or parking lots
at the airport; and technical requirements such as runway length (2000,
pp.464–465). The more speciﬁc and rigorous the needs, the fewer the
locations that will be able to meet the requirements. Conversely, the
more readily nodes can be added, the better the system can respond to
shiing demands for access.
In real terms, although the intercontinental air traﬃc passenger net-
work is eﬃcient, it is nonetheless deeply inﬂexible because of the diﬃ-
culty with which new airports can be built. Global hubs such as New
York’s JFK and London’s Heathrow are less ﬂexible still because of their
enormous technical and infrastructural requirements and the external-
ities that their operations produce—Heathrow alone employs 70,000
workers, making it the largest employer by location in all of Britain
(BBC Four, 2009a). For some businesses with very speciﬁc transport
needs, the hub-and-spoke system’s inﬂexibility imposes such high eco-
nomic costs that the shi to the fractional ownership of corporate jets
may actually be an entirely logical choice.
L F: Predictably, link ﬂexibility is a measure of how easily
new connections between nodes can be added and of how many pos-
sible routes connect any two nodes in the network, and it is deﬁned as:
“the number of available options to use alternative links for movement
between nodes, and thus the level of network reliability” (Feitelson and
Salomon, 2000, p.464). So the more easily new links can be added or
existing links can be upgraded, then the better a network can respond
to changes in demand or to failures at a given node or link. In the case
of infrastructure networks, links are clearly not abstract concepts and so
link ﬂexibility directly aﬀects connectivity.
Criteria for assessing link ﬂexibility include: link requirements such
as the engineering standards on high-speed rail; link externalities such
as the space and visual impact of rights-of-way; traﬃc externalities
which impose restrictions on operation due to noise and pollution;
and complementary infrastructure requirements to enable use of the
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link (2000, pp.464–465). For instance, it has been found that houses
250m to 500m from rail lines sell for between 2% and 5% less than
equivalent homes further from the tracks (Bruinsma, 2009, p.117) and
this is purely the result of link externalities14.
14 This type of issue seems par-
ticularly common in the case of
, where the accessibility of the
nodes is also a factor: “But there is
little question that  [the second
planned high-speed rail route in
Britain] has trimmed the value
from property along its proposed
route. It has brought the prospect
of noise without the promise of a
faster way of commuting to Lon-
don: no station is planned between
London and Birmingham” (Clark,
2010).
This ﬁnding also helps to emphasise that proximity to links does not
imply bi-directional or reciprocal connectivity: a house’s proximity
to a rail line does not in some way improve its occupants’ access to rail
infrastructure, and in a similar way air travel access requires ground
transport but the converse is not true (Feitelson and Salomon, 2000,
p.465). So whereas the air network is relatively ﬂexible in terms of the
possible links between airports (with some exceptions, see Figure 2.10),
the rail network is very much the opposite. In fact, once the links and
nodes have been set down then the rail network is less ﬂexible than the
uses to which land on adjacent property can be put (2000, p.466)15.
15 Moreover, rail links are by their
very nature exclusive, but here,
as elsewhere, technology can play
a direct role in determining the
degree of ﬂexibility in the system:
European countries have tended
to use ﬂexible but incompatible
‘moving block’ signals, while
British railways relied on a simple
but ineﬃcient ‘ﬁxed blocking
system’. The diﬀerence is that
when a train is between two signal
points on a ﬁxed block network
then no other train can enter
that segment of line, whereas
on a moving block system the
exclusion zone moves with the train
and varies according to its speed
(Railway Technical Web Pages,
2009); this means that moving
block systems can be upgraded
to carry more trains at higher
speeds without reworking the
entire system with each increase.
This situation is slowly changing,
with a European-mandated 
moving block system now found
on international high-speed lines
between France and Germany, and
the Brussels to Amsterdam route.
Moving blocks are now also found
on the Docklands Light Railway
() and Jubilee lines, but their
continued absence from the West
Coast Main Line will limit speeds
for the foreseeable future (Hall,
2010a).
Unable to confirm copyright.
Original available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2010/04/17/world/0417-ASH_6.html
Figure 2.10: Cancelled Flights in
Paris Caused by Ash Cloud from
Eyjaallajökull (Coex and Agence
France-Presse, 2010)
One special case of link ﬂexibility is worth mentioning here: sec-
tional ﬂexibility addresses the fact that diﬀering levels of ﬂexibility may
exist within a network: how much latitude is there for adding new
links and nodes at various points in the network? We obviously think
of telecoms as being particularly ﬂexible in terms of both links and
nodes: TeleGeography/ITU (2009) notes that telecoms operators added
9.4Tbps of new international capacity in 2009—more than the total
capacity available worldwide in 2007—but while this ﬂexibility is very
much true from the end-user perspective, for the owners and operators
of submarine cables between continents the case is rather more com-
plicated and some less-developed regions of the world are connected by
as little as a single link (Johnson, 2008). Figure 2.11 further illustrates
the extent to which capacity is disproportionately distributed on both
a geographic and a per capita basis around the world, with Europe and
North America very densely connected, while Africa subsists on a very
sparse set of interconnections.
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Figure 2.11: Map of Major Interna-
tional Internet Routes (PriMetrica,
2009; reproduced with permission
of TeleGeography/PriMetrica)
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T F: The concept of temporal ﬂexibility aﬀects
both nodes and links equally, and is concerned with the coordination
required to sustain travel across a network as well as the “ability to se-
quence investments” (Feitelson and Salomon, 2000, p.464). Networks
that are highly ‘divisible’ are ones in which the sequencing of infras-
tructure upgrades or extensions is ﬂexible, and this means that they too
can be more easily adjusted to changes in demand. Oen the most ﬂex-
ible networks will be to some extent ‘self-organising’—meaning that
they lack centralised control—and although less likely to suﬀer from
catastrophic failures of planning or delivery, they are also more likely to
suﬀer from congestion.
For instance, although it is entirely possible for a half-ﬁnished high-
way to be in active use or for interchanges to be added incrementally,
it is rather more diﬃcult to put into service a half-ﬁnished rail line or
airport (Feitelson and Salomon, 2000, p.465). The problems induced
by a lack of divisibility can be substantial: the Los Angeles ‘Red Line’
underground was originally designed to connect the rest of L.A. to
the employment hub of its defence sector, but by the time the line was
completed the defence industry had largely disappeared (2000, p.470).
And although there is clearly a connection between temporal ﬂexibil-
ity and the concept of latency—especially in the area of the supply of
infrastructure—these two ideas should not be conﬂated.
In eﬀect, the types of ﬂexibility summarised in Table 2.4 (page 75)
relate to the ability of a network to respond to changes in demand or
usage. Where this ﬂexibility is limited, such as by the need to manage
link externalities, then there will clearly be mismatches between supply
and demand and, consequently, periods of underutilisation or conges-
tion (cf. Beckmann, 1978, p.16). Although early underutilisation is of-
ten a feature of large-scale infrastructure projects (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2007),
a more common problem in the long run is ‘overuse’, and where this
occurs then  can be used to manage congestion thresholds upwards,
or demand can be constrained using pricing mechanisms. However, in
the meantime, “lags in national rollout of services may favour ﬁrms in
some areas over others…” (Goddard and Gillespie, 1986, p.389)
U-  L-T N: As infrastructure networks
are more intensively used, their economic costs tend to mount with
congestion eﬀects: trains become less comfortable for commuters;
deliveries are delayed on busy roads; contention ratios for broadband
connections rise, and so on. In other words, costs rise as utility de-
clines, leaving users with a stark set of choices: they can relocate to a
less congested area of the network; they can use a less congested net-
work; or they can pay to use comparable networks whose performance
is maintained through the manipulation of pricing, access, and capacity
(Feitelson and Salomon, 2000, p.475). And while this problem is hardly
new—businesses in America’s largest cities oen paid for priority relay-
ing of their messages on the telegraph system (Tarr, 2004, p.45)—it has
certainly become more acute.
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In ‘upper tier’ networks (Feitelson and Salomon, 2000, p.475), the
overall reliability, speed, and bandwidth of the network are typically
maintained at the expense of its accessibility, cost, or connectivity.
Upper tier networks are less generally ﬂexible, and this can be because
they carry traﬃc at higher speeds, because they are subject to greater
technical constraints, or because they are designed to address a narrow
range of needs. This is as much the case for privately-operated toll
highways—which employ complex transponder and camera systems
to control access—as it is for business-only airport terminals—whose
prices produce a ‘kinetic elite’ whose “ease of movement distinguishes
them from the low-speed, low-mobility majority” (Sheller and Urry,
2006, p.219).
This idea even applies to Internet traﬃc: although the Internet is
capable of routing messages around nodes that are overloaded or un-
reachable, it also makes no guarantees that packets will be delivered
in a timely fashion. So companies with strong telecoms dependencies
have switched to using private, parallel networks from companies like
Akamai that are able to guarantee service levels around the world or
along critical links. Figure 2.12 compares the higher latency and greater
packet loss of the public Internet to Akamai’s private routes between
London and Los Angeles. In both cases less is better, indicating that
corporations able to pay for private networks will beneﬁt from superior
speeds and integration even if the public Internet becomes congested.
Routing Performance Comparison
London to Los Angeles
Sept. 4, 2009 19:14
Dropped Packets
Los Angeles
London
Akamai Path Performance: 135MS Latency/0% Packet Loss
Public Internet Path Performance: 157MS Latency/39% Packet Loss
Figure 2.12: Akamai Performance
Comparison Against Public
Internet (Akamai, 2007; used with
permission of Akamai Technologies
GmbH)
Design and operation factors for upper tier networks oen create
greater externalities at nodes and along links (Feitelson and Salomon,
2000, p.475). These constraints, together with the mounting costs of
deployment in already-crowded areas, mean that upper tier networks
oen follow the same link paths as lower tier ones. So high-speed rail
routes typically follow rights of way laid out for lower-speed trains, and
Eos, Silverjet and Jet were set up to operate primarily along the
New York-London route where congestion seemed suﬃciently high
to make their oﬀers attractive. Crucially, this literal path-dependency
means that the nodes and links established today are the most likely to
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be the principal nodes and links of the restricted upper-tier networks of
the future as well (2000, p.476). This outcome suggests that it will be
much more diﬃcult for today’s less-connected nodes to leap to the front
of the pack, and that the advantages accruing to the most-connected
nodes will be cemented by the upgrade process. It has, for instance,
been noted that a good deal of European Internet traﬃc is still being
routed via the U.S. (Gorman and Malecki, 2000, p.116).
Agglomeration & Technology
A: We have arrived at the retrospectively obvious, but
nonetheless surprising conclusion that a network is constrained by its
least ﬂexible element (Feitelson and Salomon, 2000, p.466). So air
travel is constrained by airports, and rail by rail links…but how does
this work when we depend on several networks simultaneously? Eﬀec-
tively, the answer is a variation on Amdahl’s law: in a mix of networks it
is the least ﬂexible element of the least ﬂexible network that determines
overall system ﬂexibility (cf. Audirac, 2002, p.216). Consequently, the
more ﬂexible a network is overall, the less it is likely to be factored into
individual and organisational decisions.
For instance, homebuyers do not typically consider the availability of
landlines in a neighbourhood; instead, they presume that the ﬂexibility
of the network will enable one to be added if needed. The same, how-
ever, is not true for home-workers requiring broadband access since 
and high-speed cable connections are geographically constrained (see
Figure 2.13). For ﬁrms, especially large ﬁrms with dispersed operations
and extensive contact needs, the calculation is rather more complex:
households may only need to ensure availability, but ﬁrms require ac-
cessibility across multiple modes and need to juggle this across inputs,
outputs, and other interactions.
All of this means that ﬁrms will tend to gravitate towards those
points in space where they can best meet their mix of needs, and that
they will focus on nodes providing access to the relevant geographi-
cal scale, be it local, national, or global. So motorways should tend to
focus ﬁrms with local and regional access requirements around ma-
jor junctions; but since the number of available interchanges is quite
high we would expect that only the most favourably-located (i. e. most
accessible) nodes will be used. Intuitively, this suggests that from a
network perspective highways are implicated in development of edge
cities and in the dispersion of business activity since their layout permits
(relatively) quick and convenient access for labour at the risk of greater
inconvenience for meeting with other ﬁrms. We will return to this idea
in Chapter 4.
Meanwhile, the airport’s attraction is likely to be to businesses op-
erating on a national or international scale, and so the rise of what
Kasarda (2000b) terms the ‘aerotropolis’ reﬂects the dependencies of
global businesses. The development of business activity at the airport
is astounding: Schiphol now employs as many people (approximately
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Number of Broadband Technologies Available Figure 2.13: Map of British Broad-
band Availability (Department of
Trade and Industry, 2004; repro-
duced under Crown Copyright)
50,000) as Amsterdam’s traditional Central Business District ()
area (Bertolini, 2005, p.68). Interestingly, development of the Zuidas
(South Axis)—which is Amsterdam’s answer to London’s Dock-
lands—was ﬁrst pencilled in for the area to the West of the Dam, but
developers attempting to “attract foreign ﬁrms specialising in ﬁnancial,
legal, and business services” insisted on an area with better access to
Schipol (Bruinsma, 2009, p.110). In turn, developmental constraints at
Zuidas led to its being rejected by some ﬁrms in favour of Amstelveen,
which is also close to the airport but has fewer space constraints (ibid).
This pattern “points to selectivity about times and places of interac-
tions” (Bertolini, 2005, p.72), and helps to explain why new business
centres in Amsterdam have typically sought to combine superior public
and private transport access (2005, p.68).
Feitelson and Salomon go so far as to argue that the main stages of
urban development are intimately connected to technological change
in the transport sector and its supporting infrastructure (2000, p.460).
And clearly, changes in the relative ﬂexibility of a mode or modes can
have dramatic economic impacts: containerisation allows many diﬀer-
ent products to be handled with just one type of standard hardware,
enabling boats to be loaded and unloaded much more quickly and for
goods to be routed to their ﬁnal destination without warehousing.
So at the larger scale, the decline of the 19th and 20th Century’s port
cities (including London and New York) and the shi towards deep
water ports such as Rotterdam can be directly connected to the in-
creased ﬂexibility of the shipping and trucking networks. But even as it
has increased the speed of delivery, the use of palettes has made other
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segments of the network less ﬂexible: Tesco ﬁnds it easier to fulﬁl on-
line customer orders from local shops than to use a centralised system
that would require palettes to be broken up before delivery to the shop
(Murphy, 2004).
T: In contrast to this, telecoms infrastructure should the-
oretically have little impact on urban development because most ﬁrms
can meet most of their telecoms needs from almost anywhere. As an
extension of the oﬃce park, the short-lived concept of the ‘teleport’—a
site of privileged access to telecommunications networks—must have
been largely obsolete before the ﬁrst one was even built. Graham (1997,
p.109) mentions one U.K.-based teleport that placed a large, but en-
tirely extraneous, satellite dish outside to suggest its otherwise invisible
functions (see also Graham and Marvin, 1996, p.51). However, there is
a tension here between the ubiquity of advanced telecommunications
in the heavily interconnected core urban areas—where its ubiquity
actually works against its being a factor in the majority of decisions
(Feitelson and Salomon, 2000, p.472)—and its general absence in the
rural regions of developed countries and across large swathes of less-
developed countries.
Number of Bandwidth Providers
30 15 1
Figure 2.14: Map of European
Connectivity (PriMetrica, 2004;
reproduced with permission of
TeleGeography/PriMetrica)
So at the margins, the distribution of telecommunications infras-
tructure is still very deﬁnitely not uniform; for example, much of the
geography shown in Figures 2.13 and 2.14 can be attributed to demand
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concentration and to the ability to pay of households and businesses.
Figure 2.14 also shows the extent to which inter-urban bandwidth pro-
vision is skewed towards the largest cities of Europe, with London,
Paris, Amsterdam, and Frankfurt particularly well-represented. This
distribution clearly shadows the historical ‘Pentagon’ of business activ-
ity (Pain and Hall, 2008, p.1068; Hall and Pain, 2006, p.416), though 16 I note, however, that the text and
ﬁgure in the  study appear
to contradict each other in terms of
the vertices of the pentagon falling
in Holland and Germany
there are also some surprisingly high levels of integration with more
peripheral areas.
Zook (2004, p.203) showed that, together, Los Angeles, New York
and San Francisco had more domain names in 2004 than the next
12 largest metro regions combined, but Townsend found that there
had been a shi in the density of new domain registrations towards
“university towns and corporate & clusters…” (2001, p.43) Putting
these trends together, it seems that the combination of demand and
income factors tilts provision towards the parts of the country that
are both densely-developed and wealthy: Traxler and Luger (2000,
p.293) found that San Francisco, Silicon Valley, Washington ..,
Chicago, New York, Dallas, Los Angeles, and Atlanta accounted for
62% of U.S. backbone capacity. So the economics of infrastructure
provision tend to reinforce the path dependency of major infrastructure
(especially upper tier infrastructure), and this is one reason to agree with
Goddard and Gillespie’s assessment that “new transmission systems will
favour existing concentrations of economic activity” (1986, p.388).
Only the recent emergence of Dubai as a global air hub suggests that
a fortunate geographic location, great wealth, favourable regulation,
and an enormous, sustained investment in infrastructure creates some
capacity to overcome existing network lock-in.
Spatial Implications
So we have a spectrum of ﬂexibility: at the one end are the networks
such as telecoms and roads that are capable of oﬀering nearly ubiqui-
tous service across space, while at the other end are the restricted ‘nodal
networks’ that bind development to key locations. The former class of
network tends to equalise space by making all areas equally accessible,
while the latter accentuates the diﬀerence between connected and un-
connected regions. We can therefore concur with Bertolini’s suggestion
that “connectivity is analogous to the ‘space of ﬂows’” (2005, p.73) and
that it is simultaneously “what enables the spatially [and temporally]
disjointed city to keep functioning” (ibid), and what lies at the root of
a rise in global inequality between haves and have nots (Castells, 1996
[2000], 2000).
As I have argued above, we can think about the spatial eﬀects of in-
creasing mobility in terms of accessibility. However, as Bertolini and
Dijst (2003, pp.27–28) very rightly point out: accessibility relies on
“…the quality of the connections to transportation and communication
networks at multiple spatial scales…[and that] accessibility [also] com-
bines with other, more proximate features of a location to determine
sets of conditions—a ‘mobility environment’”. Knoben and Oerle-
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mans (2008, p.387) do not use the term, but they are clearly addressing
the same mix of factors when they ﬁnd that ﬁrm relocation is aﬀected
by the “distance to infrastructure facilities and type of area in which
ﬁrm is located…” More concretely, Breheny (1999, p.179) points to
a ‘Heathrow economy’ that is premised on the existence of ﬁrms for
which “proximity to air infrastructure is signiﬁcantly positive” (ibid.).
However, Bertolini and Dijst (2003, p.38) are also careful to note
that we should be wary of assuming that ‘a simple one-size-ﬁts-all pre-
scription’ would do for all industries. So even if the airport is a “place
where people and objects are transmitted into global relationships”
(Sheller and Urry, 2006, p.219), it will still pay to think about which
ﬁrms require this type of mobility as part of their day-to-day opera-
tions, and which ones do not. The mobility environment does away
with hierarchical relationships, physical spaces, and ﬁxed infrastruc-
tures, allowing us to think more ﬂexibly about how diﬀerent mixes of
access and attraction emerge (or might be encouraged to arise) in a vari-
ety of contexts, but we will need to examine how this interacts with the
requirements of individual ﬁrms and sectors in order to more fully grasp
its implications for the city and city-region.
Summary
What we have seen in this section is that they key to understanding lo-
cational behaviour is the degree of ﬂexibility that ﬁrms and households
have with respect to the infrastructure upon which they rely (see Ta-
ble 2.4). The process of choosing where to locate involves trading oﬀ
various networks against one another, as well as against the more basic
requirements of rents, labour, and plant, creating what we might term
a ‘relational geography’. The second key point is that in contemporary
infrastructure ‘proximity no longer implies any particular relationship’
(Graham, 1997, p.120), and that this holds not only for telecommuni-
cations, but for all types of infrastructure. This disjoint, relational space
is much more complex than the ‘ﬂat plain’, but ultimately oﬀers a better
way of understanding and responding to the needs of businesses and
households.
We can also consider these issues in terms of transport costs as a
share of the total cost of high-value goods. What is interesting about
contemporary transport and communications infrastructure is that
shipment costs are no longer so much a function of distance as they are
of time (i. e. speed and latency). There is an increasingly non-linear,
non-Euclidean dimension to inter-ﬁrm competition: air travel, , and
telecommunications permit, and may actually enforce, non-hierarchical,
spatially-disjointed development, making a focus on interlocking ‘mar-
ket areas’ unhelpful. Increasingly complex geographic arrangements are
evolving (Gillespie and Robins, 1989, p.113), and we are dealing not
with the hierarchy foreseen by Christaller, but a network of comple-
mentary nodes in shiing relationships to one another.
We cannot, for instance, understand the global shipping network
solely in terms of its ports, we must also consider the road and rail net-
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Table 2.4: Network ﬂexibility
dimensions (aer Feitelson and
Salomon, 2000, p.467)
works to which each port is connected and the markets to which those
give access (Fowler, 2006, p.1445). And in this example we should not
forget that shipping ﬁrms “have the ﬂexibility to carry cargo through
a range of ports…[and] can use this power to force ports to compete
in oﬀering lower rates, higher productivity, improved infrastructure,
etc” (2006, p.1443). We will therefore need to move beyond the some-
what passive/responsive notion of ﬁrms advanced in Chapter 2 towards
a more active model in which they are ‘actors within networks’ able
to shape patterns of ﬂows and “develop proﬁt-maximising strategies
outside of the interests of the cities” (2006, p.1430).
The ﬂexibility issue means that the speciﬁc geography of networks,
even the digital ones, aﬀects the diﬀerentiation of space (see Table 2.5).
The world is increasingly divided into those places that are connected
and those that are not: “oen [advanced telecoms and transport in-
frastructures] link nodes and city centres together into networks while
excluding much of the intervening spaces from accessing the networks,
because the networks pass through these spaces without allowing local
access” (Graham and Marvin, 1996, p.60). Consequently, we have no
reason to expect that the emergence of upper tier networks and our
increasing reliance upon them will herald the ‘liberation’ from space
envisioned in the late 20th Century (Feitelson and Salomon, 2000,
p.476).
This dependency helps to explain the ‘paradox’ observed by (Hall,
2003, p.142): that the deployment of the telephone seems to have con-
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Network Access points Land use eﬀect
Roads Free access Dispersion of development
Motorways Interchanges Development around interchanges and
beltways
Rail Rail stations Development around stations
Metro Metro stations Development around 
Air Transport Airports Business concentration around major
airports
Shipping Ports Industrial development around ports
Tele-
communications
Computers,
Phones
(Possible) Dispersion of business locally
Table 2.5: Land use eﬀects of
selected networks (Feitelson and
Salomon, 2000, p.469)
centrated, rather than dispersed, business activity. In eﬀect, as conges-
tion rises across a broad range of networks, we are increasingly bound
to those restricted locations—the global megacities and megacity re-
gions—where the upper tier networks are accessible. This multi-modal
ﬂexibility issue lies at the heart of Traxler and Luger’s observation that
“economic functions become footloose only in areas with advanced
telecoms infrastructure, skilled labour, and good airport access” (2000,
p.289). Agglomerations are therefore most likely to develop around
the nodes of the least ﬂexible networks (Feitelson and Salomon, 2000,
p.476), and the degree of development will be greatest where the net-
work dependency of ﬁrms is highest.
Of course, the least ﬂexible nodes are those of the upper tier net-
works, and it is in this light that we should understand the vast sums of
money spent redeveloping the Kings Cross area of London in prepa-
ration for the arrival of the Eurostar, or in developing EuraLille, which
from a regional development standpoint is not a great deal more than
a place where two major high-speed rail lines meet. To put it bluntly:
“Global markets in capital, product and labour tend to be more acces-
sible via cities and large urban areas. Advanced producer service ()
ﬁrms increasingly use major cities as hubs for global business networks.
Similarly, big cities are sites of international migration—oen highly-
skilled people with new ideas and links to markets ‘back home’” (Athey
et al., 2007, p.21).
2.5 Conclusions: Telecommunications & Regional Economics
As our review of Christaller and Lösch should have made clear, access
to high-quality infrastructure enables ﬁrms to engage with markets at
multiple scales. For businesses, the right mix and availability of trans-
port and communications infrastructure is essential, and  reports
that: “All the sectors studied served global as well as local markets, with
global markets tending to take priority. International connectivity is
therefore important. Transport infrastructure was cited as a major asset
for facilitating business connections, networks and knowledge transfer”
(2007, pp.28–29). What the addition of ﬂexibility and performance
characteristics enables us to begin to understand is how some sites be-
come privileged at the expense of others, why these inequalities are so
infrastructure and regions 77
diﬃcult to rectify once they have taken hold, and why the “functional
hierarchies of cities within nation states that were described so painstak-
ingly within central place theory are breaking down” (Graham and
Marvin, 1996, p.58).
However, Christaller’s emphasis on the function of places—not on
their physical or population sizes—helps us to understand how some
nodes, especially those where multiple networks intersect, become op-
timal locations for development because “ﬁrms are opting for places
that are optimal in terms of connectivity rather than proximity” (Au-
dirac, 2002, p.221). And cities remain the place where this occurs with
the greatest frequency, intensity, and density, so “the role of cities as
transport hubs with key road, rail and air links can also be a signiﬁcant
beneﬁt to businesses since this gives them good access to customer,
suppliers and collaborators located elsewhere within the city-region. As
the global economy becomes more integrated, international transport
connections are becoming particularly important” (Athey et al., 2007,
p.17). And the concept of upper-tier infrastructure helps us to under-
stand why technological change is currently reinforcing uneven regional
and national development, superimposing new types of spatial exclusion
on top of existing ones (Gillespie and Robins, 1989, p.15).
So we may now propose that ‘centrality’ is not a product of the di-
versity of consumer goods, but of the number and type of networks
intersecting in space. Global ﬁrms should show a preference for ac-
cess to global networks, while local and regional ones should show a
greater diversity of locational strategies, reﬂecting the greater range and
variety of locally complementary and competing networks. For ex-
ample, a segment in BBC Four’s The Secret Life of the Airport examines
multinationals based at Stockley Park and ﬁnds that its principal draw is
that it is just a few minutes from Heathrow and so highly accessible for
executives and clients arriving from abroad. We can predict that hubs
with many infrastructure connections will tend to outcompete less con-
nected ones for the oﬃces of large, sophisticated ﬁrms, undermining
the smaller sites’ capacity for innovation: “Weak urban hubs oen mean
that innovation specialisms of sectors are much narrower than in other
cities that function as stronger hubs” (Athey et al., 2007, p.4).
In a review of the implications for the city of ‘contemporary com-
munications’, Hall (2003, p.150) argues that the emergence of the
superstore and of national chains demonstrates “the dramatic increase
in mobility and thus in what [Christaller] termed the ‘range of a good’
in the 70 years since he wrote…” This is an important point, but I
believe that the discussion of consumer-goods is telling: at its heart,
Christaller’s model is one where “retail gravitation is the main force
[and] this is shaped by customer convenience…and willingness to
travel…” (Vance, 1970, pp.140–141). Combining this with a network-
oriented analysis, it now makes sense why an exclusive clinic ‘oﬀering
everything from orthopaedics to plastic surgery’ would chose to locate
itself in a major airport (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006, p.53).
However, a retail-gravitation approach is of comparatively little help
for exploring business-to-business services, and of the locational fac-
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tors aﬀecting such non-consumer oriented sectors such as wholesale
ﬁnance, merchant banking, &, or consultancy. Moreover, so far we
have thought about the ﬁrm in an abstract sense, and have not consid-
ered the network aﬃnities of businesses in any kind of systematic way:
which ﬁrms? which sectors? and why? Unpacking the idea of the ﬁrm
is essential to developing a better understanding of its eﬀects on infras-
tructure, cities and regions. Chapter 3 will therefore seek to develop an
understanding of the ways that industrial activity is changing in the 21st
century and what these shis portend for the locational preferences of
ﬁrms. What we can say here is that the tiered aspect of these multiple
infrastructures highlights one reason why innovative ﬁrms, and espe-
cially advanced producer services (s), may be even more place-bound
than their less sophisticated brethren: they are increasingly reliant upon
upper tier networks for the eﬃcient movement of people and informa-
tion on a global scale.
There have been suggestions that the emerging, networked city “op-
erates in an economy where the transport costs of the highest value
products (information and knowledge) are fairly insensitive to distance”
(Townsend, 2001, p.56). Drawing on the concept of network ﬂexibil-
ity, this chapter has attempted to lay the groundwork for an argument,
which will be developed in greater detail over the course of the next
three chapters, that this is not in fact the case. And it is important not to
overlook the fact that network development is mediated by policy and
politics: “…policy areas such as transport inﬂuence innovation by shap-
ing market access” (Athey et al., 2007, p.6). We can therefore think of
ﬂexibility as both an attribute of infrastructure networks, and as a delib-
erate objective of regional and national policy: so increasing the number
of locations where infrastructure overlaps may increase the number of
choices available to ﬁrms, whereas restricting this overlap may help to
focus economic development on carefully-selected ‘key sites’ and also
decrease the overall cost of the deployment. Depending on the situation
either approach may have merit, and so this requires us to make active
choices about where and when to invest for the future.
3Firms, Markets and Risk
3.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we set out models of regional development
that were heavily inﬂuenced by transport costs, to which we added
both an understanding of telecommunications networks and of the
constraints of infrastructure ﬂexibility. However, beyond some basic
predictions this high-level view did not make clear why some ﬁrms and
sectors would be dependent on some transport and telecommunications
modes, but not on others. Or as Haig (1926b, p.422) asked rather more
directly: why have services ﬁrms remained concentrated in the central
business district () when bulky goods—which are much more costly
to move around—have not? And, we might add, why has this pattern
persisted into the 21st Century?
In a nutshell, understanding the origins of these dependencies and
their expression in space is the purpose of this chapter. To accomplish
this, we need to examine how space aﬀects the structure of the ﬁrm, as
much through transportation and communications as through factors
that only become relevant at this ﬁner scale. We need to consider why
a ﬁrm should choose one location over any other possible location
(Weber, 1909 [1969], p.xxii), and to do so we need to examine not only
the nature of the ﬁrm, but also the nature of the markets in which it
operates (cf. Coase, 1937). We will see that although the ﬁrm is in part
a vehicle for the spatial division of labour (which has been well-studied),
it is also a means of managing risk and information (which has been less
so).
The challenge is that the ﬁrm itself is becoming more complex and
ﬂexible thanks to the “easing of locational restrictions, [and] exten-
sion of work and company boundaries” (Panteli and Dibben, 2001,
p.383). So a major step in this analysis is the deemphasis of the ﬁrm as
an atomic entity and a focus on how informational and transactional
ﬂows between units help to deﬁne the ﬁrm. We then look at how those
ﬂows are also connected to the ﬁrm’s interactions with competitors and
collaborators (cf. Scott, 1983a), and the organisational pressures that
result (cf. Robinson, 1931 [1943]; Marshall, 1890 [1948]).
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Firms
It turns out that surprisingly little was written about the factors driv-
ing individual ﬁrm location during the period between the original
works of Weber (1909 [1969]) and the other thinkers of the early 20th
Century, and their ‘rediscovery’ in the 1970s and 1980s (Bellet and
L’Harmet, 1998, pp.ix-x). This long pause obviously coincides with
the period between the ending of the 2nd Industrial Revolution and
the onset of globalisation in the 1960s, but it still means that thinking
on industrial location has given comparatively little attention to ser-
vices, and still less, with the notable exception of Goddard (1973), to
information.
So although we should not overlook the ongoing importance of the
trade in physical products to the global economy, the lack of a proper
emphasis on services seems an important gap in our understanding of
contemporary ﬁrm location strategies. Returning to Weber’s original
model enables us to begin with a fairly simply model of ﬁrm locational
factors, to which we will add detail and complexity over the course of
this chapter. And while we are, like Weber, also attempting to build a
generic model of ﬁrm location, we cannot do so without taking into
account—in a limited way, for now—the sector in which the ﬁrm
operates and, in particular, its informational characteristics.
Markets
In Chapter 2, I began to argue that the traditional assumption of a
ﬂat plain is, at best, a profoundly misleading metaphor in a network
context: it causes us to imagine a ‘frictional eﬀect of distance’ such
that ‘larger distances discourage interaction’ (Graham and Marvin,
1996, p.55). Critically, early location theory largely overlooks the fact
that not only does space aﬀect the cost of goods and services, but it
also aﬀects our ability to determine what they should cost in the ﬁrst
place. Graham and Marvin (1996, p.56) put it this way: “one of the key
simplifying assumptions…[is] that producers and consumers had perfect
information about the choices open to them: the services they could
consume and how, the changing nature of markets and organisations
and legal, technological and regulatory developments.”
So if space aﬀects our ability to make informed decisions about the
value of products or services at remote locations then there may be
little reason to assume that information is distributed symmetrically
in most, or indeed any, markets. As a result, we lose a great deal of
certainty about many core aspects of doing business and this introduces
the essential concept of spatially-determinate risk. We will see that this
begins to explain why some sectors cluster together in space in spite of
the apparent advantages available to a ﬁrm that moves to a more distant,
lower-cost location. In short, it is about managing risk and information,
and these two factors are becoming increasingly important as markets
become ever-more global in scope and interconnected in nature.
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Transactions
If the market creates the ‘playing ﬁeld’ upon which ﬁrms operate, then
it is the unique pattern of transactions and interactions of each ﬁrm that
structures its particular spatial strategies. Deﬁning transactions accord-
ing to dimensions such as as volume, stability, and intensity, enables
us to make predictions about the likely dependencies of ﬁrms in terms
of their proximity requirements to suppliers or customers, and their
ability to manage growth internally or through externalisation. We
will see that ﬁrms in a range of ﬁelds pursue complex and sophisticated
strategies to mitigate the cost of a transactional failure.
The study of transactional and informational ﬂows will also empha-
sise the fact that while the historic requirement for literal proximity
may be weakening, the ongoing need for accessibility is not. A crit-
ical component in this process has been the revolution in our ability
to exchange data electronically, which has extended the ﬁrm’s ability
to coordinate activity across long distances eﬀectively. In some cases,
this seems to lead to new levels of centralisation, but far more oen it
seems to permit ﬁrms to hive oﬀ ‘extraneous’ functions (everything
from marketing to production) and to focus themselves on a core en-
deavour. And this implies that we will need to be careful, as Goddard
(1973, p.54) suggested, ‘in distinguishing between geographic dispersal
and functional decentralisation.’
3.2 Theory of Firms & Locations
Early thinking on ﬁrm location was profoundly inﬂuenced by the im-
pact of the Industrial Revolution, and this is reﬂected in the interest of
Alfred Weber (1909 [1969]) in how raw materials are extracted, trans-
formed, and shipped to ﬁnal markets in a multitude of forms. Unsur-
prisingly, an industrial ﬁrm’s locational decisions are principally struc-
tured by the cost of moving raw and ﬁnished materials across space.
However, the shi towards a services-driven economy over the course
of the 20th Century means that we will now need to give particular
attention to ﬁrms whose only inputs and outputs are raw or processed
information; these ﬁrms are clearly far removed fromWeber’s coal and
timber users, and so would appear to suggest some major challenges
ahead.
Simplifying Assumptions
In addition to the ﬂat plain, Weber makes four simplifying assumptions
that are particularly relevant to our study1: that labour is not mobile 1 The other assumptions that Weber
makes are important for setting
the limits of the model, but are
not particularly relevant to our
analysis in this chapter: that the
geographical distribution of input
materials is ﬁxed; and that the
geographical distribution of ﬁnal
markets is also ﬁxed (Weber, 1909
[1969], pp.37–39).
(1909 [1969], pp.38); that the transportation system supporting this
economic activity is uniform (1909 [1969], p.42); that the movement
of inputs or outputs is charged on a per-mile basis (1909 [1969], p.43);
and that the geographical conﬁguration and scale of demand are con-
stant within the market area of the ﬁrm (1909 [1969], p.38). This last
assumption was strongly criticised by Lösch in The Economics of Location
(1954 [1973], p.261), but holding all of these potential factors constant
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freed Weber to focus on transportation costs as a form of ‘friction’ af-
fecting the production and distribution of goods. We will now consider
each of these assumptions in more detail.
L M: Assuming that labour is immobile signiﬁcantly
simpliﬁes Weber’s model by making human capital very much like any
other natural resource for the purposes of his analysis. And while peo-
ple—young people especially—do seem to relocate in large numbers in
the pursuit of learning and employment, capacity constraints can im-
pose limits on migration even where opportunities abound. So labour
supply constraints are thought to explain why we typically ﬁnd higher
wages in major cities such as London (Shaw and Jeﬀeries, 2005, p.38).
Clearly, the makeup of the housing market, and especially the pro-
portion of owners to renters, will also impact the inclination of labour
to respond to new opportunities at remote locations (cf. Surowiecki,
2008).
However, the shi to a services economy, especially as buttressed by
the deployment of Information and Communications Technology ()
systems, seemingly renders this whole issue a moot point. For instance,
in the 1990s Ireland pursued a strategy aimed at bringing skilled but
spatially-ﬂexible jobs in ﬁnancial services, publishing, and soware
development to its English-speaking workforce (Graham and Marvin,
1996, pp.148–149). The early success of these eﬀorts suggested that,
outside of the personal services sector, the relative mobility of services
allows business to bring on additional workers by electronic means.
And certainly, the success of international call centres and of remote
collaboration amongst teams within multinationals in the technology
sector suggest that this is happening on a substantial scale.
And yet, during the 1990s almost one-third of inter-regional reloca-
tions and nearly one-ﬁh of intra-regional moves within the U.K. were
job-related (Shaw and Jeﬀeries, 2005, p.25). And labour is increasingly
mobile at the international scale as well: “[o]ver half of Silicon Valley’s
scientists and engineers were born abroad, mostly in South and East
Asia…and help attract a constant inﬂow of skilled people” (Athey et al.,
2007, p.21). These migrations are obviously being driven by employer
demand but the underlying fact is that, at the higher-paid end, this
labour is clearly not interchangeable (Charlot and Duranton, 2004,
p.5). The volume of relocation and the scale of costs incurred by em-
ployers suggest that even if labour is much more mobile than Weber
had anticipated, there is nonetheless a spatial aspect to skilled services
delivery that merits further investigation.
T U: The equivalence of transport modes that
Weber assumes is initially diﬃcult to comprehend (1909 [1969], p.43),
since choosing between land, sea or air freight so clearly has dramatic
implications for the delivery of goods. However, as we established in
Chapter 2, the economic cost of travel is really a measure of utility that
incorporates non-monetary factors such as reliability, speed, latency,
and frequency of service. Because the unit of analysis is the same, then
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all modes of travel are functionally equivalent for analytical purposes.
This crucial ‘sleight of hand’ enables Weber to show that, for his pur-
poses, waterways and railroads are part of the same network: “for within
such a system, routes with cheaper rates mean nothing but distances
shortened in proportion to the decrease in rates” (1909 [1969], p.84).
Conversely, competition between ﬁrms on the same routes is ad-
dressed by treating each company as though it operated on a separate
network with its own cost structure (Weber, 1909 [1969], p.80). The
emergence of private competitors to the national postal system illus-
trates the relevance of this treatment: the Royal Mail, FedEx, and 
operate parallel delivery networks that use separate vehicles, process-
ing centres, and transhipment points, but all deliver to the same sets
of addresses. The varying monetary costs of each network are simply a
reﬂection of the way that each ﬁrm has selected for diﬀerent characteris-
tics such as reliability or speed.
T-M S C: The unit of analysis in Weber’s model is
the ‘ton-mile’, and it enables him to address a surprisingly broad range
of transportation issues that we might initially think are exogenous to
his theory. The key, as already implied by his handling of competing
modes and distribution networks, is that we can modify the weight
moved and distance travelled to reﬂect attributes such as speed, con-
venience, or congestion (1909 [1969], p.43). So bulky goods can be
represented as an extra weight to be transported, poor-quality infras-
tructure can be treated as extra miles to travel, and when dealing with
economies of scale: “…distance can be thought of as varying according
to the percentage of the decrease whenever such scales apply” (1909
[1969], p.44). Even input substitution can be incorporated through a
tinkering with the locational weight of inputs and the overall ‘pull’ that
they exert on the optimal point of production.
The shipping costs of a ﬁrm’s inputs and outputs lead it to locate
at the point where the total ton-mileage of inputs and outputs is at a
minimum (1909 [1969], p.48). If the ﬁnal output is ‘heavier’ than its
inputs, then the ﬁrm will tend to move nearer to its customers; but if
the inputs, either individually or collectively, weigh more than the out-
put then the tendency will be to locate nearer to either the most costly
resource consumed, or to some weighted average of all inputs (1909
[1969], pp.59–60). Figure 3.1 illustrates two simple production pro-
cesses involving two inputs and one output of varying weights2. In a 2 In some cases a resource such as
coal is consumed during the pro-
duction process, in which case we
also have to grapple with ‘weight
losing’ materials which add noth-
ing to a product’s ﬁnal locational
weight but must still be shipped
to the point of production; these
will also tend to draw production
towards the inputs and away from
the ﬁnal market (Weber, 1909
[1969], pp.63–64)
dynamic context, if the cost of movement changes, then the relation-
ships between inputs and outputs, and the optimal location for the ﬁrm
can also change.
Kasarda (2000a) suggests that the emergence of the ‘aerotropolis’ is
being driven by the need for global movement of goods and people, and
by the decline in the perceived quality of urban infrastructure. Simi-
larly, there is ample evidence to suggest that growth at well-connected
sites such as Amsterdam’s Zuidas is supported by its relative accessibil-
ity, not only for Dutch workers from both urban and suburban areas,
but also for international arrivals from Schiphol Airport and from the
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of Inputs
Aﬀecting Plant Location
new high-speed rail line running to Belgium (cf. de Graaﬀ et al., 2007,
pp.2099–2101). This is much the same argument that was later ad-
vanced by Christaller (1933 [1966]) and Lösch (1954 [1973]), but it
spatialises the internal operations of the individual ﬁrm in a way that
neither of the other authors does.
Locational Factors
Having established these underlying assumptions, Weber’s model ex-
plains ﬁrm spatial preference with ﬁve factors: labour, materials, trans-
port, perishability, and dependency. Weber argues that three ‘general
factors’ of labour, materials, and transport can be applied to all ﬁrms,
with transportation costs providing an overarching framework, while
the two special factors of perishability and dependency apply only to
some ﬁrms (Weber, 1909 [1969], pp.20–22). Our primary interest
here is the extent to which these factors successfully account for the
location patterns of contemporary ﬁrms, and especially those that use
information as both an input to, and an output of, their operations.
G F: The relationship between labour and the ﬁrm can
be nicely captured by Weber’s ‘labour index’ (1909 [1969], pp.107–108),
which is a measure of the value added by workers to the production
process. Bellet and L’Harmet (1998, p.129) term this the ‘coeﬃcient
of labour’ and deﬁne it as the total labour input per unit weight of
product. In a contemporary context we might think of this as the
information-processing capacity of workers, so for specially-trained
workers such as scientists, soware developers, artists, and designers, we
would expect a higher labour index than for employees in less-skilled
ﬁelds such as personal services, call centres, and manufacturing.
As we saw above on page 83, ﬁrms will generally try to keep the
distance over which inputs and outputs are transported to a minimum,
since they incur costs for each kilometre something is moved. However,
in certain circumstances, the distribution of skilled workers might
make it necessary to ship materials over long distances in order to take
advantage of a localised labour asset, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. At
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the limit, such as in creative endeavours like fashion design where the
value of a name-brand designer is nearly limitless and the output (e.g.
a design) quite easy to transport, the decisions of Lösch’s “gied men
who refuse to migrate” (1954 [1973], p.23) may mean that some ﬁrms
follow workers rather than the other way around.
Market
Input 1
Input 2
Labour
   Influence
Ideal
   Location
Weight-based calculation
Labour-influenced calculation
Weight of Input 1 > Weight of Input 2 >> Weight of Output Figure 3.2: Illustration of Labour
Index Aﬀecting Plant Location
Florida (2002a) makes much the same argument, though minus
the Weberian terminology, in The Rise of the Creative Class. One of the
essential claims of Florida’s work is that the growth industries of the
21st Century must adjust to the locational preferences of labour (see also
Gaschet, 2002, p.65), and that this creative group increasingly prefers
diverse, tolerant cities to monocultural suburbs, producing the capacity
for ﬁne-scale divisions of labour in all ﬁelds, including the cultural
(cf. Scott, 2001). In principle, for some industries only the location
of labour matters, in which case the labour index will tend towards
inﬁnity.
However, it is not just in creative industries that this requirement
arises: it is hardly coincidental that the oﬀ-shoring of support centres
and soware development has tended to favour English-speaking India
over China, which has a comparable—or even superior—infrastructure.
In the case of engineering and technical support, telecoms-based inter-
actions are usually easier (and oen cheaper) when the participants share
a basic linguistic ‘proximity’ (cf. Skinner, 2004; Graham and Marvin,
1996). However, graduates of Indian engineering schools can still ﬁnd
themselves needing to attend ‘ﬁnishing schools’ where they learn the
‘so skills’ of etiquette and communication skills in order to improve
their employability (Pandey, 2010; Blakely, 2008). And this is actually
becoming a two-way street, with growing demand, especially in North
America, for cross-cultural training courses for all staﬀ (Mohn, 2010).
Although the data comes from 1996, Table 3.1 highlights the extent
to which the traditional location factors—labour and transport—still
play a vital role in locational decisions. The highest-rated factors are all
accessibility-related: the rail network and major airports. Next comes
the availability of labour, with the relative importance of white and
blue collar workers varying with the nature of the work to be done.
Interestingly, in the case of white collar labour cost tends to count for
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Cost of labour 27 15 14 14 9 13 13
Availability of white collar labour 33 35 21 26 39 22 29
Availability of manual labour 7 25 39 14 3 7 14
Availability of general business
services
0 5 0 3 0 5 2
Availability of specialised
business services
0 5 0 4 3 5 4
Availability of premises 0 10 21 15 9 16 14
Cost of premises 20 25 29 32 33 35 31
Proximity of customers 7 25 18 28 30 36 28
Proximity of suppliers 7 20 18 7 9 4 9
Proximity of competitors 7 10 0 8 6 15 7
Availability of adequate housing 7 5 0 3 6 5 5
Traﬃc congestion 13 15 11 10 6 11 9
Access to London 27 25 11 22 24 33 26
Good rail connections 33 25 21 22 15 36 26
Access to national rail network 40 60 50 56 48 51 54
Access to major airport 40 30 25 22 33 22 28
Number of Cases 15 20 28 18 33 55 163
Table 3.1: Importance of Location
Factors by Establishment Function
(from Gordon 1996 in Breheny,
1999, p.181)
less than availability; this might seem obvious, but it is not always clear
that policy-makers grasp this basic constraint. The cost of premises
are also important, but are oen ranked below that of labour. Finally,
although we will not explore this issue here, I wish to also point out that
ﬁrms in some sectors also rate the proximity of suppliers, competitors
and customers quite highly as well.
S F: For obvious reasons, Weber’s general theory of in-
dustrial location largely glosses over the special factors aﬀecting ﬁrm
location (1909 [1969], p.20), but the absence of detail around the con-
cepts of perishability and production dependencies seems like another
important gap in this developing model. Many products in use today
are perishable and shipped over surprisingly long distances. So, can We-
ber’s model still serve to explain the movements of goods and services
through global supply chains using only the concept of the ton-mile?
One way to address this dilemma is to start with the assumption
that perishability can be represented through higher ton-mile rates, but
that in all other aspects perishable goods are the same as non-perishable
ones. This is, of course, largely what we experience in real life where
the monetary cost of shipping is proportional to both weight and speed:
overnight shipping of premium cuts of beef from Nebraska to anywhere
in the world is always possible3…provided that we are willing to pay
3 See
http://www.kansascitysteaks.com/
or http://www.omahasteaks.com/
for instance.for it. If we have two equivalent goods—one produced locally, and one
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being produced far away—and it still makes ﬁnancial sense to ‘ship in’
the distantly-produced competitor, then it must be the result of cheaper
inputs of materials and labour. However, the additional transport costs
must be low enough to still allow for competitive pricing in the ﬁnal
market. In other words, global supply chains are a symptom of the
reduced importance of shipping costs as a proportion of a product’s total
cost.
However, to make such structures work requires coordination on
a global scale, making it obvious how the opportunity for the global
logistics ﬁrm emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Only the logistics ﬁrm is
able to reap the economies of scale required to keep global transporta-
tion costs at a manageable level while also delivering goods in the timely
fashion required to support the ‘survival of the fastest’ (Toﬄer, 1990, in
Kasarda, 2000a, p.3). Rising fuel costs in 2008 dramatically altered the
index of production for many ﬁrms, and in some cases manufacturing
was brought from Asia back to North America (Rohter, 2008).
Ubiquitous Resources
One factor in Weber’s model that is oen overlooked concerns the
availability of ‘ubiquities’ and their inﬂuence on ideal ﬁrm location.
Ubiquity “means that the commodity is so extensively available within
the region that, wherever a place of consumption is located, there are
either deposits of the commodity or opportunities for producing it in
the vicinity” (Weber, 1909 [1969], p.51). In other words, ubiquitous
resources are available in a given area in such abundance—either in
absolute terms or relative to other possible sites of production—that
their use by ﬁrms is what economists would term non-rivalrous and
non-exclusive.
U  L: The eﬀect of a ubiquitous input on ﬁrm loca-
tion varies with its role in the production process. Taken to extremes,
a manufacturing ﬁrm that used only ubiquities to produce its goods
would seek to locate at the place of consumption since only the ﬁn-
ished product has any kind of weight to ship (1909 [1969], p.62). A
more concrete way of thinking about this aspect of location is the case
of hydroelectricity: production has a strong dependency on fast-ﬂowing
bodies of water and so these exert a powerful locational pull on electric-
ity producers (1909 [1969], p.89–94). In contrast, the actual output of
the generation process is easily shipped via power lines—though there
are large losses over long distances—and so normally has a negligible
impact on the locational decisions of ﬁnal consumers.
There are, however, some interesting exceptions: for instance, for
data centre and web hosting providers the geography of telecommu-
nications infrastructure may seem an obvious dependency, but rather
surprisingly we also ﬁnd that proximity to a large, reliable power sup-
ply is an increasingly important factor as well (Economist, 2008c). In
2006, the growing energy demands of the code-breaking computers
at America’s  nearly overwhelmed its power infrastructure entirely,
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leaving it unable to monitor global communications (ibid.). Recently,
both Microso and Google have opted to locate data centres near hydro
plants in order to secure reliable access to aﬀordable power (Economist,
2010e).
Equally, it may seem unlikely that anyone today would much take
the type and bandwidth of local telecommunications into account:
small ﬁrms are unlikely to saturate even the most basic retail broadband
connection, and larger ﬁrms normally expect to lease extra capacity
directly from a telecoms supplier without moving to a new facility.
But where speciﬁc dependencies arise, the freedom of location on
digital networks may tighten dramatically: a British ﬁlm production
or postproduction company wishing to collaborate with a Hollywood
studio still has little choice but to maintain a facility in central London
so as to have access to SohoNet for real-time editing (Nachum, 1999,
p.27).
Unable to confirm copyright.
Original available at:
http://www.sohonet.co.uk/about_sohonet/our_global_reach.php
Figure 3.3: SohoNet Services Area
(SohoNet, 2010)
Quite simply, there is no way to deliver 100Mbps or more of point-
to-point dedicated bandwidth between users—something that SohoNet
boasts (2008)—over public networks. Since SohoNet is privately-held
and demand-driven, the map of SohoNet-enabled cities essentially
reﬂects a geography of the willingness of ﬁlm-related ﬁrms to pay for
premium network services, and it points rather strongly towards a
speciﬁc global distribution of ﬁlm production (see Figure 3.3). What
is particularly interesting about this ﬁgure is that it not only reﬂects
the continued centrality of London, and even more prominently of
Los Angeles, but that it also indicates the increasing importance of
production functions at subsidiary centres such as Vancouver (cf. Scott
and Pope, 2007).
Gorman and McIntee (2003, p.1169) have argued that the ‘new
urban hierarchy’ of wireless infrastructure “provides opportunity for
peripheral locations to gain connectivity.” This may well be true in a
general sense, but the point I would like to emphasise here is that we
should not forget the forces operating at the margins of even such the-
oretically placeless technologies as mobile telecommunications. Figure
3.4 demonstrates that place still matters a great deal when you want
to access the latest in wireless infrastructure: if your ﬁrm depended
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on high-speed wireless data access then it would certainly be wise to
base yourself in the South East or Midlands, and your choice of oper-
ator would be much more tightly constrained than you might initially
expect.
U  D: Again, these newest networks are privatised, and
so the pattern of deployment is a function both of demand concentra-
tion and of wealth, so it is hardly coincidental that Vodafone’s trials of
 (High-Speed Uplink Packet Access) occurred in business envi-
ronments—central London, and in particular the City of London, and
at international and regional airports—where business demand accumu-
lates in high densities (Ray, 2009). In the same way, we may anticipate
that the long-awaited deployment of new networks such as WiMax, and
its Korean sibling WiBro (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006, p.69),
will begin in urban areas, and not in the rural areas that are most in
need of long-range, high-speed wireless access.
Three O2 Orange T-Mobile Vodafone
Unable to confirm copyright.
Original available at:
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/radiocomms/ifi/licensing/classes/broadband/cellular/3g/maps/3gmaps/coverage_maps.pdf
Figure 3.4: 3rd Generation Mobile
Coverage (Ofcom, 2009)The issue that we have not yet addressed is whether we can treat in-
formation as a material input like any other. And following naturally
from this: can information be transported from one place to another?
If so, does it have a weight? Or a transport cost? Drawing on the ﬁnd-
ings from Chapter 2, we might initially expect that the geographical
distribution of information would cease to exert much in the way of a
locational pull on industry: data accessible from anywhere renders place
irrelevant. However, consider ﬁrst that location is unimportant only if
all types of information can be eﬀectively communicated electronically;
and consider too the fact that a great deal of information processing is
still done by people. Where the people who handle information have
unique skills, then the ﬁrm’s ability to access this resource will still
matter a great deal.
Agglomeration & Technology
A: We cannot understand today’s concentration of
ﬁnancial ﬁrms on Wall Street and in the City of London without ref-
erence to these places’ proximity to major ports of transoceanic ship-
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ping that functioned as ‘entrepôt towns’ that gave traders early access
to the ‘supply’ of information coming from docking ships (Vance,
1970, p.149). And Meier (1962, p.43) makes the point that “oppor-
tunities also appear at linkage points in communications systems and
entrepreneurs located there obtain access to several independent sources
of information ﬁrst.” But when information has to be physically trans-
ported, then the consumers of time-sensitive data are constrained by
a prohibitively high ton-mile transport cost. A similar dynamic once
aﬀected the producers of information: Haig (1926b, p.425) notes that
newspaper printing needed to be centrally located because “a central
location is convenient from the point of view of the assembly of the
news.”
Over time, technological change has altered these requirements:
the presses themselves have been moved to cheaper locations, leaving
only the reporters and management downtown; and today it seems that
even the writers are no longer strictly required to be based in Mid-
Town New York or on Fleet Street since Schiﬀeres (2007) reports that
writers are now covering U.S. ﬁnancial news from Bangalore. So the
introduction of telecommunications networks as an alternate channel
for the delivery of products and services breaks the historic link between
distance and time (Graham and Marvin, 1996, p.117). In as much as
information is available instantaneously online, it seems diﬃcult to
conceive of this factor as having a ton-mile ‘cost’ for ﬁrms.
However, the recent furore surrounding high-speed/high-frequency
trading by the largest brokerage and investment ﬁrms serves to highlight
that, as with power, in some extreme cases it does still matter: access
to the server rooms where the electronic markets actually operate and
to the computing resources able to exploit a millisecond-sized trading
window can still make a diﬀerence (Duhigg, 2009; Stokes, 2009).
However, even where these extreme performance requirements are
lacking, we still ﬁnd bankers in London citing the importance of data
providers in determining where they want to locate (Cook et al., 2004,
p.12).
The point is this: when transport speeds could be measured in the
tens of kilometres per hour, then network and geographic distance were
largely equivalent. Without a phone, entrepreneurs “cannot commu-
nicate faster than they can walk” (Economist, 2007c), but the intro-
duction of digital and upper-tier infrastructures changes this equation
because within-network distance counts for much more thanks to the
massive spatial discontinuities that they create: “as far as the Internet is
concerned, the fact that Carnegie Mellon University and Lycos are 14
hops away is more important than that they are four miles apart” (Burch
and Cheswick, 1999, p.98). And as we argued in Chapter 2 this issue
is not only limited to the Internet infrastructure, it applies to all of the
increasingly sophisticated systems upon which we depend.
So by positioning themselves at points with ready access to global
networks, multinational enterprises and other providers of advanced
goods and services are actually lowering their ‘ton-mileage’ rates even
when they operate from seemingly high-cost locations. In fact, it may
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be in part the cost of these new networks that drives ﬁrms to locations
where it can be spread amongst as many companies and organisations as
possible. And of course, agglomeration also produces savings for ﬁrms
that are investing in plant since specialised technical equipment can
“be taken out of the single large plant and [made to] work for several
of them, i. e. become the basis of independent auxiliary industries”
(Weber, 1909 [1969], p.129)4. 4 For Weber, agglomeration also
had a strong social ﬂavour and this
could play an important role in
explaining persistent regional vari-
ations in labour productivity (1909
[1969], p.22). Weber excluded this
issue from further consideration
on the basis that it was a ‘particu-
larity’; however, for contemporary
ﬁrms, especially in sectors such
as entertainment, local culture is
increasingly seen as a raw ‘material’
(cf. Scott, 1997).
T: For Weber, the importance of technological change lies
primarily in its ability to alter the ways in which factors of production
are used, and in the costs incurred in transporting those factors to the
factory (1909 [1969], p.129). So if a process that once required ten tons
of iron ore as an input now only requires ﬁve, then the total eﬀective
cost of that input has been halved and the other factors have become
relatively more important. Conversely, a 50% decrease in the cost of
moving all raw material around would translate into a halving of every
factor’s cost to the ﬁrm, so unless this brings into play new options in
terms of inputs and outputs it should produce no real change to the
ﬁrm’s optimal location.
But a doubling of the distance over which inputs are shipped does
change the ease with which the ﬁrm can coordinate the transport of
goods or services since, historically, agglomeration enabled ﬁrms to
“remain ‘in touch’ with one another” (Marshall, 1890 [1948], p.189).
So, colocation of partners or units within a ﬁrm generally creates sav-
ings on the cost of organising transactions (Grabher, 2002, p.209), and
improvements to communications improve the ease with each part of a
production process can be coordinated with the next. This would en-
able research and development, manufacturing, and marketing divisions
to seek out diﬀerent points of least transport (i. e. lowest ton-mile cost)
and maximal labour beneﬁt (i. e. best labour index) while remaining in
close contact.
Spatial Implications
In ﬁnance, the shi from actual trading ﬂoors to virtual ones (Weidner,
2006), as well as to electronic trading platforms (Kharouf, 2002), frees
brokerages to use locations that are quite far removed—by historical
standards—from the physical trading ﬂoors and exchanges that they
replaced (Engelen, 2007, p.1318). So if distance is no longer strictly rel-
evant, then information in the era of digital telecommunications would
seem to be more like a Weberian ubiquity than a localised input. Us-
ing this approach, we could argue that ﬁrms which use information as
an input and deliver it as an output would be free from the interlinked
historical constraints of distance and time. This is, in fact, exactly the
dynamic that Cairncross (1997) was highlighting when she coined the
term ‘the death of distance’.
However, remember too that this consequence presumes that ﬁrms
have no other inputs, outputs, or dependencies. This critical point oen
seems forgotten in the rush by ‘technologists’ to evaluate the impact of
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the telecommunications revolution on patterns of human activity. If the
transport cost of information tends towards zero, that only implies that
other location factors will become correspondingly more important to
the ﬁrm. Removing one production dependency does not remove them
all, it simply alters the applicable production and labour indexes.
At the limit, a ﬁrm that relied solely on a particular type of skilled
labour and on ubiquitous data in its production process should be will-
ing to ‘deviate’ over almost any distance in order to access the right
labour pool. In Weberian terms: the labour index would tend to inﬁn-
ity. Soware development provides a particularly good case study: in
eﬀect, multinational ﬁrms like  have established facilities in India to
take advantage of the lower cost of skilled labour in cities like Banga-
lore and Hyderabad, and of the negligible cost of shipping the resulting
source code around the world (Lohr, 2007).
Summary
Lösch (1954 [1973], p.27) has argued that Weber’s model was funda-
mentally ﬂawed by the assumption that factory location had no eﬀect
on demand, and we began this section by noting some other important
issues with this approach to location. However, as it becomes nearly
as easy to move around the world as around town, it is worth asking
to what extent global markets function more like Weber’s model than
they do like Lösch’s? In fact, Weber’s analysis of industrial location
proves surprisingly resilient to the transition to an information-driven
economy, and we have shown that the concepts of both transport uni-
formity and ton-mile shipping costs can be adapted fairly easily to the
21st Century, not least because the ton-mile is—at heart—functionally
equivalent to the economic cost of transport considered in Chapter 2.
However, we have also noted the rather important caveat that we should
think in terms of network distance rather than geographical distance,
because the conjunction of advanced telecommunications and upper
tier infrastructure mean that we can no longer treat the world as a plain.
We have brieﬂy touched on the way that technology and commu-
nication might be changing the way in which production itself is or-
ganised. Traxler and Luger (2000, p.284) summarised the activities of
ﬁrms as follows: “[they] try to ﬁnd optimal locations for parts of the
production process and cooperate to minimise risks/costs…” The no-
tion that the production process is divisible is hardly new: although
Weber typically treated the ﬁrm as a point in space, he recognised that
it was not necessarily an ‘atomic’ entity, and that production could also
be treated as a series of discrete steps in separate facilities (1909 [1969],
pp.128–129). L’Harmet (Bellet and L’Harmet, 1998) shows how this
change transforms the ﬁrm into a network of interconnected processes,
each with its own costs and locational logic.
In much the same vein, Haig suggested that we think of the com-
pany as a ‘packet of functions’ which, as it changes over time, also
changes the ﬁrm’s spatial requirements (1926b, p.418); he notes that:
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Fabrication as a function by itself gains nothing from being located on
high-priced land. But in the industrial packet there are other functions in
varying proportions, which do gain materially because of the contacts af-
forded by the central sites. The industries that are leaving Manhattan are
those in whose packets these other functions are relatively unimportant.
Haig, 1926b, pp.426–427
However, Haig went further than this, and he explicitly connected
agglomeration in the  to the ﬂow of information (“transportation
of intelligence”) within ﬁrms and between ﬁrms (1926b, p.427). And
if we look again at Table 3.1 on page 86 then we see that many ﬁrms
still rate proximity to others (and especially to customers) highly. But
if telecoms were truly making information a ubiquity then why would
this be the case? And while the new virtual trading ﬂoors are some
distance from the physical ones, we still ﬁnd ﬁnancial ﬁrms in very close
proximity to one another.
Information as Input Information as Ubiquity
Financial Services Soware as a Product
Personal Services Call Centre Operations
†Here we force sectors into one category or the other, though as we will see later
there is really a continuum of informational usage.
Table 3.2: Sectoral Aspects of
Information Usage†
In short, we have some cases where information behaves like a lo-
calised input exerting an important eﬀect on ﬁrm behaviour, and others
where it resembles a ubiquity. But why is this the case? And what are
the characteristics of the information being employed that cause it to
behave in one way or the other? Our review has already encompassed
examples from several diﬀerent sectors, and I have listed them in Table
3.2. Accounting for this dichotomy is the challenge of Section 3.3.
3.3 Theory of Markets & Risk
The explanation that I will put forward is that we need to under-
stand the spatial behaviour of sectors in the context of market opac-
ity. Weber’s model is quite straightforward in its treatment of markets:
implicitly, it is possible, and even quite easy for a ﬁrm to price in-
puts—whether material or intellectual—from diﬀerent sources and to
determine prevailing prices in distant markets. However, the model
fails to account for the distribution of information, both in terms of
the means of distribution itself and in terms of the distribution of the
information needed for pricing a transaction or contract.
Vance (1970, p.156) has already connected information access to
market structure, noting that it will spread further ‘along the lines of
best intelligence ﬂow’. However, a more extensive analysis is set out by
Clark and O’Connor (1997) who argue that the spatial preferences of
producers of ﬁnancial products are connected to the varying levels of
informational ‘content’ in ﬁnancial markets. My intention here is to
demonstrate that their approach is relevant to all industries, and that it
brings us closer to an underlying issue identiﬁed by Coase (1937, p.398)
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which is that the ﬁrm does not exist solely as a result of the division of
labour, but also as a means of managing risk and uncertainty.
Market Opacity
Financial products make a particularly good case study because they
are immaterial and information-based. So if we ﬁnd aspects of ﬁrm
behaviour here which suggest that information is still a locational in-
put, then it is reasonable to suppose that we may ﬁnd them in many
other sectors as well. In fact, this is exactly what we will discover in
Clark and O’Connor’s (1997) examination of the ﬁnancial markets,
and their grouping into three categories—transparent, translucent, and
opaque—based on the informational content of products traded. Em-
pirical support for this tripartite categorisation comes from Engelen
(2007) and Faulconbridge et al. (2007a) in their analyses of the de-
cline of trading activity in Amsterdam following the Dutch exchange’s
merger with Paris-based Euronext.
T M: In transparent markets the value of a partic-
ular ﬁnancial product can be easily veriﬁed using standard metrics so
that “the information needed to trade does not require interpretation”
(Engelen, 2007, p.1308). Consequently, trading in transparent markets
can be routinised and requires relatively little specialised knowledge or
information (2007, p.1308). Mutual funds indexed to market compos-
ites such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average or Standard & Poor’s S&P
500 index are good examples of this, and transparency also increases the
ease with which competitors can enter the market.
What transparent ﬁnancial markets do require is scale: the thresh-
olds (liquidity, ﬁnancing, etc.) for proﬁtable operation in a transparent
market will tend to limit operations to only the very largest, global ex-
changes (Clark and O’Connor, 1997, p.103). These enormous volumes
are necessarily underpinned by sophisticated and expensive trading plat-
forms, as well as skilled personnel (1997, p.101), so the market for the
underlying systems is surprisingly small and may extend no further than
the three global hubs of Tokyo, London, and New York. In contrast,
on the consumer side the movement to digital trading systems enables
trading to happen from afar, so the retail markets are very large indeed.
O M: On the other hand, opaque markets “have a low
level of standardization, and are small in number, small in size, illiquid,
and hence risky” (Engelen, 2007, p.1307). In an opaque market infor-
mation is much more likely to be distributed asymmetrically (Clark and
O’Connor, 1997, p.98) and there is an element of trust that the seller
has correctly assessed the risk embodied in a derivative or other com-
plex instrument5. The inability of such products to scale and the unique 5 Or, in some cases, trust that
they are not betting against the
product that they’ve just sold you
(Morgenson and Story, 2009).
features of each product mean that opaque markets appear to place a
premium on local, oen un-traded information as a way to mitigate the
level of risk involved in such investments.
ﬁrms, markets and risk 95
Real Estate Investment Trusts (s) and algorithmic trading sys-
tems are two examples of opaque products (Clark and O’Connor, 1997,
p.99)6, but the turmoil in the derivatives market as a result of the ‘sub- 6 Although the latter trade pre-
dominantly transparent products
such as stocks and foreign exchange
() their workings are based on
the application of highly-sensitive
computing resources. And while
the scale of turnover—an average
of $1.2 trillion per day for April
2001 (Clark and Thri, 2003,
p.7)—might suggest that this is
an entirely transparent market,
what we seem to see here are ﬁrms
creating ways to make some aspects
of its operation largely opaque.
prime mortgage crisis’ serves to illustrate the point more eﬀectively.
Opacity in the underlying mortgage market results from the fact that
each mortgage is unique and that knowledge of the real level of risk for
any one loan is quite poorly distributed. So, historically these products
were managed by community-based banks with detailed knowledge of
the local context such as the borrower’s ﬁnancial history, the regional
housing market, and so on.
From the mid-1990s, mortgages began to be aggregated and sold on
to national and global investors in collateralised debt. Crucially, this
process depended on the assumption that the degree of risk had been
mitigated through the use of statistics to create seniority tranches with
well-deﬁned risk proﬁles. Unfortunately, this approach overlooked
two key issues: ﬁrst, that the models might fail in unusual market con-
ditions; and second, the growth of conﬂicting incentives: mortgage
originators had little or no money at stake in the event of a default, but
could reap enormous rewards for sourcing large mortgages from less
creditworthy households. The failure of the former has led Economist
(2010a) to assert that the “ﬁnancial crisis may the ﬁrst major crisis of
‘big data’, but it will not be the last.”
The pervasiveness of Collateralised Debt Obligations (s) as a
ﬁnancing and investment vehicle, along with their endless repackaging
into new products, meant that it was diﬃcult to know who was on the
hook and for how much in the increasingly likely event of a default.
The degree to which the mortgage market remains fundamentally
murky can be inferred from the fact that by the end of 2007 Goldman
Sachs was valuing each dollar’s worth of its mortgage securities at 67.5¢,
while other ﬁrms still carried them at 90¢, an astonishing divergence
“among traders who are all supposed to be sophisticated” (Cohan,
2010).
What is particularly interesting about the ensuing carnage is that it
reveals the extent to which opaque markets are still deeply rooted in
trust between both individuals and ﬁrms. The spread of mistrust nearly
brought about the collapse of the entire ﬁnancial system: bankers simply
did not believe the statements being made by trading counterparties
and sought to reduce their exposure to this market and to shore up their
own balance sheets as quickly as possible. The deleveraging process had
signiﬁcant collateral impacts in the ﬁnancial sector—leading directly to
the nationalisation of Northern Rock (Economist, 2007a)—but also for
businesses far from the property market. We will return to the issue of
trust in Chapter 5.
T M: Lying on the continuum between transparent
and opaque are translucent markets; here, products acquire “particu-
lar characteristics [that] are deliberately designed by institutions to be
diﬀerent from the standard, industry reference product” (Clark and
O’Connor, 1997, p.96). The degree of translucency can be actively
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managed, and this manipulation need not be malign: a valuable service
is performed by intermediaries that eﬀectively ‘move’ products from
one type of market to another by repackaging them as a tradeable as-
set (Engelen, 2007, p.1321). So ﬁrms engaged in the production of
translucent ﬁnancial instruments are converting “opaque assets to easily
recognisable and tradeable properties (risk, return, liquidity) and [en-
abling] the construction of higher-order assets using these properties as
building blocks” (ibid.).
Integral to the functioning of this market are the credit rating ﬁrms
who, as Sassen (2002, p.23) puts it, “turn ‘interpretation’ into ‘informa-
tion’”. The rating ﬁrms do not themselves take positions in the prod-
ucts that they rate, but they enable other ﬁrms to do so: in the bond
market, the monoline insurers use their own, and the raters’, inputs to
determine whether to act as guarantors of the opaque assets being of-
fered for sale. The monoline ﬁrms eﬀectively loan their  standing
to municipalities issuing bonds; this is a fairly low-risk and low-return
market, but one that is well-understood and where returns come largely
from scale. However, these insurers eventually diversiﬁed into the more
exotic market for s (Economist, 2007b, 2008a), enabling opaque
debt to be sold on in products purportedly suitable for institutional
investors such as banks and funds.
Clark and O’Connor (1997) link each market type to a spatial scale
(see Table 3.3): transparent ﬁnancial products will be distributed
through the largest exchanges so as to take advantage of greater liq-
uidity, while opaque products will generally be created and sold lo-
cally. Meanwhile, on the purchasing side transparent products can be
eﬀectively procured from anywhere in the world through standard-
ised trading systems, signiﬁcantly loosening the bonds of proximity,
while opaque products cannot, and so are likely to be obtained through
shorter chains of buyers and sellers with connections to the originating
market.
Transparent Products Translucent Products Opaque Products
Market Scope Global National/Transnational Local
Agents Global Financial
Institutions
Hedge Funds/
Specialised Traders
Local Brokers
Example Gold, Blue Chips,
Foreign Exchange
()
Credit-based
Derivatives,
Asset-backed
Securities, Futures
Private equity,
Commodities,
Shares of
Small/Mid-Cap
Firms
Table 3.3: Opacity Characteristics
(aer Clark and O’Connor, 1997,
p.99 and Faulconbridge et al.,
2007a)
Table 3.3 enables us to reﬁne Weber’s locational theory by mapping
ubiquitous and localised informational inputs on to the typology of
transparent and opaque markets. We can turn to the introduction of
the telegraph—sometimes referred to as ‘the Victorian Internet’ (cf.
Standage, 1998)—for an example of how changes to the transparency
of a market may play out in practice. The telegraph network spread
out across the Eastern Seaboard, and in particular along the Erie Canal
and towards Chicago, but Figure 3.5 (on page 97) neatly illustrates the
central role that New York City played as the place where goods and
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information were gathered from across America and transmitted into
global relationships via “Steamer[s] Atlantic bound for Liverpool” (Barr,
1853).
Vance (1970, p.97) set out a fuller discussion of how this ‘align-
ment’ was driven by the geographically ‘fortunate’ combination of New
York’s position at the intersection between navigable rivers and canals,
and an oceangoing trade across the Atlantic enabled by an ice-free
harbour (Townsend and Moss, 2008, p.25)7. However, in the age of 7 The growth of entrepôt cities like
New York also provides a mech-
anism for economic development
that is detached from the organised
hierarchies of Christaller’s central
places (Vance, 1970, p.85); in that
sense I believe that it represents
a more robust model for urban
growth that accords well with Ja-
cobs’ 1969 equally radical approach
to ‘cities in civilisation’.
clippers and steamships a message could easily take more than a week
to cross the Atlantic, and more than 45 days to reach Australia from
Britain (BBC, 2005c). The arrival of the undersea telegraph cables
radically changed all this, with messages now taking just 24 hours to
be relayed to anywhere in the world that was served by a submarine
or overland cable (ibid.). Such was the demand for transoceanic com-
munication, that the ﬁrst reliable link between between Porthcurno,
Cornwall and America did £1,000 worth of business on its ﬁrst day of
operation (BBC, 2005c), roughly £60,000 in today’s terms (National
Archives, 2006).
Figure 3.5: Telegraph stations in
the United States, the Canadas &
Nova Scotia (Detail from Barr,
1853; reproduced with permission)
Unsurprisingly, brokers and speculators were the ﬁrst to make ‘early
and avid use’ of the telegraph because it “allowed small time delays to
be exploited…for proﬁt, by entrepreneurial capitalists” (Graham, 2004,
p.44). But the ability to relay this information quickly and easily across
the country also provided an important impetus to the centralisation of
commodities and securities markets; indeed, the very existence of Wall
Street seemingly owes a great deal to the impact of the telegraph in the
period between 1850 and 1880. The increased circulation of pricing
information made it more eﬃcient (and competitively advantageous) for
traders to exploit New York’s position as an entrepôt for both goods and
information heading inland or overseas (Tarr, 2004, p.45).
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I would like to point out, however, that this typology of transparency
need not be limited to ﬁnancial markets alone. To boil it down to the
bare minimum, opacity is simply a measure of the ease with which in-
formation about a product circulates in the market and, as such, can
be applied to any market, and the trade of any entrepôt can extend
outwards as far as the limits of commercial intelligence (Vance, 1970,
p.156). In the case of ﬁnancial markets it is information about the price
of commodities and securities whose circulation aﬀects the incentives
for centralisation and dispersal, but we can just as easily compare other
markets in this way: the market for soware (especially as it concerns
the distinction between soware as a service and an oﬀ-the-shelf prod-
uct) or the market for healthcare (especially as it concerns the pricing of
services) for instance. In each of these cases, the market and prices for
opaque goods and services are characterised by smaller overall scales and
higher levels of uncertainty with regards to value.
Uncertainty & Risk
The market modelled by Weber becomes signiﬁcantly more complex
with the addition of opacity. What the preceding section sought to
make clear is that there is an important connection between opacity,
uncertainty, and risk. Technically, there is “a distinction between risk,
which can be assessed in terms of quantiﬁable likelihood, and uncer-
tainty, where probabilities cannot be attached to possible outcomes”
(Gray, 2009, p.13); so although I will tend to use the uncertainty and
risk interchangeably for stylistic purposes, I wish to note that they are
not the same. However, using this formal deﬁnition it should be clear
that in transparent markets there is always risk, but it is broadly under-
stood and truly unexpected shis are rare, whereas in opaque markets
there are basic uncertainties in addition to risk.
T B   F: The interaction between information
and space means that some degree of uncertainty now intrudes into
every action undertaken by the ﬁrm: buying, selling, expanding, and
diversifying. As a result, there are hidden costs to employing the market
as a coordination tool: the cost of discovering the relevant prices for
a good or service; the overhead of negotiating pricing and delivery;
and the management of contracts (Coase, 1937, pp.390–391)8. The 8 In addition, cultural and in-
stitutional variations at the level
of regions or nations can lead to
greater or lesser degrees of un-
certainty: the Economist (2010f)
suggests that the size of Tata Hold-
ings in India is directly related to a
lack of trust in the institutions that
manage markets
ﬁrm can address these costs by internalising those steps that are most
vulnerable to failure, so the degree of vertical or horizontal integration
of a ﬁrm is a measure of how far it will go to suppress ‘the market’
for a good or service upon which it depends (1937, p.389). However,
the ﬁrm must now manage functions or inputs that, in an optimal
environment, could be secured more eﬃciently in an open market
where greater economies of scale and competition prevail. In short, as
the ﬁrm grows it may actually become less eﬃcient.
Coase (1937, pp.395–397) summarises the interaction between risk
and cost as follows: the ﬁrm will tend to grow if the cost of organising
transactions is low and these costs increase slowly with the number of
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transactions; the ﬁrm will also tend to grow if size reduces the likeli-
hood of ‘mistakes’ (e.g. through an ability to research the market or
plan superior products) or the probability of a mistake only increases
slowly with the number of transactions; and ﬁnally, the ﬁrm will also
tend to grow if increases in the scale of production also enable it to ben-
eﬁt from lower prices for inputs. This does not mean that the ﬁrm’s
transactions are homogeneous, and ﬁrms that diversify or deal with
many suppliers may ﬁnd that both costs and mistakes increase with the
dissimilarity of its transactions.
In sum, the boundary of the ﬁrm is determined by the point where
the marginal beneﬁts of internalisation are oﬀset by the marginal dis-
beneﬁts of expansion:
A ﬁrm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra transac-
tion within the ﬁrm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market.
Coase, 1937, p.395
In this same vein, Scott (1986, p.219) notes that “the line that divides
the internal hierarchy [of the ﬁrm] from the external market…is ﬁxed
at the point where the relative eﬃciencies of managements and markets
are equal.” And the probability of mistakes increases with ﬁrm size
because it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to coordinate activity (1937,
p.397). The point where these tradeoﬀs emerge varies by industry since
both uncertainty and risk diﬀer from sector to sector (Coase, 1937,
p.395).
S, I  E I: Although a transaction
between ﬁrms can take many forms, Charlot and Duranton’s model of
a two-stage project with ‘search’ and ‘implementation’ phases enables
us to elaborate on how risk and uncertainty can vary with the market
(2006, p.1368) and impose spatial costs on the ﬁrm. The search phase
identiﬁes suitable partners for a subsequent implementation—whether
the installation of a piece of hardware or the establishment of a sci-
entiﬁc collaboration—while the implementation phase is ‘simply’ its
execution; note, however, that the beneﬁts of the ‘transaction’ must
exceed the combined costs of both phases for a project to be considered
worthwhile.
Diﬀerent products and industries obviously have diﬀerent balances
between the two types of costs, leading to diﬀerent communications
tradeoﬀs (Charlot and Duranton, 2006, p.1383). In general, the search
phase in a transparent market should be relatively less expensive because
comparisons can be readily drawn between competing products, while
the search phase in an opaque market will be longer and involve greater
eﬀort because features may be more diﬃcult to compare. Moreover,
these costs may also be encountered with varying frequencies: in a
recurring context even modest search or implementation costs may add
up quite rapidly, so anything that improves the likelihood of a successful
match between buyers and sellers will prove a major competitive asset.
We can connect this approach to the more traditional distinction
between ‘search’ and ‘experience’ goods. Search goods have qualities
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that can be easily assessed—a computer chip’s clock speed or a book’s
price—while experience goods such as an education or a consultancy’s
advice reveal their true value through ‘use’, typically over an extended
period of time. Following Charlot and Duranton’s model, we expect
experience goods to have both higher search and higher implemen-
tation costs: they are more diﬃcult to compare in the ﬁrst place, and
there is an increased likelihood that usage will reveal a signiﬁcant fail-
ure. Anything that decreases the probability of a successful outcome
increases the relative cost of searching.
The success of web sites such as Amazon.com and Ebay.com—ﬁrms
without any kind of physical shop-front at all—suggests that many
people have comparatively little compunction about sourcing search
goods from far away. This aspect of transparent markets may help to
explain why early thinking about e-commerce was so wildly oﬀ-base:
there were those who anticipated using Virtual Reality () goggles
to explore virtual aisles and dress avatars designed to show us what we
might look like wearing our chosen attire; and there were those who
expected the online market to be limited largely to those conﬁned to
the home by illness, or unable to make it to the shops because of work-
related commitments (cf. Graham and Marvin, 1996, pp.155–156).
Instead, the experience of online shopping is much less sophisticated,
but the market is vastly larger.
However, the growing prominence of user reviews on sites such as
TripAdvisor represents something altogether more interesting. Us-
ing the terminology of opacity, we can think of such sites as creating a
translucent market where only opacity existed. In particular, cultural
products are “about taste, not performance and so, unlike a dishwasher
or a computer or even a car, there is no method or even means to evalu-
ate how well it performs” (Currid, 2007, p.4). Cultural artefacts such as
books, ﬁlms, and music may be opaque to the extent that we have dif-
ﬁculty determining which symphony or director is ‘best’, but they are
also transparent to the extent that once we have made a choice of per-
formance we can also source the tickets or recording from anywhere9.
9 The opacity of cultural goods
means that their value is largely
contingent upon experience, and so it
is preferable to purchase them using
mechanisms that short-circuit the
search process. Recommendations
from others are a good way to
improve the odds of a successful
match, but working out who to
‘trust’ can be a time-consuming
and cognitively costly process (this
was the function that an ‘aggrega-
tor’ of reviews such as Zagats or the
Good Food Guide served). Instead,
the tools that enable Amazon,
TripAdvisor, and other web sites
to oﬀer increasingly accurate rec-
ommendations are made possible
by what Economist (2010c) calls
‘big data’, in which our own actions
are used to ﬁnd and feature recom-
menders who ‘look’ like we do, and
to make recommendations based
on people who ‘act’ like we do.
Behaviourally-driven recommen-
dations encourage us to complete
the purchase of a good that we
might previously have insisted on
handling or listening to in-person.
Telecommunications enables “information about search goods [to]
be provided on the Internet in a more accessible, less costly, and more
customizable way” (Weltevreden et al., 2005, p.68), and we can see
how this will aﬀect the boundaries between transparency, translucency,
and opacity. However, telecommunications is also unlikely to aﬀect
the most complex experience-oriented purchases except in as much as
it creates ways of improving the implementation phase (e.g. distance
learning or the simulcast of live opera into movie theatres10). So while
10 Interestingly, this latter example
harkens back to the 19th Century’s
Electrophone subscription service,
which used the phone system to
pipe live music into subscribers’
homes (BBC News, 2010).
we might expect that online ‘classrooms’ create new ways for univer-
sities to compete in the continuing education ﬁeld, the creation of
campuses in China and the Middle East by British and American insti-
tutions suggests that many such complex goods and services still require
a good deal of eﬀort in implementation.
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A: Ultimately, inventions that bring a ﬁrm’s factors of
production ‘closer together’ will increase the maximum size of a ﬁrm
by reducing the costs of spatial organisation and degree of risk (Coase,
1937, p.397). Linking the notion of opacity back to the study of in-
frastructure in Chapter 2, we can see how buyers and sellers in opaque,
complex, and uncertain markets will prioritise access to networks that
reduce perceived distance. Clark and Thri (2003, p.15) note that in
the Foreign Exchange () market, “under conditions of uncertainty,
traders bunch together at…[particular] moments in time and space for
more information”; crucially, Clark and Thri do not specify whether
this proximity is physical or virtual since both types have value for 
traders.
The link between various types of proximity and the improved
management of risk and uncertainty may help to explain why we have
historically seen increases in both telecommunications usage and busi-
ness travel—it is the conjunction of the two that enables ﬁrms to bridge
the problems inherent in long distance interactions, and not either
mechanism in isolation. However, the extent to which some form of
proximity is required varies with the degree of opacity of the market:
ﬁrms operating in opaque markets will tend to require more proximity
in general, while those operating in transparent markets will need less of
both physical and electronic proximity.
As a result, ﬁrms in transparent markets will generally experience
greater freedom of movement. Developments that improve trans-
parency of a market and lower search costs by, for instance, improving
the ability of the ﬁrm to determine the relevant prices for inputs or out-
puts, or reducing the cost of contracting and coordination, are all likely
to aﬀect the range of suitable locations for a ﬁrm. So one outcome of
the impact of telecommunications is larger ﬁrms with more widely dis-
tributed production facilities that remain nonetheless tightly integrated
and controlled from headquarters.
T: Putting this all together, we can see telecommunications
will have a disproportionate impact in markets where information cir-
culates easily. In particular, we would expect to see enormous changes
for search goods in transparent markets where the nature or quality of
the product does not vary with its source. It is this ability to buy from
anywhere and sell from just a few accessibility-favoured locations that
allows the contemporary retail ﬁrm to try to oﬀer “everything from
books and electronics to tennis rackets and diamond jewellry” (com,
2009). The consequences of this change should not be underestimated:
the degree to which customers are willing to purchase s, books,
or clothing online has important implications for retail in city centres
(Weltevreden et al., 2005, p.67). Table 3.4 provides an overview of how
we might expect diﬀerent combinations of search and implementation
costs to aﬀect the behaviour of ﬁrms.
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High Telecommunications likely to have
minimal impact as the
transactional cost is still extremely
high with little advantage to
distance-enabling technologies.
Although ease of searching will
increase competition, the high
cost of implementation will
encourage a reliance on accessible
providers.
Low The lower cost of implementation
may enable more distant
competitors to bid for business,
but intensive selection methods
(s, etc.) and word-of-mouth
are still likely to apply.
Radical reduction in search costs
and minimal implementation costs
would be expected to encourage
intense price-oriented
competition on a larger scale.
Table 3.4: Expected Impact of
Telecommunications on Transac-
tional Cost Structures
Where market opacity implies that information is poorly-distributed,
then we may anticipate that the telecoms ‘revolution’ will have rather
less impact. That said, it is diﬃcult to deterministically link any one
technology to a spatial outcome: the phone may lower the risks of
internalising transactions through improved coordination, but it may
also decrease the cost of organising transactions in the market (Coase,
1937, p.397). The location selected by a ﬁrm depends on the ‘ﬁeld of
possible locations deﬁned by current technology’, and so improvements
in transport and communications technology can enlarge that ﬁeld in
signiﬁcant ways (Vance, 1970, p.131), but the key point is that these
may also generate eﬀects within the ﬁrm that counteract this nascent
ﬂexibility.
Spatial Implications
The Economist Intelligence Unit (2006, p.58) suggests that in the
coming decades, labour-intensive, high-volume, and cheap-to-ship
products (especially those where the consumer in price-sensitive) will
be produced almost exclusively in low-wage countries, while small
volume, capital-intensive goods that are diﬃcult to ship will continue to
be produced in developed countries. However, if we draw together the
two-stage—search and implementation—transaction and the concept
of market opacity, then we can make some additional predictions about
how ﬁrms will use space. In transparent markets, the tradeoﬀs between
potential parties can be assessed from a distance, making telecoms
a viable substitute for direct interaction during the search phase. In
opaque markets, the importance of localised knowledge is likely to
make for more complex searching and implementation phases for which
technology may be no substitute and where, consequently, the cost of
travel may be a major factor in locational decisions.
The conclusion reached by Clark and O’Connor (1997, p.89) in
their analysis is that ‘geography still matters’, and that there is no evi-
dence to support the kind of placelessness originally anticipated. In the
case of ﬁnancial markets, Clark and O’Connor (1997) echo Christaller
and Lösch when they state that: “Just as with a set of retail centres,
where diﬀerences in range and threshold lead to hierarchies of out-
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lets, so in the production of ﬁnancial instruments the hierarchical pat-
tern reﬂects supply-side considerations” (Clark and O’Connor, 1997,
p.103). So this notion of transparency brings us back to market areas
but, within limits, we can now frame the market in terms of the infor-
mational characteristics of space rather than the physical ones.
As the earlier discussion of the mortgage market (see page 94) should
have made clear, opaque markets naturally tend to privilege detailed,
locally-available data (Engelen, 2007, p.1309). Hedge and venture
capital () funds operate in such an environment and typically work
closely with the ﬁrms in which they take a major stake. The ‘costs’ of
monitoring investments suggests that funds and s will tend to invest
in ﬁrms to which they have ready access or with which they have some
form of prior relationship. Where the opportunity is particularly good
but the ﬁrm is not nearby, they they may work through syndicates
acting as a local proxy (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008).
Although there is seemingly no empirical research into the matter,
I believe that we can understand the decision of the ‘hedgies’ to base
themselves in Mayfair in a similar fashion. First, the City of London
is less accessible than West London for ﬁrms engaged in many long-
term relationships across Europe and, more importantly, the Atlantic;
from Green Park it is just 10 minutes by taxi to Paddington, and 15
more by the express train to Heathrow. Second, West London has
greater amenity value for the high-net worth individuals that form both
the labour pool and the client pool for the funds11. And third, while a 11 One story—probably apoc-
ryphal—related to me by a fund
manager suggests that one of the
ﬁrst ﬁrms to arrive in London
chose Mayfair because “the fund
manager’s wife liked the shopping
in the area”. Amenity may also
play a role in the presence of major
property developers in Mayfair,
who are similarly free of the need
to be in the City.
bank simply would not be taken seriously without oﬃces in the City
or in Canary Wharf, the hedge funds had no such speciﬁc landmarks
towards which to gravitate: a non-London location would have been
unappealing for American transplants and a barrier to access by clients
and employees, but an East London location had signiﬁcant drawbacks
for non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Summary
The ability to access or transfer information nearly instantaneously has
obviously changed contemporary society in a myriad of ways, but our
long association with the land line, the fax, and other forms of telecom-
munications sometimes makes it diﬃcult to see the just how great their
impact on markets can be. So it is helpful to draw on evidence from
developing countries in contemporary Africa and Asia where telecom-
munications access has been, until recently, very limited. The point of
these examples is that we shouldn’t think of individuals and ﬁrms as be-
ing passive operators in markets with ﬁxed transparency characteristics,
but rather as active shapers of those markets.
The best-known case study is the eﬀect of mobile phone access on
the income of Keralan ﬁshermen: during the course of the study, aver-
age market prices for ﬁsh fell by 4% but average proﬁts per-ﬁsherman
rose by 8% because the risk of ‘boom or bust’ in the supply of ﬁsh fell
dramatically (Economist, 2009c). Local markets had previously been
inaccessible (i. e. opaque) while the ﬁshermen were at sea, but using
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mobile phones they could could access price data in a transparent fash-
ion and determine which port was oﬀering the best price for their type
of catch. A similar process is at work in Vietnam, where small tailors,
repair shops, and producers use their phones to check on local markets
and even document business transactions via  (TechReview, 2007).
Widespread usage of mobile infrastructure also creates interesting
new business models: Economist (2009c) cites the example of an In-
dian barber who, by giving up a physical store and using his mobile
to schedule at-home appointments with clients, increased his prof-
its signiﬁcantly. Google Trader in Kenya allows buyers and sellers to
specify via  what goods they require or have available to sell and at
what price, eﬀectively aggregating dispersed, opaque markets into a
single centralised, transparent one (Economist, 2009d). In these cases
telecommunications is very directly substituting for costly journeys on
poor-quality infrastructure, replacing them with a level of transparency
that reduces the costs to small traders of doing business in a developing
country. Another example of mobile communications replacing travel
is Eagle (2010), which uses s to distribute ‘micro-tasks’ (e.g. trans-
lation) for processing by individuals in remote locations (e.g. parts of
Africa and Asia), and sophisticated soware to assemble the responses
into a ‘macro-result’.
The above cases all describe situations in which a market was opaque
because of constraints on the circulation of pricing data; which is to
say that there was seemingly nothing innately opaque about ﬁshing
and farming that innovation in the collection and dissemination of data
could not address. However, the same is not necessarily true of the
ﬁnancial markets examined by Engelen (2007); in the case of the more
specialised products it is not simply a matter of determining the correct
price for a good because the complexity of the product’s experiential
dimensions may make it diﬃcult, or even impossible, to value in an
objective way. The importance of trust in such markets makes it a form
of ‘relational investing’ (Clark and O’Connor, 1997, p.98) because
the buyer relies on their relationship with the seller as a ‘guarantee’
of the product’s ﬁtness for purpose. In such a context, ‘customs and
conventions’ will play an important role (1997, p.106), and the extent to
which these can be created or sustained via telecommunications will be
considered in Chapter 5.
3.4 Theory of Spatial Transaction Patterns
We have established in a general way that the ﬁrm can be understood as
a ‘system of economic transactions’ (Scott, 1983a, p.235) whose bound-
ary is aﬀected by risk and by the type of market. We can now deepen
our appreciation of how the type and distribution of transactions af-
fects the dynamics of ﬁrm strategy by examining four dimensions of
transactional costs: 1) the degree of standardisation; 2) the degree of
integration; 3) the nature of inter-ﬁrm linkages; and 4) the role of tech-
nology (Scott, 1983a, pp.236–242). For Scott, ﬁrms that standardise
and integrate stages of production, manage linkages to reduce the risk
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of coordination or market failure, and employ technology to substi-
tute for workers, will demonstrate a diminished spatial dependency on
suppliers.
Of course, the degree to which technology and capital can substitute
for labour will vary by industry: logically, it will be lower in creative
sectors where the innovative dimension of work is diﬃcult to deskill,
and higher in the manufacturing and farming sectors where increasingly
complex processes are subject to automation (cf. Strickland, 2007). So
while there is scope for large ﬁrms to seize control of some types of
stable markets, in other industries underlying transactional costs limit
the potential for economies of scale and permit the persistence, or even
dominance, of small-run, labour-intensive ﬁrms (Scott, 1983a, p.236).
And this variation can even exist within the ﬁrm: the same decision-
making process may be automated in some cases, and personalised
in others, depending on the scale and nature of the transaction under
consideration (cf. Haig, 1926b, p.438).
Aspects of Transactional Patterns
S: The ability to standardise the product, as well as the
process involved in its production or purchase, will obviously impact
the extent to which ﬁrms are able to expand and automate output.
Small-scale, customised manufacture—especially if the systems require
retooling each time the output changes (Scott, 1983a, p.246)—makes
eﬃcient queuing very diﬃcult. Thus the ‘high cost of idle capital’ and
the ‘relative adaptability of labour’ has historically meant that a lack
of standardisation required the use of labour-intensive production
methods (ibid.)12. 12 Scott (1983a, p.237) also indicates
that, at the sectoral level, we can
expect an increase in demand
for labour-intensive products to
encourage more plants, not larger
ones, because it will encourage
further specialisation and ‘vertical
disintegration’ (of which more in
Chapter 4) without a corresponding
increase in scale.
However, it is helpful to bear in mind that labour can be ‘standard-
ised’ through educational and normative processes: European animators
studied by Cole (2008) employed a variety of resources to develop a
common understanding of the work to be performed and of their roles
within it. The rationalisation of the animated ﬁlm industry enables
market participants to deﬁne ‘standard interfaces’ (i. e. inputs and out-
puts) that reduce the cost of coordination and allows animators in one
country to collaborate with producers in another. In this case, standard-
isation does not entail a de-skilling of the underlying work, but extends
its geographical scope.
The domestic aﬃliates of multi-national enterprises (s) oﬀer
another example of this process: according to Nachum and Keeble
(2003a, p.180), aﬃliates and subsidiaries in the Soho advertising sector
tend to use resources from diﬀerent spatial scales depending on the type
of interaction. More standardised interactions and transactions, such as
ﬁnancing or management tend to pass through the ’s internal global
network, whereas less structured ones, “notably those used as a source
of inspiration and creativity” (2003a, p.183), happen locally. So if we
deﬁne standardisation more generically as a kind of process- or role-
based modularity, such as in a set of agreed norms for service delivery
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or interaction, then the scope of telecommunications’ ability to impact
even very sophisticated ﬁrms becomes obvious.
L: Conversely, where interactions between ﬁrms or sectors
cannot be standardised, or entail signiﬁcant communication and co-
ordination activity, then they become comparatively costly per ‘unit
of ﬂow’ (Scott, 1983b, p.359). Here, intensity and lack of standardisa-
tion—which is to say with high search costs—make the process more
expensive for dispersed ﬁrms (Scott, 1986, p.224). In more mundane
terms, in a volatile or fast-moving environment, the more complex and
extensive the set of skills required at the meeting table, then the more
diﬃcult it is to manage it all via telecoms.
Scott (1983a, p.241) suggests that there are two types of inter-ﬁrm
linkages: “the physical ﬂow of inputs and outputs, and the inter-
personal contacts required for the purposes of transacting business
(including the negotiation of input-output linkages).” Subcontracting
is a particularly interesting type of linkage since it is designed to decou-
ple demand from the ﬁrm’s capital investment: small ﬁrms in volatile
industries cannot (and should not) take on staﬀ or expand plant to cope
with sudden, but reversible, increases in demand. In such markets,
Scott argues that producers will tend to be found in horizontally- and
vertically-disintegrated production systems because outsourcing reduces
their exposure while improving their ability to adapt to ﬂuctuations in
demand (1983b, p.360).
But as we have seen, vertical and horizontal disintegration does
not come without a cost: the overhead required to manage these ex-
ternal relationships. So where these linkages are small in scale, short
in duration, or require a great deal of interaction, they are also very
costly. Anything that reduces these costs constitutes a competitive
advantage (1983b, p.357; 1986, p.224). For many, it is in part the near-
instantaneous increases and decreases in demand aﬄicting cultural
industries—and the concomitant requirement for skills or capacity to
be brought on-stream or oﬀ-loaded with little or no notice—which
account for their tight spatial clustering in major cities (Currid, 2007,
p.83). Conversely, large and stable linkages reduce the overheads of
a link and may enable more costly linkages —such as those organised
over long distances—to become economically eﬃcient. Improvements
in communications will thus make deconcentration a viable locational
strategy for sectors where this was not always the case.
I: In contrast to subcontracting, integration is most likely to
occur when there are feed-back and feed-forward eﬀects that propagate
through linkages between ﬁrms (Scott, 1986, p.221). For instance, in
the oil industry it is logical for producers to integrate backwards with
the extraction industry so as to suppress the impact of ﬂuctuations in the
supply of crude oil (Scott, 1986, p.221). But for large-scale producers
of entertainment it is sensible to integrate forwards with distributors so
as to suppress demand-side risk by securing distribution channels for
output (cf. Scott, 1996, p.316).
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For more consumer-oriented goods and services, Robinson (1931
[1943], p.128) argues that integration is likely where ﬁrms compete on
the basis of quality and recommendations, and so need tight control
of the channel and the message that is received by consumers. The
implication here for retailers is that ﬁrms that produce high-margin,
luxury goods are likely to require “…high-quality ‘shoptainment’ stores
that provide personal service and/or an entertainment experience”
(Dodge, 2004, p.225). Apple’s investment in retail was driven by just
such issues: Steve Jobs, Apple’s , observes that “people haven’t been
willing to invest this much time and money or engineering in a store
before…It’s not important if the customer knows that. They just feel it.
They feel something’s a little diﬀerent” (Useem, 2007).
In fact, the Apple Stores now found in cities around the world may
well be the best example to-date of this type of integration; they ac-
complish four things with nearly unprecedented ease: they create an as-
sociation between Apple and premium ‘signifying locations’ (which also
happen to have a lot of foot traﬃc) such as Regent Street and SoHo;
they communicate a ‘brand message’ of elegance, simplicity, and re-
ﬁnement; they oﬀer a ‘personal touch’ in the form of on-site ‘Genius’
support staﬀ; and they make Apple’s products accessible to new users13.
13 A particularly clever touch is the
fact that, unlike many retailers, all
of Apple’s computers are connected
to the Internet, allowing users to
actually try out the e-mail client,
web browser, and other network-
enabled soware. It can sometimes
seem as though half of the visitors
to Apple’s Regent Street shop are
tourists making use of this facility
to send free email home.
The result is that even though Apple has less product on display than
iconic shops such as Tiﬀany’s, in 2007 the company averaged sales of
$4,032 per square foot, nearly twice that of the luxury jeweller (Useem,
2007).
Stable Market Unstable Market
Stable/ Standardised
Transactions
Horizontal Integration
(Scale Economies)
Vertical Disintegration
(Subcontracting)
Unstable/
Unstandardised
Transactions
Vertical Integration
(Input Management)
Horizontal Disintegration
(Concurrent
Contracting)
Table 3.5: Likely Outcomes of
Market & Transaction Stability
So, on the one hand vertical integration may occur when transac-
tion failures are common “because of information asymmetries and the
diﬃculty of policing contracts and claims in complex environments”
(Scott, 1986, p.220). But on the other hand, subcontracting (i. e. ver-
tical disintegration) may be a rational response when it is the markets
themselves that are uncertain because it allows companies to oﬄoad
risk (1984, p.21). Particularly uncertain markets may even mean that
the ﬁrm may actually come to rely on potential competitors for excess
capacity, using concurrent contracting to meet demand from its own
clients. These relationships are summarised in Table 3.5.
Agglomeration & Technology
A: For reasons established in Chapter 2, physical con-
centration reduces the costs associated with travel and the limitations of
poor-quality infrastructure (Cook et al., 2007, p.1340). Lower costs in-
crease both the frequency with which meetings can occur, and the abil-
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ity to set up many meetings in quick succession on short notice (2004,
p.31). This capacity is particularly important in complex transactional
environments such as those found in the City of London where it is
common to require the services of accountants, lawyers, and bankers at
the same meeting (2004, p.27).
The extent of the inter-dependencies in the City of London can be
gauged from Figure 3.6, drawn from Cook et al. (2004, p.25). The
ﬁgure shows the percentage of times that staﬀ in a ‘source’ industry
rated ﬁrms in a ‘destination’ industry as being of particular importance
to their business14. So employees in the Banking and Insurance sector 14 The question was phrased:
“Which types of ﬁrms do you
have the most important inter-
relationships with?” (Cook et al.,
2004, p.49). We should note,
however, that some of these results
are based on low sample sizes
(2004, p.26).
see themselves (and are seen by others) as the focal points of the City of
London’s ﬁnancial services agglomeration since they rate relationships
with other ﬁrms in the same sector as being of principal importance.
Employees of Fund/Asset Management ﬁrms rate relationships with
Banks, Investment Banks, and other Fund/Asset Management com-
panies as important, while Accounting staﬀ apparently see little value
in their intra-sectoral relationships, focussing almost exclusively on the
external ones.
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Figure 3.6: Sectoral Dependencies
in the City of London (Cook
et al., 2004, p.25; reproduced with
permission of the authors)
Although the costs—rent, labour, congestion, etc.—of doing busi-
ness are greater in a big city, Charlot and Duranton (2006, p.1371)
argue that the density of ﬁrms also increases the likelihood of a success-
ful match during the search phase of a project or transaction. So projects
that would not be viable in smaller cities because of the low probability
of a nearby match are nonetheless manageable in large agglomerations,
and this increases the frequency of successful, complex projects in large
cities (2006, p.1370). Clearly, the key here is the concentration of ﬁrms
and not population per se, so agglomeration need not occur in the Cen-
tral Business District () for ﬁrms to beneﬁt from more eﬃcient
matching mechanisms (Scott, 1984, p.25).
Improvements in technology reduce the cost of travel to more dis-
tant partners, representing an increase in the eﬀective area over which
agglomeration processes can occur. The ability of more distant ﬁrms to
still participate in a large central market implies that “decentralisation
strategies…[have] been encouraged by improvements in transportation
logistics” (Scott, 1986, p.227). However, I would argue that it is likely
that this is a localised deconcentration since the incentives for ﬁrms
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to congregate are not just a function of supply-side dynamics as a spe-
cialised cluster also draws buyers in from further aﬁeld (Marshall, 1890
[1948], p.273; Echenique, 2007, p.1785)15. 15 Research that attempted to
put a cost on travel has suggested
that although the monetary cost
per kilometre travelled increased
by 29% over the past ten years,
time cost per kilometre fell by
31% because of increased speed
(Echenique, 2007, p.1786). This
would seem to ﬁt with the idea
advanced in Chapter 2 of rising
travel distances for the purposes
of consumption. That said, as
Christaller and Lösch noted,
there is an important qualiﬁcation
here: the strength of the draw of
an agglomeration of specialised
ﬁrms is connected to the type
of product on oﬀer; there is an
enormous diﬀerence between
the distances that shoppers would
travel to compare basic goods and
specialised ones (Marshall, 1890
[1948], p.273).
T: Technological change clearly has the potential to desta-
bilise linkages and agglomerations because it enables more ﬂexible
connections to be established between agents, leading to “organisa-
tional shis and changes in in-sourcing and out-sourcing behaviours
with major impacts on regional economies” (Traxler and Luger, 2000,
p.280). And as Audirac (2002, p.217) notes: “…[Electronic Data In-
terchange] and [Just-In-Time] processes have allowed ﬁrms to integrate
production and distribution functions into centrally distributed systems,
where proximity to industry and population is less important than easy
access to transportation and  infrastructure.” In other words, tech-
nology is enabling increasingly complex linkages to behave like stable,
standardised ones.
We can also expect that spatial constraints on highly-skilled activities
will loosen over time as a process becomes routinised or ‘a previously
remote area gains in human capital’ (Scott and Pope, 2007, p.1368).
However,  deployments in some companies may not be so much
about increasing productivity per se as about deskilling or standardising
previously diﬃcult or expensive work so that it can be shied out to
lower-cost areas (Scott, 1986; Leamer and Storper, 2001; Wood, 2006;
Scott and Pope, 2007). In the ﬁlm industry, for instance, the switch
to digital technologies has displaced jobs working with ﬁlm, but it has
also led to a rise in postproduction services and to an increased capacity
for remote workers to collaborate eﬀectively with the major studios in
Hollywood (cf. Scott and Pope, 2007; Cole, 2008; SohoNet, 2008).
Over time, increasingly sophisticated technologies such as the 3-D
printer may spawn entirely new types of customised production with-
out the intensive involvement of labour (Economist, 2009a; Vance,
2010). However, mass customisation should not be confused with
custom manufacture, and even such ﬂexible systems as these are un-
likely to be economical for the creation of truly bespoke outputs for
some time. Moreover, skilled designers and equipment operators will
still be required throughout the production of unstandardised outputs,
suggesting that ‘new work’ will be created even as once-skilled tasks
are subsumed by technology. In this I very much agree with Jacobs
(1969, 1961 [2002]) on the role of innovation in cities creating new,
more skilled employment in urban areas even as it undermines existing,
lower-skilled jobs. Custom printed circuit manufacture in the form
studied by Scott (1983b) almost certainly no longer exists in Los Ange-
les, but I would not in the least be surprised to ﬁnd that some markedly
more sophisticated form of customised design or production does.
Spatial Implications
The relationship between Hollywood and Vancouver, Canada—which
is both a short (2 hours 43 minutes) ﬂight from Los Angeles and in the
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same time-zone for coordination purposes—as a low-cost destination
for ﬁlm and television production is a useful illustration of how this
relationship may operate in the real world. Air travel enables specialised
staﬀ and equipment to be easily moved on to location for short periods
of time, but learning by on-site labour has also led to the outsourcing
of activities that were previously ‘locked in’ to Hollywood (Scott and
Pope, 2007, pp.1372,1377). Routine productions which require nei-
ther close supervision, nor particularly specialised staﬀ, are the most
amenable to oﬀ-shoring (2007, p.1367).
In contrast, large productions, and small one-oﬀ ﬁlms may be quite
resistant to oﬀ-shoring—some of this resistance may originate in the
complexity of feature ﬁlms, but it will also be driven by the overheads
required to set up a production abroad (2007, pp.1367–1378). Out-
sourcing abroad is designed to minimise the accumulated expenses of
caterers, drivers, costumers, grips, art directors and set construction
workers by subcontracting out work whose relationship to the rest of
the ﬁlm process is relatively weak (2007, p.1366), but the success of the
approach depends on how much the interactions can be standardised
and managed from a distance which is why scale is also a factor.
These dynamics help us to understand why the oﬀ-shoring of made-
for-television movies, which already accounted for 63% of productions
in 1990, had risen to 81% by 1998 (2007, p.1370). However, this
is not a one-time process: although Vancouver was the most conve-
nient destination, it is now facing competition from Toronto—which
has a ‘vibrant, creative atmosphere and sturdy infrastructure of ﬁlm-
production’—as well as from production centres in Australia, New
Zealand, and the Czech Republic (2007, p.1378).
In a very diﬀerent way, it has long been thought that distance af-
fects venture capitalist () behaviour in two ways: in the diﬀusion of
knowledge about opportunity, and in the transaction costs associated
with monitoring and supervising the investment (Fritsch and Schilder,
2008, p.2115). Although Fritsch and Schilder makes some excellent
points regarding the eﬀects of space on the diﬀusion of information
and ability for a  to exert control over their investment, they largely
overlook the idea that market ‘size’ is really an issue of accessibility. In
other words, s are likely to choose the sites where they can reach the
greatest number of ﬁrms with the least amount of eﬀort. If the density
of entrepreneurs is low—as it would be for a  that specialises in a par-
ticular sub-category of ﬁrms—and the exact location of successful new
ﬁrms is diﬃcult to predict—as it would be in view of the number of
businesses that fail—then it would be wise to choose a location with the
lowest average travel cost. As a result, it is hardly surprising to ﬁnd that
s are predominantly urban creatures, and that the major conurbations
or nearby suburbs are disproportionately represented in lists of large 
ﬁrms (Wikipedia, 2005a).
So while I am arguing that space is still important to many ﬁrms, in
line with Goddard (1975, p.34) I wish to emphasise the idea that spa-
tial association is no longer a necessary condition for functional linkages
to exist between ﬁrms. Returning to the European animators, Cole
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(2008) argues that they have managed to substitute a kind of ‘proximity
of standardisation’ for the traditional geographical proximity of a Holly-
wood or an Ealing; and that this process is enabling them to coordinate
even relatively costly, one-oﬀ productions remotely in a way that would
have been inconceivable just a few years ago (2008, p.894). For Cole,
this type of ‘virtual clustering’ is far more spatially diﬀuse than normally
allowed for by ﬁrm location theory.
Summary
So in this section we have examined the role played by transactions—both
internal and external—in determining the boundary of the ﬁrm. Fol-
lowing Scott’s lead, we have considered how the demands of standardi-
sation and coordination, as well as the scope for integration, impact the
ability of the ﬁrm to expand output and manage risk. When internal
transaction costs begin to eclipse the cost of organising transactions in
the market, then the ﬁrm has an obvious incentive to source inputs
on the open market. But clearly where this boundary arises depends
on the ﬁrm’s “internal information-processing capacities and eﬀective
managerial range” (Scott, 1986, p.220).
So we ﬁnd that the boundaries of the ﬁrm are determined as much
by its ability to manage information ﬂows as by its ability to deliver
a product or service cheaply! In fact, the two are inseparable, since
better management may enable the ﬁrm to internalise and organise
transactions that a less well-run ﬁrm cannot, or it may enable it to
oﬄoad complex but peripheral tasks to a long-term partner and so
be able to reap superior economies of scale. So the key concept for
understanding the interaction between these three aspects of transaction
costs has turned out to be the relative ‘cost per unit of ﬂow’. This can
be framed in terms of the overheads of management and the cost of
delivery: a transaction may be expensive to organise in absolute terms
(e.g. depending on extensive negotiation, review, and collaboration)
but yield millions of dollars’ worth of ‘ﬂow’ between ﬁrms, or it might
be quite easy to organise and yet nonetheless have an intolerably high
overhead for a small-volume transaction.
Naturally, the degree of integration between the functions of the
ﬁrm varies from sector-to-sector as well as from ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm. And
as Haig (1926b, pp.416–417) noted, in some industries the packet of
functions involved in the delivery of a product or service is tightly-
bound, while in others the functions can be readily broken up and
allocated to optimal locations. In fact, if we put together the divisibility
of the ﬁrm with the diﬀering transactional requirements of divisions
and sectors, then we will naturally tend to ﬁnd higher order functions
in the central district and lower-order functions being pushed out to
cheaper sites (Haig, 1926b, p.414). It is in part for this reason that in
Britain there is a near ‘perfect’ correlation between a ﬁrm’s size and the
likelihood that its headquarters are in London (Goddard, 1975, p.7).
Where the packet cannot be broken down into loosely coupled
sub-components, then it has historically been entrenched in agglom-
112 the place of telecommunications
erations. For instance, the packet of functions involved in the produc-
tion of a ﬁlm has historically been diﬃcult to parse out into separate,
and spatially-distant processes: each ﬁlm is unique and entails unique
challenges—such as the dynamics between cast, director, and other
members of the team, as well the problems of set design and cinematog-
raphy—as well as requiring close collaboration between producers
and editors (Scott and Pope, 2007, p.1366). In this case, although the
services may be provided by ancillary ﬁrms, the packet of functions
remains tightly-bound, leaving little scope for more ﬂexible spatial
strategies in the absence of substantial changes to the costs of coordina-
tion.
Radical change to this aspect of transactions is, of course, exactly
the promise of telecommunications and of specialised services such as
SohoNet—it allows post-production houses in London to work with
directors in Hollywood without the need for close physical proximity.
In other words, technology is raising the threshold at which a trans-
action becomes so costly that more expensive forms of coordination
are required. Taking the long view, Economist argues that companies
should be moving away from ‘command-and-control’ towards ‘co-
ordinate and cultivate’ structures (Economist, 2009b).
One example of this transformation is Cisco Systems: originally a
network hardware manufacturer, today the company makes a great deal
of its money from the services built around products that bear its logo,
but which it may never even have handled on the journey from plant to
customer (Economist, 2009b). In fact, the ﬁrm now even outsources a
good deal of basic & as well (ibid.), and there is a sense in which the
company is now more of a portfolio of ﬁrms producing products that
use networks rather than a manufacturer of networking equipment.
Eﬀectively, Cisco is in the process of becoming a prototype metanational
(Doz et al., 2001).
However, at times this complex reconﬁguration may have the seem-
ingly paradoxical eﬀect of “strengthening the importance of central co-
ordination and control functions for ﬁrms and, even, markets” (Sassen,
2004, p.196). In the case of information, “advances in telecoms and 
can actually increase the need for institutions, people, and districts that
can extract meaningful knowledge from the increasing glut of undif-
ferentiated information…” (Townsend, 2001, p.42) However, the key
point that we will take forward into Chapter 4 is that changes to the
way transactions are managed and scale can set up feedback eﬀects be-
tween a ﬁrm’s divisions or collaborators. So the ‘expansion of a branch
or plant may also stimulate growth elsewhere in the organisation’ (God-
dard, 1975, p.13), and the addition of a new product category (e.g. 
video recorders by a manufacturer of networking gear) can also, to put
in quasi-Keynesian terms, create management multipliers that ‘leak’
back into head oﬃce from peripheral production or design sites.
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3.5 Conclusions: Telecommunications & Firm Spatial Strategy
We began this chapter with a review of Weber’s original theory of
ﬁrm location (1909 [1969]), and although it proved to be enmeshed
in the movement and transformation of material inputs and outputs,
it nonetheless proved to be remarkably useful for getting to grips with
informational ones as well. In fact, by focussing on the ﬁrm in isolation
while incorporating the ﬁndings from Chapter 2, we were able to in-
vestigate the implications of modern infrastructure for ﬁrms in much
greater detail and saw that within-network distance was a more useful
way to think of proximity than the more traditional ‘featureless plain’
that is usually taken as a starting point for spatial analysis.
We also saw how the concept of ubiquity could provide us with an-
alytical purchase on the interrelated impact of  and information on
ﬁrms. Getting to grips with this aspect of the contemporary corpora-
tion is vital since, as Economist (2010a) noted: “data are becoming the
new raw material of business: an economic input on a par with capital
and labour.” Increasingly, even ﬁrms that are in the business of manag-
ing and moving physical products are ﬁnding themselves in the business
of managing and synthesising data in order to improve their competitive
position. Or as a vice-president of manufacturing operations, business
operations, and customer experience at Dell Computer put it: “in-
formation ﬂow is as critical as physical ﬂow of product” (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2006, p.60).
But we also saw how some information-oriented goods and services
deﬁed easy categorisation as ubiquities, and continue to display features
consistent with their being a localised input. This ﬁnding turns out
to mesh rather well with the diﬀerence between search goods with
readily identiﬁable and measurable characteristics, and experience goods
without such readily-determined features. Using a typology of ﬁnancial
markets—transparent, translucent, and opaque—we were able to see
how each had diﬀerent spatial and risk characteristics, with very real
implications for how ﬁrms could respond to and resolve these issues.
As well, we also began to unpack the notion of the atomic ﬁrm into
a more ﬂexible notion of interacting divisions organised around the
principle of marginal cost. Grabher (2004, p.105) has argued that “the
ﬁrm remains unproblematised as a unitary and coherent actor” and sits
in a kind of ‘privileged ontological and epistemological position’, but I
have tried to make clear that this is perhaps more a failure of neoclassical
economic modelling than it is of economic thinking per se since We-
ber (1909 [1969]), Goddard (1975), and Scott (1983a,b, 1984, 1986),
have all wrestled with ways that ﬁrms “may simultaneously alter their
internal, external, and spatial organisation” (Bellet and L’Harmet, 1998,
p.xviii).
The more subtle point is that while ﬁrms are in part a tool for the
spatial division of labour, enabling entrepreneurs to exploit diﬀer-
ences in labour and rent (Breheny, 1999, p.178), they are also a tool
for the management of information. Thus the conﬁguration of trans-
actions—including the nature of their overheads and their impact on
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per-unit ﬂows—highlights the fact that there is a real cost to searching
for, and gathering information, and that these are not (and never will
be) zero (Graham and Marvin, 1996, p.56). These ﬁndings help us to
understand why even ostensibly footloose internet businesses are “rarely
as ﬂexible as imagined” (Breheny, 1999, p.25): they are constrained by
the need to access skilled labour, the need to access clients, the need to
coordinate activity both in the market and internally, and the need to
keep track of what all of this means for the bottom line. In short, ﬁrm
structure lies at the intersection of risk, coordination, and transactions.
If we think in terms of stability, standardisation, and ﬂows in dif-
ferent sectors then we can elaborate upon the distinction established in
Table 3.2 (page 93) using the schema set out in Figure 3.7. Some ﬁrms,
those in manufacturing and call centres for instance, operate in markets
where stability and standardisation is the best route to proﬁts through
economies of scale. In those sectors, information has the characteristic
of a ubiquity thanks to the role of telecommunications in rendering
the market transparent, and so there is little purpose to remaining in
high-cost centres such as large urban areas unless a speciﬁc labour de-
pendency arises. In eﬀect, these ﬁrms can exploit the advantages of
logistics and  to become hyper-mobile. That said, we must also note
that the ‘scattering’ made possibly by ubiquitous information may also
“intensify this need [for copresence] among those whose job it is to co-
ordinate dispersed activities and the plethora of information pouring in
from diverse settings” (Boden and Molotch, 2004, p.104).
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Meanwhile, others ﬁrms thrive in situations of uncertainty where
information is deeply local: at the end of the day, personal services are
necessarily about the individual buyer, while consultancies grapple with
the particularities of each client’s business, product lines, and culture(s)
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in order to deliver value for money. Here, ﬁrms will beneﬁt from being
able to access mobility and communications infrastructure in order to
be ‘on site’ (whether physically or virtually) quickly and cheaply. How-
ever, while both types of companies use localised information as an
input, a key distinction between personal services and consulting is that
the former can exploit both the ‘law of large numbers’ (i. e. using data
processing power to oﬀer customised, but also standardised recommen-
dations to consumers) and the underlying stability of the market (i. e.
the sale of books is ultimately a standardised process) to bring technol-
ogy to bear on their operations. This process weakens the place-binding
of information in a way that creates greater competition over larger
distances.
In contrast, consultants continue to sell individually tailored services
to clients, and so within a transaction model we can think of this sector
as having particularly high overheads and low levels of standardisation:
in short, it is a labour-intensive product with little likelihood of becom-
ing a capital- and automation-intensive business in the near future. The
nature of sectors such as consulting also means that the overheads in-
volved in managing and coordinating output are almost certain to scale
at least linearly with the volume of output itself: the value of each trans-
action is high, and the cost of coordination is also high. This imposes
high transaction costs on the ﬁrm, creating further incentives for such
ﬁrms to concentrate in high-accessibility areas.
An interesting contrast to this is the ﬁrm in the soware-as-a-
product sector: they operate in a world of pure ubiquity since infor-
mational inputs in the form of each programmer’s code, and infor-
mational outputs in the form of a working application are both eﬀec-
tively placeless. Consequently, they can be said to have just one depen-
dency—labour—for which they should be willing to relocate almost
anywhere. As we will see in Chapters 4 and 5 the picture is a little more
complicated than this, but I am still inclined to agree with Breheny’s
assertion that, while we can expect that cities will remain important
employment nodes, this does not in the least imply a re-concentration
of employment there (Breheny, 1999, pp.24–25).
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4Agglomerations and Clusters
4.1 Introduction
We have examined in some depth the spatial aspects of infrastructure
and markets, as well as the impetus that they may provide for integra-
tion or agglomeration, but it is helpful to take a step back and consider
this process in a more general way. We have only thus far considered
factors that would drive a ﬁrm in isolation to seek proximity to sup-
pliers and competitors, and we have not yet considered how this might
create feedback eﬀects that inﬂuence the choices of other ﬁrms. For
this, it will be helpful to draw upon Marshall, whose Book IV, Chapter
X in Principles of Economics (1890 [1948]) focusses on the positive exter-
nalities that arise when many ﬁrms concentrate production at a single
point in space. There is good reason for this since, as Traxler and Luger
(2000, p.287) rather dramatically note, “cities and agglomerations only
exist and will only continue to exist if spatial clustering of economic
activity leads to economic advantages.’’
The focus of this chapter is therefore very much in keeping with
the current “emphasis on positive externalities as a major source of
economic development” (Scott and Storper, 2003, p.580). However,
what makes this chapter challenging is that there are a host of over-
lapping and conﬂicting deﬁnitions in widespread use to describe the
nature of these externalities: the literature contains references to ag-
glomerations, ‘growth poles’, ‘neo-Marshallian districts’, and clusters,
to name just some of the more common ones. Moreover, for some au-
thors there seems to be little or no diﬀerence between, for example, an
agglomeration and a cluster, while for others these terms refer to fun-
damentally diﬀerent conﬁgurations that can occur both independently
and simultaneously. Consequently, one objective for this chapter is to
establish a clear theoretical framework to use as a basis for exploring the
knowledge-based economy in Chapter 5.
Whether we work with agglomerations, clusters, or districts, these
groupings are all aﬀected by two dimensions of economic activity: scale
and life-cycle. Economies of scale may be internal or external to the
ﬁrm, and in the latter case they may characterise a single sector—a
localisation economy—or a diverse set of sectors—an urbanisation
economy. Similarly, the life-cycles of products, ﬁrms, and sectors are
thought to aﬀect the extent of scale economies and the beneﬁts of ag-
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glomeration, but note that these need not coincide in any deﬁnite way.
For instance, a ﬁrm may be well-established within a sector that is still
in the early stages of its development; however, as I hope to show, there
are still predictable correlations that should enable us to make some in-
formed projections about how ﬁrms are likely to respond spatially and
organisationally to the challenges and opportunities of agglomeration
and clustering.
4.2 Lifecycle & Scale
The idea that products, companies, and sectors have naturally oc-
curring life-cycles—that they are born, mature, age, and ultimately
die—suggests a natural order to business activity, enabling ﬁrms to de-
termine their (or their product’s) stage of development so as to decide
on the best growth or survival strategy. However, substituting a linear
biological metaphor for a complex socio-technical process is a risky
process: a ﬁrm could easily move straight from birth to death (many
do), a product might mature but never decline thanks to customer de-
mand and a lack of eﬀective competition. So let us begin by noting that
this concept should be handled with some care because the choices of
ﬁrms may dramatically alter the long-run outcomes and ‘life-cycle’ of a
product (Dhalla and Yuspeh, 1976).
A particularly vivid illustration of this point can be found in Glad-
well (2000, pp.3–5), where he attributes the resurgence of the Hush
Puppies brand—a shoe company that was by most measures at death’s
door—to the trend-setting inﬂuence of a small group of particularly
well-connected and stylish young people who made it cool again. The
revival of demand for Hush Puppies’ products does not neatly ﬁt into
any deterministic model: we could argue that the brand had been ‘re-
juvenated’, but this overlooks the fact that its ‘resurrection’ was driven
by arbitrary shis in demand, not by some natural selection process or
any basic product innovation. And in the broader context, we should
note too that this example is also abundant demonstration that there
is no necessary connection between the life-cycle of product, ﬁrm, or
industry (Menzel and Fornahl, 2010, p.2).
With these important qualiﬁcations in mind, we can still draw upon
our understanding of transactions and risk from Chapter 3 to see how
the development of new technologies and markets can impact the dis-
tribution of ﬁrms. And reinforcing these evolutionary dynamics are
the eﬀects of three types of economy of scale: economies internal to
the ﬁrm itself; localisation economies resulting from the concentration
of a single sector or set of interdependent sectors at a single location;
and urbanisation economies accruing to diverse industries at a single
location (Hackler, 2000, p.201). These scale eﬀects create feedback dy-
namics that compensate ﬁrms for the relatively high costs of choosing
congested, oen urban locations over cheaper, more remote ones.
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‘New Work’ and Product Lifecycles
Historically, the early stages of a product’s development have tended
to involve labour-intensive processes such as research, design, and pro-
totype manufacture. Given the relative ﬂexibility of labour (see page
104 for a fuller discussion), its abundance in cities, and a long-standing
association between urban areas, universities, and research centres, it is
hardly surprising that there seems to be a correlation between innova-
tion and urban environments (cf. Dawkins, 2003, p.141).
Jacobs (1969, 1984) distinguished between ‘new work’, which she
argued was intimately connected to the diversity of economic activity
in the city, and routine work that could be performed more eﬃciently
in suburban and rural areas where the costs of land and labour are sig-
niﬁcantly lower. Standardisation would lead ﬁrms to ‘expel’ routine
work from high-cost locations and internalise it at lower-cost sites
where the advantages of volume production are at a maximum (God-
dard, 1975, p.50). Support for the ‘specialisation-expulsion hypoth-
esis’ can be found in a range of research: for example, Gaschet (2002,
pp.74–78) was able to document that ‘low-order’ (i. e. routine) func-
tions were expelled most strongly from those French cities with the
greatest concentration of high-order functions in growing sectors.
So “there is an ongoing transformation of complex and unfamiliar
coordination tasks into routine activities that can be successfully ac-
complished at remote but cheaper locations” (Storper and Venables,
2004, p.367). If this were a one-way process, then perhaps product
life-cycle theory would have greater relevance to urban planners, but
as Storper and Venables also noted: innovation can actually cause new
‘coordination problems’ to arise, bringing work back to the skilled
urban workers. In eﬀect, technical advances need not always lead to in-
creasing specialisation or routinisation, but may stimulate a ‘resynthesis’
in which previously separate operations are merged into a single, new
process (Scott, 1986, p.218).
As a result of these issues, simpler treatments of the product life-cycle
have some important weaknesses (see: M. Taylor 1986 in Dawkins,
2003, p.142). First, they are at odds with models of incremental in-
novation as embodied in, for instance, Toyota’s ‘Kaizen’ philosophy.
Second, they ignore the capacity for product diﬀerentiation to protect
and perpetuate markets—this eﬀect is, for instance, particularly pro-
nounced in the pharmaceutical market where the availability of generic
substitutes for brand name drugs seems to have only a modest impact
on consumer preference. Third, they assume that labour or land costs
are the primary consideration for ﬁrms.
These are rather abundant conceptual shortcomings, but the con-
cept of the ‘life-cycle’ remains a useful shorthand for discussing the
balance between routine and non-routine interactions within a ﬁrm or
a market. And if we narrow the focus a bit, to the pattern of transac-
tions, then we can draw out some useful implications: in sectors where
new products and radical innovation are a way of life, then routinisa-
tion is diﬃcult to establish and so the advantages of access to partners
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and competitors may trump the long-term cost advantages of more re-
mote locations; but where the innovation process is less ‘traumatic’ then
more ﬂexible strategies become viable since the process itself is more
predictable.
We can put this in more concrete terms by comparing high-tech
manufacturers in Silicon Valley with car manufacturers in Detroit.
Electronics ﬁrms in Silicon Valley compete in a sector where entirely
new product classes are created on a regular basis and where new infor-
mation must be constantly acquired, and existing knowledge updated,
in order to remain competitive. In fact, perhaps the only real certainty
in Silicon Valley is that you will need to engineer something largely
from scratch—an iPod or an iPad, for instance—using new chips, dis-
play technologies, and form factors, every few months, and that your
market-leading product from last year may well already be obsolete. In
contrast, car manufacturers compete in a market where innovation is,
for the most part, predictable and incremental: new features (safety-
related or otherwise) may be added, but the underlying product remains
largely unchanged. This dynamic means that even labour-intensive and
innovation-oriented processes such as design are actually rather pre-
dictable: the skill sets are well-understood, and the interactions between
teams within the ﬁrm can be ‘programmed’ and managed accordingly.
Internal Economies
We have already seen in Chapter 3 that, broadly speaking, the ‘units’
of a ﬁrm can be internalised or externalised according to the dictates
of marginal eﬃciency. At the very least, negotiating this boundary
requires a management function that is not part of the production
process per se but is integral to the successful coordination of intra- and
inter-ﬁrm ﬂows of material and information. More generically, Scott
(1986, p.225) divided the modern corporation into three functional
groups: 1) management and control; 2) skilled tasks requiring particular
qualiﬁcations; and 3) deskilled processes. So even the most basic model
of a straightforward manufacturing ﬁrm could therefore usefully include
a management entity that coordinates resources, a marketing unit that
promotes the ﬁrm’s output, and a design unit that produces the ﬁrm’s
next generation of products.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the implications that this breakdown of the
ﬁrm into sub-units has for the dominant conception of corporations
employed in some economic models. On the one side are controllable
and uncontrollable ﬂows of information to the management unit of the
ﬁrm, and on the other side are coordinated ﬂows of material. In this
ﬁgure, the administrative and productive units actually have more
external dependencies and interactions than they do internal ones,
though realistically the scale and volume of external interactions will
vary with the ﬁrm and unit under consideration.
Consider also that for each unit the linkages may scale very diﬀer-
ently as the ﬁrm adjusts its output towards some hypothetical optimum.
This is, in fact, the central insight of The Structure of Competitive Industry
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Figure 4.1: Flows of information
and external economies (aer
Thorngren; Goddard, 1975, p.12;
reproduced with permission of
Oxford University Press)
(Robinson, 1931 [1943]): it suggests that entrepreneurs employ both
organisational and spatial processes to enable each division or factor
within the ﬁrm to achieve its own optimum scale (1931 [1943], p.108).
The scale of the ﬁrm is therefore neither purely the product of a pro-
duction technology, nor of a market, but is actually bound up in the
transactional and informational dependency structures of the ﬁrm itself.
I S  D: If each division has a role to play
in determining the ﬁrm’s overall size, then instead of a single point of
optimal eﬃciency, the interactions between units create an envelope
within which the ﬁrm can proﬁtably operate using a variety of conﬁgu-
rations. The range of possible conﬁgurations means that, for Robinson,
the classical micro-economic equilibrium is actually highly unstable
since the optimal scale for production may not coincide with the ideal
size of the management and marketing functions. Robinson puts it in
terms of a multi-way tug of war in which it is impossible to tell whether
no one is pulling at all, or if everyone is pulling in a diﬀerent direction
but the forces are temporarily cancelling each other out (Robinson,
1931 [1943], p.17).
By implication, management and marketing functions may not scale
linearly, and sometimes may not scale at all, with the overall level of
output of a ﬁrm (Robinson, 1931 [1943], pp.40,65). Thus a key chal-
lenge for the entrepreneur is how to reconcile, say, a smaller output
optimum with a larger marketing optimum (1931 [1943], p.117). For
instance, although the market for rail infrastructure is enormous in
terms of its output, it may require relatively little in the way of market-
ing because there are few customers for its wares (1931 [1943], p.70). In
contrast, the market for telecommunications or electronics may need
management or marketing to scale up far beyond the number of people
involved in design and production—we have only to look at the amount
of money spent by Microso, Apple, and their various competitors and
collaborators on advertising to consumers and other corporations.
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In fact, if a marketing department succeeds in expanding the market
for a given product, then it will have lowered the ‘per unit of produc-
tion’ overhead (Robinson, 1931 [1943], p.40) and enabled the ﬁrm to
expand beyond the original manufacturing optimum (1931 [1943],
p.82). In other words, the functional specialisation of groups within
large ﬁrms creates new economies of scale; and yet, the scaling up of
marketing and management overheads may simultaneously also create a
minimum size below which the ﬁrm can no longer proﬁtably operate.
In some cases, the solution to this challenge may be to outsource
one or more ‘internally ineﬃcient’ functions so as to take advantage
of economies of scale or special skills available nearby. At other times,
because of risk and coordination issues, it may be more sensible to
internalise these roles even if it is not, strictly speaking, eﬃcient to do
so. So in the context of transactional and informational ﬂows, a range
of spatial and organisational responses might follow: we could have
centralised management with dispersed production, or its opposite,
and we can have integrated production, management, and sales, or
management can hand-oﬀ some tasks to specialised service ﬁrms to
extract additional economies (Robinson, 1931 [1943], p.117).
M L O: However, note too that the notion of in-
dependent variation in the scale of each division creates the possibility
that multiple locally-eﬃcient and proﬁtable optima exist for a ﬁrm. The
scaling up of marketing functions may markedly increase demand for a
product, enabling the ﬁrm to bring on-stream a new technology and,
subsequently, a substantially higher level of output. This transition does
not mean that the previous output level was necessarily ineﬃcient: the
investments in new plant and new marketing outputs might oﬀset any
gains in scale if the older plant had lower costs and a simpler operation
that made for more modest management needs. This feature of Robin-
son’s model helps to shed light on the allowance in Scott’s approach
for multiple output technologies to coexist comfortably within a single
sector (1983b, p.349).
So instead of an envelope, it is perhaps better to envision a complex
landscape of peaks and valleys. The peaks represent local optima where
particularly eﬃcient and generally stable conﬁgurations of marketing,
management, and production arise. In valleys, the conﬁguration of
units or divisions is unbalanced and unproﬁtable, and costs are diﬃcult
to recoup. A growing ﬁrm must somehow negotiate the gaps between
optima; if the gaps are small then the ﬁrm may be able to make the leap
using external ﬁnancing or internal resources, but where this gap is
particularly large we can expect growth to occur through horizontal
integration instead (Robinson, 1931 [1943], pp.123–124). To put it in
more concrete terms: a ﬁrm may wish to expand production using new
technology at a cheaper, remote location but be unable to do so because
of the overheads involved in setting up an entirely new facility (Scott
and Pope, 2007, p.1367).
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T R  F: Moreover, as a ﬁrm expands, the eﬀect of a sin-
gle mistake in planning or execution may become more severe than
they would be for a smaller one (Robinson, 1931 [1943], p.66). And
this brings us to the second of Robinson’s insights: the problem of co-
ordination. Since perfect coordination and knowledge are impossible
there is an implicit upper bound to the size of the ﬁrm in any indus-
try because there comes a point where the risks created from further
growth overwhelm the economies of scale resulting from specialisation
(Robinson, 1931 [1943], p.45)1. Large ﬁrms may eventually become so 1 An interesting example of how
scale can work against large ﬁrms
is the disruption to world markets
attributed to Société Générale’s
secret unwinding of positions
taken by its ‘rogue trader’ Jerome
Kerivel: some analysts allege that
the bank’s rapid exit caused an
8% overall decline in European
markets (Chrisaﬁs et al., 2008).
Regardless of whether these trades
actually drove the market down, it
is clear that the sheer scale of the
anomalous positions forced SocGen
into a ‘ﬁre sale’ of assets and that
these losses would have been lower
had the transactions been smaller
and the ﬁrm been able to wait to
close out Kerivel’s positions.
complex that no one person truly has a good sense of its activities:
…More and more leverage in the system, the entire system is about
to crumble any moment…the only potential survivor the fabulous
Fab…standing in the middle of all these complex, highly levered, exotic
trades he created without necessarily understanding all the implications of
those monstruosities [sic] !!!
Email of Tuesday, 23 January 2007 from Fabrice ‘Fab’ Tourre, trader at
Goldman Sachs, to his girlfriend, Marine Serres; Sibun, 2010
Like Coase (see page 98), Robinson predicted that smaller ﬁrms
or divisions would be found in industries where there are substantial
risks of failure and where frequent decisions and rapid coordination
are required. For instance, even though the scale of modern ﬁnancial
institutions might seem to militate against such a conclusion, the invest-
ment banking and hedging units of commercial banks are in fact much
smaller than their consumer-oriented divisions. And even within small
ﬁnancial institutions we tend to ﬁnd specialist teams working in phys-
ical and virtual proximity to one another. However, there is little to
suggest that the control processes required to manage the risks taken by
these teams will be radically improved by anything short of a revolution
in how they are run2. 2 Consequently, Robinson’s model
lends support to the idea that
the breaking up of banks that are
‘too big to fail’ may well be an
appropriate regulatory response.
Robinson (1931 [1943], p.50) also noted that the strength of small
ﬁrms is greatest where ‘fashion rules’—used here in the sense of fre-
quent changes in preferences and output—and the contemporary fash-
ion industry is a particularly good example of this. Fashion designers
may have a general ‘look’ for which they are known, but each season’s
collection constitutes a fairly radical overhaul of production. Moreover,
these cycles are very short and so the risk of complete failure (or run-
away success) recurs constantly, creating an underlying and persistent
uncertainty that is thoroughly incompatible with scale. This is why
for many labels the team is the ﬁrm. Larger ﬁrms in the fashion indus-
try tend to be built around the advantages of distribution, not design,
and frequently operate a stable of competing brands that each combine
standardised outputs with limited edition collections.
An additional conﬁguration is suggested by Grabher (2001), who
notes that Soho’s advertising industry seems to actively court chaos
with ongoing mergers, de-mergers, and shis of role and responsibility.
The ‘heterarchy’ embodied in both the global agencies and amongst the
smaller independents who take on diﬀerent tasks in diﬀerent projects,
has a ‘very high tolerance for internal diversity’ (2001, p.353). This
complex ecology promotes a situation in which work and staﬀ are
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endlessly recombined in new conﬁgurations so that boundaries are
‘perforated’ but a common culture of sorts is nonetheless created. For
Grabher, this approach is not so much about ﬁnding a ‘solution’ to
an immediate problem as it is about becoming better at searching for
solutions to a client’s problems (ibid.).
Localisation Economies
Looking now beyond the individual ﬁrm, localisation economies
emerge when ﬁrms are able to pool demand so that a specialised prod-
uct can be sold either to more than one company or to one particularly
large company (Marshall, 1890 [1948], p.275). Localisation economies
are typically understood to arise around the activity of a single sector, so
the congregation of car manufacturers in Detroit is an obvious exam-
ple, as is the concentration of ﬁnance-work in the City of London and
on Wall Street. Derived demand for specialised products and services
geared to the dominant sector then spawns a host of companies whose
existence is predicated on supplying the key ﬁrm or ﬁrms.
The idea that some sectors and ﬁrms are essential to regional economies
and growth is oen embodied in cities’ attempts to secure the oﬃces of
what  calls ‘anchor ﬁrms’ (Athey et al., 2007, p.19). The principle
is that a key sector can be used to stimulate employment and to ‘pin
down’ a host of related activities connected to the supply of services and
products to the core sector. These ﬁrms may also create new employ-
ment through spin-oﬀ processes: the case of Silicon Valley’s ‘Fairchil-
dren’ illustrates the way that in some circumstances even a single ﬁrm,
acting as a kind of ‘focal point’ for an emerging localisation economy,
can spawn a host of enterprises that share both a similar ‘process ’
and, frequently, social connections as well (Menzel and Fornahl, 2010,
p.6).
Cook et al. (2007, p.1334) use survey data from the City of London
to argue that vertical linkages between the bankers and their ‘suppli-
ers’—who in this case are found in the legal and accountancy sec-
tors—are vital to the success of the area as a whole. Similarly, research
into the biotech sector indicates that the presence of larger ﬁrms has
encouraged new start-ups to locate nearby, and that their pursuit of
innovation positively impacts local businesses through the contract-
ing out of various functions (Athey et al., 2007, p.47). This same basic
logic underpins the government-mandated ‘Out of London’ strategy for
the  and its relocation of production, post-production, and associ-
ated processes to second- and third-tier British centres such as Belfast,
Cardiﬀ, Glasgow and Manchester (BBC, 2005a; Conian, 2008).
However, these relocation policies rest on two important assump-
tions: that localisation economies are a spur to regional development,
employment, and local innovation, and that this impetus is sustainable
in the long run. Clearly, in many cases the emergence of a localisation
economy can produce initial innovation through the scaling up of pro-
duction: specialist parts suppliers and services ﬁrms develop to serve the
burgeoning auto industry, for instance. But as early as Marshall (1890
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[1948], p.273), important questions were raised about the ability of
localisation economies to support long-term innovation. The risks for
regional economies dominated by a single industry include technolog-
ical lock-in and a kind of group-think that encourages ﬁrms to dismiss
‘paradigm changes’ originating outside of the area (Martin and Sunley,
2003, pp.22–23).
Checkland (1976) coined a rather memorable term—the Upas tree
eﬀect—to describe the way that the long shadow of a singularly domi-
nant sector could stiﬂe the emergence of new business. Named for the
poisonous Antiaris toxicaria that was purported to destroy other growth
for 15 miles (1976, p.iv), the eﬀect appears when an established ﬁrm or
sector starves competitors, spin-oﬀs, or start-ups for resources. In some
cases this process may be deliberate: a large ﬁrm might impose exclusive
contracts on suppliers or apply pressure on local government for prefer-
ential treatment or regulation. But it could also be entirely inadvertent:
a ‘not invented here’ syndrome that blinds ﬁrms to emerging threats or
opportunities. In either case, since all economic activity is geared to the
core ﬁrm or ﬁrms, any negative repercussions (e.g. negative long-term
health outcomes or skills made redundant through technology change)
will have a disproportionate impact on the region’s ability to recover
from the collapse of the dominant industry.
Glasgow is a particularly good example of this process since early
successes in heavy engineering, and in shipbuilding in particular, un-
dermined the growth of nascent ‘modern’ industries such as automobile
and aircra manufacturing (Checkland, 1976, p.48). In time, an inabil-
ity to diversify meant that the economy became utterly dependent on
just a few employers: by 1968 the 100 largest enterprises accounted for
fully 70% of regional employment (1976, p.64). With such a narrow fo-
cus, it is hardly surprising that local businesses failed almost completely
to anticipate the impact that air travel would have on demand for pas-
senger ships (1976, p.48). Yet even had they anticipated this shi, they
faced two additional challenges: ﬁrst, they would have had to develop
a ‘managerial psychology’ of consumer manufacturing completely at
odds with their existing knowledge of heavy industry (1976, p.11); and
second, labour would have had to be willing to migrate to work with
only the most eﬃcient ﬁrms, instead of demanding only those ﬁrms’
rates of pay (1976, p.50).
Additional evidence of the Upas Tree eﬀect comes from places as
far removed as Rochester, New York (Jacobs, 1969, p.96) and the East
Midlands (cf. Beatty et al., 2002). However, the most glaring recent
example is the way that Detroit’s historical success in automobile pro-
duction seems to have meant that the Big Three producers—Chrysler,
Ford, and General Motors—were largely ‘asleep at the wheel’ when
Japanese manufacturers began to devise entirely new methods of man-
aging inventory and production (cf. Halberstam, 1987). Of course,
it was not always like this: at its inception, industrial activity in De-
troit was quite well-balanced (Hall, 1998, p.488) and the early auto
industry displayed many of the dynamic qualities that—as we will see
later—are associated with the emergence and growth of innovative
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clusters (Menzel and Fornahl, 2010, p.22). But the consequence of the
motor industry’s success, combined with the massive economies of scale
in production, meant that, like Glasgow, Detroit would have no other
industries on which to fall back when the vehicle producers, with their
‘big ﬁrm’ culture, got into trouble. Today, the wider metro area’s un-
employment rate stands at 15.4% (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2010),
but within Detroit proper the combination of unemployed, underem-
ployed, and ‘no longer even looking’ is thought to account for fully
50% of the working age population (Wilkinson, 2009).
Urbanisation Economies
As the name suggests, urbanisation economies are associated primarily
with large cities, but in contrast to Detroit’s industrial monoculture,
they are associated with the interaction of many sectors simultaneously.
In part, these economies are tied to eﬃciencies gleaned from the shar-
ing of capital-intensive infrastructure between many unrelated ﬁrms
(Scott and Storper, 2003, p.582). But they are also tied to the sharing
of input and output structures, so here a single ﬁrm supplies its goods
or expertise to a diverse range of industries and entirely new needs can
emerge (Marshall, 1890 [1948], p.271). The combination of these fac-
tors means that particularly large, diverse cities such as New York are
“a good place for ﬁrms that rely on external economies” (Currid, 2007,
p.47).
Using the seemingly trivial example of brassière manufacturing in
New York, Jacobs (1969, p.56) argues quite cogently that urbanisation
economies—incorporating both planned and fortuitous interactions
between economic agents—are a primary source of innovation and
long-term economic resilience. We can see in the rise of the ‘new
media’ industry in San Francisco the binding together of the existing
creative and high-technology sectors in the region, and this mingling
has spawned a variety of innovative products and services ranging from
many web design ﬁrms to the more recent rise of ‘Web 2.0’ companies
(cf. Movers 2. 0, 2008). In eﬀect, the existing ‘ﬂavours’ of economic ac-
tivity in Silicon Valley—and Silicon Alley as well, for that matter—were
combined in novel ways by entrepreneurs who had both the industry
expertise and market exposure to identify and exploit an emerging op-
portunity at the boundary of two or more existing sectors (cf. Zook,
2004). This, I believe, helps to explain an observation by Menzel and
Fornahl (2010, p.5) that “locations with older but related industries
have a higher likelihood of forming a cluster.”
Jacobs seems to have envisioned recombination within urbanisation
economies as a largely unpredictable process. And in The Warhol Econ-
omy, Currid (2007, pp.66–67) recounts the way in which an unplanned
interaction on a New York sidewalk led to her being able to interview
the fashion designer Marc Jacobs for her research aer months of try-
ing to obtain a chat through more formal routes. Currid (2007, p.9)
suggests that the walkability of cities such as New York and London
encourages these fortuitous encounters and is a key driver of their com-
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mercial success but, more generically, the easy ﬂow of information from
person-to-person will make ﬁrms aware of opportunities or threats well
before they become public knowledge. We will return to this issue in
more detail later in this chapter.
Labour Economies
P: Labour pooling is typically handled separately from the
more market-focussed externalities of localisation and urbanisation
economies. On one level pooling is simply an economy of scale in
labour markets where we deal with “specialised skills rather than spe-
cialised products” (Scott and Storper, 2003, p.583; Storper and Ven-
ables, 2002, p.7). However, pooling is also a response to risk: labour
with substantial investments in specialist skills is drawn to areas where
it is in demand because the ‘cost’ of unemployment is relatively greater
than it is for less skilled workers (Marshall, 1890 [1948], p.271; Storper
and Venables, 2004, p.352)3. 3 In this analysis we are not par-
ticularly interested in the cultural
dimensions of entrepreneurship,
or the mechanics of hiring and
ﬁring, though as we noted earlier
these factors are clearly relevant.
Cultural and legal practices can be
understood primarily as a ‘drag’ on
markets; depending on one’s po-
litical or economic viewpoint this
may or may not be a good thing,
but clearly such policies may have
an important eﬀect on the process
that we are considering here.
Financiers who were asked to rank the beneﬁts of a City of London
location chose ‘the ability to tap a strong labour market’ as the second
most important factor in their decision (Cook et al., 2007, p.1332;
Athey et al., 2007, p.28). So the scale of London’s specialised markets
is a key competitive asset since ﬁrms ﬁnd depth of expertise, while em-
ployees ﬁnd that it ‘provides a better chance of continuity of employ-
ment and supports specialist skills training’ (Cook et al., 2004, p.14).
Moreover, the decline of the ‘job for life’ and the rise in short-term and
project-based contracts in high-skill ﬁelds means that the search cost of
new employment recurs with higher frequency than before; in short,
“successful labour markets in innovation-rich sectors become magnets
for talent” (Athey et al., 2007, p.28).
Short-term employment is particularly common in the cultural in-
dustries—ﬁlm, advertising, and design, for instance—where freelancing
and project partnerships abound. While the rewards for a successful cre-
ative collaboration can be enormous, there is also a high risk of failure
if the ‘right’ staﬀ are not selected. The existence of a deep labour pool
in a very localised market creates the ability for employers to identify
promising collaborators through a mix of informal and formal channels
(Cook et al., 2004, p.16), and this issue will be discussed in more detail
on page 150. For now, note only that the risks of failure also mean that
a great deal of work must be put into the search phase of a project, and
so looking for staﬀ or for work may be as costly and time-consuming
as the work itself. Consequently, any ‘shortcuts’ to the qualiﬁcation of
partners, employers, and employees will provide a valuable competitive
advantage.
I also argued in the preceding chapter that linkages between ﬁrms
can take the form of informational exchange4; however, labour market
4 Meier (1962, p.128) suggests
that “the ﬂow of information in a
social unit has many of the same
properties as the ﬂow of economic
values”, and that the latter can be
considered a kind of ‘special case’ of
information exchange.
churn is clearly a second conduit for the circulation of information since
“mobile workers are carriers of knowledge on the local labour market”
(Keeble and Nachum, 2002, p.81). There is, however, no reason why
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we should conﬁne ourselves to the local market, and Cole (2008, p.898)
suggests that “economic geographers have begun to pay more attention
to long-distance labour migration that ties together labour markets and
diﬀusing information.” Regardless of whether the circulation is vol-
untary (entrepreneurs identifying a new opportunity) or involuntary
(employees being laid oﬀ during a recession or bankruptcy), departing
workers carry with them a wealth of ostensibly conﬁdential informa-
tion. America’s Silicon Valley oﬀers abundant examples of employees
leaving a parent ﬁrm and setting up shop just down the road to oﬀer
competing or complementary products and services. Figure 4.2 outlines
the relationship between the dysfunctional Shockley and the host of
‘Fairchildren’ (and see Hall, 1998, pp.435–440).
Atmel (1985)
George Perlegos,
Tsung-Ching Wu
Linear
Technology (1981) 
Robert Swanson,
Robert Dobkin
Sierra
Semiconductor (1983) 
James Diller & four others 
SDA Systems* (1983)
James Soloman
Cypress (1983)
T.J. Rodgers, Lowell Turiff
PlanetWeb (1996)
Kamran Elahian
Xilinx (1984)
Bernard Vonderschmitt
Synaptics (1986)
Federico Faggin, 
Carver Mead
3Dfx (1994)
Gordon Campbell,
Scott Sellers
S3 (1989)
Ron Yara,
Dado Banatao 
Wafer Scale Integration 
(1983)
Eli Harari
VLSI Technology (1979) 
Jack Baletto, Dan Floyd,  
Gunnar Wetlesen 
Four Phase* (1969)
Lee Boysel, Jack Faith
Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers (1972)
Eugene Kleiner
LSI Logic (1980)
Wilfred Corrigan
Chips & Technologies* (1985) 
Gordon Campbell, Dado
Banatao & two others
SEEQ (1981)
Gordon Campbell,
George Perlegos 
Zilog* (1974)
Federico Faggin,
Ralph Ungermann
Synertek* (1973)
Robert Schreiner,
R. Barringer & six others 
Computer
Microtechnology* (1968) 
John Schroeder, Jack 
Schmidt & two others 
NeoMagic (1993)
Kamran Elahian,
Prakash Agarwal
Cirrus Logic (1985)
Michael Hackworth, Kam-
ran Elahian & five others
Signetics* (1961)
(now Philips 
 Semiconductor)
David Allison, David James,
Lionel Kattner, Mark
Weissenstern & two others 
National
Semiconductor (1967)
Charles Sporck & two others
After leaving Fairchild,
Sporck ran National for 24
years, building it into a
giant in analog and
digital chips.  
Intel (1968)
R. Noyce, Gordon Moore
Intel is now the largest chip 
company in the world, with 
revenues topping $20 
billion. 
Most Intel execs stay on 
board instead of launch-
ing startups.
AMD (1969)
W.J.Sanders III & 
seven others
Flamboyant Sanders left
Fairchild to found this up-
and-down rival to Intel. 
Shockley Labs* (1955)
William Shockley & 
eight others
Co-inventor of the transis-
tor, Shockley recruited
eight young men from 
East Coast labs to deve-
lop the technology. They 
left because of Shockley’s 
erratic management style
and became the founding
cadre for the West Coast
semiconductor industry.
*Acquired  
Fairchild
Semiconductor* (1957) 
(From left) Gordon Moore,
Sheldon Roberts, Eugene
Kleiner, Robert Noyce, Victor
Grinich, Julius Blank, Jean
Hoerni, Jay Last
Founded by “The Traitorous
Eight” from Shockley, Fair-
child was the first company
to work exclusively in silicon.
Business Week wanted £200.
Original available from:
http://www.businessweek.com/1997/34/b354115.htm
Figure 4.2: Fairchild Semiconduc-
tor and its Spin-Oﬀs (Hamilton and
Himelstein, 1997)
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The rapid movement of employees between ﬁrms ensures that in-
novations are likely to be quickly copied by competitors, or even com-
bined with other processes to produce ongoing innovation (Marshall,
1890 [1948], p.271). Since highly-skilled employees will tend to ex-
perience the greatest beneﬁts from frequent changes of employer, we
would expect to ﬁnd particularly active churn in the most competitive
labour markets. This certainly seems to be the case in London, where
s tend to hire locally (70% of recruits) and from large ﬁrms (42% of
recruits), enabling sensitive knowledge to spread quickly (Keeble and
Nachum, 2002, p.81). Cook et al. (2007, p.1333) put average annual
turnover in staﬀ within the City of London’s at 25%, and rate it an
important channel for the circulation of best practice.
M: Increasingly, the mobility of individuals and households
seems to be impacting their spatial preferences and, consequently,
those of ﬁrms with speciﬁc staﬃng requirements. Mugerauer (2000,
pp.222–225) suggests that three basic factors drive the locational choices
of households: utility, amenity, and sociability. The utilitarian aspects
of location include the basic costs of housing, space, and access to ser-
vices and infrastructure. Amenity incorporates ‘non-social’ externalities
such as a prestigious location, and access to cultural goods. The social
aspects are primarily understood as the likelihood of ﬁnding a fulﬁlling
non-work life in a given residential area. Crucially, Mugerauer (2000,
p.225) ﬁnds that, today, many households assume that their utilitarian
concerns can be met from nearly any geographic location and so focus
on amenity and sociability (cf. Leland, 2007).
In The Economics of Location, Lösch (1954 [1973], p.16) allowed that
an entrepreneur might well be guided by amenity in the selection of
a site for his or her new ﬁrm, and he went on to suggest that this be-
haviour was entirely reasonable so long as the new site fell within the
‘spatial envelope’ of proﬁtability (1954 [1973], p.247). More recently,
Beyers (2000) and others (cf. Nachum, 1999) have also argued that the
spatial decisions of small consultancies may be aﬀected as much by the
personal preferences of their founders as by the business logic of market
access. So whereas, historically, basic transportation or communication
needs might have constrained such choices, today this pattern is much
more strongly shaped by amenity and its evolution over time—the
life-cycle of the entrepreneur’s household itself, if you will.
Employees in particularly specialised sectors have oen preferred to
live in cities ‘for reasons of consumption, taste, and social relationships’
(Beyers, 2000, p.162). And for the highly-skilled young—those most
in search of opportunity and sociability—the city is, again, a preferred
location (Glaeser, 2006, pp.15–16). This is why it is hardly surprising
that “factors such as [amenity] and cultural diversity help underpin
urban growth and innovation” (Athey et al., 2007, p.21)5. Reduced to
5 The deeper demand for skills
in major cities actually beneﬁts
all workers, including less-skilled
migrants: data from France suggests
that a one-point increase in the
number of college graduates in a
city translates into an overall wage
increase for all workers of between
one-half and one-percent (Charlot
and Duranton, 2004, p.14).
the bare essentials, this is largely the argument of Florida (2002a) and
his ‘rise of the creative class’ thesis.
However, as these workers age and form families with a preference
for space, security, and access to schooling, then more ambiguous or
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complex trends seem likely to emerge. The ability to ‘telecommute’
(of which more in Chapter 5), together with the mobility options en-
abled by car, train, and plane, creates a new kind of ‘accessible rural
idyll’ in which entrepreneurs and specialised consultancies—such as
Comedia/Charles Landry, , and GeoFutures to name a few in the
planning ﬁeld—can base themselves in non-urban but amenity-rich
environments. So depending on the degree of dependency, companies
may be ‘pressured to follow the labour market’ into the suburbs’ (Bre-
heny, 1999, p.19), and it is clear that edge-city development stems at
least in part from “from executive and worker preferences for suburban
living” (Leigh, 2000, p.329); or as Breheny (1999, p.9) puts it: “the
residential preferences of entrepreneurs and professionals for the ‘tamed
rurality’ of towns and villages.”
Transportation & Technology
T: The scope of economies of scale and employment
will obviously be augmented by anything that increases the overall ac-
cessibility of a location. So a reduction in travel costs sets up a situation
in which, barring the negative eﬀects of long commutes, employees can
live ever-further from their place of employment (Paumgarten, 2007;
U. S. Census Bureau, 2005). This, in turn, gives businesses the ability
either to draw on wider and deeper labour markets without needing to
relocate, or to move their facilities to previously impractical locations
outside the urban core where they beneﬁt from both lower costs and
improved access, especially if their staﬀ are drawn from suburbanised
locations (Gillespie and Green, 1987, p.401).
In some cases, such as computer services (which now extends to
homes and home oﬃces), changing locational behaviours may be driven
by changes in the sector’s client base (Coﬀey and Shearmur, 2002,
p.376). But businesses with larger and more complicated staﬃng needs
cannot move to truly remote sites as most people seem unwilling to
suﬀer regular commutes of much more than an hour each way. So the
suburbanisation of the workforce was a prerequisite for business out-
migration to edge cities, and the link between the amenity value of
suburbs and the movement of educated households to those areas is
clearly an underlying factor in this process (Gaschet, 2002, p.66; Leigh,
2000, p.329).
The trend towards ‘employment sprawl’, especially when combined
with changes in the  environment, clearly complicates the idea of a
‘local’ market and the range over which localisation and urbanisation
economies can successfully operate. Robinson (1931 [1943], p.148)
distinguished between scale economies that are ‘mobile’ (their bene-
ﬁts can be accessed from other locations) and those that are ‘ﬁxed’ (the
ﬁrm is spatially-constrained). In other words, some economies of scale
behave like ubiquities, while others remain localised, but better trans-
port means that these distinctions may become less relevant as all areas
become more accessible.
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For instance, Beyers (2000) explores niche markets in America
where the service is so specialised that demand is actually quite diﬀuse,
and suggests that it is only the improvement in transportation that en-
ables this demand to become a proper market. He also ﬁnds, however,
that although these providers are able to locate with greater freedom,
this shouldn’t be confused with true economic decentralisation since
many of these ﬁrms depend on clients in centralised, -type locations
(Beyers, 2000, p.162). Examining this dynamic from a diﬀerent stand-
point, Keeble and Nachum (2002, pp.78–79) found that the emergence
of s in high-amenity but non-urban locations seemed to have been
driven by an outmigration of entrepreneurs from London.
For British ﬁrms on this model (such as the ones named above), lo-
cations within the Greater South East of England () generally oﬀer
access to both Central London and to major airports, such as Gatwick
and Heathrow, all from a semi-rural environment that punches well
above its weight in terms of cultural oﬀerings. In part, this is undoubt-
edly thanks to the presence of university towns such as Oxford and
Cambridge (as is also the case with, for instance, Princeton in Amer-
ica), but it also owes a great deal to the fact that, in some cases, the en-
trepreneurs are only really ‘resident’ in the rural location on weekends;
so they raise the demand for sophisticated goods and services locally but
are nonetheless still rooted in a London-based economy.
What is particularly interesting about these emerging edge city and
edgeless city structures, however, is that they also defy the idea that only
routine activities will be exported from the urban core. Very complex
and un-routinised tasks in sectors such as & and engineering have
also moved to oﬃce parks and other peri-urban locations in the past
two decades (Coﬀey and Shearmur, 2002, p.372). In fact, in some
ways the trend seems so pronounced that we are at the point where the
non-emergence of suburbanisation in a high-skill sector can be taken to
suggest an unusual dynamic at work.
T: One key eﬀect of technology on ﬁrms—especially large
ﬁrms—is the way that it enables them to better integrate their internal
functions (Robinson, 1931 [1943], p.41), while also allowing them
to better coordinate and manage external relationships (Gillespie and
Robins, 1989, p.11). In short, technology extends the envelope of
viable conﬁgurations for the ﬁrm. Today’s ﬁrms should be able to
exploit increasingly ﬁne divisions of the supply chain and production
process to yield new eﬃciencies. And the ‘informational content’ of
work is also increasingly amenable to this type of management such
that the innovative phase of product development can be centralised
to take advantage of creative resources while the application phase is
decentralised to exploit routinisation (cf. Hackler, 2000).
Technology also changes the balance between the ‘complex’ and
the ‘routine’. We can expect to see increasing outsourcing of tasks
previously considered essential to the ﬁrm’s operation, including ,
accountancy, or even legal counsel (cf. Timmons, 2010). This process
now encompasses not only routine administrative functions (Traxler
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and Luger, 2000, p.289), but also critical managerial and creative func-
tions: a recent study by Economist (2009e) found that fully half of
American ‘temps’ were professionals, and that the practice of temping
(even if not exactly publicised) had even spread to the boardroom.
Hall (2002a, p.269) connects technological change to the outmi-
gration of households and entrepreneurs, suggesting that it has made
Howard’s ‘Third Magnet’—the Town--Country axis (see Figure
4.3)—more attractive to many. And clearly, the ability to remain in
touch with clients using telecommunications is a major factor for small
consultancies and freelancers working in these formerly remote loca-
tions. Equally, telecoms will be an important factor for large ﬁrms in
sophisticated sectors: because of their size, they may still have shared
dependencies—for skilled labour, for transport infrastructure access,
etc.—and will thus be encouraged to exploit the advantages of coloca-
tion, but they will be able to do so in areas that might well have been
very much ‘out-of-bounds’ a few years ago.
Figure 4.3: Ebenezer Howard’s
Three Magnets (1898 [2003], p.24)
The soware development and services industries are good examples
of this process: they are quite concentrated to the West of London,
but many of them are, by historical standards, some distance from
their principal clients. One of the attractions of regional centres such
as Reading, Oxford, or Bristol seems to be that, thanks to the mix of
universities and amenities, they are a good source of skilled labour and
agglomerations and clusters 133
are also attractive to households seeking space for starting or raising a
family. So unlike London, these smaller towns and cities do not need
to try quite so hard “to reverse a strong tide of people who show every
sign that they want to escape the cities—above all, young parents with
children, who have very negative perceptions of urban life and urban
education” (Hall, 2002a, p.268).
Spatial Implications
For ﬁrms, the advantages to relocation out of the Central Business
District () include lower rents for newer space, and reduced staﬀ
costs. In fact, even back in an era of more expensive communications
and travel, reducing these costs represented a substantial savings: in
1975, the monetary costs of communication averaged only 8% of over-
all oﬃce costs, compared with 73% for staﬀ costs and 15% for rents
(Goddard, 1975, p.40). The greatest savings came to ﬁrms that moved
between 50 and 100mi. from central London (1975, p.40), and decen-
tralisation was seen as a normal part of oﬃce reorganisation as certain
functions were “hived oﬀ” to less expensive environments (1975, p.35).
Returning to the life-cycle concept, before transactional patterns
stabilise there is likely to be a ‘window of locational opportunity’ in
which no one location or subset of possible locations has a decisive
competitive advantage because signiﬁcant place-based economies of
scale have not yet emerged. Furthermore, in sectors where economies
of scale are more modest and where diﬀerentiated production makes it
possible for new entrants to compete with incumbents, then there may
not only be many windows, but new windows may open on a frequent
basis (cf. Scott and Storper, 2003, p.584). This dynamic may therefore
give rise to a locational life-cycle of sorts in which the concentration of
industry changes over time: dispersed during the early stages of sectoral
or product development, then narrowing to just a few points with
decisive location advantages, before eventually broadening again as the
pattern of interaction stabilises (Menzel and Fornahl, 2010, p.3).
The issue facing specialised producers, which harkens back to the
central place structure discussed in Chapter 2, is that large volume
outputs require large markets into which to sell. Storper and Venables
(2002) suggest that if the output is destined for ﬁnal consumers then
access to big cities will be a priority, but that if the ﬁrm produces an
intermediate output then they will prioritise access to specialised cities
“which concentrate large numbers of demanders of relatively specialised
kinds of input’’ (2002, p.6). However, we need to qualify this predic-
tion by noting that the complex supply chains supporting ﬁrms such as
Zara or Benetton enable them to sell rapidly-changing clothing lines at
shops all over the world without the need to have factories anywhere
near the ﬁnal market. To some extent, one could argue that integrated
distribution and supply management systems have replaced physical
plant as the key competitive asset of many large ﬁrms.
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Summary
This review of scale economies has emphasised an essential diﬀer-
ence between localisation and urbanisation economies: localisation
economies are typically tied to the participation of ﬁrms in predomi-
nantly client/supplier relationships within a single sector, while urban-
isation economies are tied to the participation of ﬁrms in several such
relationships across diﬀerent sectors simultaneously. And we can also
now see how the stage of development of a ﬁrm or sector aﬀects the
extent to which it is able to exploit internal and external economies
of scale; however, we have also highlighted the challenge facing en-
trepreneurs as they do so: while multiple optima indicate that the ﬁrm
can pursue multiple routes to growth, the conﬁguration of these optima
may constrain the number of viable strategies.
For instance, Das and Finne (2008, pp.161–162) found that local-
isation eﬀects contribute to the rate of growth in mature industries,
while the externalities associated with urbanisation economies were
more important for young sectors and businesses. And the diﬀerential
impacts extend to the sector in which a ﬁrm operates: manufacturing
industries appear to be negatively impacted by the diversity of urban
environments, while service and high-technology ﬁrms appear to ben-
eﬁt (2008, p.162). In sum, perhaps ﬁrms in sectors with high rates of
growth or innovation beneﬁt from diversity because, on a pragmatic
level, they simply do not know in advance what specialist inputs they
will require or what new opportunities might suddenly appear. Con-
versely, established large ﬁrms tend to beneﬁt from more incremental
approaches, and the greater stability of their operating environments
enables them to formalise their relationships in ways that reduce spatial
dependence.
In fact, the beneﬁts and disbeneﬁts of agglomeration extend down to
the level of the units of the ﬁrm itself. In the case of management func-
tions, Scott (1986, p.225–226) argues that there is a tendency to locate
in ‘disintegrated complexes’ with access to the specialist support services
that might be required on a regular basis. Conversely, in the case of
low-skill functions, it is oen desirable to develop integrated facilities in
more remote locations where labour is relatively less expensive (1986,
p.226). Finally, in the case of skilled but non-managerial tasks, Scott
predicts that they will gravitate towards secondary centres with desirable
amenities (ibid.).
The role of transportation and technology change within this over-
arching framework is complex: cheaper transportation and communi-
cation will tend to shorten and disrupt product life-cycles by ‘increasing
reactivity to the market and cheapening upstream relationships in com-
modity chains’ (Storper and Venables, 2002, p.33). However, travel
and telecoms also enable ﬁrms, and especially s, to more eﬀectively
integrate dispersed operations and generate additional economies of
scale even in historically complex tasks such as accounting or ﬁnancing
services (Nachum, 1999, p.22).
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4.3 Agglomeration
In the previous chapter we considered several reasons for localised spe-
cialisation; in this chapter we’re examining in more detail the reasons
that these producers concentrate in particular spaces and districts. The
importance of agglomeration to regional and national economic devel-
opment can be gauged from the fact that 40% of American employ-
ment was found in counties making up just 1.5% of the country’s land
area (Scott and Storper, 2003, p.581). The importance of such small
areas to overall American employment would appear to suggest that
agglomeration has an economic beneﬁt (Cook et al., 2007, p.1325), and
in the above sections we have considered several factors that might play
a role in this outcome. Here we will examine the agglomerative process
in more detail so as to better understand its causes and eﬀects, as well as
the potential disbeneﬁts that might eventually ensue.
Surprisingly, our ability to distinguish an agglomeration from, say,
a localisation economy immediately runs into the limitation that com-
paratively little has been added in the past hundred years to Marshall’s
basic three-part outline of the advantages of agglomeration: access to
a large pool of specialised labour; access to specialised suppliers; and
access to “knowledge with the characteristics of a public good” (Cook
et al., 2007, p.1326), or as Marshall originally put it: access to places
where knowledge is “in the air” (1890 [1948], p.271). For reasons that
will become clear in the subsequent section on clustering, I will argue
that the ‘in the air-ness’ of knowledge is a feature of clusters, but not
necessarily of agglomerations. Instead, I suggest that we should supplant
this last part of Marshall’s deﬁnition with the idea that “…agglomera-
tion consists of diﬀerent sectors sharing common input structures and
clients” (Storper and Venables, 2004, p.365), and that it is therefore
characterised primarily by market relationships.
Types of Agglomeration
Using this deﬁnition, and building on the ﬁndings from the previous
section on the impact of scale and life-stage, we can see how agglom-
eration can occur along two axes: vertical and horizontal. Vertical
agglomeration is connected to the economic beneﬁts resulting from
the proximity of one or more stages within a single supply chain, while
horizontal agglomeration occurs when competitors and/or collaborators
who are not necessarily engaged in direct input/output relationships de-
rive some beneﬁt from being concentrated at a single location. Clearly,
horizontal and vertical agglomeration can occur both independently
and concurrently, and the predominance of one or the other can be
connected to the impact that scale and life-cycle have on the optimal
corporate and sectoral conﬁguration.
As we saw in Chapter 3, the proximity of customers and suppliers
oﬀers advantages to ﬁrms by acting to suppress the costs of market co-
ordination (see page 98). For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit
(2006, p.58) quotes a specialised manufacturer of steel products who
indicates that: “A factor in locating our manufacturing is availability of
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raw materials. China and Taiwan cannot supply, and as we are based
in Europe, we are close to key suppliers in Germany and France.” In
a similar way, as producers of specialised labour and information out-
puts universities “provide a non-mobile, valuable, and restricted input
to production” (Lösch, 1954 [1973], p.83) that may also spur agglom-
eration. The point is that high levels of specialised demand or supply
encourage an increasing specialisation of labour and production in a
region, and this, in turn, “opens new ways of doing business and oppor-
tunities not recognised in more integrated production methods” (Cook
et al., 2007, p.1327).
In contrast, horizontal agglomerations place competing ﬁrms within
the same industry together, usually for the purpose of making them-
selves ‘collectively available’ to potential customers (Scott, 1984, p.13).
There is obviously a good deal of overlap between the concept of the
Central Place and horizontal agglomeration: in both cases, economies
of travel for buyers give agglomerated ﬁrms access to more potential
customers. However, because the ﬁrms do not necessarily serve the
same sets of clients, or may serve many diﬀerent types of clients, we
would expect to ﬁnd greater diversity in the technologies and processes
employed. This inter-ﬁrm variation has two important beneﬁts: ob-
servability, in which a ﬁrm can more easily monitor and copy what its
competitors are doing; and comparability, in which a ﬁrm can more
easily benchmark its own output against other approaches (Cook et al.,
2007, p.1327). Survey results by Cook et al. (2007, pp.1334–1338)
from the City of London suggest that horizontal agglomeration is im-
portant, but that the beneﬁts are not seen as clearly by ﬁrms as they are
for vertical agglomeration.
Conceptual Challenges
There are, however, several important conceptual challenges con-
nected to the identiﬁcation of an agglomeration. The ﬁrst, and most
important, is the problem of scale: what density of ﬁrms, and over
what geographical extent, is required to create an agglomeration? Do
they, for instance, occur only at the neighbourhood scale, or do they
span cities, or even entire regions? Coe and Townsend (1998) have ar-
gued that small scale, localised agglomeration in the U.K. is largely a
myth—though they also note that the obverse, that only global forces
are relevant, is equally fallacious—and suggest that the appropriate an-
alytical unit is really the entire Greater South East of England ()
region.
A second factor is that some longitudinal measures of agglomeration
may be quite misleading because they are not like-for-like comparisons.
For instance, many metrics indicate that ﬁnancial services have become
more concentrated with time; but this may in part be the result of
changes in what ﬁnancial work actually is: the vast branch networks
of the 20th Century have been largely replaced by s (Coﬀey and
Shearmur, 2002, p.376). For banks, most tasks are now performed in
just three places: the head oﬃce, the back oﬃce, and the call centre, and
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so increasing concentration may be driven by the redistribution of work
alone and not by an increase in the beneﬁts of agglomeration. In short,
the seeming concentration of some activities may largely be the result of
measuring an increase in spatial monopoly—the fact that only one ﬁrm
can occupy a given point in space.
An additional consideration is the extent to which power relation-
ships between ﬁrms and infrastructure operators can impact the overall
distribution of activity while being misleading as to its underlying
causes. In a study of the transoceanic shipping network, Fowler (2006,
p.1430) points out that agglomeration eﬀects seem to be driven not so
much by positive externalities as by the competitive strategies of the
ports to lure business away from other points of entry. Moreover, the
largest shipping ﬁrms are fully aware of their market-making power,
and force ports to oﬀer higher levels of service by threatening to take
their business elsewhere (ibid.). So “some portion of the observed
agglomeration may have little to do with current beneﬁts to locally
embedded business interests: instead, agglomeration can come from
technological advancements and strategic decisions on the part of actors
in networks who are not necessarily tied to the cities that they connect”
(Fowler, 2006, p.1436).
Finally, a review by Athey et al. (2007, p.27) found that some cities
seem to beneﬁt from a kind of ‘supply push’ in which the “supply of
innovative goods and services actively shaped markets, rather than sim-
ply responded to consumer demand.” Hall argues that Silicon Valley,
through the growth of the venture capital industry (1998, p.452) and
‘inﬂux’ of researchers from Stanford (1998, p.495), and Detroit, be-
fore scale manufacture of automobiles wiped out its diversity (1998,
p.489; see also page 125), both displayed this characteristic and notes
that “many of the innovative milieux seem to have begun by catering
for what could be called an internally generated demand” (1998, p.495).
This would ﬁt with an assertion by Storper and Walker (1989, p.71;
reported in Cole, 2008, p.900) that “contrary to Weberian theory, in-
dustries are capable of generating their own conditions of growth in
place and making factors of production come to them…or come into
being.”
Transportation & Technology
Demand for information-oriented services has produced a boom in
highly-specialised s and ‘boutique’ consulting ﬁrms (cf. Beyers,
2000; Hall, 2007b), some of which report operating in markets with
as few as ﬁve serious competitors (Keeble et al., 1998, p.331). From a
traditional business development standpoint, many of these boutique
ﬁrms follow a rather unusual developmental path: their markets are so
specialised that they must be eﬀectively ‘born global’ in order to have a
suﬃciently large market for their very particular oﬀerings (Hall, 2007b,
p.1850). Consequently, for highly-specialised ﬁrms an internationalisa-
tion strategy rooted in global travel and telecoms is essential to survival
(Keeble et al., 1998, p.327).
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However, the same process that enables these ﬁrms to access clients
globally also brings them into competition with similar ﬁrms elsewhere
in the world. To remain competitive, these s must leverage not only
their global linkages, but also any local sources of innovation that might
act as a source of competitive advantage (Keeble et al., 1998, p.333).
This dynamic would seem to be the reason that ‘internationalised’ s
surveyed by Keeble et al. reported that collaborations with universities
and with ﬁrms in the same overall line of business were vital to their
success and why they spent more time and money actively cultivating
research and development contacts than their less outward-looking
counterparts (1998, pp.335–337).
For larger ﬁrms, the combination of ease of communication and ease
of movement for employees based in the leading world cities creates
the possibility of a ﬁrm that is simultaneously spatially-diﬀuse but still
vertically and horizontally integrated, and able to beneﬁt from local
agglomerations at the level of the individual oﬃce. In other words, im-
provements in travel and telecommunications make it possible for the
ﬁrm to coordinate activity within a mix of real and electronic spaces
that constitute what Audirac (2002, p.218) calls a ‘hybrid’ space, and
the deployment of  within s suggests that they are making par-
ticularly extensive use of this hybrid environment.
Revisiting the operative deﬁnition of agglomeration, we can see
that none of the three elements—specialised labour, specialised sup-
pliers, and common input structures and clients—actually requires the
continued spatial proximity of ﬁrms, though this would be a natural as-
sumption. In short, we need to better-distinguish between geographic
dispersal and functional decentralisation (Goddard, 1975, p.54). This
possibility will be considered in more detail in sections 4.4 and 5.3,
but it is the tension between these two forces which generates the ba-
sic question—as raised by, amongst others, Sassen (1991)—of whether
management functions will continue to agglomerate at strategic global
locations, or whether this technology-enabled hybrid space will enable a
re-diﬀusion of this coordination function?
Spatial Implications
Like many others, Scott and Pope (2007, p.1365) argue that large, dense
industrial agglomerations have always been sites from which routine or
low-value work has been ‘expelled’. Evidence from the City of London
would certainly appear to support this: while low-value and back oﬃce
activity have already moved out (Cook et al., 2007, p.1343), the prob-
lem of information interpretation seems to have forced the most-skilled
workers together in order to manage the almost overwhelming ﬂow of
market data and information (Gillespie and Richardson, 2000, p.234).
Predictably, we also ﬁnd that some areas of the cultural economy, such
as pre- and post-production, which have “transaction-intensive struc-
ture and highly-specialised labour requirements’’ (Scott and Pope,
2007, p.1366), are also heavily concentrated in the city-centre.
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(Coﬀey and Shearmur, 2002,
p.371; reproduced with permission
of Sage Publications)
We’ve noted above (see page 127) that some ﬁrm decisions may
be driven by workforce migration to the suburbs and the need to set
up oﬃces at accessible locations outside the . What is particularly
intriguing from an planning perspective, however, is that the relocated
work has not been randomly distributed around the region and still
seems to end up in concentrated in particular areas (Gaschet, 2002,
p.65). Evidence from Atlanta suggests that edge-cities are in some sense
the recreation of the  on an accessible metro fringe (Leigh, 2000).
What seems to be happening is that these emerging subcentres are
nearly as specialised as the  zone they encircle, but that they are spe-
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cialised in diﬀerent sectors from the urban core. So in the examples from
France, the ‘economic base’ of the subcentres is systematically biased
towards manufacturing, construction, and transportation, and against
personal and collective services (Gaschet, 2002, p.78). Similar study
of the Montréal region found that, although all centres and subcentres
were specialised in at least one high-value service, the  was relatively
more specialised in all high-order services (Coﬀey and Shearmur, 2002,
p.367), with the notable exception of science and engineering services
and an increasing decentralisation of the Accounting and Management
Consulting sectors (2002, p.368). Figure 4.4 gives us a sense of how
these trends have developed over the past decades.
However, the sheer cost of major infrastructure remains one reason
that physical proximity is attractive to ﬁrms with such dependencies
(Coﬀey and Shearmur, 2002, p.361; and see also Hall, 2009, p.807).
A particularly topical analysis by Bettencourt et al. (2007) of the rela-
tionship between ‘urban indicators’ and city size in America quantiﬁes
this eﬀect very clearly: infrastructure, such as roads, electrical cable,
and petrol stations, scale sublinearly with city size, while other aspects of
cities such as patents, wages, and crime, scale superlinearly. The terms
superlinear and sublinear here refer to the exponent  in the equation
Y (t) = Y0N(t)
 where N(t) is the population of a city at time t, Y0 is
normalisation constant, and Y (t) the indicator of interest.
Y (Urban Indicator)  Country & Year
New patents 1.27 U.S. 2001
Private & employment 1.34 U.S. 2001
‘Supercreative’
employment
1.15 U.S. 2003
New  cases 1.23 U.S. 2002–2003
Total housing 1.00 U.S. 1990
Household electrical
consumption
1.00 Germany 2002
Household electrical
consumption
1.05 China 2002
Gasoline stations 0.77 U.S. 2001
Length of electrical cables 0.87 Germany 2002
Road surface 0.83 Germany 2002
Table 4.1: Scaling exponents for
urban indicators (adapted from
Bettencourt et al., 2007, p.7303)
In plain English, when  < 1 a doubling of a city’s size does not
double the indicator, but if  > 1 then doubling the city’s size more
than doubles the indicator. In terms of our discussion of the beneﬁts of
agglomeration and of urbanisation, Bettencourt et al.’s (2007) analysis
demonstrates the substantial cost advantages of deploying infrastructure
in urban locations since the ‘circulatory’ indicators all have  < 1 (see
Table 4.1). However, the summary table also suggests that there are
measurable productivity and creativity advantages to urban locations
since they all have  > 1. We will approach the ‘superlinear’ indicators
indirectly later, but for now let us note only that these all seem to be
characterised by network eﬀects.
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Summary
So on the one hand we have “continuing pressures towards agglomer-
ation, includ[ing] available skilled labour, universities and colleges, and
[the] availability of specialised training resources” (Traxler and Luger,
2000, p.288), but on the other hand we have increasingly sophisticated
methods for enabling functional agglomeration to supplant or comple-
ment geographic concentration. The ability of technology to enable
coordination at a distance and to reduce transaction costs suggests that
proximity should no longer be considered a necessary precondition for
agglomeration, and our revised deﬁnition emphasises this change.
So, the coordinative changes enabled by  should encourage us to
put more focus on the possibility that ‘virtual agglomerations’ of ﬁrms
may emerge which have no corresponding geographic manifestation
(Traxler and Luger, 2000, p.286). Firms and individuals can now co-
ordinate bidding and purchasing electronically, reducing the barriers
to entry and increasing the scale over which informational and mate-
rial ﬂows can be managed. Technology thus serves here to increase the
transparency of markets, making search and match processes more eﬃ-
cient, and reducing the cost penalty exacted by space on both stages of a
transaction.
Locationally, we may anticipate some level of path-dependency, with
‘new economy’ ﬁrms exercising greater freedom of choice than their
more established counterparts; some will pick their location “on the
basis of access to airports and highways, where those opting for exurban
and rural locations do so for quality-of-life reasons” (Audirac, 2002,
p.221). However, while some sectors are relocating over large distances,
others seem barely to be ‘moving down the road’ even if they are no
longer strictly based solely in the  (Audirac, 2002, p.216). The
question is this: why has growth in the highest-order sectors occurred
primarily in the ? And why are engineering and & seemingly
following a diﬀerent trajectory? Section 4.4 begins to oﬀer an answer to
this question, and Chapter 5 will attempt to ﬂesh out a response to these
seemingly contradictory trends.
4.4 Clustering
In Book X of his Principles of Economics, Marshall (1890 [1948], p.xi)
observed that in some rare cases concentrations of industry emerge that,
while exemplifying “a ‘general rule’ of diﬀerentiation combined with
integration” like an agglomeration, also create an environment within
which “the mysteries of trade become no mysteries; but as it were in the
air…” (Marshall, 1890 [1948], p.271). Marshall’s observation points to
the idea that in particular times and places the ‘secrets’ of a profession
may be socialised and a culture of collaboration arise and thrive within a
shiing framework of nonetheless cutthroat competition.
A more precise deﬁnition of what we now call ‘a cluster’ was given
by Nachum and Keeble (2003a, p.173), who deﬁned it as a “geograph-
ically concentrated group of competing, collaborating and independent
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ﬁrms connected by a system of market and non-market links.” The
existence of ‘non-market interactions’ is the key to deﬁning a cluster
of ﬁrms in a way that is meaningfully diﬀerent from ‘mere’ agglomera-
tion; and we can make use of social network analysis to get to grips with
what is happening within clusters since “conceptualisations of networks
remain fairly basic in economic geography and are largely focused at the
inter-organisational level…” (Grabher, 2004, p.105).
The reason this distinction matters is that clusters are thought by
many policy-makers to demonstrate high rates of innovation and new
business formation, and they have invested a great deal of money in
trying to recreate the success of Silicon Valley—as documented by,
amongst others, Hall and Markusen (1985), Hall (1998), and Saxenian
(1990, 1994, 2000)—elsewhere around the world. Martin and Sunley
(2003) and McDonald et al. (2007) suggest that some policy-makers are
inclined to see clusters everywhere: in his opening remarks at theWorld
Congress on Local Clusters, the Secretary-General of the  asserted
that by the mid-1990s the U.S. contained some 380 ‘local clusters’
that collectively accounted for 60% of America’s industrial output
(Johnston, 2001).
However, the diﬃcult experiences of many countries in trying to
manufacture ‘technopoles’ on the Silicon Valley model (cf. Castells
and Hall, 1994), makes the notion that there is such a profusion of
clusters in America, or indeed anywhere, profoundly problematic. The
experience of Tsukuba (Castells and Hall, 1994, pp.65–76) and Sophia-
Antipolis (1994, pp.85–93) highlights this: neither has produced many
spin-oﬀs nor entrepreneurs, and the principal attraction for ﬁrms has
been policy-generated, such as access to national lab facilities or tax
incentives, rather than sustained innovation (1994, p.70).
Clearly, the fact that Silicon Valley is a shorthand for high-tech
success is in part a function of size: San Jose grew from 95,000 to more
than 500,000 people in the space of just 25 years (Hall, 1998, p.449),
and today there are more than 500,000 working in ‘high-tech’ jobs
alone (Thibodeau, 2009). In contrast, Sophia-Antipolis—in spite of
being Europe’s largest ‘innovation park’—had just 26,000 workers as of
2003 (Fondation Sophia Antipolis, 2006). But California’s association
with innovation also stems from the fact that, whereas Silicon Valley
is composed of ﬁrms at all stages of growth and is a hotbed of start-
ups, Sophia-Antipolis has historically been dominated by large ﬁrms
with an aversion to collaboration and owes its very existence to direct
government intervention (Hansen, 1990). This is not to suggest that
the French oﬃce park is a failure—it is now a nationwide leader in &
activity (Lazaric et al., 2004)—but that something qualitatively diﬀerent
happened in California that did not happen in the Côte d’Azur.
Deﬁning a Cluster
According to Cooke’s review (2001), these divergent outcomes hinge
on the fact that little in the way of dynamic, local learning systems
emerged in the French business park: the majority of relationships were
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vertical (supplier/buyer), learning partnerships were minimal, and the
local labour market was quite weak, meaning that employees tended
to stick with the large ﬁrms rather than leaving to form start-ups. In
short, Sophia-Antipolis was an agglomeration of ﬁrms with few of the
cross-cutting inter-organisational relationships (s) that characterise
information- and exchange-rich environments like the one in Silicon
Valley (cf. Knoben and Oerlemans, 2008, p.388). It is not that clusters
do not have market-based exchanges, they do (Menzel and Fornahl,
2010, p.16), but that this is not a deﬁning characteristic.
As connections between individuals and ﬁrms proliferate, they create
disincentives to relocation: economic agents will naturally hesitate to
disrupt stable s, particularly those which support growth and inno-
vation (Knoben and Oerlemans, 2008, p.389). So what we are saying is
that the “spatial proximity of large numbers of ﬁrms locked into dense
networks of interaction provides the essential conditions for many-sided
exchanges of information to occur” (Scott and Storper, 2003, p.583),
and that these exchanges serve to ‘lock in’ ﬁrms to particular districts.
However, the nature of these networks needs to be examined in much
more detail before we can begin to establish why “geographically con-
centrated companies…exhibit a disproportionately high innovation rate
during the growth phase of the industry” (Menzel and Fornahl, 2010,
p.3).
F  I N: Generally speaking, the study of
business networks within regions has been seen as the study of infor-
mal personal networks; however, Lawton-Smith (2010) points out
that formal networks also exist and may play an important role for
younger ﬁrms. The distinction between formal and informal interac-
tions gives rise to three basic network-types: formal ﬁrm-based business
networks designed to foster ‘resource formation and exploitation’ in
supplier/customer-type relationships; formal professional networks
where employees meet ‘for personal and professional advancement’; and
informal open networks of personal interaction with no speciﬁc sectoral
aﬃliation (2010, p.6).
As an example of this, the Oxford-to-Cambridge Arc ( Arc6)
6 This term actually appears to
have originated with a coordinated
initiative by three Regional Devel-
opment Agencies (East of England,
East Midlands, and South East of
England) in support of technology-
sector activity in 2003, but it has
now gained wider currency as a
generic term for new business
eﬀorts in the area bounded by the
two cities (cf. The Cambridge
Network, 2003).
contains no fewer than 221 networks of varying types and sectoral
orientations, with sources of support that range from participant-
subscription to government- and -funded initiatives alongside less
formal conﬁgurations (Lawton-Smith, 2010, p.6). Publicly-funded
networks seem to predominate where there has historically been less
start-up activity, while private and academic networks are more com-
mon in Oxford and Cambridge, both areas with longer innovation
histories (Lawton-Smith, 2010, p.8). In line with Saxenian’s study of
Silicon Valley (1994), the prevalence of business networks is here con-
nected to higher rates of innovation—Oxfordshire, Cambridgeshire,
and Milton Keynes outpace ‘less connected’ adjacent regions such as
Bedfordshire and Northamptonshire (Lawton-Smith, 2010, p.6)—but
what is notably diﬀerent here is that formal networks are the dominant
type (2010, p.7).
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Participants in Lawton-Smith’s research connect involvement in for-
mal networks to beneﬁts including increased sales, collaboration, legit-
imation, and representation (Lawton-Smith, 2010, p.5). So we are not
dealing solely with eﬀects on innovation, and although the latter two
advantages seem to have been less-studied, they are clearly also impor-
tant to emerging industries: European animators used a major industry
conference as a formal professional networking environment (Cole,
2008), and boutique ﬁnancial ﬁrms created a formal alliance through
which to promote their specialised services to potential clients outside
of their existing personal contact network (Hall, 2007b, p.1848).
The history of the Homebrew Computer Club amply demonstrates
the value of a mix of fora for networking: ‘formal’ meetings to present
new hardware or ideas were oen followed by informal, ‘random ac-
cess’ discussions, oen at The Oasis bar and grill (Hall, 1998, p.443;
Wikipedia, 2002). In a similar way, ﬁnanciers, accountants, and consul-
tants interviewed by Cook et al. (2007, p.1336) report that proximity
to social venues is an important factor because it oﬀers access to indus-
try gossip and insight into key market movements (Cook et al., 2007,
p.1336). And as many of these ﬁelds are characterised by high staﬀ
turnover—on average, professionals in New York and London’s legal
and advertising markets had worked for three diﬀerent ﬁrms— workers
see staying in touch with past colleagues as “a valuable way of partic-
ipating in discussions about shared [challenges]…typically through
infrequent lunches or aer-work meetings…” (Faulconbridge, 2007,
p.1644)
Torre has suggested that “geographical proximity is not an economic
cause of agglomeration as much as a social eﬀect of the embeddedness of
economic relations” (Torre, 2008, p.878), by which he means that the
localisation of ‘innovation networks’ may just be the product of our ten-
dency to trust and collaborate with those who are closest to us socially
and geographically. In other words, because our social connections tend
to be more dense in our immediate vicinity than they are at a distance
(Rychen and Zimmermann, 2008, p.769), the non-market links that
characterise clusters mean that they were always destined to be local
as well. Recalling the City of London in the 1950s and 1960s, one of
the Bank of England’s representatives says “I always reckoned you were
idling if you were sitting at your desk in the Bank, I loved putting on
my top hat and going round and dropping in on the banks and having a
chat” (Kynaston, 2001, p.206).
We can expect an abundance of interaction to stimulate the forma-
tion of an extensive and well-connected network of contacts at the same
time as it reinforces the idea of a ‘community of learning’ that is some-
how greater than the sum of its participating parts. Indeed, there may
be a sense of ‘belonging’ that ﬂows from shared challenges and simi-
lar backgrounds (Storper and Venables, 2002, p.13), and this sense of
being part of a group (especially one at the leading edge of an exciting
industry) helps to establish social norms to which people will adhere in
part “…to show that they have certain criteria of judgement, which in
turn signals to others that they belong to a certain social world” (Stor-
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per and Venables, 2002, p.16). But the larger point I am making here is
that while Silicon Valley and Wall Street are agglomerations in a classic
sense, they are also fundamentally social entities in which a wide range
of interactions, occurring both inside and outside of working hours, are
crucial to their perpetuation.
Of course, this is not to suggest that staﬀ run around sharing trade
secrets willy-nilly7, nor should we expect even notoriously uncom- 7 In fact, McCann et al. (2002,
p.655) argue that in the semi-
conductor and pharmaceutical
industries physical proximity be-
tween some suppliers and buyers
may actually be designed to limit
the likelihood of information leak-
age and so have little to do with
new knowledge generation (2002,
p.657).
mercially minded engineers to freely share insights into products or
services that they are in the process of developing. The ﬁnanciers in-
terviewed by Faulconbridge (2007, p.1644) emphasised that “it was
possible to describe a situation without divulging conﬁdential mate-
rial” and that therefore exchanges of information and learning could
take place without compromising a ﬁrm or client. However, for such
informal exchanges to occur, it is clearly important that the relationship
between participants be characterised by some degree of trust: they
must believe that their insights will be reciprocated at some point in the
future (Morrison, 2008, p.821). In sum, Faulconbridge’s interviewees
pursue a cautious strategy of making one or two oﬀers of insight which,
if unreciprocated or unduly exploited by the recipient, would cease
immediately (2007, p.1648).
T  S T: We can frame the structure of this exchange
more formally using Granovetter’s (1973, p.1361) deﬁnition of strong
interpersonal ties as “a (probably linear) combination of the amount of
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual conﬁding), and the
reciprocal services which characterise the tie.” So the ‘junior profession-
als’ in ﬁnance who are expected to share their insights into the market
with others within the ﬁrm are in the process of building strong ties
rooted in their peers’ and supervisors’ recognition and respect (2007,
p.1649). And because face-time is not fungible (i. e. substitutable), it is
a signal of importance that is very costly to fake for highly-skilled work-
ers. In fact, the personal costs “can be substantial, far outweighing the
cost of the message’’ itself (Storper and Venables, 2004, p.356), and in-
creasing proﬂigacy only serves to “enhance the validity of the message”
(Storper and Venables, 2002, p.26).
Historically, trust has been thought to play a particularly important
role in the ﬁnancial sector where “money is moved daily on the basis
of advice or without the beneﬁt of a written agreement but on the basis
of understanding and custom” (Traxler and Luger, 2000, p.291). One
City of London ﬁnancier’s memoirs indicate that in the 1950s he had
underwritten agreements worth more than £2,000,000 (more than
£35,000,000 in today’s terms) with nothing more than verbal agree-
ment and a note on a piece of paper (Kynaston, 2001, p.203). It may
seem odd that a sector which at times focusses on advantages measured
in fractions of a cent should also be so beholden to personal and pro-
fessional relationships of trust, but the collapse of Bear Stearns in 2008
makes it abundantly clear what happens when there is a breakdown of
the trust in ﬁnancial markets (Economist, 2008b). In fact, it is clear
that for many ﬁnancial ﬁrms their reputation is their main competitive
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advantage: “Reputation—slow to gain, quick to lose—[is] integral to
the reposing of trust” (Kynaston, 2001, p.203)8. 8 The more recent controversy
around the role of Goldman Sachs
in betting against ﬁnancial products
that it was simultaneously touting
to clients has dragged the issue of
trust back into focus (cf. Story and
Morgenson, 2010).
A recent study of the ‘boutique’ ﬁnancial industry in London high-
lights the changing nature of strong ties in the ﬁnancial sector: because
the boutique ﬁrms are small compared to the full-service investment
banks with which they compete, it is not usually the boutique’s name
that closes a deal, but the individual and their reputation with the client
(Hall, 2007b, p.1848). In the past, when bankers were uniformly drawn
from an Oxbridge background, this established a ‘shared biography’
in which trust was implicit: “Good Etonian standards means a total
trust—if you say you’ll do something, you’ll do it. On the whole, deal-
ing with Etonians in the City, you had a sense of conﬁdence that they
would behave impeccably” (Kynaston, 2001, p.201). The decline of
this uniformity in background and outlook, Hall suggests, has removed
this shortcut to trust and forced these bonds to be ‘actively manufac-
tured’ (2007b, p.1848).
The non-work environment seems especially important to the pro-
cess of manufacturing strong ties:
Knowing your clients is crucial…I was actually told that when I started
here…like I went to the Six Nations [rugby tournament] with a client
and that’s how they come to trust you…you share your experiences with
them and they see what you’re like as a person, not a voice at the end of
a phone line. Trust centres on me as a person as well as me as a corporate
ﬁnancier.
Associate at boutique ﬁrm (February 2003; reported in Hall, 2007b, p.1848)
This last comment points to the importance of common frames of ref-
erence to building a kind of ‘category trust’ (cf. Grabher, 2002, p.210);
a more diﬀuse type trust that may act as a platform for building inter-
personal trust: “Interviewees suggested that feeling part of a deﬁned
local community encouraged collaboration and the sharing of ideas and
insight with individuals at rival ﬁrms” (Faulconbridge, 2007, p.1650).
Granovetter’s ground-breaking paper on social networks showed
that if an individual has two trusted friends, then it was highly likely
that that these two individuals also knew each other and were friends as
well (Granovetter, 1983, p.1362). And given the obvious importance
of trust to the eﬃcient operation of opaque markets, it might seem that
weak ties would be irrelevant to the operation of clusters. However,
Granovetter’s crucial insight is that strong ties in social networks can
have negative economic eﬀects if they yield a lack of exposure to ‘nov-
elty’. While strange on the surface, this result stems from the fact that
strong ties—on account of their socioeconomic similarity—are likely
to be found between individuals who are already part of a tight-knit
group, whereas weak ties will by deﬁnition tend to be found between
dissimilar groups.
I  W T: Because weak ties are more likely to “con-
nect individuals who are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another”
(Granovetter, 1983, p.204), they will tend to bring together people who
have been exposed to diﬀerent information about their environment.
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The evidence from Granovetter’s research was that blue collar, profes-
sional, technical, and managerial workers all tended to ﬁnd out about
job opportunities through people they saw only occasionally (55.6%)
or rarely (27.8%), and that new information was more likely to come
from “an old college friend or a former workmate or employer, with
whom sporadic contact had been maintained” (1973, p.1371)9. Perhaps 9 In fact, the only people for whom
strong ties proved to be important
as a source of employment oppor-
tunity were those in periods of
great uncertainty and stress, such
as aer a period of unemployment,
which suggests that we may only
feel comfortable drawing upon
close friends in an active way (1973,
pp.211–212), even though it is our
acquaintances who are most likely
to be useful to our search.
nowhere have these dynamics been seen to be more important than in
the market for cultural and innovative high-technology goods where
“social and professional networks [are] not simply conduits for the dis-
semination of technical and market information. They also [function] as
eﬃcient job search networks” (Currid, 2007, p.73). As a result, many
ﬁrms actively exploit such networks “as [a] source of recommendations
and referrals for hiring” (Nachum and Keeble, 2003a, p.181)
In the literature review of their 2007 investigation, Hauser et al.
(2007) cited empirical support from a variety of sources for the appli-
cation of social network theory to economic development, stating that
“aer controlling for trust, weak ties exert a stronger eﬀect on successful
knowledge receipt than strong ties” (2007, p.78). In their own work
with human capital data collected by Eurostat, Hauser et al. (2007)
found that innovation was correlated with two dimensions of ‘social
capital’: Associational Activity, which they took as a proxy for weak
ties, and (to a lesser extent) Political Awareness, which they interpreted
as a proxy for an outwardly-oriented disposition towards the world;
trust, it seems, played little role in the degree of innovation (2007,
p.83–84)10. 10 However, the authors note that
the survey used to generate the
results phrased trust in negative
terms along the lines of ‘how do
you feel about people who don’t
look like you?’ (Hauser et al., 2007,
p.84)
According to Torre (2008, p.871), Schumpeter’s model of innova-
tion ‘bundles’ had groups of entrepreneurs emerging at the same time
and place when both their technology and their ideas had reached some
level of maturity. However, the next and crucial step to self-sustaining
innovation may only be possible if some level of reciprocality between
weakly-connected individuals is possible. This type of relationship un-
doubtedly exists in Silicon Valley, where engineers engage with diﬃcult
problems beyond the boundary of the ﬁrm largely for the reputational
eﬀects. However, I suspect that it also exists in a slightly diﬀerent form
in the fashion and ﬁnancial centres of New York and London: the need
for constant innovation, combined with the need to work with spe-
cialists in other diﬀerent sectors in order to deliver a product or service,
requires employees to maintain extended circles of acquaintances upon
who they can draw for insight and assistance on short notice, oen in
ways that preclude extensive formal negotiations or alliances.
Multi-scalar Social Networks
Although it might seem that these social network eﬀects can operate
only at the local level, an analysis of the Soho advertising industry clus-
ter by Nachum found that it was “far from being self-contained and
isolated” (1999, p.36) and that local linkages, while ‘vital for compet-
itiveness’, were “insuﬃcient by themselves to gain access to expertise
and knowledge which are increasingly shaped on a global basis” (1999,
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p.4). It was not that international networks supplanted local ones, rather
they complemented them “as a route for the circulation of informa-
tion and expertise” (Keeble and Nachum, 2002, p.84; and see also
Rychen and Zimmermann, 2008, p.767). This may well be why re-
search amongst British s found that ﬁrms with a more international
outlook not only valued their local links more than domestic ﬁrms,
but were also more likely to actively develop them (Keeble et al., 1998,
pp.335–337).
So how does this complementarity operate at these very diﬀerent
spatial scales? Storper and Venables (2004, p.356) have suggested that
the circulation of information occurs at two levels: a globally mobile
network of top executives, creatives, and scientists, and a more localised
network of professionals within a unique socio-cultural context (see
Figure 4.5). Logically, in this model we would expect to ﬁnd informa-
tion being funnelled between local clusters through the ‘elite’ who span
the two scales; and while we would tend to associate these people with
Multi-National Enterprises (s), there is no reason why this type of
mobility should be restricted to s alone.
Global Pipeline
Local Flow
Figure 4.5: Pipelines & Gatekeep-
ers
This slightly binary view of social interaction led some researchers to
speak of ‘pipelines’ between agglomerations being essential to the cir-
culation and acquisition of knowledge (Cook et al., 2007, p.1337). The
basic argument is that the global pipelines enable a cluster to identify
and take advantage of remote informational inputs (Rychen and Zim-
mermann, 2008, p.768). In terms of what these pipelines might look
like, Rychen and Zimmermann (2008, p.770) propose three types: a
permanent interface (i. e. an oﬃce) which collects information directly;
a gatekeeper conﬁguration in which a designated individual or organ-
isation collects and distributes information; and temporary proximity
created at trade fairs or industry expos.
There seem to me to be several basic challenges that Rychen and
Zimmermann’s model does not address directly: ﬁrst, the oﬃce model
presumes that the ‘space of the ﬁrm’ is fully-integrated and that infor-
mation ﬂows smoothly from one oﬃce of a  to another; second, the
agglomerations and clusters 149
gatekeeper approach suggests the emergence of a hierarchical organi-
sation within what is an essentially unstructured and complex process;
and third, the idea that temporary proximity (which we will discuss
more extensively on page 177) permits eﬃcient knowledge transfer be-
tween clusters seems to assume that participants are inclined to share
competitive advantages in this way.
To date, the gatekeeper approach seems to have garnered the most
attention, and some have argued that for this process to occur some
kind of ‘translation’ mechanism must be at work (Morrison, 2008,
p.818). Evidence for this process seems to come from a study of Italian
industry, which ﬁnds that the most innovative ﬁrms “devote signiﬁcant
eﬀorts to search and translate knowledge coming from external sources,
including universities and sectoral research centres” (Morrison, 2008,
p.818). The idea here is that gatekeepers draw on “a high degree of
relational capital” (Morrison, 2008, p.820) to identify, interpret, and
absorb the information from external resources before ‘translating’ it
into something useful to the local cluster.
While elegant, my suspicion is that the gatekeeper metaphor un-
duly privileges one set of individuals or ﬁrms in the ﬂow of information
through clusters. The evidence from internationally-oriented s
seems to suggest that formal collaborations between ﬁrms may well be
so structured because not all companies see the same value in estab-
lishing international links; however, this is not the same as arguing that
clusters—which I’ve argued are profoundly social in nature—are so
organised and, additionally, the evidence at the interpersonal level is
naturally much more mixed. So while it may be helpful to note that
some ﬁrms are more active than others in exploiting external infor-
mation ﬂows, this suggests only that it would be dangerous to treat a
cluster as a kind of soup of interchangeable ﬁrms.
Network science outlines two mechanisms by which information
can propagate quickly and extensively without the need to promote a
few key nodes to ‘gatekeeper status’. First, while geography is an im-
portant variable in social networks, it is not the only one: interviewees in
multi-national law ﬁrms emphasised to Faulconbridge (2007, p.1643)
the importance of long-distance links with colleagues doing the same
job in a diﬀerent oﬃce. Those distant colleagues are the quintessen-
tial weak ties—people with whom a worker may have sporadic con-
tact—and are not some kind of formal acquisition channel. Here, the
‘spacelessness’ of  means that physical proximity may no longer
be quite so strong a predictor of whether or not the ties across which
information can ﬂow exist between individuals.
Second, depending on the intensity and level of socialisation, people
may be able to extract meaningful information without a single ‘mes-
sage’ being actively relayed from one cluster to another. This second
approach might be particularly important in markets such as ﬁlm or
technology where the ‘players’ are in constant ﬂux and so the build-up
of ‘buzz’ around individuals and groups signals to others that valuable
activity is occurring (2008, p.769). The topic of buzz is dealt with sep-
arately below, on page 154, but I wish to emphasise here its role in the
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propagation of information through social networks and how it impacts
the success of clusters.
Returning now to the idea that geography is not the only dimen-
sion of social networks, Watts et al. (2002) found that if we take a more
complex approach to proximity and allow an individual to be ‘close’
to another by bonds of kinship, friendship, ethnicity, and occupa-
tion, for instance, then the result is a ‘searchable’ network of surpris-
ingly small worlds. A study of the LiveJournal social networking site
(Liben-Nowell et al., 2008, p.11623), found that although some 70% of
friendship processes are geographically informed, “existing models that
predict the probability of friendship solely on the basis of geographic
distance are too weak to explain these friendships…” The Liben-
Nowell et al. (2008) model of rank-based friendship has also recently
been found to apply in landline phone networks as well (Quercia and
Calabrese, 2010).
The broader point is that while technology does not annihilate
geographically-based socialisation, it does make it more compli-
cated—might virtual teams that rarely meet in person function eﬀec-
tively as global pipelines without the need for a hyper-mobile ‘elite’? I
do not wish to claim that global and local social interactions are func-
tionally equivalent, but that from the standpoint of the individual, the
global/local dichotomy is just one axis of distance. So a colleague at a
remote location may still be close to an individual if they share, for in-
stance, a similar educational or occupational background, and I would
argue that this is the origin of the Faulconbridge (2007, p.1647) inter-
viewees’ claim that there is an important synergy between local and
global communications.
A recent article in Nature opens up what I feel to be an important,
alternative way of approaching this problem. In social network analysis
we tend to focus on the nodes, using the links between them as a guide
to grouping the nodes into unique communities. However, Ahn et al.
(2010, p.761) rightly point out that “whereas nodes belong to multiple
groups (individuals have families, co-workers and friends), links of-
ten exist for one dominant reason (two people are in the same family,
work together or have common interests)…” As a result, they therefore
propose that “[instead] of assuming that a community is a set of nodes
with many links between them, we consider a community to be a set
of closely interrelated links.” This shi in focus is crucial: the commu-
nity—of ﬁnanciers, art directors, and scientists—is deﬁned by its links,
and it is the nodes—people who are both scientists and artists, for in-
stance—bridge these groupings; so there are not just a few gatekeepers
or translators, they are eﬀectively everywhere.
Information Acquisition
S  S: We have seen that both ﬁnance and adver-
tising are industries where it can be “diﬃcult to evaluate the quality of
the service in advance, and sometimes even aer the service has been
agglomerations and clusters 151
provided” (Cook et al., 2004, p.10). In the terminology of Chapter 3
(see page 94), these are ‘opaque’ markets where trust plays an important
role, and yet we haven’t established how agents identify trust-worthy
individuals to begin with. Fortunately, economics gives us two mech-
anisms for dealing with opacity: signalling, in which information is
imparted indirectly, and screening, which ﬁlters out low-performing
workers. Signalling occurs when an agent sends a non-monetary mes-
sage to aﬀect the result of a transaction; conversely, screening operates
by attaching costs to participation in a particular group such that only a
successful individual or ﬁrm would be willing to maintain the required
level of eﬀort (Storper and Venables, 2004, p.352).
Education is one way for an individual to signal ‘worth’, but this
mechanism does not work for ﬁrms and so location has become an im-
portant way for them to indicate quality and credibility (Keeble and
Nachum, 2002, p.82)11. The lack of ‘procedural screening mecha- 11 At the interpersonal level,
interviews conducted by Brown
and O’Hara (2003) suggest that
mobile workers also use space to
signal their availability—using an
oﬃce with a closed door was readily
interpreted by colleagues as a need
for privacy, while sitting at a desk
near an oﬃce crossroads could
be used to signal both presence
and a willingness to chat (Brown
and O’Hara, 2003, p.10). In a
similar way, business meetings at
coﬀee shops are assumed to signal
rather strongly that the meeting
is intended to be informal or
oﬀ-the-record (2003, p.13).
nisms’ (cf. Storper and Venables, 2004, p.360) helps to explain why ﬁ-
nanciers attach a high value to addresses, with one stating that “we have
an ambition to be an international bank and you can’t be an interna-
tional bank unless you have something in London” (Cook et al., 2007,
p.1332). Similarly, the cost of a Soho oﬃce signals to potential clients
that the ﬁrm is successful enough to be a credible supplier of market-
ing campaigns (cf. Nachum and Keeble, 2003a, p.183)12. In both cases
12 As Torre (2008, p.875) puts it:
“one cannot ignore the impor-
tance of ‘window dressing’ eﬀects
through the association with a
successful technopole or cluster,”
though this implies that some areas
are desirable not because of the
access that they oﬀer to innovation
and social networks, but because
they are expensive and thus work as
‘prestige’ sites (cf. Castells and Hall,
1994, p.90).
signalling is helping to overcome both high search costs—screening a
large number of possible partners—and the high cost of implementation
failure—signalling the ability to complete projects successfully.
At the individual scale, social networks are very eﬀective at perform-
ing this signalling and screening task: a ‘hot’ designer or ﬁlmmaker is
talked about at social gatherings, and people are said to be ‘in the loop’.
So social networks oﬀer a collective evaluation system that operates
through “an informal network in which knowledge about other mem-
bers of the group is shared and ﬁltered” (Storper and Venables, 2004,
p.356). To succeed, however, the network must be both small enough
that members who fail to ‘deliver’ can be excluded—the “you’ll never
work in this town again” stick—and costly enough that only the best
will bother—the “if you can make it here…” carrot (cf. Storper and
Venables, 2004, pp.360–364).
And as Sinatra’s paean to New York suggests, the costs and beneﬁts
of network participation can be substantial: although a successful ﬁrm
or worker in the New York City or London can expect to spend a great
deal of money on space and socialising, they can also expect to reap
substantial rewards by virtue of being a ‘New York-based’ or ‘London-
based’ designer, ﬁlmmaker, or consultant. Critically, colocation lowers
the cost of making these social judgements since it both facilitates access
for newcomers—they know exactly where they have to set up shop in
order to be taken seriously—and lowers the cost of evaluation—in-
group members do not have to travel in order to assess the suitability of
a prospective member (Storper and Venables, 2004, p.365).
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S (A A): Of course, important information
does not simply ‘fall into the lap’ of decision-makers, and must oen
be actively collected or cultivated. Goddard (1973, 1975), building
on a model proposed by Thorngren (1970), connects the nature of
information collection to the temporal horizon within which decisions
must be taken. Although all of the processes in Figure 4.6 are occurring
simultaneously, it can actually be most easily read from right-to-le:
on the right are the ‘orientation processes’ concerned with the distant
future and scenario-building (e.g. the ideologies and basic science);
in the centre are ‘planning processes’ that seek to link together more
likely, near-term environmental changes (e.g. the potential social values
and knowledge); and to the le are the ‘programmed processes’ that
govern the management of activities in the ‘now’ (e.g. the economic
technological environment).
Ideologies
Potential social values
Economic environment
Technological environment
Potential knowledge
Basic science
Figure 4.6: Contact patterns
in the development space (aer
Thorngren; Goddard, 1973, p.191;
reproduced with permission of
Elsevier)
Using the example of a car company, Goddard (1975) oﬀers a more
concrete way of understanding this ﬁgure: at the orientation stage
discussions might cover “changes to social values of personal mobility
that aﬀect viability of car itself”; in the planning stage the company
might consider the development of a battery-operated vehicle; while
the programmed, or control process would be concerned with the
production of a speciﬁc model in the near term. Clearly, the output of
one stage informs the requirements for the next, and Figure 4.6 suggests
not only a narrowing of the horizon, but also a progressive structuring
of the interactions between agents. And while the ﬁgure may appear
to also suggest that there are more orientation than control contacts,
Goddard indicates that programmed interactions are likely to make up
the ‘the bulk of the organisation’s external relations’ (1975, p.20).
There are two key assumptions of contact theory that we should
dwell on here for a moment: ﬁrst, that the degree of structure in the
pattern of interactions increases as we move from right to le; and sec-
ond, that the level at which each type of contact is presumed to occur
also varies: from senior management, through middle management,
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and on down to the ‘shop ﬂoor’. Goddard (1975, p.20) explicitly con-
nects these stages to discrete spatial contexts: orientation contacts with
research, government, and ﬁnancing organisations, for instance, are
expected to occur in the very largest urban centres because cities are the
best venue in which to bring together the widest variety of contacts for
a ‘large, lengthy, and preplanned meeting’ (1975, p.20; 1973, p.190).
In contrast, at the planning and control stages the participants are
much more likely to have had prior interactions of some sort. At plan-
ning meetings, participants are expected to have more deﬁned objec-
tives and tasks to accomplish (Goddard, 1975, p.21), while programmed
interactions are expected to be largely routine in nature and involve
the giving and receiving of instructions. In both of these cases, God-
dard suggests that telecommunications may substitute for some level of
face-to-face (2) contact because the interactions are usually organ-
ised around an identiﬁable objective, instead of being for the purpose
of identifying an objective in the ﬁrst place. Interestingly, Goddard
suggests that while programmed processes such as buying and selling
could theoretically be organised entirely via telecoms, the sheer number
of interactions might make this diﬃcult, or even impossible, and that
consequently programmed contact could actually be quite directly and
negatively impacted by distance (Goddard, 1975, p.21).
There is an important spatial implication embedded in the idea that
“the higher the administrative level in an organisation, the greater the
proportion of staﬀ time spent engaged in outward-facing contacts with
other organisations (especially face-to-face)” (Gillespie and Green,
1987, p.400). Because urban areas have historically oﬀered the broad-
est and deepest information space, we can expect to ﬁnd the highest
managerial levels in cities, while those with programmed functions and
interactions are more likely to be found in lower cost regions. Further-
more, as ﬁrms diversify and innovate, their need for specialised external
services increases (Gillespie and Green, 1987, p.401), reinforcing their
dependence on the city as a source of business-critical inputs. Or to put
it another way, “for strategy, we need organised information about the
environment” (italics in original Drucker, 1999, p.121) and urban envi-
ronments oﬀer the best way to bring together and organise the diverse,
uncertain information sources from which strategy can be built.
Although the ﬁndings are slightly dated, Goddard and Morris (1976)
compare pre- and post-relocation contacts for ﬁrms moving out of Lon-
don, and ﬁnd that the movers had 58% fewer external calls and 62%
fewer external meetings than the ﬁrms that stayed put. Firms that had
already dispersed had 72% fewer external calls than the movers, but
nearly 50% more internal meetings (see also Goddard, 1975, p.46).
Crucially, contacts at the relocating ﬁrms were the most likely to be
‘programmed’, suggesting that these oﬃces either had less need for
strategic/orientation contacts, or played information-processing roles
within their organisations. Conversely, the ﬁrms that rejected incen-
tives to relocate had more ‘orientation’ (i. e. unprogrammed external)
contacts (Goddard, 1975, p.48). These ﬁndings are summarised below
in Table 4.2.
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Meetings per respondent Calls per respondent
External Internal External Internal
Non-Movers (i. e. remained in
Central London)
1.6 0.8 9.0 5.3
Movers (i. e. le Central London) 0.6 0.2 3.7 5.5
Decentralised oﬃces 0.6 0.4 1.0 4.9
Table 4.2: Variations in Contact
Intensity (aer Goddard, 1975,
p.46)These ﬁndings, framed in terms of life-cycles and the earlier dis-
cussion of strong and weak ties, suggest that diﬀerent stages in the
production process require diﬀerent degrees of contact with other ﬁrms
and, thus, impose particular information costs on the management,
planning, and control functions. This understanding helps to ﬂesh
out the division of the ﬁrm sketched out in Chapter 3 and why the
‘information-intensive work’ of planning, negotiating, designing, and
consulting is so oen ﬁrmly anchored in accessible urban areas: they are
the sites where information can be actively and eﬃciently acquired.
N  B (P A): Scanning entails a deliberate
process of seeking out and exchanging information, but research by
Storper and Venables (2002, 2004) into the ‘buzz’ of big cities opened
up a new way of thinking about information acquisition that is closely
connected to the earlier discussion of signalling13. The Silicon Val- 13 See also Leamer and Storper
(2001, p.649) for an early use of
the term in a theoretical context.
We would note too that the term
was also being used in a similar
way contemporaneously to refer
to aspects of e-marketing and e-
commerce with relevance to this
discussion during the dot.com
boom: see, for instance, Eakin
(2001), Khermouch and Green
(2001), Richter (1999), and White
(1999).
ley region oﬀers several well-known examples of buzz in action: the
Homebrew hobbyist club at which Steve Jobs and Steven Wozniak
premiered the ﬁrst Apple computer functioned as both a job network
and a kind of peripatetic trade fair, and alcohol lubricated the ﬂow of
information and ideas between engineers and entrepreneurs at Walker’s
Wagon Wheel bar in Mountain View (Hall, 1998, pp.443–454; Ag-
mon and Von Glinow, 1991, p.107; and see also Figure 4.7). So the
chatter that characterises the oﬃces, studios, bars, and restaurants of big
cities is actually a form of transmission, a “group-based self-generating
exchange of information and knowledge outside [of] formal collabora-
tion” (Asheim et al., 2007, p.658).
The point is that buzz operates within a kind of ‘ecology’ created
when people and ﬁrms in the same (or related) industries are in more
or less constant social contact with each other (Bathelt et al., 2004,
p.38). When participants are “surrounded by a concoction of rumours,
impressions, recommendations, trade folklore and strategic misinforma-
tion” (Grabher, 2002, p.209), then the resulting swirl of information
generates an almost unconscious awareness of who is working on what,
who has landed a major new client, and who is tipped for a prestigious
award. And while many of these exchanges may be social in nature,
they nonetheless have important competitive eﬀects and cement the
reputations on which companies operating in opaque markets depend;
for this reason, “part of the buzz of the city is judging, and putting
oneself up to be judged” (Storper and Venables, 2002, p.25).
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Figure 4.7: Silicon Valley Watering
Holes (Mullins, 1998, p.34;
reproduced with permission of
the New Scientist)
Coherence & Diversity
The tension between strong and weak ties elaborated in this chapter can
also be understood as the tension between coherence and diversity: it
is a ‘paradox of clusters’ that if they lack any coherence then there are
no synergies between ﬁrms, but that if they lack any diversity then they
suﬀer from technological lock-in and a lack of long-term developmen-
tal resilience (Menzel and Fornahl, 2010, p.12). What I have sought
to develop through the analysis of social networks is the idea that both
coherence and diversity are essential to the proper functioning of a clus-
ter. When combined with the spatial characteristics of social networks,
this sets up a tension in which increasing distance—be it physical or
metaphorical—increases the likelihood of diversity, but also reduces the
likelihood of coherence.
In a similar way, Menzel and Fornahl (2010, p.8) base their def-
inition of a cluster on the distinction between a thematic boundary
that diﬀerentiates one ‘production and innovation system’ from others
within its spatial range, and a spatial boundary that separates one group
of organisations from others ‘working in the same thematic ﬁeld which
are located elsewhere’. Firms that are in physical proximity to one an-
other can bridge larger thematic distances, and so access more diverse
sources of information (2010, p.26), while those with greater thematic
coherence can collaborate eﬀectively across larger distances. Menzel
and Fornahl (2010, p.13) also suggest that ‘size matters’ because larger
clusters can support more diversity than smaller ones can; and while
they do not deﬁne exactly what is meant by ‘size’, we can infer that they
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mean the number of ﬁrms at the intersection of a thematic and spatial
boundary and not the scale of production or number of employees.
I feel that this approach to clustering is particularly powerful be-
cause it accounts for the observed behaviours of ﬁrms in what are
widely recognised as clusters, while also allowing for ﬂexibility in the
range of viable conﬁgurations that might qualify for this status. In that
sense, Menzel and Fornahl (2010) move away from a deterministic or
teleological account of clustering, and over time the tension between
thematic and spatial coherence within a single cluster may even be ex-
pressed as a movement into entirely new technologies and an increase in
heterogeneity (2010, pp.14–15). This is eﬀectively what has happened
in Silicon Valley, which has negotiated the transition through several
generations of radical hardware and soware change, and did not hap-
pen in Detroit, which once contained many start-ups pursuing a range
of automobile technologies (2010, p.22).
Furthermore, by thinking about the process in this way, it becomes
possible for two clusters—even ones of the same size and in the same
industry—to contain diﬀerent levels of diversity (Menzel and Fornahl,
2010, p.26). Even ﬁrms within the same cluster can pursue divergent
or convergent technological or process strategies (2010, p.20). Cumu-
latively, these results take us further still from the idea that there is a
pre-determined life-cycle for a cluster; instead, it is better to think of “a
steady oscillation” (Menzel and Fornahl, 2010, p.15) between states of
stability and growth. The ongoing tension between scale and diversity
over the life-cycle of a cluster—together with the dynamics of renewal
and decline—is brought together in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Quantitative and
Qualitative Dimensions of the
Cluster Life-Cycle (Menzel and
Fornahl, 2010, p.14)
Technology
Studies of the creative sector might suggest that buzz is largely local (cf.
Florida, 2002a,b), but Faulconbridge’s ﬁndings (2007, p.1647)—together
with the analysis of homogeneity above—have made it clear that the so-
cial networks that underpin buzz can also operate at much larger scales.
Grabher (2001) explores one example of this process in action amongst
employees in the diﬀerent oﬃces of a global advertising ﬁrm. By em-
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phasising the role of spatial proximity and face-to-face interaction we
may “unnecessarily fetishise the local” (Faulconbridge, 2007, p.1650)
and overlook other mechanisms which may impact this process. For in-
stance, Bathelt and Schuldt (2008, p.864) suggest that buzz can be cre-
ated on a global scale through trade fairs, and there is growing evidence
to suggest that it can also be generated and propagated electronically as
well (Asheim et al., 2007, p.658).
The presumption in favour of 2 interaction being integral to buzz
rests to some extent on the assumption that electronic communications
cannot provide the kind of instantaneous group feedback that operates
during, say, aer-work drinks at a bar in New York. But as Jones et al.
(2009, p.9) note, the emergence of collaborative, largely real-time plat-
forms such as Facebook and Twitter may be enabling some privileged
sites and technologies to become a vehicle for the broad-based, shared
context that lies at the heart of buzz. I am obviously not suggesting that
virtual proximity replaces physical proximity for social interaction, but
to maintain that these interactions must remain uniquely local is equally
improbable. Rather, what we seem to be seeing is an augmentation of
both processes: as we communicate and travel more, the reach of buzz
and, consequently, clustering is being signiﬁcantly extended.
Spatial Implications
Returning now to the rise of ‘boutique’ consultancies, we can see how
they illustrate the spatial implications of all of these diﬀerent processes
particularly well. Investment advisory services in particular have his-
torically been a major source of income for the large commercial banks
by dint of driving referrals to other parts of the business (Hall, 2007b,
p.1840). We might expect that the large banks’ brands would deliver an
overwhelming advantage against small-scale market entrants; however,
the niche focus and lack of complementary services has been taken by
clients to mean that their advice will be more trustworthy and not part
of a cross-sell or up-sell process.
The consultancies’ founders also use their personal networks to re-
cruit former colleagues as employees, and clients as sources of new
business (Hall, 2007b, p.1847). Lacking the brand name of the white
shoe ﬁrms, the boutiques—in common with other London-based s
(Keeble and Nachum, 2002, p.79)—employ their personal network as
their principal business development tool. And while this strategy is
available to small- and medium-sized ﬁrms anywhere in the country,
ﬁrms in London are able to maintain more extensive networks more
easily, and I believe that this helps to drive a pattern of development in
which London-based s not only seem to grow larger, they also ap-
pear to grow faster while generating higher levels of innovation (Keeble
and Nachum, 2002, p.75).
Returning to the superlinear indicators listed on page 140 in the
section on Agglomeration, we can see that the ‘social’ indicators can
now be characterised network-driven externalities14. This eﬀect can be
14 In a similar vein, Meier (1962,
p.43) suggests that an “…intensi-
ﬁcation of communication, knowledge
and controls [seems] to be highly
correlated with the growth of
cities,” although his focus on formal
information theory leads him to
some slightly eccentric conclusions.demonstrated with social network models that focus on the interactions
158 the place of telecommunications
between a hierarchical social network (of the sort that might charac-
terise a family or a ﬁrm) that encapsulates social distance, and a random
interaction network (of the sort that might characterise the pattern of
social interactions in a city) that encapsulates the ‘bridging’ compo-
nent (Arbesman et al., 2009). Such a model generates superlinearity of
the sort found by Bettencourt et al. (2007), and so one of the manifest
beneﬁts of large cities—in spite of the increasing costs of concentra-
tion such as congestion, crime, and so forth (Scott and Storper, 2003,
p.584)—can be traced back uniquely to the opportunities for social
interaction that occur there.
Summary
In examining clusters it is easy to focus on their spatial characteristics,
but the problems of science cities and technology parks highlight the
fact that proximity alone is not a guarantee of interaction, nor, thanks to
telecommunications, is distance any longer a barrier to association. For
instance, in Tsukuba, Japan, the hierarchical organisation of government
laboratories inhibited researcher-led collaborations with the private
sector (Castells and Hall, 1994, p.72). Conversely, in Sophia-Antipolis
the s showed little interest in cultivating an ‘innovative milieu’
(Castells and Hall, 1994, p.91), and Athey et al. (2007, p.5) have noted
that in the Reading region “[local] networks, knowledge transfer and
links are somewhat constrained by the corporate structure—as the
innovation system tends to be dominated by large companies located in
oﬃce campuses.”
So while I have focussed in this chapter on the importance of per-
sonal social networks to clustering, we would also be wise to recognise
the importance of institutions and their attitudes to networking as well
(Torre, 2008, p.875). Of course, there is feedback between these two
layers such that “the institutional form of an economy is, to some extent
at least, a function of its social networks” (Green, 2001, p.19). What the
approach taken here has shown is that proximity can be deﬁned along
several axes simultaneously, and that geographic distance on one axis
may be less relevant if, for instance, shared employment or educational
context creates closeness along another.
Linking this argument back to the earlier discussion of life-cycles
also suggests that ﬁrms at diﬀerent stages of development may perceive
diﬀerent beneﬁts in clustering: ‘young’ ﬁrms (or ﬁrms in sectors where
constant reinvention is the norm) may beneﬁt from weak links and
from highly-localised diversity (McCann et al., 2002, p.660)—which
increases exposure to novelty—while more ‘mature’ clusters may
tend to beneﬁt more from strong ties and from systematic methods
of knowledge acquisition—which improves eﬃciency (Staber, 2007,
pp.510–511). Similarly, Asheim et al. (2007, p.666) have argued that
the importance of ‘buzz’ diminishes in more mature industrial dis-
tricts, and we can also expect that ﬁrms may concentrate more on
intra-cluster relations during the early stages, and more on inter-cluster
relations during later stages of growth (Torre, 2008, p.883).
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And yet, some clusters seem to defy this life-cycle, or to preserve the
characteristics of ‘young’ sectors indeﬁnitely: speaking of the City of
London in the 1950s and 60s, one interviewee comments that: “Ev-
eryone who mattered knew almost everyone else who did” (Kynaston,
2001, p.203). And in a discussion on the networking culture of Silicon
Valley, Paul Saﬀo (director of the Institute for the Future) comments
that: “Silicon Valley is a tightly packed place, hemmed in by hills on
one side and water on the other—everyone is constantly tripping over
each other, gossiping and swapping information and intrigue” (Mullins,
1998, p.33). It is this conﬂuence of factors—geographic, social, and
institutional (cf. Scott, 2000)—which suggests that clusters are rather
more than, as Torre (2008, p.872) suggests, just the “‘latest addition’ to
a long list of local production systems which assume that colocation is
necessary for economic development.”
4.5 Conclusions: Telecommunications, Agglomerations & Clusters
We began this chapter with the concept of the business life-cycle, and
in spite of some important conceptual issues it proved nonetheless
to be a useful short-hand for describing the mix of routine and non-
routine activities at a ﬁrm, and how this mix changes over time. When
paired with the concept of heterarchy, the life-cycle helps us to un-
derstand why the spatial concentration of ﬁrms alone can sometimes
have so little impact on rates of innovation in oﬃce parks or science
cities (Castells and Hall, 1994, p.81). Simply put, the kind of diversity
that beneﬁts ﬁrms in younger sectors—or, perhaps, young ﬁrms in
established sectors—may not be compatible with the more managed,
iterative innovation of large ﬁrms and s. The former favour envi-
ronments that maximise exposure to new ideas, while the latter favour
coherence.
From the life-cycle, we turned to internal and external economies
of scale, and found that the concept of an optimal size for the ﬁrm is
complicated by the way that divisions may scale independently of one
another as output increases. Consequently, I asserted the existence
of multiple local optima for ﬁrms, and pointed also to the increasing
costs of coordination and risk of failure as the ﬁrm ceases to operate
as a coherent organism. Coordination costs aﬀect ﬁrm location when,
for instance, complex transactions require input from a wide variety
of specialists; managing input from diverse groups can be eﬀected via
email in a series of round-robin communications, but it will oen be
far more eﬀective to bring everyone together for a face-to-face meeting.
So although they may be costly locations, major cities and sites near
important infrastructure nonetheless oﬀer high levels of accessibility and
reduce the costs of coordination.
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We next considered the changing nature of the labour market and
the ways that cheap telecommunications and travel are impacting the
distribution of companies: high-skill workers are able to access ma-
jor labour markets from greater distances than ever before, but they
nonetheless tend to participate in centralised labour markets. So al-
though industries may want to avoid New York and London when their
primary requirement is low-wage labour (Currid, 2007, p.47), when
high-skill labour is required the situation can be very diﬀerent. In fact,
by some measures London’s labour costs are apparently quite “low by
world standards for the expertise available…” (Nachum, 1999, p.22).
This last point returns us to agglomeration, which we have treated
primarily as a form of “large number search and matching system…”
(Storper and Venables, 2002, p.38). The point is that within the model
I have put forward, agglomerations are predominantly market-based
and, implicitly, presume a degree of transparency; this does not mean
that ﬁrms within agglomerations are necessarily engaged in direct com-
petition—as Scott (2001) noted, many agglomerations have established
narrowly-focussed niches that enable them to avoid competing with
one another—but it does mean that there is less of a dependency on
social mechanisms, which are the methods that continue to function
eﬀectively in opaque markets.
Ultimately, I have distinguished between clusters and agglomerations
on the basis of the level of social interaction, but it should be clear from
Figure 4.8 (page 156) that these two modes of operation are neither
exclusive, nor easily distinguished. In fact, a group of thematically-
coherent and spatially-constrained ﬁrms might easily oscillate between
functioning as an agglomeration and as a cluster; depending on the
circumstances, vertical and horizontal agglomerations could be a sign
either of incipient clustering, or of post-clustering ‘decay’ (Menzel and
Fornahl, 2010, p.23). Clusters can, therefore, be distinguished from
agglomerations through their “unusual levels of embeddedness and
social integration” (Hauser et al., 2007, p.78), even if it is, in practice,
nearly impossible to quantify that process or to draw a neat line between
the two types of industrial organisation.
However, it is also important that the value of embeddedness and
social interaction is not available to all comers. Signalling and screening
act to conﬁne the circulation of information to a qualiﬁed in-group
that have reciprocal relationships with one another. This is one very
good reason for thinking that in some cases localised knowledge is
perhaps better treated as a club good than a public good (Morrison,
2008, p.831). Workers in the City of London emphasised this dynamic
through their habit of wearing ‘the old school tie’—the ultimate in-
group signal—on Fridays (Kynaston, 2001, p.213), but my additional
claim is that the circumstances in which this type of mechanism is an
asset are those were such signals are a way of building trust, and the
links across which novel information can pass.
Coﬀey and Shearmur (2002, p.376) ﬁnd that the most highly-
clustered ﬁrms in the  are the high-order services that “gener-
ally involve uncertain data and ambiguity, decision-making, and lots
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of interaction between ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ of information with
qualitative-subjective features that are not easy to share via telecoms”
(see also Figure 4.4 on page 139)15, but the emergence of technologies 15 This is not to say that ﬁrms in
opaque markets do not attempt
to standardise practices and struc-
tures in search of eﬃciency and
replicability: Faulconbridge (2007,
p.1643) has noted that all of the
advertising and law ﬁrms with
which he spoke sought to capture
and transfer ‘best practices’ through
the use of “standardised client
relationship management systems,
ﬁnancial management tools, and 
practices…”
that promise to recreate social processes similar to cluster dynamics in
virtual contexts complicates this view.
Traxler and Luger (2000, p.286) asked if virtual clustering on digi-
tal telecommunications might eventually obviate the need for physical
clustering? My answer is a qualiﬁed ‘no’, although the response will
require expansion in the next, and ﬁnal, theoretical chapter on the
knowledge economy. My feeling is that the most socially-driven sec-
tors—cultural, ﬁnancial, etc.—will remain highly clustered even as
their reach is extended by globalisation and technological processes that
enable aspects of buzz and reputation to diﬀuse through virtual social
networks as well as 2 ones. However, taken together, these factors
suggest that true cluster dynamics aﬀect only a minority of ﬁrms—in
Soho and the City of London, for instance (Keeble and Nachum, 2002,
p.71)—and that the colocation of  ﬁrms in Reading, for example, is
more properly classiﬁed as an agglomeration. Testing this theory, how-
ever, will require access to the ‘space of ﬂows’ and the ability to model
the intensity of informational ﬂows from ﬁrms according to both sector
and geography, which we will tackle in Chapter 7.
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5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we connected clusters to higher rates of innova-
tion, and in this chapter we will examine in more detail the dynamics
of knowledge generation (who) and circulation (how), together with the
spatial implications for ﬁrms. The importance of understanding and
deﬁning this type of work arises because enormous incentives from lo-
cal and national governments are riding on complex sets of assumptions
about knowledge: for instance, if innovation is localised and stochas-
tic—i. e. random in the way that the weak ties model asserts—then
communication within and between ﬁrms is vital to capturing and ex-
ploiting opportunities. But if innovation can now be ‘programmed’ in
some more deterministic way then regional development authorities can
and should oﬀer innovative ﬁrms the physical and social infrastructure
necessary to succeed.
However, an interest in knowledge workers and innovation is not
new, and Lösch wrote of factors or production that were ‘exhaustible,
immobile, or unique’ and ranked among them “gied men who refuse
to migrate” (1954 [1973], p.23). The human dimension is important:
it is easy to forget that real knowledge ﬂows happen between people,
not ﬁrms (Torre, 2008, p.877), and that they “remain the containers
for shipping complex uncodiﬁable information” (Leamer and Storper,
2001, p.648). We will consider what ‘uncodiﬁable’ means in a moment,
but for now let us recognise that the human aspect of knowledge places
innovation issues squarely within the realm of the social. Consequently,
technologies that impact our social networks and their distribution in
space seem likely to have a profound impact on the nature of knowledge
work, much as they do on clustering. Global knowledge access would
also imply a radical globalisation of the geography of innovation: might
ﬁrms then turn to Asia for ‘cheap smarts’ in the same way that they turn
there now for cheap labour (Brinkley, 2006, p.10)?
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5.2 The Production of Knowledge
Formal Deﬁnition
In the three previous chapters I have tended to use the terms ‘data’ and
‘information’ interchangeably, while attempting to avoid introducing
the notion of knowledge even though, quite obviously, not all intangi-
ble goods and services exchanged between individuals or ﬁrms consist
only of data. We understand intuitively that knowledge is somehow
‘diﬀerent’ from mere facts since it connotes discernment or judgement
in a way that simply reciting details or measurements does not. Drucker
(1999, p.126) suggests that “information is organised data”, while
Economist (2010a) suggest that: “Information is made of a collection of
data; knowledge is made of diﬀerent strands of information.”
One pragmatic way of looking at this issue is to return to our ongo-
ing consideration of the ﬁnancial markets. The fact that company ’s
stock is trading at $75 a share is simply a data point with little innate
action value: is that a good price, or a bad one? The fact that company
’s stock has risen by $20 in the past two months gives this datum a
context: we now know that this represents a 36% return-on-investment
(). But it is only when drawn together with other strands of informa-
tion—the performance of ’s peer group, the marketplace, and the
regulatory environment—that this starts to become knowledge pred-
icated upon the weighing of factors. While information is essentially
passive, ‘knowledge empowers actors with the capacity to act’ (Brinkley
et al., 2009, p.11).
For Echeverri-Carroll et al. (2007), knowledge belongs to a ‘com-
munity of practice’ which might encompass engineers who meet at
a bar to talk shop, and parents who meet in a café to share stories of
raising children; and it also implies the existence of an ‘epistemic com-
munity’ that is rooted in professional networks with an ‘authoritative
claim to expertise in a particular domain’ (2007, pp.715–716). Par-
ticularly in the latter case, the members of these communities may be
quite physically distant from one another but nonetheless adhere to a
common set of ‘beliefs’ in a particular area (Grabher, 2004, p.110). The
set of norms deﬁnes how issues are understood, discussed, and acted
upon since “[learning] is not simply a matter of acquiring information:
it requires the development of a disposition, demeanour, and outlook of
practitioners” (Echeverri-Carroll et al., 2007, p.715).
The ‘climate-gate’ e-mail controversy is a useful illustration of this
point since it marks the collision of two distinct communities: one a
community of climate researchers based largely at East Anglia, the other
a more diﬀuse one rooted in doubt about the very existence of climate
change. The epistemic dimension is particularly clear here: scientists
opposed the release of data to sceptics on the grounds that they “would
not understand them’’ (Pearce, 2010) and encouraged colleagues to
delete email subject to Freedom of Information () requests so as not
to cast doubt on their results (Randerson, 2010). Fundamentally, this
is an argument about legitimacy, and the scientists felt that the sceptics
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had neither the background, nor the expertise to evaluate the data
appropriately and derive new knowledge from it.
Tacit & Codiﬁed Knowledge
This controversy should help us to see how the distinction between
information and knowledge is caught up in the idea that some types of
knowledge are codiﬁable while others are not. For instance, the methods
underpinning climate change research can be easily posted online,
as can the outputs of the models, but the expertise required to judge
which method to apply, what adjustments might be needed, and the
reliability of the results cannot. Quite simply: codiﬁed knowledge can
be fully encoded in some replicable way while its complement—tacit
knowledge—cannot.
Codiﬁed knowledge therefore has a “stable meaning which is as-
sociated in a determinate way with the symbol system in which it is
expressed, whether it be linguistic, mathematical, or visual” (Storper
and Venables, 2004, p.353). The critical point is that while acquir-
ing the ‘symbol system’ and building a means to transmit encode-able
knowledge may be expensive, subsequent communication can be easy
(2002, p.18). In economic parlance, codiﬁed knowledge has strong
‘network externalities’ (2004, p.354) in that it can continue to be ac-
quired without direct, ongoing social interaction (Cook et al., 2007,
p.1327).
In contrast, tacit knowledge deﬁes a straightforward encoding—it
is profoundly ‘analogue’—and oen “requires a kind of parallel pro-
cessing of the complexities of an issue, as diﬀerent dimensions of a
problem are perceived and understood only in relation to one another”
(Storper and Venables, 2002, p.19). The relational component is both
analytical—seeing the implicit connections between issues—and lit-
eral—forming this knowledge through interaction with other experts.
Tacit knowledge is therefore presumed to be profoundly context-
dependent and we can think of it as existing, or being produced, in
the moment of transmission (Cook et al., 2007, pp.1327–1328). It is
the ‘you should have been there’ experience and builds on our social
awareness of others: their tone of voice, their physical and emotional
disposition, and their level of engagement with the task at hand; because
of this there are few network externalities.
Soware development oﬀers a particularly good example of the dif-
ference between codiﬁed and tacit knowledge: no matter how arcane,
programming languages are still constrained by the requirement that
they translate some process into a set of logical operations. So while
the exact function of a line of code may take time to work out, it is
ultimately accessible to anyone who invests suﬃcient time and eﬀort
in learning the underlying language1. The formal rules of computer
1 This is not to suggest that there
are not cultural and stylistic norms
within programming subcul-
tures—including Leet/l337-
speak—but these are simply ac-
quired norms of expression and do
not fundamentally impact another
developer’s ability to understand
the function of a script or applica-
tion if given enough time to work
through the code.
languages are what make bulletin boards and discussion groups such an
eﬀective method for dispensing advice, but the broader implication is
that for this type of knowledge there is a growing stock of ideas that can
be accessed globally (Brinkley, 2006, p.10).
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In contrast, tacit knowledge remains ‘geographically sticky’ because
it is formed within a particular social context; it is therefore accessible
only through relations that are “not simply…input-output relations
or linkages, but [are] untraded interdependencies subject to a high de-
gree of reﬂexivity” (Storper, 1995, p.4; see also Staber, 2007, p.509).
Because it is not widely available, tacit knowledge creates a key com-
petitive advantage for ﬁrms that are able to access and exploit it; or as
Mitchelson and Wheeler (1994, p.87) put it: “the success enjoyed by
New York ﬁrms is not, of course, independent of their location amid
the greatest volume of nonroutine information ever assembled in one
place.”
The distinction between tacit and codiﬁable knowledge therefore
maps surprisingly cleanly on to the distinction—ﬁrst raised in Chap-
ter 3—between information as a locational input with high shipping
costs, and information as a ubiquitous resource. Of course, a good deal
of knowledge will sit somewhere between these poles; this only im-
plies that the locational eﬀect of knowledge will vary in proportion to
its codiﬁability. For ﬁrms, especially s with dispersed operations,
the ability to transfer knowledge between oﬃces is an important com-
petitive advantage, so they will have strong incentives to identify and
exploit ways of codifying complex, formerly tacit knowledge (Morri-
son, 2008, p.827).
How might this codiﬁcation occur? Successful approaches might
include the use of standardised analysis tools or processes, training
seminars, and social functions that encourage the mixing of, and
sharing between, staﬀ. In fact, the rise of video conferencing and
Internet/Intranet-based forums (e.g. Wikis, Groupware, etc.) within
corporations suggests that ﬁrms are already hard at work on ways to
circumvent the spatial constraints of tacit knowledge through the judi-
cious application of technology and exploitation of managed external
linkages.
Knowledge Bases
The dichotomy between codiﬁed and tacit knowledge can be com-
plemented by Asheim et al.’s argument (2007) that there are three
diﬀerent classes of knowledge: analytical, synthetic, and symbolic. In
many ways, analytical knowledge is most closely connected to codiﬁable
knowledge, while synthetic knowledge is presumed to be generated
iteratively and transmitted bilaterally, making it similar in operation to
tacit knowledge. The concept of symbolic knowledge relates to undi-
rected, multilateral interaction and so brings us back to the concept of
buzz explored in Chapter 4 (page 154), seemingly creating a third axis
of transmission along which knowledge can propagate.
A: The analytical knowledge base is oriented towards what
we commonly understand as scientiﬁc knowledge; these are fundamen-
tal principles in nature and society that are testable or falsiﬁable and,
generally speaking, replicable. This type of knowledge can be elegantly
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summarised as ‘know-why’, and it oen requires “analytical skills, ab-
straction, theory building, and testing” (Asheim et al., 2007, p.661).
Because scientiﬁc knowledge is typically encoded in formal symbol
systems (e.g. mathematics) it can oen be made available to others by
publication, and as a result it may require little in the way of face-to-
face interaction in order to propagate eﬀectively (2007, p.662), nor
does group interaction seem to be essential to the pursuit of analytical
knowledge.
This conﬁguration would seem to reduce the need for proximity,
and from this deﬁnition it is clear that analytical knowledge comes from
two main sources: academic institutions and private entrepreneurs.
Commercialisation pressures on universities, and resource constraints
on ﬁrms, mean that both may have a strong interest in some types of
research collaboration. The increasing codependence between these
two groups creates an incentive for analytically-based industries to
locate in the general vicinity of “major universities or research institutes
carrying out leading research in their ﬁeld” (2007, p.662). The key here
is that availability and accessibility are not the same as a requirement
for permanent ‘copresence’, so this type of innovation ‘milieu’ might
operate across a wider geography so long as the travel requirements
remain modest. Moreover, the codiﬁability of analytical knowledge
suggests that ﬁrms may be able to transfer it across long distances.
S: Synthetic knowledge is created in response to speciﬁc is-
sues, oen in an iterative or evolutionary manner. Regardless of the
‘sophistication’ of the ﬁeld, synthetic innovation arises from ‘know-
how’ rooted in experience and long-term relationships between clients
and suppliers pursuing what is oen called ‘applied research’ or ‘prod-
uct/process development’ (Asheim et al., 2007, p.663). So synthetic
knowledge is not associated with many-to-many interactions, and al-
though synthetic outputs must be codiﬁable to some extent (e.g. as
blueprints), many of the inputs will remain profoundly tacit because
they ﬂow from what is “oen a trial-and-error process, involving user-
producer interaction as an essential input and selection mechanism for
innovation” (2007, p.663). The speciﬁcity of solutions derived from
synthetic knowledge may make it diﬃcult to generalise a solution.
Examples of synthetic innovation and knowledge at work include:
plant engineering, advanced industrial machinery, production sys-
tems, and shipbuilding (ibid.). Architecture, however, is a particularly
interesting example since each ‘solution’ is unique, but broader gener-
alisations are also possible (cf. Rybczynski, 1990). In all of these cases
there is obviously a strong connection between synthetic knowledge
and iterative innovation ((Asheim et al., 2007, p.657); see also Moodys-
son et al., 2008, p.1044). Iteration implies that the cost of meeting will
recur regularly even if telecommunications can be used to manage more
mundane issues. As a result, we would expect to see the ﬁrms “agglom-
erate in traditional clusters to exploit the advantages of being close to
suppliers and customers” (Asheim et al., 2007, p.663); however, this
agglomeration does not need to be in an urban area because the emphasis
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is on bilateral, rather than multilateral, relationships. Consequently, the
cost and accessibility beneﬁts of a suburban location may trump those of
more central sites.
S: Symbolic knowledge arises from “the creation of cultural
meaning through transmission in an aﬀecting sensuous medium”
(Asheim et al., 2007, p.661). This knowledge is, in other words, pri-
marily artistic and aesthetic in nature, incorporating everything from
industrial and graphic design, to advertising and ﬁlmmaking, as well as
art and music. Generally speaking, we are dealing here with cultural
and cra outputs across a range of material and immaterial media, and
clearly these products also have a very strong tacit component (Asheim
et al., 2007, p.664), but one that is rooted in the complex associations,
aspirations, and connotations that particular brands, artists, and perfor-
mances raise for each of us.
We would expect a great deal of interaction to be involved in sym-
bolic knowledge generation since output in these sectors is oen rooted
in collaborative project-based work that draws on a range of disciplines.
For instance, a young ﬁne art photographer and an established fashion
designer may work together on a t-shirt featuring some of the photog-
rapher’s more controversial work (cf. Helmore, 2010). Symbolic work
tends to involves a great deal of feedback, with producers of one cultural
product oen being consumers of another: there is an importance to
what music the designers hear, and to what clothing the band wears
(Currid, 2007, p.7). Because of its cross-cutting nature, knowledge
about the market and the roles of individuals within it is oen gener-
ated at large gatherings (Asheim et al., 2007, p.665), and this places the
eﬀects of buzz—outlined in Chapter 4 on page 154—squarely within
the productive process of the symbolic base; it also connects symbolic
output to a propensity to cluster.
The rate of change in cultural outputs also means that, in spite of
the money at stake, the selection and implementation processes remain
profoundly subjective and contextual. Moreover, the majority of ap-
titudes required for symbolic innovation are not ‘teachable’ in formal
situations and so qualiﬁcations and degrees mean relatively little. In fact,
one well-known author has gone so far as to argue that creative writing
degrees from universities may well be an indicator of unsuitability for
the profession of writer (Menand, 2009). In the absence of objective
metrics, buzz is essential for knowing “who is relevant, available, and
interested in participating in a particular project” (Asheim et al., 2007,
p.665). So what is being communicated in social contexts is not only
the ‘know-how’ of artisanal output via ‘learning by doing’, but also
the ‘know-who’ of who is suitable for a project (Asheim et al., 2007,
pp.664–665). For this process to operate eﬀectively, participants must
be able to interact with one another on a frequent basis, and the only
place where intensive, regular multilateral ﬂows are cost-eﬀective is the
city.
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S: Of course, although we have discussed each knowledge
base in isolation, it is clear that there is the potential for signiﬁcant lev-
els of overlap between them. Moodysson et al. (2008) examine two
life sciences projects in Sweden, ﬁnding that in one case two separate
analytical breakthroughs were merged into a commercial, synthetic
project (2008, pp.1047–1050), while in the other case study two ﬁrms
engaged in an intense synthetic collaboration around a new product that
eventually resulted in a patentable—which is to say, analytical—output
(2008, pp.1050–1051). The point here is that, over the life-cycle of a
product, we may expect the manner of working and problem-solving to
shi—perhaps frequently—between bases. With this important qual-
iﬁcation in mind, the broad diﬀerences between the three knowledge
bases are summarised below in Table 5.1.
Analytical Synthetic Symbolic
Innovation by creation of new
knowledge
Innovation by application of novel
combination of existing
knowledge
Innovation by recombination of
existing knowledge in new ways
Importance of scientiﬁc
knowledge oen based on
deductive processes and formal
models
Importance of applied,
problem-related, knowledge
(engineering), oen through
inductive processes
Importance of reusing or
challenging existing conventions
Research collaboration between
ﬁrms and research organisations
Interactive learning with clients
and suppliers
Learning through interaction in the
professional community, learning from
youth/street culture or ‘ﬁne culture, and
interaction with ‘border’ professional
communities
Dominance of codiﬁed knowledge
due to documentation in patents
and publications
Dominance of tacit knowledge
due to more concrete know-how,
cra, and practical skill
Reliance on tacit knowledge, cra,
and practical skills and search skills.
Table 5.1: Summary of Knowledge
Bases Approach (Asheim et al.,
2007, p.661)Technology
As Leamer and Storper (2001, p.651) and Storper and Venables (2002,
p.20) note, there is a parallel between codiﬁability and the ‘searchabil-
ity’ of goods that we considered in Chapter 3 (see page 99). Codiﬁable
knowledge, like a search good, has qualities that can be objectively as-
sessed from afar, while tacit knowledge, much like an experience good,
has qualities that are only available through prolonged involvement in
its production or consumption. As a result, we may expect the same
spatial relationships to generally hold true: that codiﬁable knowledge
will be increasingly easy to seek out and source from anywhere in the
world, while the search and implementation costs of tacit knowledge
will continue to place a premium on proximity for the sake of eﬃciency
and accessibility.
However, for Echeverri-Carroll et al. (2007, p.715), the key to the
knowledge economy is not so much gaining access to information as
developing new ways of ‘working with, and working together with’
it. The proliferation of information online has made it increasingly
necessary—at least in technical circles—to think about metadata: infor-
mation about information (Economist, 2010d). In a sense, metadata is
a way not only of working with data, but also of building new knowl-
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edge around it; in this there is an important link back to Lösch’s (1954
[1973]) discussion of ﬁnished and unﬁnished goods (see page 44).
Here, raw data is the unﬁnished good, while metadata and relationships
that it captures between data are the ﬁnished product.
Card catalogues and bar codes are both examples of early metadata
(Economist, 2010d), but its role has expanded enormously with the
growth of digital storage and retrieval. In eﬀect, Google’s $180 billion
business ismetadata, but the current ‘revolution in search’ shows just
one way in which increasingly complex information—types that might
once have been considered tacit knowledge—can be codiﬁed and cate-
gorised by machines, or by machines and humans working together. In
short, investment in better  is enabling ﬁrms to move the boundary
between tacit and codiﬁed knowledge in their favour.
Torre (2008, p.870) goes further than this, arguing that s make
‘long-distance sharing or coproduction of tacit knowledge possible’.
Anecdotal evidence of this is beginning to emerge, with online interac-
tion even being employed in the production of animated, feature-length
Hollywood productions (Brody, 2009; Crockett, 2007). The key is
that high-bandwidth applications such as Skype and Apple’s iChat now
oﬀer a way for colleagues at geographically distant sites to collaborate
by voice, video, and screen-sharing, all at once. Since peer-to-peer calls
are entirely free, it should hardly be surprising that Skype’s cross-border
traﬃc increased by 41% in 2008 alone, but it transpires that Skype is
already the world’s largest cross-border telecommunications carrier,
full stop (TeleGeography, 2009).  spent millions of dollars in the
1960s developing the ‘videophone’, only to abandon it as a commercial
non-starter; but in the space of just a few years—thanks to the increas-
ing integration of networks, computers, and cameras—it has become
commonplace.
The videophone illustrates several socio-technical and economic
dynamics rather well. First, in line with ‘Metcalf’s Law’, the value of
one videophone is eﬀectively nil since there is no one with whom to
use it. Second, the poor quality of video did not pass as a substitute
for 2 interaction at a time when, since people travelled less, their
need to maintain extended social circles was lower. So the success
of Skype and other forms of video chat is a function not only of the
reduced cost of cameras (many laptops now come with them built-
in), and of the increased rates of travel and migration (people use the
‘personal touch’ of video to maintain extended networks), but also
of the massive increase in accessibility brought about by the spread of
public WiFi hotspots. So it is not so much that the videophone was the
wrong concept, but that the lack of integration and immediate demand
made it very much the wrong time.
Summary
In line with Brinkley et al. (2009, p.11), I have proposed in this section
that telecoms are making data, information, and codiﬁed knowledge
largely indistinguishable. When we encode an idea, process, or inter-
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action, we can now transmit it to another point on the planet nearly
instantaneously. And the ‘informational exhaust’ of these operations
becomes itself the input to new rounds of innovation in products and
services: for instance, the Chinese logistics ﬁrm Li & Fung substi-
tuted video conferencing where, historically, samples had been sent
in the post to clients for quality-control processes; however, the ﬁrm
quickly realised that the resulting data ﬂows could also be used to
identify changes in the geography of sourcing and in overall retailing
trends months before these showed up in more traditional data sources
(Economist, 2010b).
Clearly, the arrival of high-bandwidth digital networks represents an
enormous scaling up of the externalities associated with codiﬁed knowl-
edge. Historically, delays in transmission and limits on the amount of
data that could be collected, analysed, and relayed would have placed
important constraints on the use, and re-use, of information. Now,
suppliers to Wal-Mart can not only see how well their products are
selling generally, but also how well they are selling on a store-by-store
basis and with what other products their wares are being purchased in
real-time (Economist, 2010b). Google has experimented with map-
ping web searches for ﬂu symptoms as a way of predicting the spread of
the virus, and has found that its results are about two weeks ahead of
hospital-collected data from the Centre for Disease Control, and they
are nearly as accurate geographically (Google, 2010).
The proliferation of ubiquitous information, together with the rise in
distributed knowledge generation by multinationals, is also creating de-
mand for an entirely new discipline: knowledge management. A survey
of ﬁrms by Brinkley (2006, p.28) found that twice as many managers
expected knowledge management to be the biggest source of produc-
tivity gain as chose new product development or supply chain manage-
ment. This ﬁnding may reﬂect the heavy optimisation of these other
aspects of ﬁrm operation, but it is nonetheless a remarkable transforma-
tion for ﬁrms to see the storage and dissemination of knowledge itself
as the critical source of future competitive advantage for their business
rather than the more ‘traditional’ areas of business optimisation.
Yet if access to codiﬁed knowledge becomes easier, then the ability
to produce and control tacit knowledge paradoxically becomes more
important to the ﬁrm. This will be true not only in the commercial
sense but also in terms of the locational decisions that the ﬁrm takes in
order to secure access to this type of knowledge. Torre (2008, p.873)
suggests that we should view all types of knowledge as ‘imperfectly
appropriable’, and that proximity simply lowers the barriers to access
and enables ﬁrms to beneﬁt from spillovers more easily; this would
certainly ﬁt with the previous chapter’s conclusions.
What the knowledge bases approach enables us to grasp is why these
spillovers appear to operate diﬀerently depending on the sector: the
nature of symbolic knowledge requires the copresence of large, diverse
groups of socially connected people in a metropolis, whereas analytical
knowledge can arise amongst people in relatively more remote locations
such as small university towns. Of course, in practice scientists will
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Buzz
Analytical
Synthentic
Art
Advertising
Music
Consulting
Scientific Research
Industrial Design
Graphic Design
Engineering
Data Mining
Architecture
Figure 5.1: Typologies of Knowl-
edge
make use of buzz about who is working on ground-breaking research,
and advertisers will make use of synthetic knowledge built up over the
course of a client relationship to deliver creative solutions that meet
their clients’ needs. In Figure 5.1 I have deliberately done away with the
sharp distinctions between the bases to highlight how most professions
contain mixes of all three. The ﬁgure is necessarily impressionistic,
but what it communicates is consistent with our ﬁndings so far, and it
serves to emphasise the fact that ﬁrms must strive to balance these po-
tentially conﬂicting knowledge-generation needs—and their associated
spatial interaction requirements—when making locational decisions.
How does this three-sided ﬁgure ﬁt with the earlier exploration of
codiﬁed and tacit knowledge? Rather than squeezing one model into
the other, I would suggest that it is more helpful to see codiﬁcation as
being orthogonal to this plane, meaning that all bases are to some extent
codiﬁable and, simultaneously, that all are to some extent tacit. The
epistemic community bridges the two approaches: even were knowl-
edge ‘ﬂoating freely’, the receivers would still need a shared ‘cognitive
framework’ with the transmitter in order “to make sense and value of
this knowledge” (Moodysson et al., 2008, p.1054). The community
of expertise enables scientists to have a tacit understanding of ‘how sci-
ence is done’—in their lab, at their institution, as a global community
of researchers—and enables engineers to codify the output of a client’s
needs in the form of blueprints or lines of code. In short, these views of
how knowledge is created complement each other, enabling us to turn
to how new knowledge may be shared with others.
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5.3 The Exchange of Knowledge
In his review of the literature, McCann (2007, pp.118–119) notes that
most economic models presume that knowledge ﬂows are predom-
inantly local, and that these short-range exchanges lie at the root of
innovation. But as Clark and Thri (2003, p.17) have pointed out, this
comes at a time when collaborating individuals and organisations are
increasingly dispersed geographically. So how do we reconcile these
seemingly contradictory trends? This part of the thesis seeks to shed ad-
ditional light on the argument, developed in Chapter 4, for why prox-
imity is important for ﬁrms involved in innovative outputs (Dawkins,
2003, p.141), but we will also see that ﬁrms are increasingly able to
supplement physical proximity with engineered forms of proximity.
Face-to-Face Interaction
As our examination of tacit knowledge and of the synthetic and sym-
bolic knowledge bases makes clear, particularly complex forms of (new)
knowledge seem to be best communicated in person. We can trace the
roots of this idea in planning and economics literature back through
seminal work by Storper and Venables (2002, 2004) to more purely
information theorists such as Meier (1962), all of whom argued that 2
interaction should be treated as a communications technology. This
idea builds on the fact that inter-personal interaction is clearly not just
about what is said or seen: Storper and Venables (2002, p.14) and Bo-
den and Molotch (2004, p.103) point out that we extract information
in social contexts from the verbal (what was said or unsaid?), the physical
(was there physical contact? where? for how long?), the contextual (where did
we meet? who was at the meeting?), the intentional (what have the attendees
done to bring this meeting to fruition), and the unintentional (what does their
demeanour indicate about their level of commitment?).
To put it another way, as profoundly social animals we engage with,
and respond to social stimuli in ways that we would never respond
to a written report, a phone call, or an email. Copresence is ‘like be-
ing on stage and playing a role’ (Storper and Venables, 2004, p.355):
sometimes it is the performance, not the message, that plays the piv-
otal role in eﬀective communication. In person, the host of a meeting
can much more easily see that he or she is ‘losing’ the audience and ad-
just the delivery of their message accordingly (2004, p.354). Readers
have undoubtedly all experienced the crucial project meeting or pre-
sentation from which the participants emerge more motivated—‘ﬁred
up’—physically and psychologically than they were when they entered
the room.
We can think of this engagement of all ﬁve senses as delivering truly
staggering bandwidth—Meier (1962, p.64) estimated that it would
take 3–10 times as much interaction over the phone to achieve the same
‘channel capacity’ as a face-to-face meeting—and enabling the process-
ing of information “not only deductively but analogically, metaphori-
cally, and through mutually-enriched parallel methods [as well]” (Stor-
per and Venables, 2004, p.355). As a result, ‘instrumental assumptions’
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Function Context Eﬀects Outcomes
Communication
technology
Non-codiﬁable
information
High frequency Eﬃcient communication under
uncertainty, especially of tacit
knowledge
Teaching Visual and body
language clues
Acting or responding correctly under
uncertainty when a message is
intended
& Rapid feedback
Parallel sending and receiving
of information
Trust and
incentives in
relationships
Meeting Co-presence and commitment
of time as ‘forfeitable bond’
Ability to trust and bond where
messages and their content are
inherently uncertain
Detection of lying
Screening and
socialising
Professional
group
Loss of anonymity First-mover advantages in
innovation and learning
Being ‘in the
loop’
Judging and being judged
Acquisition of shared values
Rush and
motivation
Presentation Performance as display Productivity, creativity,
inventiveness & energy
Table 5.2: Face-to-Face Interaction
(aer Storper and Venables 2004,
p.353 and 2002, p.15)
that sending more data down a wire will somehow substitute for 2
interaction are naïve (Graham, 2004, p.101), and the issue for remote
collaborators is therefore that creative problem-solving simply does not
seem to function as eﬀectively over the wire.
The wide range of potential beneﬁts embodied in 2 interaction
is summarised in Table 5.2; but one of the more subtle beneﬁts is the
way that “the face-to-face encounter presents a much fuller opportu-
nity to develop deep commitment and trust…” (Graham, 2004, p.101).
So while the eﬀectiveness of a meeting derives in part from the band-
width of 2 interaction, it also derives from the signal it sends that
participants have made a real investment to attend (see Information Ac-
quisition on page 150 for a fuller discussion). Or as Boden and Molotch
(2004, p.103) put it: “copresence requires participants to set aside not
only a shared time but a shared space, while also constraining other
activities that can take place.” In short, meetings help to weed out the
partners who are “unable or unwilling to put in suﬃcient eﬀort to bring
a collaboration or project to fruition” (Storper and Venables, 2002,
pp.30–31).
Even if professional and social ‘screening networks’ can be main-
tained electronically (something we will consider in more depth on
page 177), it should also be clear that periodic 2 helps to raise barriers
to entry by ‘producing a loss of anonymity and exposing individuals to
the judgement of peers’ (2004, p.356). As I emphasised in the section
on clustering, this evaluative dimension is crucial in opaque markets
and 2 streamlines this process by making it easier to create and main-
tain groups (Meier, 1962, p.42), as well as faster to arrive at ‘complex
judgements of character and trustworthiness’. The implicit cost of
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2 meetings is therefore particularly important when the returns are
substantial but the risk of ‘freeloading’—because of opacity—is high
(Storper and Venables, 2002, p.21).
Writing about the importance of such networks in the operations of
the City of London in the 1960s, Kynaston (2001, p.205) notes that “it
was all about picking the right people—deﬁnitely an art rather than a
science…” And on an empirical level, ﬁnanciers interviewed more re-
cently by Cook et al. (2004, pp.18–19) reported that the ability to meet
in person reduced the risk of a costly misunderstanding and enabled
information to be communicated more quickly (Cook et al., 2007,
p.1334). The respondents also noted that it could be diﬃcult enough
to get employees of the same ﬁrm in diﬀerent oﬃces to collaborate and
communicate eﬀectively, and that the challenges are even greater when
employees from diﬀerent ﬁrms or industries were involved.
While many interactions—such as meetings—are structured so as
to be both formal and informative, we shouldn’t discount the role of
the ‘ritual and communal’ in such communications as well (Graham,
2005, p.99). Thus frequent and intense communications support the
emergence of a ‘common culture’ (Cook et al., 2004, p.21), and enable
fruitful interactions between clients, competitors, and even regula-
tors (2007, p.1336). Where this culture is spatially, as well as socially,
constrained, then it will produce a locational asset that is diﬃcult to
replicate (Taylor et al., 2002, pp.93–94).
V P P: A slightly diﬀerent approach to 2 was
adopted by Leamer and Storper (2001), who divide personal interac-
tion into two categories: handshakes and conversations. Handshakes
establish the context for future conversations by cementing a mutual
understanding of the goals and abilities of the participants, while con-
versations are connected to the ongoing ﬂow of information between
collaborators. More concretely, we can think in terms of a project:
there is nearly always a ‘kick-oﬀ’ meeting in which the collaborating
teams meet each other, introduce themselves, socialise, and agree how
interactions will occur in the future; however, following this crucial
ﬁrst encounter the project typically settles into a more ‘routine’ format
where information is exchanged and participants are updated on the
progress of various tasks.
We can formalise the spatial implications of this analysis using a
framework proposed by Charlot and Duranton (2006, pp.1368–1370).
Recall that in Chapter 3 (see page 99) we considered how the costs
of a transaction are spread across search and implementation phases.
Implicit in this model is the question of whether coordination during
each of these phases can beneﬁt from 2 encounters, and how costly
these meetings are to their participants. If the coordination tasks are
straightforward, then they will usually be performed electronically (e.g.
by phone, email) because that is the fastest and the cheapest way to do so
(Charlot and Duranton, 2006, p.1369). But if the coordination required
is complex, or entails iterative problem-solving or tacit knowledge then,
on balance, it would be more suitable to resolve it through a costly
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2 meeting. Interestingly, this model brings us full-circle to the form
of consumption discussion in the review of Lösch (see page 44) and
connects it to the idea of a threshold of complexity for informational
transactions.
So we now have a threshold of complexity and value: below this
boundary coordination takes place via telecommunications, and above
it a 2 meeting is required. What Charlot and Duranton (2006,
p.1370) point out, however, is that the costs of a meeting are higher
in a city—because of travel, rent, congestion, and labour costs inter
alia—than they are in suburban or rural area and that these costs in-
crease with the size of the city while the cost of telecommunications
remains the same. Consequently, the threshold of a ‘complex’ problem
increases with the cost of the location (ibid.). But what cities take away
in terms of cost, they return through the increased probability of ﬁnd-
ing a suitable partner: more ﬁrms are accessible and the odds of a match
within a fairly short range are higher (2006, p.1371). Meier (1962,
pp.64–65) notes that many business meetings to organise a project will
go nowhere, but that when they succeed then a skyline or a market
can be transformed; we can now see why these types of transformative
projects are oen uniquely urban in nature.
However, this approach says little about how the trade-oﬀs vary
across sectors, and McCann (2007) points out that not only do we typ-
ically assume that 2 has the same value to all ﬁrms, but also that all
ﬁrms have the same required frequency of interaction. If we allow the
demand for 2 to vary by industry, then we can see how ﬁrms with
complex needs will have very high travel costs indeed if they must jour-
ney some distance in order to meet with suppliers, clients, or partners
(2007, p.122). Comparing the 2 needs of people in advisory or deal-
making roles with those of innovators, Buck et al. (2002, p.119) argue
that the latter “have [an] insuﬃcient need for 2 contact to justify
London rents” and we can see how this need is rooted in part in the
diﬀerence between, say, 1–2 meetings per week and 1–2 meetings per
day.
In sum, the greatest beneﬁts of physical proximity will accrue to
individuals and ﬁrms that have complex outputs, short product cycles,
frequent contact needs, and a predominance of short-term contracts
(McCann, 2007, p.131). This result connects the economic cost of
travel (e.g. for meetings) to the distribution of sectors within the city-
region: sectors employing symbolic or synthetic knowledge—such as
ﬁnance, publishing, consulting, and the arts—with frequent interaction
requirements will normally be willing to outbid those sectors—such
as & or engineering—with less of a need for 2 and, consequently,
a diminished dependency on central locations (2007, see footnote on
p.132).
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Other Proximities
T P: The growth of mobility and -enabled
interactions means that permanent proximity may no longer be the
only way to exchange complex knowledge. The simplest way to oﬀer
propinquity without colocation is travel. Grabher (2002, p.210) and
Torre (2008, p.879) suggest that technology has increased our ability
to coordinate activity to the point where some collaborators now only
need to meet intermittently. And as we have seen, proximity will tend
to be important at the beginning of a longer-term interaction: it is the
point at which the rules and codes for a subsequent interaction are im-
plicitly and explicitly negotiated (Torre, 2008, p.884). In other words,
temporary proximity can function eﬀectively during the ‘handshake’
phase of a transaction.
So where ongoing 2 needs are modest, employees can be moved
on-site while they ‘ramp up’ and get acquainted with their new col-
leagues. They then return to their ‘home’ oﬃce with both codiﬁed
and tacit knowledge about the way that ‘things are done’ within an or-
ganisation and as carriers of a corporate culture. In short, temporary
proximity, supported by global and regional transportation systems,
oﬀers ﬁrms a new level of locational ﬂexibility by reducing their im-
mediate dependence on 2. Obviously, this type of interaction could
also be generated at trade fairs and conferences which ‘compress an
entire world into a single place’ (Rychen and Zimmermann, 2008,
p.774)—and also seem to display some of the beneﬁts of a cluster in
terms of monitoring (Morrison, 2008, p.826), building buzz (Rychen
and Zimmermann, 2008, p.774), and identifying new opportunities
(Cole, 2008, p.896).
V P: An alternative to temporary copresence is telep-
resence, and a good deal of work is now done from remote locations
via a variety of services: voice, video, email, and web, to name just a
few. Given the focus in this chapter on how 2 interaction is integral
to tacit knowledge transfer and complex problem-solving, we might
expect telecommuting to be associated with less-skilled positions. But
while this appears to the case for some areas such as telesales, most data
on teleworking suggests that it is dominated by those with a college
education performing highly-skilled tasks (Haddon and Brynin, 2005,
p.40).
This seeming contradiction is driven by the fact that many ostensi-
bly home-based teleworkers seem to work only part-time from home
(Haddon and Brynin, 2005, p.36). In fact, the number of hours spent
by telecommuters on ‘telework’ may not be all that great (2005, p.39),
and full-time remote working seems to produce a sense of isolation,
leading to a loss of creativity as well as a feeling ‘economic precarious-
ness’ because the employee is no longer fully-integrated with the ﬁrm
(Traxler and Luger, 2000, p.290). And, reinforcing the earlier point
about handshakes and conversations, Echeverri-Carroll et al. (2007,
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p.715) note that ‘virtual teams’ oen need an opportunity to develop or
reinforce relationships through 2 interaction so that they can collabo-
rate eﬀectively.
Until recently, the more expensive forms of telepresence were largely
a tool for executives already at the limits of travel endurance; this way
they could tack on one more meeting without needing to tack on
another plane trip (Crockett, 2007; Economist, 2007a, 2009b). By
implication, this type of telepresence is a substitute for face-to-face in-
teraction only when absolutely necessary, and it is not a ﬁrst-choice.
Evidence from ‘high touch’ sectors such as venture capital () indicates
that it is the ﬁrms with the most 2 interactions that also use telecom-
munications most actively (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008, p.2125). Recall
too that Figure 1.2 in the Introduction (see page 22) shows telecoms
usage and business travel increasing in parallel. The point is that copres-
ence seems set to remain an essential component of knowledge-based
work (Gillespie and Richardson, 2000, p.232), and that the dependence
of knowledge workers on periods of intense face-to-face interaction
ensures that telecommuting will remain a part-time practice, at least for
the time being.
Through mobile telecommunications, however, travel time is no
longer ‘dead time’ as we can now reach, and be reached by clients,
colleagues, and friends while en route (Lyons and Urry, 2005; Sheller
and Urry, 2006; Urry, 2006). Because of this eﬀect, the perceived
cost of travel is lowered and so, paradoxically, by freeing employees to
work from nearly anywhere, mobile oﬃce technologies may actively
encourage workers to locate further from the oﬃce than ever before
(Mokhtarian, 2003; Mokhtarian et al., 2004). Since trains now permit
travellers to charge laptops, send email, and place and receive calls,
perhaps the greatest long-term advantage of public transit over private
vehicles may well prove to be the fact that people can perform much
more complex tasks without placing themselves, or others, at risk of an
accident.
O P: Finally, Torre and Rallet (2005) add to
our understanding of distance by introducing the concept of an ‘organ-
ised proximity’ that can be deﬁned as: “the set of routines—explicit
or implicit—which allows coordination without having to deﬁne be-
forehand how to do so…[these] routines incorporate organisational
structure, organisational culture, performance measurement systems,
language and so on” (Rallet and Torre, 1999, p.375). In a sense, this
idea actually combines the ‘logic of belonging’ and the ‘logic of sim-
ilarity’ that we covered in the review of social networks and types of
proximity (Watts et al., 2002), but it is also obviously relevant to our
understanding of the knowledge economy. This also sheds additional
light on our understanding of clusters: their social dimension is what
allows workers to develop the ‘routines’ that will allow them to collab-
orate when necessary, while still competing with one another intensely
on a day-to-day basis.
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Grabher (2001) elaborated on these ideas in an study of the Soho
advertising cluster, ﬁnding that its heterarchical organisational struc-
ture nonetheless permitted identiﬁcation amongst employees with both
‘the Group’ of multinational advertising ﬁrms (e.g. WPP or Ogilvy
& Mather), and ‘the Village’ of independent contractors and studios
(2001, p.353). In both cases, heterarchy promotes diversity, ensuring an
ongoing adaptability to client needs (2001, p.360), while also enabling
the emergence of a kind of diﬀuse trust built around social and working
norms (e.g. work hard/play hard) and a latent network of personal rela-
tionships that can be activated at-need (Grabher, 2001, p.371; Grabher,
2002, p.208).
So to some extent spatial transaction costs can be managed organi-
sationally (Torre, 2008, p.879), potentially negating the ‘lock-in’ eﬀect
caused by the diﬃculty of transferring various types of knowledge
(Knoben and Oerlemans, 2008). However, even though organisational
proximity is a powerful concept for explaining how a ﬁrm can suc-
cessfully manage a distributed working environment, the inescapable
fact remains that distance-enabling tools such as email and videocon-
ferencing still work ‘better’ with people that you know, and that new
relationships still seem to require, or are at least signiﬁcantly improved
by, face-to-face initiation (cf. Cook et al., 2004, p.19; Torre, 2008,
p.877).
Technology
An early sales pitch for Hewlett Packard’s videoconferencing system was
quite explicit about the limitations of voice-only calling: “You’ve just
ﬁnished making your pitch to the board and there is complete silence
on the end of the line…are they nodding their heads in agreement?”
(Economist, 2007a) However, the historically poor quality and accessi-
bility of video conferencing services meant that they played only a small
role in the communications activity of even such wealthy and enthusias-
tic adopters of new technology as the ﬁnancial services sector (Faulcon-
bridge, 2007, p.1647). In addition to the growth of Skype (see page
170), there is new evidence of the growing popularity of video calling:
Economist (2009b) notes that live video traﬃc on the Internet is grow-
ing at a rate nearly double that of other forms of electronic interaction,
and Matson and Prusak indicate ﬁrms can use ‘videoconferencing and
occasional in-person meetings’ to “bridge physical distances and build
relationships” (2010, p.2).
Hi-tech ﬁrms oen make for particularly interesting case studies into
the eﬀect of technology on remote interaction since they tend to have
global production chains and employees who are particularly receptive
to collaboration via telecommunications. Cisco is no exception, and
as a matter of corporate policy it, in the inimitable language of busi-
ness, ‘eats its own dog food’: in 2009 the ﬁrm averaged 5,500 internal
telepresence meetings a week and the company reports that it has cut its
travel budget by nearly 50%, saving $290 million (Economist, 2009b).
However, whatever the success of High Deﬁnition () video confer-
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encing, one of the clear ironies of this shi away from long-distance
business travel is that senior management ﬁnd themselves called into the
oﬃce at all hours of the day and night in order to ‘meet’ with vendors
and clients because the bandwidth and hardware required are not (yet)
available at home.
Spatial Implications
Torre (2008) treats organisational and geographical proximity as or-
thogonal (see Table 5.3): geographic proximity can exist without or-
ganised proximity, and vice versa. In the former case, there is no foun-
dation upon which to build a platform for exchanging knowledge and
so you have ‘spatial concentration without spillovers’. In the latter case,
the existence of an epistemic community means that there is less need
of physical proximity for knowledge transmission. Where both types of
proximity coexist then Torre sees this as a classic localised cluster, and
this distinction brings additional conceptual clarity to our consideration
of clusters in Chapter 4.
Geographical
Proximity
Organised
Proximity
Geographical
Proximity
Spatial concentration of
activities (without
knowledge spillovers)
Cluster with local
knowledge transfer
Organised
Proximity
Cluster with local
knowledge transfer
Footloose epistemic
community
Table 5.3: Role Played by both
Types of Proximity in Knowledge
Transmission (aer Torre, 2008,
p.879)
The epistemic community also gives us a useful tool with which to
understand how the combination of temporary and virtual proximity
can act as a functional—even if not necessarily ideal—substitute for
the sort of dense physical clustering that is thought to be so essential
to creative ﬁelds. Indeed, the ability of technology to support more
extended epistemic communities may well be driving the continued
growth in long-distance business travel (Asheim et al., 2007, p.666)
because it enables the community to survive long periods without close
contact. However, to truly thrive the community still seems to require
2 interaction, and although I’ve tended to frame this all in terms of
meetings, it should be clear from the discussion of strong and weak
ties in Chapter 4 that the reinforcement of norms and the development
of new contacts also occurs in informal contexts; as one European
animator puts it “the most eﬀective part of the Cartoon Forum [trade
fair] is probably the bar” (Cole, 2008, p.898).
Finally, Torre (2008, pp.882–883) also suggests that the need for 2
varies with the phase of the production process—that the requirement
for geographical proximity diminishes with time and can be largely re-
placed by organised proximity when processes are codiﬁed. Certainly,
the evidence we have seen so far indicates that this is a factor; however,
the discussion of knowledge bases and of the relative merits of 2 high-
lights the fact that when complex issues are involved then there is still
no substitute for 2 interaction. So although a location outside of Lon-
don might be entirely feasible for non-client facing staﬀ, even here we
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ﬁnd that there are distance constraints if the back oﬃce activity depends
upon intimate—which is to say tacit—knowledge of, say, City practices
and clients (Cook et al., 2004, p.34).
Summary
We can now pull together the many threads of an argument around the
continued importance of 2 contact in an era of advanced . As we
saw in the section on buzz (see page 154), meeting in person is a par-
ticularly costly way to do business; however, the many levels on which
copresence works in practice makes it a very eﬃcient way to commu-
nicate a great deal of complex, uncertain information while minimising
the risk of misunderstandings (Cook et al., 2004, pp.18–19). At a time
when the acquisition and exchange of knowledge acts is the corner-
stone of a ﬁrm’s response to uncertainty (Faulconbridge et al., 2007b,
p.12), colocation “creates favourable pre-conditions for 2 and, conse-
quently, accelerated localized learning” (Grabher, 2002, p.209; Buck
et al., 2002, p.112).
Foreign Exchange () is a particularly good example of the chal-
lenges facing modern ﬁrms that depend on the successful exchange of
complex, dispersed knowledge (Clark and Thri, 2003). Since trading
takes places around the clock, positions need to be handed oﬀ from one
oﬃce to the next in an orderly way (2003, p.15). In the case of the 
sector, this can done through a combination of geographic proxim-
ity within each market—the traders are usually physically close to one
another as a way of improving communication and awareness, even if
the trading ﬂoor is no longer as noisy as it once was (2003, p.20)—and
organisational proximity between markets—traders coordinate around
sets of practices and norms that enable them to communicate eﬀectively
with workers in another oﬃce and culture. Supplementing this are
events that ‘engineer’ sociality: staﬀ from around the world meet up
regularly to celebrate success and talk shop (2003, p.21).
Of course, ﬁrms can also (re)conﬁgure themselves so as to decrease
relational distances: the ‘culture’ within a soware ﬁrm (i. e. synthetic)
tends to be shaped by the culture of its client industries, while the
cultures of advertising (i. e. symbolic) powerhouses such as Ogilvy &
Mather (‘emotional’) J. Walter Thompson (‘scientiﬁc’) reﬂect an agency
ethos of how to do projects (Grabher, 2004, p.110). Cook et al. (2004,
p.27) claim that, as ﬁnancial products become easier to copy, ﬁrms
increasingly compete on their service levels and bespoke solutions:
they now invite prospects to their oﬃces in order to show oﬀ the ‘ﬁrm
culture’. In other words, s have actually begun to use the social
characteristics of their oﬃce as a defensible competitive advantage.
So the concept of ‘relational proximity’ oﬀers us a more generic
way to think about how ﬁrms might navigate between the various
options presented by permanent, temporary, electronic, and organ-
isational proximity. In eﬀect, relational proximity is what helps to
bridge the gaps within an oﬃce and between the dispersed oﬃces of an
—Asheim et al. (2007, p.659) associate it with the eﬀective transfer
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of tacit knowledge and root it in “shared values, shared visions, [and]
shared vocabulary…” It is these features that allow Cole (2008, p.892)
to conclude that while colocation may represent a ‘best practice’, it is no
longer the only one.
5.4 Knowledge Work
Key Sectors
We have now explored the ways in which knowledge is created and
transmitted, but to be able to analyse telecommunications ﬂows in
Chapter 7 we ﬁrst need to deﬁne knowledge work in a way that con-
nects this evolving understanding to the existing industrial classiﬁca-
tions. This will require a more directly sectoral approach and while
some, such as the one set out in Table 5.4, draw on the  deﬁni-
tion—which includes high- and medium-tech manufacturing, and
value-added ‘knowledge intensive’ market services such as ﬁnance, in-
surance, telecommunications, business services, education, and health
(Brinkley, 2006, p.14)—others focus on ‘professionals’ such as solic-
itors, accountants, management consultants, ﬁnanciers, researchers,
engineers, architects, and soware developers (cf. Goddard, 1975; Kee-
ble and Nachum, 2002). So although Brinkley (2006, p.14) improves
on the  deﬁnition by including employment in cultural industries
as well2, it is nonetheless clear that “no single deﬁnition will capture all
2 In the following review of the
‘key sectors’ in the knowledge
economy I will not deal directly
with ﬁnancial services since we
have explored this ﬁeld extensively
in the preceding chapters.
aspects of the knowledge economy” (2006, p.29).
Exports (£ billions) 1995 2005
Business services 10.9 30.7
Financial services 8.6 24.8
Computer services 0.8 5.8
Communications 1.0 3.0
Cultural/media 0.7 2.0
Government 1.4 2.0
Royalties/licenses 3.9 7.3
Knowledge services 27.3 75.6
Non-knowledge services 23.3 35.5
Total services† 50.6 111.1
†All ﬁgures current prices, balance of payments basis. Totals may not sum due to
rounding.
Table 5.4: Value of Knowledge
Work (Brinkley, 2006, p.11)
Moreover, just as working in an oﬃce does not guarantee an information-
or knowledge-rich environment, not working in an oﬃce should not be
taken to demonstrate an absence of knowledge-work. But if knowledge
workers can be found outside of the more obvious spaces of information
work, then the coarse traditional classiﬁcations may be unreliable (God-
dard, 1975, p.3). In turn, this implies that we should consider the role
of the division or oﬃce within the ﬁrm as well; but this is an altogether
more diﬃcult proposition analytically since, to date, that level of detail
has only been available through expensive qualitative investigation. In
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Chapter 6, I intend to show the ways in which new, computationally-
enabled methodological approaches are beginning to overcome this
historic limitation.
Gillespie and Green (1987, p.400) deﬁne business services as an “ex-
ternalised extension of the division of labour in management”, and
indicate that these services are diverse both in terms of what they of-
fer to businesses and in terms of their spatial strategies. The value of
outsourcing management and administration tasks stems from rising
levels of competition and rising rates of technological change, both of
which mean that ﬁrms face signiﬁcant risks if they make substantial
investments in non-core functions (Wood, 2006, p.349). This is espe-
cially true where there are signiﬁcant costs and little opportunity to reap
economies of scale in return.
B S: Within the general category of business services,
those that are intensively involved in knowledge generation and appli-
cation—termed Knowledge Intensive Business Services ()—fall
into two groups: the lower-order routine functions associated with the
‘back oﬃce’ and the higher-order ones associated with business and
product development. A good deal of  growth in the U.K. has been
of the more routine functions, and Wood (2006, p.340) argues that such
ﬁrms are usually attracted to ‘property-led oﬃce developments with
an accessible workforce and good communications’. In contrast, the
higher-order services will generally involve more complex exchanges
and decision-making, and so a good deal more 2 interaction is ex-
pected (Coﬀey and Shearmur, 2002, p.376).
The nature of  work means that demand for their services is of-
ten funnelled through a head oﬃce (Gillespie and Green, 1987, p.400),
and so many business services are fairly tightly clustered in the largest
cities (Bennett et al., 1999). As a result, it is hardly surprising that Cen-
tral London possesses almost three times the average  employment
share of the other core U.K. cities, and over 50% more jobs than all the
other cities combined (Wood, 2006, p.341). However, most  are
small to medium-sized businesses and may depend on just a few major
clients even though they may operate in a global market (2006, p.347)3. 3 This, of course, links us back to
the earlier discussion of scale and
transportation in Chapter 4.
Some ‘higher-order’  ﬁrms in the capital may be so specialised that
they actually ﬁnd it advantageous to outsource some of their own routine
functions to lower-order ﬁrms in cheaper locations: according to Wood
(2006, p.346), two-thirds of  purchases in 2003 were actually from
other .
C I: Recent work by Florida (2002a,b) and Currid
(2007) has shied attention to the importance of cultural industries.
This reﬂects a welcome rebalancing of an analysis that has all-too-
oen favoured the measurability of ‘high-tech’ ﬁrms through patenting
activity at the expense of equally important, but harder to measure,
symbolic output. However, some of the subsequent work in this ﬁeld
has, at times, bordered on being an advocacy campaign for nightclubs
and restaurants instead of a considered explanation of how and when
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cultural industries form sustainable knowledge-production complexes,
especially outside the major centres such as London, New York, Paris,
and Tokyo (MacGillis, 2010; Little, 2010).
In spite of this limitation, it is helpful to recognise that cultural
production is an important aspect of knowledge work because of the
convergence between cultural and economic development (Scott, 1997,
p.323). In eﬀect, the ‘use value’ and ‘sign value’ of goods is increas-
ingly indistinguishable, and there is growing demand “for goods and
services that serve as instruments of entertainment, communication,
self-cultivation, ornamentation, social positionality…[that] exist in
both ‘pure’ form (ﬁlm, music) or in combination with utilitarian func-
tions (furniture, clothing)” (2001, p.12). And perhaps more than in
most other sectors, in cultural industries the supply of, and demand for,
products is characterised by feedback eﬀects that reinforce one another
(ibid.).
Cultural industries are generally thought to include: media such as
ﬁlm, music, and publishing; various types of fashion such as clothing,
furniture, and jewellery; services such as advertising and entertainment;
and the ‘commercial art’ professions such as architecture, and graphic
and web design (Scott, 2001, p.16). Many researchers also count the
‘fora’ of museums, art galleries, restaurants, bars, opera houses, and
libraries as part of the cultural infrastructure. Certainly, these venues
constitute a shared resource that no one industry on its own could
sustain, and the concentration of institutions in large American cities
helps to explain why more than 50% of the three million culture work-
ers that Scott (2001, p.16) identiﬁed in his research could be found in
metro regions containing more than one million people. Meanwhile,
metropolitan London accounts for 26.9% of cultural employment in
Britain (ibid.), but only 12% of its population.
Currid (2007, p.7) makes a strong case for the cultural economy
being much more ﬂuid than usually imagined by people “who see art,
music, ﬁlm as separate endeavours.” Cultural output oen combines
many diﬀerent strands of work—there is research, production, and
marketing, for instance—and relies on a ‘motley crew’ of collaborators
in a sector where ‘nobody knows’ which products will succeed (2007,
p.77). These combined pressures mean (as we have already seen at
several points) that there is a reliance on many small contracts and on
the reputation of collaborators to reduce risk.
The other diﬀerentiating dimension of cultural products is that they
are consumed socially—it is, again, the importance of what designers
hear and singers wear—and that many people are simultaneously pro-
ducers and consumers (Currid, 2007, p.7). So while buzz matters to
many industries, it is considered vital to the functioning of the cultural
market where goods are of an inherently ‘uncertain and taste-driven na-
ture’ and their value is oen ambiguous or has applications beyond their
inherent ‘use value’ to the purchaser (Currid and Williams, 2010, p.4).
Cultural products send socially-coded signals, but the place-speciﬁc
characteristics of culture also create eﬀective, defensible ways for ﬁrms
to diﬀerentiate products in a competitive environment (Scott, 1997,
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pp.324–326). A few places acquire such durable reputations for dis-
tinctiveness and quality (e.g. Champagne), that copies from another
location are still considered to be imperfect substitutes (2001, p.14).
The binding of culture and place is why we speak of West End the-
atre, Broadway shows, and Parisian dining, but foremost amongst these
locations is undoubtedly Hollywood, where the feedback loop between
Hollywood the place and Hollywood the creative production complex
reinforces the desirability of both. This relationship explains why Scott
(1997, p.325) argues that cultural industries “tend to be rooted in dense
recursive relations between place and logic of local production system”;
moreover, the link between place and product serves to ‘authenticate’
the output for consumers and yields a kind of monopoly rent that ex-
plains why cultural producers are willing to pay the high costs of living
and working in global ‘signifying locations’ (ibid.).
Of course, over time these eﬀects may weaken as new artistic and
cultural trends emerge, but the most competitive sites also build up
social and physical assets—what Currid and Williams term ‘magnets’ of
interaction (see Figure 5.2)—that are very diﬃcult to copy from scratch:
“London’s universities and fashion institutes are where future designers
ﬁrst form networks that endure through most of their careers. Fashion
designers continually used their former educational institutions as an
innovation community and networking hub” (Athey et al., 2007, p.31).
Cosmopolitan cities also oﬀer an abundant supply of desirable ‘quality
of life’ features (bars, cafés, clubs, etc.) that are crucial in attracting
and retaining creative workers and in stimulating cultural output. This
concentration can, in turn, attract other people and industries in a
virtuous spiral of economic growth (Asheim et al., 2007, p.666; Currid,
2007, p.46).
H F: Although Currid’s emphasis on the creative sector as a
source of growth and competitiveness in New York City’s economy is
a welcome counterbalance to an historical focus on ﬁnance, she appears
to largely exclude creative activity in historically ‘technical’ roles such as
those found in ﬁelds like architecture and programming. However, it is
quite clear that with the blending of high-technology and high-design
we seem to be entering the era of what might be termed the ‘hybrid’
ﬁrm (Hutton, 2004, p.91). For instance, within the British economy,
soware design, computer gaming and electronic publishing—all hy-
brid endeavours by this deﬁnition—have nearly doubled their shared of
Gross Value Added from 1.8% in 1997 to 2.8% in 2003, for an annual
growth rate of 11% (Brinkley, 2006, p.15). In fact, with employment
also growing at about 8% per annum, these three sectors account for
much of the expansion in the ‘creative industries’ that was shown in
Table 5.4.
As evidence for the existence of these ﬁrms, Hutton (2004, p.91)
points to the mix of “pre-Fordist (artisanal) and post-Fordist industrial
production regimes” in the inner city and to his typology of ‘signifying
New Economy precincts’ (2004, p.93) such as SoMa in San Francisco
and Hoxton in London. So, much like more purely cultural producers,
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Figure 5.2: Density of ‘Magnet’
Events Derived from Photo Data
(Currid and Williams, 2010, p.16;
reproduced with permission of the
authors)
hybrid ﬁrms prefer environments that support interaction, and within
which the mingling of work and life enriches the local “information
surface” (ibid.). While Hutton seems to expect that most hybrid pro-
ducers will be comparatively small, it seems to me that in some cases the
ﬁrms may be much, much larger: companies such as Apple and Nike
are hybrid ﬁrms in that they blend cultural inputs with  to generate
high-value products, yet they are vastly larger than the type of hybrid
ﬁrm studied by Hutton. In fact, even ﬁrms that appear on the surface
to be relatively traditional in terms of their output may actually operate
in an increasingly hybridised manner: one designer furniture ﬁrm stud-
ied by (Morrison, 2008, p.827) employed a complex technical system
to track the performance of furniture components through the entire
production process.
R  D: The last category of interest to us in this
review is traditionally known as Research & Development, although
this is clearly a pretty broad category and could encompass both social
sciences and natural sciences research. Although some sectors such as
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals outsource a great deal of research
activity, Gillespie and Green (1987, p.402) suggest that thinking of &
as a ‘service’ can be misleading and that it should be considered part of
the production process. Outsourced or not, the connection to analytical
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knowledge generation makes it clear that the locational preferences
of & groups may well diﬀer from those of other knowledge-based
services.
More than any other knowledge-intensive sector, it is & that
points to the dangers of sampling just one or two industries and assum-
ing that the conclusions are universally applicable (Gillespie and Green,
1987, p.408). In 1970, the South East of England outside of London
contained 49% of & units (Goddard, 1975, p.7); and Gillespie and
Green (1987, p.408) found that, nearly twenty years later, although
more & activity had decamped from London it was still very much a
feature of the Greater South East of England (). Today, this pattern
seems ﬁrmly embedded: the majority of Britain’s innovative & ac-
tivity—as measured by patents—falls roughly within Hall’s ‘Western
Crescent’ (see Table 5.5). From a planning standpoint, many of these
ﬁrms operate from corporate ‘campuses’ which provide a panoply of
services for workers—including banking, retailing and leisure facili-
ties—so that staﬀ rarely need to leave during work hours and there is
comparatively little of the kind of face-to-face social interaction that
characterises, say, ﬁnance or fashion in London.
Top ﬁve performers Bottom ﬁve performers
Cambridge 80.8 Doncaster 3.1
Oxford 50.1 Luton 2.9
Birkenhead† 35.0 Sunderland 2.3
Swindon 34.4 Blackpool 1.6
Reading 30.7 Grimsby 1.6
† My own limited research suggests that the presence of Birkenhead in this list may
be due to the activities of one or more legal ﬁrms specialising in Intellectual Property
law, and not to ‘innovative activity’ per se.
Table 5.5: Patents per 10,000
people in England’s largest 56
urban areas (Athey et al., 2007,
p.15)
Particularly in the case of & activity, it is internal knowledge ﬂows
that seem to predominate, and there may little in the way of a wider
local community (Athey et al., 2007, p.30). In the case of s, this
approach may explain why domestic collaborations make up a declining
share of partnerships, and why international inward investment to the
U.S. increased from $1.5bn in 1980 to $22bn in 1998 (Echeverri-
Carroll et al., 2007, p.714). The international commissioning of &
means that national measures of research output may be misleading as a
guide to overall activity (Brinkley, 2006, p.10).
That said, as we saw in the section on the analytical knowledge base
(see page 166), innovative ﬁrms—and especially the smaller ﬁrms and
entrepreneurs who seem to ‘rely more on local sources of innovation
and inspiration’ (Sonn and Storper, 2007, p.1033)—may well still see
some advantage to local collaborations with universities as both a source
of innovation (Athey et al., 2007, p.32) and a source of skilled labour
(Vorley and Smith, 2007, p.177). There is also evidence to support
the idea that academic institutions can play a vital role as a trustworthy
partners for, or brokers between, between ﬁrms concerned about the
leakage of intellectual property to competitors (Athey et al., 2007,
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p.31), but it is signiﬁcant that these relationships are oen formalised
quickly (Moodysson et al., 2008, p.1043).
& is probably the most well-researched of the four categories of
knowledge work that we have considered here—and several creative
methodologies, such as those developed by Jaﬀe et al. (1993), Hender-
son et al. (1998), or Sonn and Storper (2007), have focussed on patent-
ing activity, especially in the high-technology sector, as a proxy for &
activity in general. From a research standpoint, patents have several
advantages: in many countries, applications are searchable electroni-
cally and allow researchers to zero in not only on a generally-accepted
marker of innovation, but also to mine the relationships embodied in
the patent’s citations and in the social network characteristics of who
works together on which patents (cf. Das and Finne, 2008; Torre, 2008;
Gallié, 2009). In short, patents are what tends to be measured because
patents are what are measurable4; however, it is also clearly just one in- 4 There are, however, signiﬁcant
shortcomings with this approach
when it used for local and regional
analysis outside of America and
Germany because of issues with the
data; this has become even more
problematic with the increasing
relevance of the European Patent
Cooperation Treaty (Van Dulken,
2010).
dicator and the importance of non-patentable innovation should not be
overlooked (Athey et al., 2007, p.20).
S: A recent study of the Phoenix, Arizona metro area supports
this general model: ÓhUallacháin and Leslie (2007, pp.1598–1599)
found that, overall, & had the lowest level concentration, while legal
services, accounting, business support had the highest. And, as might
be expected, architecture and engineering were clustered, but were
not found in the  (2007, p.1598), which only reinforces the ear-
lier ﬁndings from Montréal, Canada (Coﬀey and Shearmur, 2002).
Overall then we have general support for the idea that knowledge
‘spillovers’ are spatially constrained, and the extent of the constraint
is connected to the complexity of the product or service (ÓhUal-
lacháin and Leslie, 2007; Gallié, 2009). We can also think of this
dynamic as ‘spatial economies of synergy’ meaning that there is a
value—innovation—attached to being located in a place where there
is a potential for interaction with others (Castells, 2009, p.9).
Knowledge Workers
One of the most striking features of the knowledge economy is that,
even as increasingly sophisticated technology is displacing routine activ-
ity, it is increasing the demand for skilled, creative staﬀ. This has always
been true for cultural goods and services since they are dependent upon
“large inputs of human intellectual and manual labour, even where 
plays a major role” (Scott, 2001, p.16). But the complex workﬂows
embodied in many outputs will increasingly require employees to act
in a ﬂexible fashion, and so we may expect a ﬂattening of the corporate
hierarchy in the coming decade (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006,
p.7). Drucker (1999, p.142) has argued that, more than other classes of
worker, knowledge workers will need to be able to manage themselves,
and two-thirds of executives interviewed by the Economist Intelligence
Unit intend to give their employees greater autonomy (2006, p.81).
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However, reﬂecting the complexity of the knowledge economy,
there is some confusion as to just how many people are engaged in this
type of decision-making work in Britain. Part of the confusion stems
from the overlap between knowledge work and services in general: de-
pending on where we draw the line between basic services, information
work, and knowledge work we will get very diﬀerent levels of engage-
ment. Using the 1981 census, Goddard and Gillespie (1986, p.385)
reported that 45% of British workers could be classiﬁed as ‘information
workers’, but fully ten years later Castells (1996 [2000], pp.323) was
indicating this number was only slightly higher at 46%. And more than
ten years later again, Shaw and Jeﬀeries (2005, p.38) claimed only that
50% of British employment was in the more broadly deﬁned service
sector, although the size of of the ‘Other Industries’ section (typically
30% per region) suggests that we’re facing a deﬁnitional issue.
Regardless of the exact number, the core driver of this sustained in-
crease in all services (see Table 5.6) seems to be the fact that “…ﬁrms
in all sectors of the economy—from mining and manufacturing to
ﬁnance and consumer services—buy more intermediate service in-
puts…” (Sassen, 2002, p.16). Overall, services employment growth
seems to have been split between skilled sectors requiring high levels of
educational attainment, such as many of the 20% of employees in the
banking and ﬁnance categories, and lower-skill sectors such as the travel
and hospitality industry (Green and Owen, 2006, p.25). However, the
rates for these two types of services have been very diﬀerent: between
1995 and 2005 the export of specialised services grew by more than
100% compared to ‘just’ 50% for more traditional service exports such
as transport and travel (Brinkley, 2006, p.11).
Occupations 1984 1994 2004 2014 (Projected)
Knowledge Workers† 31% 36% 41% 45%
Personal services‡ 25% 28% 28% 28%
Skilled/semi-skilled; manual 28% 23% 19% 18%
Unskilled 16% 14% 11% 9%
† Knowledge economy jobs are managerial, professional, associate professional
standard occupational classiﬁcations.
‡Personal services include care, recreational, and some hospitality jobs, sales; ad-
min/clerical.
Table 5.6: Knowledge workers
in the U.K. economy 1984–2014
(adapted fromWilson et al., 2006,
p.70 by Brinkley, 2006, p.19;
reproduced with permission of the
authors)
Linking Table 5.6 back to our earlier discussion of tacit and codiﬁed
knowledge (see page 165), Brinkley et al. estimate that these changes
in employment structure are leading to the emergence of a 30–30-40
workforce in Britain where 30% of jobs involve extensive use of tacit
knowledge, 30% involve some tacit knowledge content, and 40% are
largely codiﬁed but not automated (2009, p.4). But we should bear in
mind that knowledge workers cannot be solely described by titles or
education levels. Brinkley et al. (2009, p.5) indicate that some 20% of
‘high-knowledge content’ workers are not graduates, and the manage-
ment writer Peter Drucker has noted that a “tremendous amount of
knowledge work includes manual operations” (1999, p.141).
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T  K W: Quite obviously, as more and
more economic activity is connected to the ‘generation, processing and
exchange of information’, then factors aﬀecting these aspects of ﬁrm
operation will have a greater and greater impact (Goddard and Gillespie,
1986, p.383). The focus of technology investment is therefore likely to
shi from the more obvious economies of scale and automation towards
making knowledge workers more productive (Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2006, p.7). Drucker, notes that:
the most important, and indeed the truly unique, contribution of man-
agement in the 20th century was the ﬁy-fold increase in the productivity
of the   in manufacturing. The most important con-
tribution management needs to make in the 21st century is to increase
the productivity of   and the  .
1999, p.135 (Capitalisation in original)
So we may expect that the focus of investment this century will be in
the processes and activities that are the most diﬃcult to automate, and
in particular in “new collaboration and communication tools; new ways
to store, ﬁlter and retrieve unstructured data; and decision-support
tools that expand and enhance knowledge workers’ ability” (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2006, pp.78–79).
The interest in using technology to augment collaboration and com-
munication seems particularly important since many of the areas in
which the Economist Intelligence Unit’s respondents see the most
scope for productivity growth—such as customer support, business de-
velopment, marketing and sales, and knowledge management—involve
intensive working across organisational boundaries (2006, p.7). But
even in less overtly outward-oriented jobs, innovation will introduce
fundamental changes: for instance, in the healthcare sector we can ex-
pect to see computers performing increasingly sophisticated diagnostic
and monitoring tasks, leaving the physician to focus on the complex
tasks of making diagnoses, selecting treatments, and communicating
with patients (2006, p.54).
Another way to get at the diﬀerential impacts of technology on
workers is to turn to a task-based categorisation established by Levy
and Murnane (2007) which identiﬁes ﬁve diﬀerent classes of workers:
expert thinkers, complex communicators, routine cognitive workers,
routine manual workers, and non-routine manual workers. For expert
thinkers, computers serve to make information more accessible but
cannot substitute for the judgement of the worker as there are no formal
rules to guide choices. The complex communicators group is composed
of workers—such as managers, teachers, and sales executives—whose
primary task is communication with others.
In contrast, the routine cognitive (e.g. bank branch workers, claims
adjusters, etc.) and routine manual workers (e.g. factory and farm
workers) tend to perform simpler tasks whose scope can be deﬁned
by rules and sets of well-deﬁned procedures. Critically, the improving
performance and power of computers makes both of these latter types
of tasks amenable to automation within the constraints outlined above.
The ﬁnal group of non-routine manual workers (e.g. truck-drivers and
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cleaning staﬀ) perform tasks that are not considered intellectual, but
which are hard to deﬁne by rules because of the environment in which
they are performed.
R, R  C: So we can think of knowledge-work as
requiring a particular set of educational and/or aptitudinal requirements
that can only be met by speciﬁc individuals and groups—neuroscientists,
mathematicians, singers, artists, and so forth—whose work cannot be
scripted or proscribed. At the other end of the scale is role-based work,
such as data entry, that can be fulﬁlled, at least in theory, by any human
being with some modest level of procedural training; and we are at the
point where we may soon see automated systems begin to substitute for
people in low-value training roles (Hall, 2002a, p.275). The point is
that the individual skills and attributes of the human being in a ‘role’ are
relatively unimportant to the ﬁrm, and their work is oen designed so
that the employees are functionally interchangeable. This is a ‘services
factory’ in which ﬁrms can reap economies of scale through massive
concentrations of labour in less expensive locations.
In the retail segment of ﬁnancial services, the Economist Intelligence
Unit (2006, p.44) anticipates that banks will move forward with the
centralisation of back-oﬃce work at just a few global processing centres
where they can secure further savings on transaction-related costs.
Increasing sophistication in the training of, and computerised support
for, employees in how to handle clients from another country means
that we are likely—within the cultural and linguistic constraints set
out earlier (see pages 49 and 85)—to see the role-based jobs amenable
to remote interaction continue to disappear from high-cost regions.
However, the impact, especially on skilled workers whose skills are
no longer needed, may be severe; a former administrative assistant
interviewed by the New York Times and now working at Wal-mart
reports her frustration: “A monkey could do what I do…Actually, a
monkey would get bored” (Rampell, 2010).
In the middle range are jobs that I would call rule-based: they are
distinguishable from role-based employment in terms of the degree of
individual agency, but they are nonetheless not creative employment
in a meaningful way. I would argue that rules-based work may still
involve high levels of training—the level of specialisation means that
staﬀ are no longer functionally interchangeable to the same extent—but
organisational policy constrains the range of activities and of decisions
quite tightly. So one example of a ‘rules-oriented’ worker would be the
technician responsible for maintaining desktop computers or network
hardware at large corporations (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006,
p.72), and another would be the drilling engineer responsible for mon-
itoring boreholes (2006, p.80). Both of these jobs involve a great deal
of knowledge acquisition and application, but technological change,
through standardisation and increasing sophistication, seems likely to
have structural and permanent impacts on such jobs.
So while it may be diﬃcult to imagine automated tools fully replac-
ing the set of skills required to diagnose a misconﬁgured router or an
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application failure, the growing power of soware agents and the scope
for remote manipulation or interaction means that fewer such people
are required to accomplish the same work. The engineer may no longer
need to travel in order to diagnose and correct issues, and may be able
to perform the same work from a console anywhere in the world that
suﬃcient telecommunications bandwidth is available. Objectively, it
is probably here that new -enabled tools are having the greatest im-
pact on workers at the start of the 21st Century—productivity has been
extended to such a degree that structural unemployment seems like
a very real risk even though these employees are not unskilled in the
traditional sense of the word.
In contrast to these two groups, for knowledge workers the ability
to collaborate with others—Matson and Prusak (2010, p.1) suggest
that knowledge workers spend half their time on ‘interactions’—and
to identify and act on novel information will oen trump established
rules or processes entirely (2006, p.79). However, in the same way
that there are direct and indirect services, we can distinguish diﬀerent
‘informational orientations’ amongst knowledge workers. Towards one
extreme are soware developers or research scientists whose inputs are
primarily codiﬁed but who, unlike role workers and to a lesser extent
rule workers, such workers do have irreplaceable skills—so ﬁrms cannot
simply trade them for cheaper labour in India, though they can certainly
complement them with labour from less costly locations. Towards the
other extreme are knowledge workers who depend on regular, intense,
and multi-lateral knowledge ﬂows as a way of remaining abreast of
market movements, cultivating awareness of participants and of their
shiing allegiances, and maintaining contact networks of opportunity.
For workers in the latter category, the ‘outward’ orientation of such
work makes an extensive, localised social network of strong and weak
ties absolutely vital.
Looking to the future, the Economist Intelligence Unit even goes
so far as to suggest that the “employee required to build a fail-safe
network could even be an obstacle [to the ﬁrm] in the future” (2006,
p.72) because as the ﬁrm seeks to become more ﬂexible, they continue
to apply outdated rules. Of course, this issue is not conﬁned to the
 sector alone: even ﬁrms involved in such traditional industries as
pulp and paper will come—thanks to their increasing use of specialised,
intermediate services—to rely on knowledge workers. But as Mark
Miranda, Georgia Paciﬁc’s director of marketing, observes: “Creativity
is hard; it’s easy to ﬁnd people who can do the books” (2006, p.35).
Truly gied knowledge workers will be seen as crucial to the success
of the ﬁrm: “They [the employees of hedge funds and investment
banks] are pure ideas and human-capital machines…Employees are
their only factor of production, and there is a direct linkage between
compensation and production” (Nader Farahati, managing director
for ﬁnancial services of Mercer Oliver Wyman in London, reported in
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006, p.49).
Finally, Brinkley et al. (2009, pp.24–25) grouped people who
worked with knowledge in some capacity into seven categories: leaders
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and innovators, experts and analysts, information handlers, care and
welfare workers, servers and sellers, maintenance and logistics opera-
tors, and assistants and clerks. Of these, the ﬁrst three groups make up
the 30% of core ‘tacit knowledge workers’ discussed on page 189, and
the highest group of all—the leaders and innovators who have “high
intensity knowledge jobs [combining] high-level cognitive activity with
high-level management tasks” (Brinkley et al., 2009, p.4)—account
for just 11% of the overall British workforce. The nature of their work
means that these workers do not face displacement by computers; in-
stead, they will make intensive use of computers to synthesise com-
plex, structured and unstructured information into decision-enabling
knowledge (see Figure 5.3), and ‘continuous learning, teaching, and
innovation’ will be built into their work (Drucker, 1999, p.146).
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Figure 5.3: Share of workers
that frequently perform at least
one specialist computer task
(Brinkley et al., 2009, p.29; used
with permission of The Work
Foundation)
T ‘M M’: In all of the ‘hype’ about the knowledge econ-
omy, it is easy to forget that ‘the creatives’ are likely to make up only
a modest share of overall employment, and that far more people will
be employed in less knowledge-intensive work. Brinkley et al. (2009,
p.68) suggest that “the more excitable accounts’’ of the potential for
knowledge work have in mind a group (their ‘leaders and innova-
tors’ category) that makes up just 11% of all workers. In other words,
decades of growth in various knowledge industries has still only brought
us to the point where 1 in 10 workers are employed in real innovation
or knowledge work with a high level of tacit knowledge and output
measured in terms of patents, process innovation, and art openings. For
the remaining 90% of the population, pressure to ‘oﬀshore’ indirect
informational services and to substitute capital for informational labour,
may mean the continuing decline of mid-level ‘white collar’ staﬀ (Hall,
2009, pp.810–811).
The combination of these trends means not only that the rules-
based workers in the middle will be squeezed by ongoing technological
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change, but also suggests that many ﬁrms in the middle will be similarly
squeezed between low-cost and premium-service providers (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2006, p.76). The recent popularity of netbooks
alongside Apple’s high-end products is a good case in point: consumers
are migrating towards the ends of the spectrum where they can pur-
chase products that are either small, cheap, and functional, or well-
designed, high-performance, and luxury status-symbols (Surowiecki,
2010). And it seems that we should expect a similar dichotomy to
appear in services, with a division between ﬁrms oﬀering utilitarian,
transaction-type services and those oﬀering premium, advisory services
for their ‘most valuable’ customers and those contemplating a high-
value purchase.
The logic behind this division in industries such as ﬁnancial services
is straightforward: routine tasks such as payments and transfers are easily
handled now through voice-activated automation, freeing more costly
call-centre staﬀ to handle complex queries (Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2006, p.59). And if we compare the cost of a call centre with the
still higher cost of 2 service in a branch, then it is only logical that
branches will ultimately provide only those services which are neither
routine, nor low-margin. A walk through a high-street bank branch
of  today will show a row of phones and terminals through which
consumers interact with a call centre; and the aggressively expansionist
Washington Mutual (WaMu) created and patented an ‘Occasio’ branch
design that seemed to be a mix of open plan oﬃce and coﬀee shop (with
mortgage advisers available until 10 p.m.)5. 5 I also recall holding a Chase ac-
count in New York in the late
1990s for which I was charged a
fee whenever I spoke to a teller in a
branch to complete any transaction
that could also have been com-
pleted online or over the phone.
P, T  C: So  has enabled both the
optimisation of supply chains and an increasingly ﬁne-grained segmen-
tation of knowledge work, but there is a limit to how many eﬃciencies
can be squeezed out of such a system. As senior-vice president of Blyth
Inc., a $1.6 billion designer and marketer of home products, notes:
“the reduction in the number of warehouses reaches a level where
it does not add much value. At some point you have to go beyond
price” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006, p.34). Competitive advan-
tage in a knowledge economy does not depend only on eﬃciency and
cost—these are, or should be, a requisite for all businesses—and ﬁrms
will need to cultivate their “ability to innovate, respond just-in-time,
focus on quality, and establish more cooperative inter-ﬁrm and intra-
ﬁrm relationships” (Garcia, 2002, p.54). This type of work has always
been common in knowledge-intensive sectors where, for the most part,
quality of output has been more important than quantity (Drucker,
1999, p.142), but the ‘project structure’ characteristic of ﬁelds such as
advertising or ﬁlm-making is no longer limited to what Grabher terms
the “traditional ‘one-oﬀ’ sectors” (2002, p.206).
The spread of project-led work emphasises both internal and exter-
nal communications, and “it is oen better to think of it as being with
a client rather than for a client” (Grabher, 2002, pp.207–208). This
mode of production also requires tight integration between such histor-
ically separate functions as design, production, and marketing because
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changes to any of these can have repercussions up and down the supply
chain. The need for ﬁrms to pursue constant innovation whilemanag-
ing complex networks of suppliers and clients implies that intra- and
inter-ﬁrm communication is crucial to success (Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2006, p.78). In fact, ﬁrms may well distinguish themselves on the
basis of their ability to create and maintain relationships, regardless of
whether this in the literal sense of a boutique consultancy’s contact net-
work (see page 145) or in the metaphorical sense of a company’s brand
message (i. e. ‘Think Diﬀerent’). It is, again, the culture of the ﬁrm as
competitive asset that is hard for competitors to replicate (see page 181).
This dynamic suggests that the intersection between individuals and
teams is of special importance—the individual maintains personal and
professional relationships with suppliers and clients, while the team
oﬀers “the ability to research new market segments faster, to develop
new products more eﬀectively and to respond to customer requests
with the optimal mix of skills and services” (Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2006, p.48). And as Moodysson et al. (2008, p.1042) observed,
the team oen has the advantage of transcending spatial, divisional,
and hierarchical boundaries, promoting the circulation of information
and knowledge. So as long as the risk that proprietary knowledge will
leak out to competitors is fairly modest, then a heterarchical approach
(see page 178) that promotes intensive interaction may be useful to any
ﬁrm engaged in complex work, and not just to ﬁrms in ‘traditionally-
disruptive’ sectors such as advertising6. 6 The heterarchical approach has
been tried elsewhere—British
Telecommunications plc. planned
at one point to divide itself into
smaller, competing components
(Economist Intelligence Unit,
2006, p.82)—but with mixed
success, possibly because most
infrastructure seems to have natural
economies of scale that preclude
smaller organisations. Soware,
however, does not suﬀer from
such limitations, and this may
explain why telecoms providers
are shiing their focus towards
soware-enabled services such as
‘app stores’ (Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2006, p.69).
The importance of communication makes it clear that one way of
thinking about jobs in the knowledge economy is the degree to which
a particular position is either outward-facing (i. e. involves interaction
with people external to the ﬁrm) or inward-facing (i. e. involves inter-
action principally with people internal to the ﬁrm). The Economist
Intelligence Unit (2006) made this, together with the distinction be-
tween role- and knowledge-based tasks, a cornerstone of its Foresight
2020 publication7. This approach yields ﬁve general categories: ﬁrst,
7 In fact, I had arrived at nearly
the same classiﬁcation entirely
independently based on my own
reading and was rather dismayed
to discover that the Economist
Intelligence Unit had beaten me to
it by about three years.
those who employ complex knowledge and are primarily outward
facing; second, those who employ complex knowledge but are primar-
ily inward-looking; third, the group who use ‘simple knowledge’ in
roles that are rules-based and outward-facing; fourth, a group that is
rules-based, but inward facing; and the ﬁh group is involved in non-
knowledge, production-oriented roles. When asked to rank the value
of these diﬀerent classes of worker to their ﬁrm, s and other decision
makers made their preferences abundantly clear (see Figure 5.4).
Technology
In the case of physical outputs, there is an expectation that technology
will enable even very complex tangible products to become modular (i.
e. ﬂexible) in nature—Tata Motors envisions a car that can be assem-
bled by dealers on-site (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006, p.26)—so
that suppliers and ﬁrms can produce parts in high volume but person-
alise the delivery to the end-user. In the case of intangible products the
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Which of the following types of role will be most valuable to 
your organisation as a source of competitive advantage in 2020?
(% respondents)
Complex knowledge-based roles that are 
primarily outward-facing and require 
developed communication and judgement 
skills   62
Complex knowledge-based roles that are 
primarily inward-looking and require 
developed communication and judgement 
skills  28
Simple knowledge-based roles that are 
rules-based, outward-facing and do not 
require developed communication and 
judgement skills  4
Simple knowledge-based roles that are 
rules-based, inward-looking and do not 
require developed communication and 
judgement skills  4
Production roles directly related to 
manufacturing or production processes  2
Figure 5.4: Expected Value of
Diﬀerent Types of Workers
(Economist Intelligence Unit,
2006, p.79; reproduced with
permission of The Economist)
situation is more advanced: a less obviously radical, but no less innova-
tive at the time, example of technology-enabled customisation can be
found in the way that Amazon deployed localised web sites (i. e. sites
that use the appropriate language, domain name, and presentation for-
mat for a particular country). Even though transactions and inventory
were largely managed from America, Amazon improved customer ac-
quisition and retention by oﬀering a customised ‘local’ store (Dodge,
2004, p.224).
The picture is more complex for services because  can operate as
an augmentation of, rather than a substitution for, costly 2 interac-
tion—this is the case of, for instance, contact management soware and
corporate wikis: they are an attempt to codify ‘best practice’ but do not
fundamentally replace knowledge work and the importance of proxim-
ity (Grabher, 2004, p.109). And as we have seen, the costs of travel and
of cross-sectoral collaboration constrain the spatial ﬂexibility of workers
while also requiring substantial communication and interpersonal skills.
This is why it seems signiﬁcant that although levels of intra-ﬁrm ‘chat’
in France do not vary much between urban and non-urban ﬁrms, inter-
ﬁrm communications do: 24.2% of French workers in rural ﬁrms have
‘given instructions to customers or suppliers’, but more than 50% of
employees at urban ﬁrms have done so (Charlot and Duranton, 2006,
p.1374). Similarly, 7.6% of rural staﬀ in France collaborate in teams
with customers or suppliers, but 16.1% of urban core staﬀ do so (ibid.).
Given these communicational and collaborative aﬃnities, we can
reasonably expect to ﬁnd team- and project-based work concentrated
in cities: French workers reporting involvement with innovation and
design teams account for 14.4% of workers at rural ﬁrms, 23.7% of
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workers in suburban ﬁrms, and 34.9% of employees based in the urban
core (Charlot and Duranton, 2006, p.1374). So although all workers
interviewed in 1997 were more likely to report interacting with clients
or suppliers than they were in 1987 (2006, p.1387), the trend is much
more marked in cities where staﬀ communicate with customers at
nearly double the rate of their counterparts outside the . These
ﬁndings link together the earlier discussion on complexity thresholds
for 2 interaction (see page 175) with our improved understanding of
knowledge work. And we can now more fully grasp why Charlot and
Duranton found not only that urban workers communicate more, but
also that they also have a greater propensity to use telecommunications.
Table 5.7 summarises the usage of communications technologies by
urban workers in France, regardless of their skill or education level, and
serves to highlight the degree of communicational complementarity.
Telephone Written
Paper
E-mail Personal
Computer
Internet
Voice/2
meetings C S ns ns ns
Telephone C C C C
Written
Paper C C ns
E-Mail C C
Personal
Computer C
Notes: C denotes a positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5 per cent in the logit
estimation; S denotes a negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5 per cent in the logit
estimation; ns denotes coeﬃcients not signiﬁcant at 5 per cent.
Table 5.7: Complementarities
across media for urban workers
(Charlot and Duranton, 2006,
p.1386)
The ‘communications gradient’ helps to explain an observation by
Gillespie and Robins (1989, p.13) that, paradoxically, rural areas make
the least use of distance-shrinking technologies. Another way of think-
ing about this issue was put forward by Meier (1962, p.139): he notes
that workers in cities already border on informational overload, and so
have an incentive to automate low-value message handling. In short,
high-value interactions will be most eﬀectively handled in cities, even
if the outputs of the ﬁrm are of comparatively lesser value: Goddard
observed that manufacturing ﬁrms had 74% of head oﬃces and 48%
of central services (i. e. services like those found in head oﬃces but not
actually in a head oﬃce) in the South East of England, when only 28%
of ‘operating units’ were located there (Goddard, 1975, p.7). Goddard
argued that this meant that the most important information was ‘locked
up’ in head oﬃces, and so ‘accessibility’ needed to be considered not
just in terms of the physical movement of goods but also in terms of
“the hidden costs of access to information”. This dynamic helps to
explain why staﬀ in oﬃces outside of London typically have fewer
contacts than those of a similar grade in the capital (Goddard and Pye,
1977, p.22).
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Spatial Implications
As we have noted at several points in this dissertation, there is evidence
now to suggest that this absolute concentration of activity in the  is
weakening in subtle ways: Currid, for instance, points out that there has
been a steady decline in Fortune 500 ﬁrms headquartered in  (2007,
p.55). But at the grander scale, these ‘controlling’ activities have tended
to remain within the larger regional economy such that ﬁrms in, say,
the North of England still tend to be managed from an oﬃce located
in the , and the demand for high-value services also originates there
(cf. Goddard and Pye, 1977; Goddard and Gillespie, 1986; Gillespie and
Green, 1987). This brings us full-circle to the argument that the control
and coordination of peripheral operations actually increases the need
for the clustering of specialised managerial functions and services at a
few, critical nodes in a web of transport and communications networks
(Audirac, 2002; Sassen, 2002, 2004, 2008).
That conclusion is all very well for s, but what of the many
small, innovative ﬁrms that provide specialist research, design, and ﬁ-
nancing services to clients of all sizes? As Hutton (2004, p. 90) pointed
out: if we are in a ‘new economy’ then we should be able to ﬁnd evi-
dence of preferred economic spaces with “innovative industrial ensem-
bles at regional and local levels, and fresh divisions (social, spatial, and
technical) of production labour.” For Hutton, these spaces were almost
unquestionably to be in found in the inner city districts of older metro
regions such as SoMa in San Francisco and SoHo in New York. What
has helped to establish these areas as breeding grounds of new ﬁrms is
that they are tightly bounded and are conducive to social interaction
(Hutton, 2006, p.1822).
Echoing Jacobs (1961 [2002]), Hutton also emphasises the impor-
tance of adaptable buildings, as well as the importance of physical and
psychological landmarks around which a ‘signifying district’ can be
assembled (ibid.). Hutton found that the growth of the dot.com indus-
try in Singapore’s Telok Ayer neighbourhood owed a great deal to the
cheap, ﬂexible, and relatively “cosy” spaces on oﬀer (2008, p.162), as
well as to the area’s proximity to the  (2008, p.170). In contrast, the
‘manufactured’ antiquity of the adjacent Far East Square seems to have
proved more popular with established ﬁrms and boasts rents to match
(2008, pp.165–166)8. Green’s study of the growth of the East London 8 Following the dot.com col-
lapse, Hutton (2008, p.166) notes
that Telok Ayer seems to have
(re)adapted very quickly to cultural
production, while Far East Square,
despite proving popular with cor-
porations, has lost several of its
‘anchor’ tenants
ﬁne arts ‘scene’ reinforces the connection between small, ﬂexible spaces
and creative working: “Furniture factories, carpentry workshops, print
workshops, warehouses…[such] property tends to be well-lit and spa-
cious, with high ceilings, and large open ﬂoor spaces…[it] is also cheap
to rent or lease. Ideal, in other words, for artists’ studios” (Green, 2001,
p.9).
So for cultural and hybrid work, the inner city is conducive to new
industry “because of the micro-scale ways of working, socialising,
and labour market access” (Hutton, 2004, p. 92). However, the evi-
dence produced by Asheim et al. (2007) and Moodysson et al. (2008),
amongst others, suggests that this type of arrangement may be much
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less important for analytically- and synthetically-oriented work, though
this does not mean that they cannot also beneﬁt from local interaction
eﬀects. For instance, the popularity of ‘college towns’ such as Princeton
and Cambridge (either one) with entrepreneurs suggests both that these
are high-amenity places to work, and that they see a beneﬁt to the op-
portunity to interact with researchers at the university. This may not be
the kind of intense, late-night socialisation that Currid (2007) and Cur-
rid and Williams (2010) write about, but it still assigns an importance to
face-to-face encounters and to these towns’ proximity to major urban
areas.
However, even with this added ﬂexibility there is a certain path de-
pendency here: in the same way that web advertisers have tended to
set up shop near advertising agencies, high-tech soware and hard-
ware ﬁrms have tended to continue to locate near to the former defence
sites that spawned the initial demand for their wares (Hall, 1987). In-
terestingly, according to Breheny (1999, p.25) video game develop-
ment—which has no ‘old industrial equivalent’ from which it draws
inspiration or income—is more closely distributed in line with total
employment. But by drawing on the ﬁndings from this chapter, we
can see how the diﬀerence between video games and other specialised
soware can also be located in part in the interaction requirements and
contact patterns of the two ﬁelds: many employees at Oracle or Mi-
croso may be called on to travel to client sites for integration, training,
or troubleshooting, but game developers are delivering a dispersed, con-
sumer product without a specialised market or concentrated demand
from which they would beneﬁt through proximity; they are thus free to
pursue more distributed, amenity-oriented locational strategies.
This combination of factors helps to explain why, even where ﬁrms
havemoved out of London, they oen have not moved very far: 85%
of relocations between 1964 and 1977 were within the  area (God-
dard and Pye, 1977, p.19). Ten years later, even with the growing use
of  to support inter-oﬃce interaction, Gillespie and Green (1987,
pp.401–402) found that the relocation of back oﬃce activity still tended
to peter out approximately 80 miles from the centre of London. Gille-
spie and Green speculated that this was the point of diminishing spatial
returns where the declining cost of oﬃce space could no longer oﬀset
the rising cost of interaction, especially in terms of travel costs. So al-
though the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts
() reports that fully 90% of ‘knowledge workers’ were concen-
trated in Britain’s city-regions (Athey et al., 2007, p.13), Table 5.8 (on
page 200) shows just how great the concentration of this type of work
in the South East really is—of the top 10 cities in the list, only two (Ed-
inburgh and Leeds) are more than two hours from Central London by
train. Over time, these eﬀects have been compounded such that Lon-
don and the South East have far outpaced the other English regions in
terms of overall rates of growth (see Figure 5.5).
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Rank City Number Employed % of Employees
1 Cambridge 31,000 35.2
2 Oxford 35,500 33.0
3 Edinburgh 90,100 29.6
4 Milton Keynes 40,000 28.0
5 Reading 63,500 27.7
6 London 1,250,000 26.5
7 Leeds 105,600 25.3
8 Bristol 91,100 24.7
9 Norwich 30,800 23.4
10 Brighton 31,900 23.2⋮ ⋮ ⋮
54 Huddersﬁeld 16,100 10.7
55 Barnsley 7,100 10.2
56 Birkenhead 12,600 9.9
57 Blackpool 13,300 9.9
58 Hastings 2,800 9.7
59 Doncaster 11,100 9.6
60 Rochdale 7,000 9.5
61 Wigan 9,000 9.1
62 Mansﬁeld 7,700 9.0
63 Burnley 5,500 8.7
Great Britain 4,560,700 17.1
England 4,060,100 17.5
Table 5.8: Knowledge-Intensive
Cities (Centre for Cities, 2010,
p.20)
Summary
In this section we have moved from the theory of knowledge and of
knowledge transmission to the practice of knowledge work itself. We
began with a review of the key sectors involved in the knowledge econ-
omy and explored the ways in which each industry embodies a distinct
set of socio-spatial interactions: three of the four core sectors—business
services, cultural, and hybrid ﬁrms—seem to be particularly reliant
upon cities as sites for knowledge generation through access to collab-
orators and clients in other sectors and exposure to novel information.
However, the fourth category—&—no longer seems to be as re-
liant upon urban locations, and so an important point in this chapter
has been the idea that that some types of knowledge are becoming
amenable to more dispersed forms of generation and exchange.
So while cities are humanity’s largest artefacts, they seem to play
their most important role in the knowledge economy at the micro-scale
where their diversity appears to encourage, or at least to enable, innova-
tion in the synthetic and symbolic arenas (see Figure 5.2 on page 186,
for instance). The symbolic knowledge base in particular beneﬁts from
the deliberate “destabilisation of prevailing norms and practices…”
(Scott, 2001, p.13), and cities stimulate this instability by bringing into
contact knowledge workers from across a broad range of sectors. In
the knowledge economy 201
19
89
19
91
19
90
19
92
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
0719
93
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
100,000
140,000
180,000
120,000
160,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
G
VA
 in
 m
ill
io
n 
£ 
in
 1
98
9 
pr
ic
es
London
South East
North West
East of England
South West
West Midlands
Yorkshire & the
 Humber
East Midlands
North East
Figure 5.5: Regional Growth Rates
(Centre for Cities, 2010, p.18;
reproduced with permission of The
Centre for Cities)
eﬀect, as Torre (2008), Goddard (1975), and Hauser et al. (2007) have
all noted, occupational structure and the relationships between actors
within that structure binds together the economic and social compo-
nents of regional development, and the knowledge economy makes
both sides integral to innovation.
Consequently, I have also tried to connect the micro-structures of
how knowledge work is done to the macro-structures of the knowledge
economy itself. Thinking on infrastructure and technology has tended
to focus on the value of the network (see ‘Metcalf’s Law’ page 59), but
what this section has sought to emphasise is that for most ﬁrms it is
what cannot be put on the network that is most vital to their business.
So where technology has enabled role-based work to be largely discon-
nected from geographical location, and it is in the process of radically
altering the relationship between place and rules-based employment, its
impact on creative jobs remains more modest: an augmentation, but not
yet a wholesale transformation.
So in spite of the impact of technology and increasing mobility
on our ability to coordinate and interact with one another, there re-
main four reasons why geography matters (Sonn and Storper, 2007,
pp.1022–1023): ﬁrst, and returning to the recurring importance of
relative diﬀerences between inputs and outputs, the ease with which
codiﬁed knowledge can be shared actually increases importance of
tacit knowledge; second, the increasing use of out-sourcing and of spe-
cialised services may encourage ﬁrms to collocate for the purpose of
improving coordination and collaboration; third, constant innovation
makes it diﬃcult to formalise interactions (see Theory of Spatial Trans-
action Patterns on page 104); and, fourth and ﬁnally, changes to the
labour market in terms of contracting and churn may well require more
extensive and ﬂexible contact networks (see Labour Economies on page
127).
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5.5 Conclusions: Telecommunications & Knowledge Flows
In this ﬁnal theoretical chapter we have covered a great deal of ground,
but the growing number of references to material from previous chap-
ters points to the fact that we are beginning to draw together the many
threads developed in the course of this review. We have deﬁned knowl-
edge in contradistinction to ‘mere’ data and information and, in turn,
have deﬁned innovation as the production of new knowledge—be it a
new material, a brand message, an algorithm, or a ﬁnancial derivative.
As such, knowledge requires the the exercise of discernment or judge-
ment, and does not result from the application of rules or procedures
in a largely automated fashion. This is the case even where, as oen
occurs in soware, new knowledge also comes from the recombination
or rearrangement of existing knowledge (cf. Grabher, 2004).
Clearly, technological change has had an enormous impact on
knowledge: not only has it enabled codiﬁed knowledge to be dis-
seminated across much larger distances at much higher speeds, but it
has also enabled ﬁrms to rearrange the boundary with tacit knowledge
in ways that suit their activities. Wikis and blogs enable the codiﬁca-
tion of formerly-tacit knowledge, while  video conferencing enables
even some of our semi-conscious social signals to be propagated over
long distances. However, where the characteristics or requirements of
tacit knowledge remain beyond the reach of technology then it remains
largely bound up in 2 interaction, which is where our social sensi-
tivity to one another enables the ‘parallel processing’ of information in
creative, intuitive, and adaptive modes of collaboration.
The knowledge bases approach enables us to further develop our
understanding of when and how innovation might entail, or even re-
quire, 2 interaction. The evidence provided by Asheim et al. (2007)
and Moodysson et al. (2008) suggests that analytical knowledge is less
sensitive to proximity and can be transmitted in codiﬁed form (e.g.
in journals or formulae, as soware or algorithms). In contrast, syn-
thetic knowledge tends to be more closely conﬁned to small groups and
client/vendor relationships with less formalisation, and a greater reliance
on long-term interaction. Finally, with symbolic knowledge we return
to the importance of many-to-many social interactions—especially
in industries, such as the arts and advertising, which are characterised
by constant disruption and where ‘shaking things up’ is desirable. Of
course, no industry is purely of one type of knowledge base or another:
the ‘creatives’ at an ad agency want to push boundaries, but their ac-
count managers want to maintain a stable client relationship and max-
imise agency proﬁts. So the prevalence of each base may also vary from
division to division within the ﬁrm, as well as over the life-cycle of the
product, ﬁrm, or sector (Moodysson et al., 2008, p.1043). This places
the dynamics of the ﬁrm (see Chapter 3) and of aggregation and clusters
(see Chapter 4) squarely at the heart of the knowledge economy.
This review of the knowledge bases approach also allows us to update
Scott’s analysis (1983a; 1983b; 1984; 1986) of how diﬀerent transaction-
cost structures support diﬀerent modes of production and innovation.
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In some areas, such as where there are major risks connected with
innovative failure, then small, tightly-focussed ﬁrms are more likely
to be the drivers of innovation (examples of this approach might range
from biotechnology to fashion), but codiﬁcation will enable scale eﬀects
to yield competitive beneﬁts to large ﬁrms (examples of this approach
might include pharmaceuticals, and hardware or soware services).
This way of thinking about innovation helps to explain why Athey et al.
found that “both large ‘anchor ﬁrms’ and s are potentially important
innovators”: each plays diﬀerent, but complementary, roles in urban
innovation systems (2007, p.26).
We then turned to the characteristics of knowledge exchange and
saw that, although better communication technologies enable social
networks to be maintained at a larger scale both extensively (in terms
of number) and intensively (in terms of frequency), in the bigger pic-
ture this has not changed the value of copresence. At the heart of my
analysis of knowledge is the ﬁnding that the importance of physical
proximity in innovation processes is unlikely to diminish in the imme-
diate future. But by thinking further about 2, we found that it plays
a particularly important role in contexts that are high-risk and high-
reward. Financial and cultural services are both sectors where these
conditions hold; however, in less interaction-heavy sectors temporary,
virtual, and organisational proximity oﬀer alternative means of deliver-
ing many of the advantages of permanent proximity without incurring
its costs. The concept of relational proximity helps us to bring all of
these concepts together, and it also links the knowledge economy back
to our review of the role of ‘weak ties’ as a source of novel information,
and to the ‘routines of behaviour’ that are “eﬀectively untraded forms of
interdependency between economic agents [that] collectively constitute
the relational assets of the regional economy” (Scott and Storper, 2003,
p.586).
The commoditisation of culture has made cultural industries a par-
ticularly vibrant part of the knowledge economy, and we saw how
cultural outputs, in combination with the social features of clusters,
can establish very strong, place-speciﬁc ‘brands’—spatial monopolies,
if you will—that create a feedback eﬀect between place and product.
And we also considered the way in which cultural and technical in-
puts are merging in hybrid production. If we deﬁne hybrid ﬁrms more
broadly, then the potential for strong agglomerative tendencies becomes
very clear: advertising, for instance, is both a cultural endeavour and an
advanced business service (Hall, 2003, p.143).
Finally, we considered the way that competitive advantage will in-
creasingly depend not on routine, easy-to-automate processes but on
unpredictable, hard-to-automate knowledge workers (Economist Intel-
ligence Unit, 2006, p.7). Ultimately, we divided much of contempo-
rary work into three broad, sector-spanning categories: roles, rules, and
creatives. Role workers are employed in jobs that are increasingly cir-
cumscribed by automated systems. There is, however, still a diﬀerence
between direct and indirect services, and it is indirect services—where
information is, eﬀectively, a ubiquity—that are most liable to be relo-
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cated. For rule workers the picture is slightly diﬀerent, since technology
here acts to augment the productivity of the rule worker but cannot
(yet) replace him or her entirely. I have argued in this chapter that rule
workers will be most directly impacted by the growing power of com-
puters in the 21st century: their productivity will be extended to such a
degree that structural unemployment amongst the less able (or amongst
the less ‘desirable’, such as the elderly) becomes a real risk. On a more
optimistic note, however, an ageing population may also make for new
opportunities in ﬁelds where pervasive networking and cheap technol-
ogy are enabling new methods of remote interaction and support.
Wherever personal interaction is an important source of information
or knowledge, then jobs will be caught up in human geographies of
time and place (Goddard and Pye, 1977, p.300). The importance of
the strong/weak ties argument (see pages 145 and 146) as it pertains to
complexity is this: we shouldn’t think of our friends and acquaintances
as a good source of information for where to buy transparent goods,
since the information that we collect this way is profoundly partial and
deeply fragmented; rather, this mix of links comes into its own when
the information that we need is complex (i. e. it will only ever be partial
and fragmented) and the potential pay-oﬀ—be it in terms of pick-
ing the right person, or in terms of not picking the wrong service—is
enormous. At this point, the ability to exploit an extended network of
rumour and gossip about who or what is ‘hot or not’ becomes abso-
lutely vital, and the concentration of 2 social activity in a few key sites
extends this network’s eﬃciency and searching capacity signiﬁcantly by
encouraging the formation of many weak ties.
What this means for thinking on knowledge generation and space is
that focusing solely on the eﬃciency and routinisation of the ‘learning
region’ is likely to overlook the real value of what happens in particu-
larly innovative milieus (Grabher, 2001, p.371). As we have seen, this
is particularly true in the cultural sector where “people need to be in
the same place, at the same, time, constantly interacting…in situ and in
real-time” (Currid and Williams, 2010, p.2). This review has suggested
that the ability to ‘bounce’ ideas oﬀ colleagues or collaborators is uni-
versally valuable—though to varying degrees—in all knowledge-related
employment, and this helps to explain why knowledge work still tends
to be spatially clustered, but not always in the  and not always at the
densities seen for some cultural and ﬁnancial activities.
The interdependence between communication and location enables
us to shed additional light on Goddard and Pye’s insight that reloca-
tion from an urban to a non-urban area almost inevitably leads to an
alteration of the functioning of the relocated oﬃce: established rela-
tionships break down because of distance, new relationships emerge but
are qualitatively diﬀerent in nature, and more formal ‘contact events’
replace spontaneous ones (1977, p.20). As a result, we are le with
Goddard and Gillespie’s expectation that oﬃces and factories in the
North of England, Wales, and Scotland will interact mainly with clus-
ters in the South instead of with one another, and that this will hamper
the emergence of a ‘local information environment’—a knowledge
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economy—upon which economic development can be based (1986,
p.386).
However, recent advances in computer processing power and stor-
age capacity are ﬁnally bringing ideas such as Goddard and Gillespie’s
within the realm of test-ability: using increasingly ﬁne-grained com-
munications data sets, it is becoming possible to examine these in-
teractions on a grand scale and to determine whether or not the in-
formational ﬂows predicted by the theory are happening in the real
world. Having set out in the preceding four chapters to understand the
underlying principles of information and knowledge ﬂows, it is now
appropriate to turn towards the empirical data that, I hope, will help to
move forward the debate on the spatial characteristics of the knowledge
economy. But before diving into the data, we ﬁrst need to properly sit-
uate this work within the emerging ﬁeld of computational social science
() and to establish its relevance to the topic at hand.
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6Methodology
6.1 Introduction
We have seen that the workings of the knowledge economy are bound
up in the interactions within and between ﬁrms and individuals. How-
ever, data on information and knowledge ﬂows extending much beyond
the level of the individual case study has been diﬃcult: not only dif-
ﬁcult to map, but diﬃcult even to collect. The only widely-available
data source on the activities of ﬁrms is at the level of sectoral employ-
ment, but the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation () data “focusses
on [the] outputs, not [the] functions of the oﬃce” (Goddard and Pye,
1977, p.298). So there is a basic evidentiary problem in trying to study
ﬁrms and clusters (Knoben and Oerlemans, 2008, p.386), not least of
which is the challenge of trying to collect data for many of them at once
(Staber, 2007, p.514).
Fortunately, even as telecommunications is rendering many inter-
actions invisible, it is also making them accessible to researchers on an
unprecedented scale. Using telecommunications data supplied by major
British and American networks, in Chapter 7 we will be exploring this
‘space of ﬂows’ to see if telecoms data can augment our ability to under-
stand the socioeconomic structure of cities and city-regions. However,
because much of the material and many of the issues raised by the data
and the methodology that I employ will be new to readers, Chapter 6
is organised as follows: the ﬁrst section sets out how we can pursue the
original research questions in light of the ﬁndings from the literature
review; the second section puts the selected methodology in context
and identiﬁes some of the key strengths and weaknesses of this approach
to urban and regional research; the third considers telecommunications
data collection and positions the research within the nascent study of
regional- and national-scale networks; and subsequent sections discuss
the various steps employed for social, economic, and telecommunica-
tions analysis.
6.2 Revisiting the Research Questions
In the course of the past four chapters, we have explored the ways in
which locational decisions by ﬁrms are impacted by diverse factors:
infrastructure availability and ﬂexibility; the relationship between inputs
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and outputs within and between ﬁrms; the dynamics that come into
play when many ﬁrms colocate in a single location; and, ﬁnally, the
ways that knowledge-driven work impose new constraints on ﬁrms
even as information becomes ever less place-bound.
I began this work by setting out four challenges that telecommuni-
cations poses for planning; the ﬁrst of these—the challenge to planning
theory—has been addressed in Chapters 2 through 5; it now time
to address the second and third challenges: those of invisibility and
analysis. In this chapter, we will consider how both of these might be
addressed by this, or indeed any other, research rooted in telecommu-
nications data. We will seek to establish the ways in which telecom-
munications can be made visible, and to set out how we can analyse
informational ﬂows in order to better understand their eﬀect on the
fourth and ﬁnal challenge: our conceptions of time and place.
The Picture So Far
I  R: In Chapter 2, Infrastructure and Re-
gions, we considered the interactions between infrastructure and ac-
cessibility. Although the Christallerian concept of ‘centrality’ proved
useful as a foundation for thinking about specialisation and access, we
have seen that his central places are no longer—if, indeed, they ever
were—deﬁned by the diversity of goods available; instead, they can be
identiﬁed by the number and type of networks intersecting in space.
In a contemporary context, “one of the persistent advantages of urban
areas over non-urban ones is the thickness and density of their commu-
nication infrastructures and  networks” (Athey et al., 2007, p.17).
Subsequent work by Lösch (1954 [1973]) led us to the idea that dif-
ferent sectors might have diﬀering dependencies on infrastructure and
that this might, in turn, aﬀect the ﬂexibility with which they could
pursue diﬀerent locational strategies. Using the concept of relative
ﬂexibility—as well as the related dimensions of monetary cost, speed,
bandwidth, connectivity, integration, and convenience—we were able
to get to grips with the basic tradeoﬀs between travel and communi-
cation, addressing an historical gap in planning theory: how to begin
comparing radically diﬀerent infrastructures and types of interaction.
To put this ﬂexibility in more concrete terms, in constant 1996
prices, the cost of a three-minute call from London to New York City
has fallen from £486.98 in 1927 to £62.80 in 1945, £12.46 in 1970, and
£0.52 in 1996 (Hall, 2003, p.141). For many people, the cost of an in-
ternational call now borders on the negligible1, so from the perspective 1 In 2010, the cost of an oﬀ-peak
call from London to New York
on a  landline without any in-
ternational discount plans is less
than £0.30 in 1996 terms, and for a
£5.00 per month subscription one
could place nearly unlimited calls
for free (British Telecommunica-
tions plc., 2010).
laid out in Chapter 2 this suggests not only that telecommunications
will have important eﬀects on the way they interact, but also on how
ﬁrms perceive this network in relation to other types of infrastructure.
F, M  R: In Chapter 3, Firms, Markets and Risk, we
turned to the nature of the ﬁrm and sought to develop the idea that
“economically, [the ﬁrm] is ﬁction” (Drucker, 1999, p.114). We be-
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gan by returning to Weber and the impact of space on how the ﬁrm
organises its activities, paying particular attention to the ways in which
information ﬂows might be modelled within this a framework built
around material ﬂows. Hall (2003, p.142) has suggested that, in We-
berian terms, concentrated informational inputs might act “…rather
like a large ore ﬁeld yielding a precious metal”, but that in such cases,
“the raw material and the market are concentrated at the same location”
(ibid.).
However, the concept of ‘ubiquity’ suggests that an ‘informational
ore’ would only be one-half of the picture since information seems to
behave like a ubiquity as well. To explain this ambiguity, we turned
to the nature of markets and considered how the degree of trans-
parency—which is to say the ease with which information on pricing,
suitability, and availability can be accessed—aﬀects their spatial extent.
Ultimately, this observation led to the conclusion that , by making
it easier to seek out pricing data and to interact with suppliers, deterri-
torialises transparent markets but has only a limited impact in opaque
markets.
Furthermore, by adopting a broad view of transactions we could see
how “transaction costs and the value of economic information have
increased over time as markets have expanded in scope and as economic
processes and products have become more complex” (Garcia, 2002,
p.47). In particular, we found that Charlot and Duranton’s (2006)
model of search and execution costs makes it clear that determining the
‘right’ price for a product or service is a far from trivial operation. Over
the course of the chapter we came to see that the ﬂow of inputs and
information within and between ﬁrms also aﬀects the ﬂexibility with
which they can pursue some ‘ideal’ locational strategy.
A  C: In Chapter 4, Agglomerations and
Clusters, we incorporated the dynamics of life-cycle and scale for prod-
ucts, ﬁrms, and industries, as well as the characteristics of environments
where many ﬁrms colocate. This chapter also reinforced our appreci-
ation of the importance of instability in ﬁrm operations: I argued that
there is an oscillation between stable and unstable conﬁgurations, and
that the uncertainties embodied in this oscillation encourage speciﬁc
organisational and spatial responses. Communications and information-
processing technologies aﬀect this process by enabling more ﬂexible
and complex reconﬁgurations: one strategic manager for a retail bank
reports that “we showed that synergies in banking are not only ob-
tained by closing branches, but also by having a good combined 
platform…[it] allows you to grow your business without growing the
back oﬃce in the same proportions” (Economist Intelligence Unit,
2006, p.46).
We then turned to the process of agglomeration and found that it
has three important advantages for ﬁrms: ﬁrst, that it enables ﬁrms
to share the cost of public and private infrastructures, enabling them
to out-compete ﬁrms in less well-provisioned regions; second, that
it improves the ‘search and match process’ by increasing awareness
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of, and access to, the local market; and third, that it reduces the cost
of managing ongoing complex interactions. These factors become
especially important to ﬁrms when informational and material ﬂows are
intense, unpredictable, and unstandardised.
I then argued that information ﬂows also lie at the root of clustering,
but that clusters may well be ineﬃcient by traditional measures since
they tend to be costly and congested locations. However, the diversity
of informational inputs, and the frequency of encounters between
competitors and collaborators, in clusters generates crucial long-run
beneﬁts, and I ﬁnd it particularly encouraging that Menzel and Fornahl
(2010) have connected the ‘sustainability’ of clusters to their ability to
maintain a delicate balance between ‘thematical’ (i. e. productive and
technological) coherence and diversity; the authors suggest even that
clusters may oscillate forwards and backwards through various stages
of development (i. e. life-cycles; see Figure 4.8), and I think that this
nicely draws together my arguments on scale, life-cycle, and instability
as fundamental factors in clustering.
T K E: In Chapter 5 we turned ﬁnally to the
knowledge economy, and we found that the distinction between codi-
ﬁed and tacit knowledge maps nicely back on to the Weberian distinc-
tion between ubiquities and localised inputs. By drawing on the knowl-
edge bases approach (Asheim et al., 2007), we were able to reconcile
Storper and Venables’s (2002; 2004) basic dichotomy with divergent
preferences at the sectoral level: the analytical, synthetic, and symbolic
bases all play a role in shaping how knowledge work is done. So al-
though social interaction is a component of all knowledge work, what
varies with the knowledge base is the extent to which social interaction
is an integral element of the generation and transmission process.
We then considered the ways in which knowledge could be ex-
changed between workers, and highlighted the degree to which face-
to-face (2) interaction is still integral to this process. Because we are
social animals, physical proximity provides more than just massive
bandwidth—though this is also important—it stimulates trust, gener-
ates motivation amongst participants, streamlines screening processes,
and enables complex and uncertain—unspoken, even—knowledge to
be shared. This understanding of the value of 2 led to an examination
of the ways in which diﬀerent types of ‘proximity’ could be deployed to
stimulate and support the eﬃcient dispersal of complex knowledge.
Hypothesis Generation
Although the literature review has set out what I believe to be the or-
ganising principles of contemporary ﬁrm location strategy, it has not
clearly set out any testable predictions. So we must take a step forward
from broad generalisation if we are to advance the analysis substantively.
Figure 6.1 draws on the factors identiﬁed in the preceding chapter to
lay out a tripartite categorisation of 21st Century work. I believe that
these three axes can be used as a guide to modelling a ﬁrm or sector’s
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spatial decision-making—in each case, the dashed grey line along an
axis points towards greater locational ﬂexibility, and the solid black
line towards less—and so can be used to predict their distribution and
interaction proﬁles.
Localised
Information
Ubiquitous
Information
Creative Work
Role Work
Bilateral
Interaction
Multilateral
Interaction
Figure 6.1: Integrated Typology of
Knowledge Work
L  U I: Where informational inputs
are ubiquitous thanks to -enabled interactions, I expect there to be
a lessening of the external dependencies that constrain locational de-
cisions. When workers can access relevant information or knowledge
from anywhere, then this makes actual location a relatively less impor-
tant factor in work. Conversely, where opacity conﬁnes key knowledge
to a particular local context, then the places and times where such assets
to become available will be correspondingly more important.
M  B O: Ongoing multilateral in-
teraction—especially of the social forms favoured by symbolic knowl-
edge workers, and of the cross-cutting forms favoured by, for instance,
ﬁnanciers—is prohibitively costly in inaccessible places. Here, the pro-
vision of high-density, high-quality infrastructure, especially of the
‘upper-tier’ type, will tend to bind multilaterally-oriented workers
to the very largest urban locations. In contrast, I expect bilaterally-
oriented work to be increasingly deterritorialised, especially where
interactions are routine or are sustained over long periods of time such
that participants build up a shared context to streamlines exchanges.
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C  R O: By creative orientation, we should
understand any type of work—analytical, synthetic, or symbolic—that
involves the generation of new knowledge. Clearly, this axis incorpo-
rates a continuum of practices, and so rules-based work falls somewhere
in the middle. In much the same way as a network is ultimately con-
strained by its least ﬂexible links, we can expect to ﬁnd that some parts
of an organisation are constrained by the requirements of its least ﬂexi-
ble (or, to put it another way: most desirable) employees, and these are
almost invariably the creative workers. However, we should not forget
that the complex and collaborative nature of contemporary innovation
means that even the most knowledge-intensive workers may depend on
a support-structure of skilled technicians and administrators2. 2 In fact, Drucker (1999,
pp.149–154) makes much of
the importance of ‘technologists’
to America’s long-term advantage
in productivity. These workers
have a great deal in common with
my ‘rules-based’ workers classi-
ﬁcation, and one of his examples
concerns  technicians who
were trained in the ‘right way’ of
doing things by the corporation,
but were then given substantial
latitude in determining how best to
handle customer issues (ibid.); this
is, to my mind, a canonical example
of ‘rules-based’ work which com-
bines a degree of autonomy with
predeﬁned execution paths.
Prediction & Empirical Veriﬁcation
L  T: Using Figure 6.1, we can gener-
ate a series of predictions about the spatial distribution and interaction
characteristics of diﬀerent sectors, and even of ﬁrms or oﬃces within
sectors. The underlying expectation is that, because types of work diﬀer
along one or more axes, they will also display systematically diﬀerent
spatial preferences and communicate with others in systematically dif-
ferent ways.
So it is the nature and degree of the similarities and diﬀerences that
helps us to predict a sector’s likely locational decisions. We can sum-
marise these predictions as follows:
1. Localised work will be found near larger transport nodes, while
Ubiquitous work will be more dispersed;
2. Creative work will be found in high-amenity areas, while Role
work will be found in lower amenity areas; and
3. Multilateral work will be found in areas containing many sectors,
while Bilateral work will be found in areas with industrial monocul-
tures.
However, spatial disposition is only one aspect of ﬁrm behaviour,
and we must also consider how this typology aﬀects predictions of
telecommunications usage. This yields three more predictions:
1. Localised work will communicate with fewer areas, while Ubiqui-
tous work will communicate with more;
2. Creative work will employ telecommunications intensively, while
Role work will use it less; and
3. Multilateral work will employ telecommunications across smaller
areas, while Bilateral work will use it over larger ones.
G: On top of these underlying diﬀerences, we must also
superimpose a geography of internationalisation since many of the
sectors most closely associated with knowledge-intensive industry
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are also closely associated with the process of globalisation. There is
a widespread presumption that “…globalised economic sectors tend
to be intensive users of the new telecommunications and computer
technologies…” (Sassen, 2002, p.4), and this implies very strongly
that these sectors will have a particularly prominent presence in the
telecommunications data.
S S: We have examined a number of industries in some
detail over the course of the preceding chapters, and so it is appropriate
to use these same industries as the basis for the empirical veriﬁcation
of the predictions developed in the literature review. Table 6.1 high-
lights three overlapping deﬁnitions of sectors closely associated with
the processes of interest, so by sampling these sectors’ spatial and com-
municational preferences we can see if the evidence stacks up with the
theory.
Sector Pain and
Hall (2008,
p.1068)
Taylor and
Walker
(2001,
pp.24,25)
McCann
(See
footnote in
2007, p.132)
Derudder
et al. (2010,
p.1866)
Accountancy Y Y Y
Advertising Y Y Y
Arts & Theatre Y
Finance Y Y Y Y
Design Y
 Y
Insurance Y Y
Law Y Y Y
Logistics Y
Management
Consultancy
Y Y Y
Political
Consultancy
Y
Publishing Y
Real Estate Y Y
Table 6.1: Sectors Associated with
Knowledge Work, Face-to-Face
Interaction, and Globalisation
Summary
At the intersection between the typology of knowledge work outlined
above, and the internationally-oriented businesses identiﬁed in Ta-
ble 6.1, lies a set of concrete practices of location and communication.
There will necessarily be variation within each sector, and I fully expect
the size and degree of globalisation of each ﬁrm to aﬀect the observed
behaviours. However, we must nonetheless place some kind of stake
in the ground against which to test the theoretical predictions. So al-
though we expect the data to require the reﬁnement of the hypotheses,
Table 6.2 serves to anchor the analysis undertaken in Chapter 7.
To test the predictions set out in Table 6.2 we will need two com-
plementary data sets: one which enables us to localise industries, and
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Sector Spatial Preference Communication
Preference
S
ym
b
ol
ic
Cultural Highly-clustered in
core cities; high
amenity
2; local
Advertising Highly-clustered;
clients accessible
2; local & global
S
yn
th
et
ic
Global Finance Highly-accessible;
largest agglomerations
(i. e. ) with
specialised labour
available
2; global
Engineering Connected areas; high
amenity; specialised
labour available
Regional; some global
 Well-connected areas;
clients accessible
Regional; some global
A
n
al
yt
ic
al
 Dispersed; high
amenity; clients
somewhat accessible
Global; some regional
& Highly-dispersed; high
amenity
Global; few external
linkages
F
lo
w
s
Logistics Highly-connected
areas; cheap land &
labour
Global; some regional
and local
Table 6.2: Spatial and Communica-
tions Predictions
one which enables us to examine their telecommunications usage. For-
tunately, industrial employment data is relatively accessible—though,
as we will see, it is not without limitations—and the National Online
Manpower Information System () provides the relevant data for
Britain3 at a range of geographical scales. 3 Similar industrial data for America
is provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau.
Until recently, the second data set of telecommunications has been
beyond the reach of academics, but as the next section will make clear,
this is now changing in a dramatic fashion thanks to an alignment be-
tween computing and storage power, and the increasing willingness of
a small number of network operators to make various types of anony-
mous data available to select individuals and groups. The conjunction of
industrial—and, for that matter, residential—and communications data
promises to transform the nature of social science research.
6.3 Methodological Context & Concerns
Computational Social Science
Historically, the cost and complexity of capturing large, detailed data
sets has meant that much of social science research relied either on
small-scale surveys, or on large-scale national studies funded by central
government for administrative purposes. The latter programs tend to
be mounted decennially at best, and the timeliness of the results is oen
inversely proportional to the scope of the research. The basic problem
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here is that the cost of collection increases with the sample size (cf. Pain
and Hall, 2008, pp.1069–1070): to double the sample size is, typically,
to double the cost of the research; to double the length of the survey is,
in all probability, to halve the number of respondents.
However, the increasing mediation of everyday life by digital net-
works oﬀers a new way to collect data on human populations on a truly
massive scale: a single phone company’s Call Data Records (s) can
shed light on the behaviour of millions of individuals! At that scale
we are no longer really even dealing with ‘sampling’ as traditionally
conceived. Researchers are already analysing data sets from network
operators in Europe, America, and Africa with a view to understand-
ing the links between such varying characteristics of social existence as
individual mobility and commuting, public health and the spreading
of epidemics, and the correlation between social network structure and
deprivation (cf. Ahas and Mark, 2005; Ratti et al., 2006; Eagle, 2008;
Gonzàlez et al., 2008; Eagle et al., 2010).
Lazer et al. (2009) argue that our ability to leverage rich sources of
behavioural data is ushering in a “computational social science” ()
that is markedly diﬀerent in scale and scope from existing practices in
ﬁelds such as sociology or planning. We can also position  within
the larger category of ‘third culture’ research that seeks to bring meth-
ods from the natural sciences to bear on some of the more intractable
problems in the social sciences (Brockman and Williams, 1995). This is
not, of course, to suggest that other modes of data collection—such as
qualitative interview data—will play no role in future investigations, but
rather that they can now be aligned with much larger data sets on what
people actually do: intention can be tested against action.
The value of the  approach is already recognised by business—one
employee of Google observed that “we like learning from large, ‘noisy’
data sets” (Economist, 2010c)—but declining storage and process-
ing costs have ﬁnally brought this type of analysis within the reach of
academics. Quite simply, “existing ways of conceiving human be-
haviour were developed without access to terabytes of data describing
minute-by-minute interactions and locations of entire populations of
individuals” (Lazer et al., 2009, p.722), and as a result this represents
an enormous augmentation of our ability to investigate human activity
on a grand scale. What also sets  apart from other approaches is its
reliance on the ‘informational exhaust’ of contemporary society, which
it transforms into a tool with which to analyse society itself4. 4 An excellent example of this is the
work undertaken by Currid and
Williams (2010) using the commer-
cial Getty Images database to map
the density of fashion, theatre, and
music events in Manhattan and Los
Angeles
LaGrangian & Eulerian Approaches
If the study of telecommunications is really a study of informational
ﬂows, then we can also position this research within the distinction
between LaGrangian and Eulerian analyses. This diﬀerence originates
in the fact that there are two ways of describing the motion of a ﬂuid:
from the frame of reference of a particle in the ﬂuid, and from the frame
of reference of a ﬁxed point across which the ﬂuid moves. In more
concrete terms, it is the diﬀerence between studying a river from a
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boat ﬂoating downstream, and studying a river by watching it from
the shore (Wikipedia, 2006). This seemingly esoteric distinction has
one very important implication: that there are actually two ways of
analysing telecommunications ﬂows, only one of which has received
much research attention.
From the standpoint of telecommunications, LaGrangian meth-
ods—the particle approach—naturally ﬁt the study of individuals.
So this mode of analysis seeks to build a picture of the whole from a
sampling of its separate parts and, given the particular physics back-
grounds of many network scientists, this is naturally the point from
which they approach the study of such data. LaGrangian styles of analy-
sis are what gives us Gladwell’s (2000) ‘hubs’, ‘mavens’, and ‘salesmen’,
and Barabási’s (2003) power laws and preferential attachment models.
In contrast, Eulerian methods—the ﬁxed point approach—enable us
to get at something subtly diﬀerent. Let’s imagine for a moment that we
have one building from which people ﬂow out at 8 a.m. and ﬂow in at
6 p.m., and another building into which people ﬂow at 9 a.m. and out
from which they ﬂow at 5 p.m. We know nothing about the individuals
going in and out, but we can nonetheless infer that the ﬁrst building is
residential and the second, commercial. If we imagine too that there are
several hundreds of people doing so each day, then we might also infer
that we are dealing with a major oﬃce development or housing block.
The point is that the ﬂows—in terms of their timing, direction, and
magnitude—tell us a great deal about the location being monitored. In
eﬀect, we use the characteristic ﬂows to develop a description of place,
and by comparing many spaces simultaneously we can group them
according to the degree of similarity expressed in their patterns ﬂow.
Mapping
However, one of the basic challenges of mapping this space of ﬂows
is the lack of an appropriate representational tradition: the data itself
are new, as is the way that they join non-contiguous places together.
There is no natural means of showing this data, and consequently the
information-space only adopts “the formal qualities of geographic (Eu-
clidean) space if explicitly programmed to do so” (Dodge and Kitchin,
2001, p.3). What this means is that the mapping of telecommunica-
tions is inseparable from a process of ‘spatialisation’—the assignment of
map-like structure to data without any inherent spatial aspect (2001,
p.2)—and, as such, is inherently arbitrary: is it better to map minutes
or megabytes? the route taken by the data? or the link that it actually
established?
This challenge is made more diﬃcult by the sheer volumes involved:
high levels of generalisation and classiﬁcation are essential to getting to
grips with the data, and this inserts an additional interpretative layer
between the recorded events and their representation (2001, p.4).
To put it more concretely, I could present a map showing the origin
and destination of every call made in Britain, but such a map would
utterly incomprehensible. Instead, we are forced to make still more
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choices, imbuing maps with values and judgements about what is and
is not worth mapping (2001, p.3). My point is not that this eﬀort is fu-
tile—rather, I perceive it to be absolutely vital—but that there are very
real choices to be made about what to show, and that there is such a
wealth of data here that not even an atlas could do it justice.
Representativity
Although telecommunications data can tell us a great deal about pat-
terns of interaction, we have to recognise that the analysis of individual
Call Data Records tells us nothing about the purpose or quality of that
communication. There is also a tendency to associate duration of inter-
action with intensity of interaction: if two people speak on the phone
for twenty minutes then this is somehow a more meaningful conver-
sation than one that lasts ﬁve minutes. But duration and frequency
interact in complex ways: we seem to call those close to us more oen,
but speak with them for less time; and to call those who are more geo-
graphically distant less oen, but talk for longer (Wellman and Tindall,
1993).
Calling data will obviously capture a blend of personal and profes-
sional communications (Pain and Hall, 2008, p.1070). Most parts of
most major cities contain a mix of activities, and Lee et al. (2007, p.416)
have suggested that our phone communications “tend to straddle rather
than follow traditional economic, political, and cultural fault lines.”
However, in the context of the chapters on clustering and the knowl-
edge economy, and of the importance that we were able to attach to
social interaction as a business development process, we can see that
perhaps our inability to untangle the two types of messages is rather
less important than commonly thought. We can also, as we will see
in Section 6.6 (see page 235), use employment data to narrow our fo-
cus to areas that are more likely to capture economic interactions than
personal ones.
Modiﬁable Areal Unit
A ﬁnal analytical issue worth noting is that of the ‘modiﬁable areal unit
problem’, usually referred to by the acronym . This issue is a long-
standing one in spatial analysis: Openshaw (1984) traces it as far back
as the 1930s, but it has become a much more pressing concern with
the spread of Geographic Information Systems () and increased use
of census-type data for areal analysis. The  was summarised by
Dodge and Kitchin (2001, p.5) as “the same data mapped onto diﬀering
sets of spatial units (e.g. wards, districts, counties, states) can produce
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent spatial patterns…” In short, the  tends to
manifest itself through changes in the relationship between variables at
diﬀerent scales; consequently, attempts to adjust the resolution of the
data (whether for abstraction or speciﬁcation purposes) can lead analysts
to draw incorrect conclusions regarding the relationships within and
between objects in space (Dark and Bram, 2007, p.472).
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Typically, the  can be understood in terms of two dimensions:
scale and zone. The scale problem results from the fact that applica-
tion of data—especially individual or household data—collected at one
scale to a diﬀerent spatial scale can obscure important variations within
and between areas. For instance, aggregation will tend to ‘ﬂatten’ dif-
ferences by lumping together dichotomous individuals or households
into a blander average population (Openshaw, 1984, p.20), with the
concomitant risk of increasing correlation between unrelated variables
(Fotheringham and Wong, 1991, pp.1033–1038). Conversely, disaggre-
gation will tend to increase random and inexplicable noise in a model or
analysis as this smoothing eﬀect is lost (Openshaw, 1984, p.26).
The zoning issue arises when choosing which units to group to-
gether into a larger unit: diﬀerent grouping choices can yield markedly
diﬀerent aggregate results. Fotheringham and Wong (1991, pp.1038–1041)
explore this issue in some depth, and demonstrate that various types of
re-zoning can cause explanatory variables to swing wildly between
signiﬁcant positive and negative correlations! The net result is that dif-
ferent, and oen contradictory, interpretations can be derived from the
same data depending on the scale at which it is examined or the way in
which the data was aggregated.
Certainly, the  is a potential factor in this work, although I have
taken steps to limit its possible impact. The underlying issue is that,
as with the census (1991, p.1042), conﬁdentiality is a serious concern
with such data and so ‘individual’ callers cannot be the level of analysis.
Moreover, there is no basic spatial unit (bsu) below the telecommuni-
cations ‘area’—known in America as the Common Language Location
Identiﬁer () and in Britain as the Public Exchange Area (), of
which more later—that is available to researchers outside of the part-
ner ﬁrms and so it is pointless to frame this in terms of ‘individual’
behaviour or attributes (ibid.).
However, the  and  are not arbitrary areal units: although the
social and economic characteristics of each bsumay vary signiﬁcantly,
together with their particular usage patterns, they are all designed to
provide consistent telecommunications service levels to users within
that area. In that sense, these areal units are associated with speciﬁc
properties and this may go some distance towards moderating the im-
pact of the . In addition, I have worked with the network opera-
tors to join socioeconomic data to this bsu in as uniform and reliable a
manner as possible, and so treating each of these areas as being of ‘unit
importance’ is the natural, and indeed only, solution.
Finally I have, wherever possible, employed a data-driven classiﬁca-
tion of space, rather than a hierarchical or user-speciﬁed one, and this
should help to reduce the risk of -related problems in the analysis.
Fortunately, improvements in computational power in the past decade
mean that even quite large spatial data sets can be explored without
aggregating beyond the original bsu-level; this ensures that, as much as
possible, neither zonal nor scalar issues aﬀect the subsequent analysis.
Nonetheless, we should refrain from attributing the results extracted
from the British and American data sets to the behaviour of individual
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ﬁrms within those area; rather, we should interpret these results as re-
ﬂecting the environment—the behavioural characteristics of an area—in
which a given set of ﬁrms in an area operate.
Privacy
Two of the most impressive pieces of research based on telecommu-
nications network data published to-date examined individual human
mobility patterns (Gonzàlez et al., 2008) and the characteristics of social
ties between individual users of mobile phones (Onnela et al., 2007).
Compared to previous studies, this research represents a massive step
forward, but in both cases the results are aﬀected by an inability to
compare the results with standard data sets that currently represent the
‘gold standard’ in place-based research. The consequences of this sen-
sitivity are severe: without even the name of country involved in the
research we cannot speculate on the extent to which the results might
be culturally-contingent or representative of ‘normal’ behaviour.
The situation suggests that the data supplier perceived a signiﬁcant
level of reputational and privacy-related risk in supporting this type
of research; similar issues aﬀect nearly all of the methodologies docu-
mented here—including my own—because the operators reasonably
require strict conﬁdentiality agreements and the researchers are eager
to protect the advantages ﬂowing from what can amount to years of
relationship-building with the analysts and managers of a corporation.
Fortunately for my work, both networks involved in this research have
been willing to assist me in connecting the electronic geography of
communications to a real geography of places, with tangible beneﬁts
that I hope to make clear in the course of my analysis.
It is far beyond the scope of this work to argue for, or to develop,
a comprehensive data-sharing and liability model, but I would like to
note that there are two broad responses to the issue of individual and
corporate privacy: the ﬁrst is philosophical, and the second, procedu-
ral. As Lazer et al. (2009) argue, the potential beneﬁts to society as a
whole from computational social science () research are substantial:
whether it is using airline and social network data to model a pandemic,
or using communications data to understand how groups gain access
to information on economic opportunity, social assistance, and health
care issues. Consequently, there is a strong case to be made for more
enlightened regulation, together with more research into whether and
how such data could be shared in a constructive way without compro-
mising the supplier or leaving them open to severe legal liability.
We can also consider how computational approaches can be used
to mask individual identity while still granting insight into a group’s
aggregate behaviours. There is an extensive, but still growing, lit-
erature on privacy-preserving database mining; the solutions range
from encryption and suppression, to conﬂation and randomisation
(see Reades, 2010 for a summary of relevant techniques). In addition,
corporate/academic workﬂows can be designed so that individually-
identiﬁable data are never shared between research partners in the ﬁrst
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place, an option that will be discussed in more detail below (see page
226). We are at a point where data are leaking out of sensitive data si-
los—sometimes with disastrous results in spite of the best of intentions
(cf. Sweeney, 2001)—but as yet there is no common framework for
negotiating the line between behavioural insight and privacy invasion
(Langheinrich, 2002).
Summary
The challenges raised in this section are signiﬁcant, but they are prin-
cipally the result of a concerted push by researchers into terra incognita.
I am not suggesting that such research will supplant existing qualitative
methods, but it is worth noting that we will be looking at a month’s
worth of data generated by the aggregate activity of more than 70 mil-
lion people, and that we will be able to examine in unprecedented detail
local and global patterns, regardless of whether these massive ﬂows are
headed down the street or to the other side of the planet. As these issues
are addressed in a systematic way, then the impact on social science and
public policy from  research has the capacity to be truly revolution-
ary.
6.4 Mapping the ‘Space of Flows’
Returning now to the challenges of mapping regional and interna-
tional ﬂuxes, Pain and Hall (2008, p.1069) have pointed out that while
secondary data such as the census are suitable for the study of Castells’
‘space of places’, a diﬀerent strategy is required for mapping the ‘space
of ﬂows’. And Taylor and Hoyler (2000, p.179) have pointed out that
traditional approaches to regional analysis are premised on the collection
and labelling of attributes, when what is really needed is a relational
analysis of linkages. In short, a new set of tools and data seem required
in urban and regional research.
The phone system addresses both of these issues: the numbers (or
their anonymised equivalent) are both universally routable and unique,
and they enable us to connect calls to households and businesses for
socioeconomic analyses. For the purposes of geodemographic analysis,
this means that there are some very substantial incentives to use the
phone network as a research platform. The review presented here cov-
ers a mix of approaches in order to provide a sense of the directions in
which this type of study can be taken; however, many of these projects
were conducted with very diﬀerent research objectives in mind and
thus did not logically form part of the literature review in Chapters 2
through 5, where we focussed on the relationship between telecommu-
nications and ﬁrms.
Infrastructure Mapping
It can be easy to assume that telecommunications infrastructure is ‘as
ethereal and virtual’ as the data that it carries (Dodge and Kitchin,
2001, p.10); however, as we saw in Chapter 2, the topology of an in-
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frastructure can oﬀer substantial insight into the distribution of activity.
Moss and Townsend (2000) and Townsend (2001) use the evolution
of bandwidth capacity and peering points on the Internet backbone
to posit a shi in the dynamics of urban growth from the primate
cities—New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago—towards a second tier
that includes San Francisco, San Jose, and Washington, ..
Normalised
density
0.0039 – 0.059
0.06 – 0.16
0.17 – 0.33
0.34 – 0.54
0.55 – 1.00
Figure 6.2: Cell phone antenna
densities in Manhattan (Shoval,
2007, p.193; reproduced with
permission of the author)
In a similar way, Shoval (2007, p.172) argues that the distribution of
mobile phone masts can be used to infer the location of urban ‘activity-
nodes’. Shoval’s unusual approach avoids the access issues associated
with other methods of phone-based research. Rather than negotiate
access with networks or pay a group of volunteers to collect data on his
behalf, Shoval used information contained in mandatory regulatory dis-
closures to map the distribution of towers. Shoval took this distribution
as a proxy for the density of human activity (see Figure 6.2), but there
are obvious methodological concerns with this approach: in particu-
lar, the idea that cellular infrastructure is systematically correlated with
some unspeciﬁed deﬁnition of ‘activity’.
The most extensive analysis to date at the metropolitan scale, by
Gorman and McIntee (2003), suggests only that the density of Per-
sonal Communications Services () masts for mobile data and voice
connections tracks the overall population of American metro regions,
and not the distribution of ‘activity’ within them. In fact, Gorman
and McIntee’s work (2003, p.1164) indicates that, while wireless in-
frastructure is more evenly distributed that wired infrastructure, there
remains a systemic bias in provision towards large metro areas: they are
over-represented on a per capita basis across all high-end telecoms infras-
tructures. Regardless, this creative technique is an important alternative
research tool since it avoids the signiﬁcant challenges facing those who
need to work through the regulators and operators.
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A third infrastructural approach—using Internet Protocol () ad-
dresses—has two technical drawbacks: the ﬁrst is that there is a weak
relationship between  addresses and physical location (cf. Hall and
Pain, 2006); the second is that a great deal of internet usage is migrating
on to private networks that use non-geographical addressing. So in the
ﬁrst case, not only can the  addresses assigned by an access provider
be re-used for users in a diﬀerent physical location at any time, but it is
also diﬃcult to localise users at much more than a regional level. And
secondly, especially with the arrival of the mobile Internet, traﬃc is
shiing on to the ‘walled garden’ networks where address blocks cover
an entire country and are much less easily probed by researchers.
Number of domain names
Summer 1998
1–5
6–25
26–100
101–300
> 301
Figure 6.3: Location of commercial
domain names in downtown
New York (Zook, 2000, p.419;
reproduced with permission of
Pion Limited)
Finally, in some rare cases the architecture of the network oﬀers a
fourth way to extract information about the distribution of activity:
Moss and Townsend (1997) and Zook (2000, 2004) have investigated
the distribution of domain name registrations as a way of assessing the
growth of Internet-related activity at the intra-urban scale (see Figure
6.3). Although this is a clever approach, there are important underlying
assumptions: that the location of the registration is functionally equiva-
lent to that of the business; and that the scale of the businesses is consis-
tent or irrelevant. While small ﬁrms are likely to register their business
address, the same is not true for the vastly larger s: they could regis-
ter a head oﬃce, a back oﬃce, or even the oﬃces of the ﬁrm’s counsel,
and we have no way of determining which is which without a great deal
of manual cleaning5.
5 I would also like to note that we
should not assume that a popular
Top-Level Domain () like
‘dot.com’ will only be used to
indicate commercial activity. As
a resident of New York between
1997 and 2002, and as the owner
owner of a dot.com address that I
use for personal communications,
my own registration is included in
the map shown in Figure 6.3.
Handset Mapping
An alternative strategy to mapping the topology of the networks them-
selves is to map the activities of users of those infrastructures. Eagle and
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Pentland (2006; 2009; and see also Barabási, 2010, pp.193–195 for a
good summary of this research) pioneered the ‘reality mining’ approach
using an application installed on participants’ mobile phones. Running
on Nokia handsets, the Context application samples the local radio fre-
quency () environment—speciﬁcally, the cell towers and Bluetooth
devices ‘visible’ to the phone—and then logs the results as a set of time-
stamped observations. Because the devices and infrastructure accessible
by the phone vary with geographical location, the phone can use these
as a kind of spatial ﬁngerprint and can assign each one to a unique point
in space.
A. Location Data B. Day Transformation
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Figure 6.4: Transformation of
Location Data in Eigenbehaviours
(Eagle and Pentland, 2009, p.1060;
reproduced with permission of the
authors)
Eagle and Pentland grouped the set of points into ﬁve categories:
home, work, other, no signal, and oﬀ. This classiﬁcation process yields
the simple colour-coded matrix shown in Figure 6.4A, and has the ef-
fect of radically reducing the complexity of the ensuing analysis. Now,
because a user’s position can be represented with just ﬁve states, we can
simply extend the matrix right-wards so that the ﬁrst 24 columns hold
binary values (i. e. on or oﬀ) for home, the next 24 columns hold on/oﬀ
values for work, and so forth (see Figure 6.4B).
Each row represents one day of the total sample collected for that
individual and means that Eagle and Pentland have been able to extract
a covariance matrix suitable for quantitative analysis from a very ‘noisy’
environment. In eﬀect, the matrix describes a multi-dimensional
behaviour-space amenable to eigendecomposition—this technique
will be discussed at some length later in this chapter—which can be
used to extract the principal components (most common recurring pat-
terns) of a user’s behaviour and discriminate between diﬀerent types of
user. Plotting the components’ coeﬃcients in 3D space makes visible
distinct groupings within the volunteer sample.
A very diﬀerent approach is used by Ahas and Mark (2005), who
employ network positioning events—usually billable customer actions
(see explanations in Ahas et al., 2008a, p.472 and Ahas et al., 2010b,
pp.4–5)—to locate customers at the cell-level within the operator’s mo-
bile network. Depending on whether they are using active or passive
positioning, and whether or not the users being tracked are volunteers,
the researchers have diﬀerent amounts of knowledge about their sub-
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jects. Their more complex ‘Social Positioning Method’ () analyses
merge demographic data supplied by participants with pay-per-position
updates from Estonia’s largest operator to explore individual mobility
patterns at the national scale (cf. Ahas et al., 2008b, 2010a).
Although Ahas and Mark’s studies are not constrained by the need
to install applications on to a participant’s handset, the cost of paying an
operator for location updates can be substantial. It is not clear to me if
they are still paying for positioning events or if they are now receiving
these data in bulk aer having built a more extensive relationship with
the operator. However, it is certain that the cost of their early collection
attempts were prohibitive for long-term research, and so most other
research in this area has focussed on collaborating directly with network
operators able to supply more extensive data on their entire subscriber
population in one go (cf. Gonzàlez et al., 2008).
Aggregate Network Mapping
Diﬃculties in collecting and analysing aggregate phone data mean that
progress in this area has been ﬁtful: one of the earliest papers to examine
aggregate point-to-point informational ﬂows on the phone network
with a view to exploring regional economic interactions dates from
19796; however, there has been little further research into this area until 6 There was, however, earlier
work rooted in the ‘social physics’
approach; Stewart, 1950, for
example, considers the ﬂow of
bank cheques to and from New
York in light of rank-size laws and
population potentials.
quite recently. And in the meantime, there has been a seismic shi in
both platform and extent: Davies’ research used only long-distance
calling within the state of Montana, whereas contemporary research has
drawn much more heavily on mobile telecommunications, particularly
from Italy (cf. Ratti et al., 2006; Reades et al., 2007), and has used ﬁne-
grained data with temporal resolutions as high as 15 minutes and spatial
resolutions measured in tens of metres.
Ratti et al. (2006, pp.740–744) used heat maps to identify activity
hotspots on the mobile network, but also put forward the idea that
the usage levels of a cell generate a unique ‘signature’ that is related
to the activities taking place within its coverage area. Variations in
mobile bandwidth usage—measured in Erlang—can be used to “infer
information about the ‘character’ of a neighbourhood in which the
antenna is placed” (2006, p.740). To put it simply, an antenna with
higher usage between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. would most likely
be providing coverage in a work/oﬃce area, while one with higher
usage before 9 a.m. and aer 6 p.m. would be located in a residential
neighbourhood (see Figure 6.5).
However, the nature of phone networks means that some infrastruc-
ture carries thousands of simultaneous calls, while other hardware may
have just a few connections for most of the day. To enable such wildly
varying levels of usage to be compared in some meaningful way, Ratti
et al. (2006) suggest that two forms of normalisation are necessary: ﬁrst,
a ‘normalisation in space’ in which each antenna’s load is normalised
against the total load on the system at a single point in time; and sec-
ond, a ‘normalisation in time’ dividing the load on an antenna at a given
point in time by the average load on that antenna for the entire day.
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Figure 6.5: Cell activity—a group
of cells with prevalence of activity
during (a) oﬃce hours, and (b)
the evening and night time (Ratti
et al., 2006, p.741; reproduced with
permission of Pion Limited)
Normalisation in space allows us to control for the fact that usage levels
are globally lower at 1 a.m. than they are at 5 p.m., while normalisation
in time allows us to control for the fact that city-centre infrastructure
always carries more traﬃc than suburban or peripheral infrastructure.
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3           Cluster 4          Cluster 5           Cluster 6          Cluster 7          Cluster 8
A CB
Figure 6.6: Analysis of eight
clusters of Erlang data: (a) clusters
1–4; (b) a satellite view of Rome,
for comparison; (c) clusters 5–8
(Reades et al., 2007, p.36)
Signature analysis was extended by Reades et al. (2007) to address
the fact that hundreds, or hundreds of thousands of unique signatures
simply cannot be analysed by hand. This work was the ﬁrst to try to
apply clustering to the study of aggregate telecommunications usage,
and the technique employed in this article was fairly straightforward:
the researchers identiﬁed six times of day when usage varied substan-
tially from place to place and then used these data points to create a
multi-dimensional vector that could be fed into a k-Means clustering
algorithm. Clustering grouped the spaces according to their degree
of similarity across the six observations, and in Figure 6.6 we can see
how some clusters (e.g. 2 and 3) picked up non-urban features such
as parkland and lower-density building, while other clusters (e.g. 7
and 8) identiﬁed high-ﬂow zones such as the Termini rail station and
nighttime activity hotspots spanning the Tiber.
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For our purposes, however, perhaps the most interesting mapping
eﬀort to-date is that undertaken by Halbert (2004, 2008) for the Île-
de-France region. Halbert is explicitly trying to connect telecommu-
nications ﬂows to informational ﬂows between advanced business and
provider services (s) and other classes of business (see Figure 6.7).
Unfortunately, there are aspects of Halbert’s analysis that are puzzling
and, ultimately, rather frustrating: while some maps appear not to have
controlled for population at all (cf. Halbert, 2004, p.224), other maps
speak of a ‘positive residual’ for inter-regional telecommunications (cf.
Halbert, 2004, pp.230–231), although the formula for calculating these
residuals seems incomplete (cf. Halbert, 2004, p.89).
Figure 6.7: Calls in the Paris 
Region (Halbert, 2008, p.1157;
used with permission of Taylor &
Francis)
Summary
Clearly, researchers are pursuing a wildly divergent set of strategies for
mapping informational ﬂows and the intensity of information-driven
activities. This is, at least in part, simply a reﬂection of the diversity
of data sets to which academics are gaining access, but it also reﬂects a
growing sophistication in approaches to these very large, very complex
data sources. My own work is ﬁrmly positioned within the aggregate
research tradition established by Davies (1979) and taken up by Ratti
et al. (2006); I feel that handling the data in this way oﬀers the best way
to measure the structural ﬂows which deﬁne an informational region,
and also carries the lowest risk of privacy pitfalls because unaggregated
records are discarded at the earliest opportunity.
6.5 Data Provision
The ﬁndings in Chapter 7 will focus on data drawn from Great Britain
because it proved to have a scope and resolution that enabled me to
advance my research much further; however, where the need arises to
illustrate a key point in the text I will also present results drawn from
New York City. The U.K. data contains information on a majority of
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landline calls made in August 2005, while the American data contains
calling information about mobile, leased-line, and ﬁxed-line calls in
September 2008. For brevity’s sake I have highlighted only the most
relevant aspects of the data sets below, and more detail on the data,
record layouts, and relative merits of both data sets is available in Ap-
pendix D: Data Management & Processing, beginning on page 477.
About the Research Collaboration
Access to both data sets was initially arranged through ...’s able
City Laboratory, to whom I owe an enormous debt of gratitude for
their support. The research was designed simultaneously to allow aca-
demic research into local and global connection patterns, and to help
the operators to understand the environmental and contextual drivers
of network usage. Unlike some providers of network services, both
operators are typically constrained by regulation to engage primarily in
research that will help the ﬁrm to improve service delivery to end-users;
this treatment sets up a diﬃcult dynamic that will need to be addressed
in the long term if public interest research is to progress.
A  O: For complex reasons, neither the British nor
the American operators are able to be directly named and thanked for
their involvement in this research, but it is nonetheless important to
give a sense of their market position and services so that the reader can
form a picture of the representativity and scale of the data employed
in the analysis. The major American telecommunications company
oﬀers mobile, wireline, and broadband services, but the geographical
distribution of these oﬀerings is not uniform: consumer services are
of limited availability in New York, while business-oriented services
for large companies and public bodies are oﬀered across the United
States. Similarly, the U.K. operator oﬀers a wide range of services to
households and major corporations and institutions on a national scale,
but its principal focus is ﬁxed line operations.
Data on market-share is diﬃcult to come by for more recent years,
but as of 2004 the American telecommunications company accounted
for approximately one quarter of all U.S. billed minutes (Federal Com-
munications Commission, 2009), and it remains one of the largest
American networks today. However, a long-term strategic shi in focus
away from consumer services towards integrated voice and data prod-
ucts targeted at the global enterprise market means that the operator
has particularly good coverage of large businesses, even in areas where
it is not an incumbent. This makes the carrier an excellent partner for
research into the spatiotemporal aspects of telecoms usage by businesses,
but it does also imply that care must be taken when drawing conclu-
sions from research undertaken in areas—such as New York—that are
not part of the operator’s ‘home territory’.
Similarly, in 2005—the year from which the data is drawn—the
British operator was amongst the country’s largest providers of telecom-
munications services to homes and businesses (Ofcom, 2006). Using
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data drawn from regulatory ﬁlings, it is possible to infer that in that
year the operator accounted for approximately 75% of all ﬁxed busi-
ness and residential connections. Given the intensity of competition in
the British market, this represents astonishingly complete coverage of
the country’s calling activity. In short, the sheer scale of both carriers’
operations ensure that micro-scale diﬀerences amongst customers are
unlikely to systematically bias the analyses in ways that will fundamen-
tally invalidate the ﬁndings.
Terminology
Before delving more deeply into the data provided, it will be helpful to
review the terminology in use in both markets since much of it will be
entirely new and potentially rather mysterious. This brief overview is
supplemented by more extensive material in Appendix D: Data Man-
agement & Processing on page 477.
N A: North America utilises a standardised naming and
addressing scheme—an eleven-character Common Language Location
Identiﬁer (, pronounced ‘silly’) code—that was created to enable
network hardware to be uniquely identiﬁed. The relationship between
a  and a phone number is complex because number portability and
physical mobility mean that the number may no longer be near the
region suggested by its area code.
It may be helpful to think of  codes as analogous to  address
blocks and phone numbers as analogous to human-readable s. In
other words, many phone numbers can be associated to a single ,
and it is (at least in theory) possible for a number to reallocated to a
new  should the need arise. So the number identiﬁes the intended
recipient of a call, at which point the network uses s to route the
call to an actual location. Because of its historical role in billing and
maintenance systems, -level data is relatively easy to collect for a
network operator.
G B: The basic spatial unit for British landline data is the
exchange area: this is conceptually similar to a wire centre in that it
corresponds in some way to a geographic service area for handling
wireline calls. One exchange area may contain several independent
network switches, but the data is only reported at the exchange area
level. Because the U.K. has limited number portability—it is available
for mobile phones, but is much more tightly circumscribed for land-
lines—there is little diﬀerence between the number and its routing.
In short, all numbers beginning 0207–722 would be sent to North
London and never, say, to Aberdeen; only the 0800- and 0845-class of
numbers lack a geographical mapping. The typical British exchange is
rather smaller in size than an American , giving it a higher spatial
resolution and allowing the data to be used for more detailed studies of
activity, especially in urban areas where the exchanges can be quite tiny.
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O C: Beyond Britain and North America there are
many diﬀerent standards for phone numbers and routing, so only rarely
can the number be used to predict the ﬁnal destination of a call. For
instance, data on calls to France suggest the existence of no less than
15 ‘sub-regions’ in the Île-de-France area; however, it is impossible to
determine which, if any, of these subregions map on to the urban heart
of Paris or on to business centres such as La Défence. In fact, the only
consistent part of any number is the mandatory country code and so,
following discussions with the networks, it was agreed that international
calling data should be mainly handled at the country-level.
Overview of Data Sets
N A: The data for  amounted to some 10 of raw
data: for each hour of each day we received a count of the total number
of new calls and total time spent on all calls, grouped by New York 
and by remote location, of which there are approximately 32,000. We
also know whether the call originated or terminated in New York, the
platform on which the call originated, the latitude and longitude of the
New York , and as much information as the network operator was
able to infer about the counterparty’s general geographic location7. 7 Local calls were not included,
though there are some cases
where local calls were accidentally
captured by the collection process.
This data was suppressed from my
analysis as it is not representative of
intra-urban ﬂows.
A simpliﬁed version of three raw records is shown here:
20080901,0,Dedicated,Terminating,NYCXNYTRDS1,40,-72,Bronx,
APNUNK,US,No_state,,1,1.5
20080903,13,Pre-Paid Card,Originating,NYCMNY371MD,40,-72,Manhattan,
5922,GY,,Georgetown,1,4.3
20080911,23,Voice-over-IP,Originating,NYCQNYCODS0,40,-72,Queens,
9144,IN,,Chennai (Madras),1,0.0
Reading from le-to-right, each record shows: the date, the hour of
the day, the platform8, the direction, the New York , the latitude 8 It should also be noted that
this data highlights the ongoing
relevance of this type of analysis
for the future since Voice-over-IP
data—as long as it is not generated
by user-level applications such as
Skype—can also be researched this
way.
and longitude (here masked for security reasons), the borough in which
the  is located; then, there is the remote location identiﬁer (oen a
 if the call is within North America), its two-character  country-
code, its state name and city name, and ﬁnally, the number of calls and
number of minutes. Because of New York’s enormous telecommu-
nications volumes and the number of permutations of these diﬀerent
dimensions, the total number of records transferred exceeded 100 mil-
lion rows.
Figure 6.8 shows the distribution of s across the ﬁve boroughs,
and I have provided an inset for lower-Manhattan because the sheer
density of infrastructure there would otherwise make this map illegible.
Note that here we are distinguishing between two types of s: wire
centres, and all others. The 66 wire centres ﬁeld ﬁxed line communi-
cations and so have a speciﬁc geography to which measurable demo-
graphic attributes can be attached; they thus form a bridge between the
geography of communications and the geography of people and ﬁrms.
The boundaries of the wire centres were used to group the appropriate
U.S. census tracts into each . The same is not possible with the
mobile and private branch exchange () switches (represented by the
light-grey marks in this ﬁgure) because the coverage area (i. e. cell) of a
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Figure 6.8: Mapping s on to
Wire Centres in New York City
particular mobile tower may span the boundary of one more statistical
units—and can even vary over time with local network load—while the
 may be so speciﬁc as to be a potential source of privacy concerns
even though there is no corresponding statistical unit with which it can
be paired.
In order to build a total telecommunications proﬁle for each area, all
s—regardless of the type of traﬃc that they handle—had their calls
and minutes mapped on to the closest wire centre areas using a Voronoi
plot as an approximation (these are the white-edged polygons in the
background of Figure 6.8). The Voronoi plot9 divides space so that the 9 Created in ’s ArcGIS using
the ‘Create Thiessen Polygons’
function in the ‘Analysis’ toolbox.
boundaries between service areas are equidistant from the nearest wire
centres. Since this process ignores physical geography, some subsequent
editing was required to remove artefacts such as islands divided between
two s when one is on the mainland, but by using this plot we could
quickly assign every  to its nearest wire centre sibling.
Manhattan Queens Brooklyn The Bronx Staten Island
All Wire
Centres
Resident Population (2007
estimates)
1,613,496 2,135,429 2,617,630 1,376,419 478,285 8,221,259
Working Population 2,543,910 646,681 727,191 383,889 147,586 4,449,257
 Count 758 80 72 25 27 962
Wire Centre Count 20 16 18 9 4 66
Table 6.3: Borough Infrastructure
Overview
As Table 6.3 shows, there are more than 900 s spread across
the New York-metro area, but the amount of equipment varies sub-
stantially from borough to borough: Staten Island contains fewer than
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50 switches, while Manhattan contains well over 500. Clearly, with
this level of aggregation it is impossible to identify individuals or ﬁrms
within the data set, guaranteeing the privacy of the operator’s customers
while enabling researchers to extract signiﬁcant information from over-
all telecoms usage patterns. The density of s in Manhattan is partic-
ularly fortunate since that is also where we will ﬁnd the highest density
of businesses. The sheer concentration of telecommunications infras-
tructure in lower Manhattan, and especially in Mid-Town and around
Wall Street, is mind-boggling. For a more detailed breakdown of the
infrastructure please see Table 12.2 in Appendix D: Data Management
& Processing on page 478.
G B: The very diﬀerent data set for Britain was collected
in August of 2005, and the core table in the able data warehouse
contains 7.2 billion unique records, spanning more than 150 of data.
To date, this is the largest network data set ever made available to aca-
demic researchers; the only comparable one from which papers have
been published draws on Instant Messaging () data collected by Mi-
croso’s own analysts using its proprietary  network (Leskovec and
Horvitz, 2008). This massive data set provides a record of nearly every
call that either originated or terminated at a landline in the U.K. that
month.
Since the data was provided at a ﬁner level, extensive discussions
were held with the British telecommunications company to determine
the best way to manage the privacy issues associated with the analy-
sis of this data. Each number in the  log was assigned a random,
unique identiﬁer (i. e. a pseudonym, see Pﬁtzmann et al., 2001) using
an approach that would, very deliberately, never be shared with us. Fol-
lowing conversion, the data was transferred on a biometrically-secured
hard drive to ..., where it was loaded into a secure database using
the structure described by the Entity Relationship Diagram () in
Appendix D: Data Management & Processing (see page 481).
A simpliﬁed version of the data contained in the core calling table is
shown here:
46947334 93164513 2 1 2 26 18 74.00 1
37500942 30778385 1 1 9 25 47 3.00 1
73311732 123904475 3 1 8 23 38 42.00 1
37640164 35791306 1 1 9 19 29 91.00 1
34216069 103654151 2 1 9 4 7 48.00 1
Reading from le-to-right, we have the originating pseudonym (who
placed the call), the terminating pseudonym (who received the call),
a call-type identiﬁer (e.g. landline, mobile, international), a date id,
hour id, minute number, seconds number, the duration of the call (in
seconds), and the call count (always ‘1’ here because this is a dummy
variable). Note that the call-type identiﬁer is determined by whichever
of the numbers (if any) is not on a landline because it is only the ﬁxed
line that we can localise; so, if both callers are on landlines then the
value is ‘landline’, but if one of the callers is on a mobile then the value
is ‘mobile’, and if one of the callers is calling from abroad then the value
is ‘international’. The last two options are non-geographic (i. e. 0845-
232 the place of telecommunications
and 0800- numbers) and other (anything not ﬁtting into the other
categories).
For calls involving mobile numbers, non-geographic numbers, and
international numbers, callers are impossible to localise below the level
of the country: for instance, U.K. mobile users could only be identiﬁed
as calling from somewhere within the U.K., while international callers
could only be recognised as having called from a given country. This
means that pseudonyms come from a pool of tens of millions and that
there is no possibility of reidentiﬁcation. For the landline callers the
situation is more complex: because their location is reported at the
level of the exchange there would be a theoretical risk of privacy attacks
involving the caller’s social network if we were not careful handling the
data (cf. Backstrom et al., 2007; Bonneau et al., 2009).
Generally speaking, this issue is referred to by privacy researchers as
a k-anonymity issue (cf. Sweeney, 2001, 2002a). The simplest solution
to k-anonymity risks is generalisation (i.e. aggregation, see Sweeney,
2002b), and here the structure of the data works very much in our
favour: the smallest exchange contains a population of nearly 1,000 and
covers an area of 19km2, and the average exchange contains a popula-
tion of 14,000 within an average area of 36km2, meaning that it is eﬀec-
tively impossible to disambiguate callers. Furthermore, analysis is con-
ducted entirely at the aggregated level and so individually-identiﬁable
data never leaves the hardened data warehouse.
Entire U.K. England
Greater South East
of England
Outer
Metropolitan
Area Greater London
Population
(Mid-year 2005
estimates)
53,431,744 50,451,657 21,410,906 13,492,054 12,103,387
Output Area Count N/A 32,700 13,600 8,600 7,600
 Count 5,600 3,600 1,400 500 400
Average population per  N/A 14,000 15,700 25,600 26,500
Average phones per  6,400 8,300 10,200 17,300 18,100
Table 6.4: British Infrastructure
Overview
Since we are here working only with ﬁxed-line data, the data is al-
ready mapped on to the relevant ‘wire centres’. However, exchange
areas do not map cleanly on to the publicly available statistical units
such as the Oﬃce of National Statistics’ Super Output Areas (s) and,
moreover, the exact boundary of the exchange area is commercially sen-
sitive. As a result, the operator joined the public geography of Output
Areas with the private geography of exchange areas to create a ‘public
exchange area’ () whose boundaries, since they were less sensitive,
could be shared with us. The process resulted in -linked polygons
to which we could then append any of the standard socioeconomic data
sets, including the  employment data and census population data.
Table 6.4 shows the overall distribution of s at the scales that are
most interesting to us. And Figure 6.9 gives a sense of how s are
distributed within the  region, while the inset highlights the con-
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centration of telecommunications infrastructure within the London
metropolitan area. The s are shown here as points to address poten-
tial concerns with exchange boundaries being inadvertently revealed
in areas where they are particularly ﬁne-grained. As with the , the
density of exchanges varies substantially with the density of people and
businesses.
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Figure 6.9: Mapping Exchanges in
London and the Greater South East
Spatiotemporal Considerations
Although such massive data sets enable meaningful information to be
extracted from tiny slivers of space and time, it is much more useful to
look at the overall pattern of ﬂows. Figure 6.10 shows an entire month’s
worth of calling activity on the British telecommunications company’s
data set, and one week’s worth of activity on the wireline (i. e. landline)
and mobile platforms for every  in the American data set. What this
shows very strongly is that there are daily and weekly cycles within the
data, and that this holds true regardless of the data’s origins or the type
of telecoms data being studied10. Two features of particular note are:
10 Obviously, in cultures where
the work week is not synchronised
with predominantly Christian
traditions then we may see diﬀerent
patterns of usage.
the obvious presence of a long weekend at the end of August in Britain,
and the enormous surge in activity aer the nightly ‘watershed’ for free
mobile calling on the U.S. network.
The data from the major American telecommunications company
also emphasises the extent to which diﬀerent s and exchanges may
carry very diﬀerent levels of traﬃc: the red line marking the averages
in Figure 6.10 falls a long way from the peaks observed in the data. In-
terestingly, the weekly cycle is particularly strong for dedicated lines,
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Figure 6.10: Global Patterns in
New York and U.K. Data
reinforcing the idea that leased lines are dominated by businesses usage,
while landlines show a similar, though less exaggerated, load pattern
over the course of the week. However, the magnitude of the diﬀerences
between the maximum and minimum loads on all of these platforms
strongly implies that some kind of normalisation of the data is required:
either log normalisation of the call data or, depending on the distribu-
tions, normalisation by population. Regardless, Figure 6.10 makes it
clear that there are compelling reasons for focussing on the hour of day
and the day of week as the critical analytical intervals.
Previous research using other telecoms data sources has also found
that the diurnal and weekly cycles are the critical ones: the Fourier
Transform shown in Figure 6.11 highlights the most prominent tem-
poral cycles in WiFi activity using their magnitude: so higher peaks are
more meaningful to the analysis of the data. In the case of the ...
WiFi data, 24 hours (i. e. 1/0.04 hours) is by far the most prominent
feature, followed by 1 week, 48 hours, 12 hours and 8 hours in declin-
ing importance. In every case, cycles lasting longer than one week were
found to be of marginal importance to the observed data when com-
pared to the diurnal cycle of waking up, heading to work, breaking for
lunch, and then heading out or home in the evenings.
The weekly cycle is also particularly useful is in distinguishing be-
tween oﬃce and home locations since these show very diﬀerent levels
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Figure 6.11: Fourier Transform of
... WiFi Data
of use over the weekend. By averaging together the four weeks of data
in the data sets into a single representative week, we can also control
for the random variation of day-to-day activity over the course of the
month (including holidays and special events), reduce the overall size of
the data set being analysed, and work with a timeframe that is particu-
larly suited to picking up the diﬀerences between s and exchanges.
6.6 Analysing the Data
Over the past two years I have worked closely with ...’s Francesco
Calabrese to extend the ‘signature analysis’ method ﬁrst proposed by
Ratti et al. (2006). Using data from a variety of providers and platforms
in Rome and Boston we obtained early, but quite exciting, results and
this work seeks to bring together the techniques developed in those
publications (cf. Reades et al., 2007, 2009; Calabrese et al., 2010) with
these extraordinarily rich data sets in order to more fully test the validity
of the methods.
In this section we will ﬁrst review the analysis of industrial concen-
tration using the Location Quotient () and consider some method-
ological issues to do with the normalisation of irregularly-distributed
data. Next, we will consider a Telecommunications Quotient ()
approach, modelled on the  methodology, to see if it has analyti-
cal beneﬁts for rapid exploratory work. Finally, we will turn to the
eigenplace analysis, which uses the output from an eigendecomposi-
tion process to feed a clustering algorithm that enables us to compare
and categorise hundreds of very diﬀerent signatures according to their
underlying similarities.
Employment Data
To provide a frame of reference for the telecommunications data,
we need to ﬁrst count the number of workers and residents in each
telecommunications  or exchange. Most studies of cities, regions,
and agglomerations measure industrial concentration using Florence’s
(1948) Location Quotient (), and so this metric provides a useful
benchmark against which to compare phone usage data. If we can
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identify a systematic relationship between some feature of the telecom-
munications data and one or more industries then we will have found
the characteristic signature of that industry and provided a template
against which to test other signatures for similar industrial activity.
The Location Quotient () is essentially a form of normalisation
designed to cope with the fact that employment is rarely uniformly
distributed. To calculate the , we compare the concentration of a par-
ticular industry in an area-of-interest against the expected concentration
of that industry given its regional average. So the basic  formula is:
(EmploymentiA/EmploymentA)/(EmploymentiR/EmploymentR)
where, i is an industrial sector, and A is an area-of-interest within a
benchmark region R. So a  of 1 means that the share of employ-
ment for industry i in area A is equal to the regional average for that
sector. A  above 1 means that an industry is over-represented in area
A compared to the region R as a whole, and a  of less than 1 implies
under-representation. The  is a multiplier measure, so a  of 10
means that an industry is ten times more concentrated in area A than it
is in the region R overall.
S  R: Although the  is fairly straightforward, it
should be obvious that the denominator terms EiR and ER establish an
implicit frame of reference with important implications for the resulting
analysis. Depending on whether R is a metro area, a region, or a nation,
derived s can change substantially. For instance, if we take i to be the
ﬁnancial and commercial banking sectors and use census tracts in New
York City () as the relevant A, then switching from using New
York State as the R to  causes the peak  to fall from more than
30—thirty times more concentrated than the state average!—to ‘just’
16.
This issue was considered by Hall (1962, p.17), and he developed
the ‘Local Location Quotient’ () for the study of the industries of
London. Quite simply, the  is an explicit acknowledgement of the
fact that there is usually a region of interest being explored in this sort of
work, and that data from outside the region may be either less reliable,
or less reliably comparable. This approach also keeps the focus ﬁrmly on
relative diﬀerences in industrial concentration, rather than absolute ones,
and this is relevant to our proposed analyses of the highly-specialised
areas that make up London and the Greater South East of England
()11.
11 The American telecommuni-
cations company data only covers
activity within New York City
anyway, so it seems sensible to
select the city as the benchmark R
here as well—we can’t see usage
outside of the city, so we have no
way of knowing how it might diﬀer
from usage within the city.Because the data supplied by the U.K. network covers such a large
area, it supports ﬂexible and intensive investigation. So I will ﬁrst per-
form a  analysis of the London metropolitan area to provide some
useful, if partial, insight into the functioning of a ‘world city’; however,
this is only the ﬁrst step since I will also perform a similar analysis using
the much larger Greater South East of England () region. This larger
region should contain the entirety of the London Mega-City Region
(12) hypothesised by Pain and Hall (2008) in  and other
12 The formal deﬁnition of the
 is that it consists of “a series of
anything between twenty and ﬁy
cities and towns, physically separate
but functionally networked,
clustered around one or more
larger central cities, and drawing
economic strength from a new
functional division of labour” (Hall,
2009, pp.806–807).recent publications, but whose functioning has only been understood
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to-date in terms of commuting and labour markets. Consequently, this
will be the ﬁrst time that we have been able to explore the informational
ﬂows within something resembling a ‘megalopolis’.
S  A: The nature of the exchange and the  create
a basic ‘unit of analysis’ below which we cannot conduct any viable re-
search, making this the natural choice for the numerator (A) in the 
analysis. The size of each exchange, and the number of workers and
residents that it contains, varies with the overall density of activity, so
there is no set size for the area served by a switch. The process of nor-
malisation involved in calculating the  helps to control this potential
source of comparability problems because large concentrations of em-
ployment tend to have both a large numerator and a large denominator.
Dividing by physical area would serve very little purpose here since
the area of a  or  is largely meaningless: at the very least we
should be using the total ﬂoor area, but all this would accomplish would
be to further emphasise the communication peaks at a small number
of extremely active locations without in any way helping us to control
for working or residential population. Furthermore, if we were to take
this approach then we would also want to apply the same area-based
normalisation to the telecoms usage data in order to generate mutually
comparable data sets13. 13 In the event that it became
necessary to control for area A’s
size then the  for sector i could
be recalculated using the following
formula, which includes a measure
of employment density:
(EmploymentiA/EmploymentA)
AreaA
(EmploymentiR/EmploymentR)
AreaR
Normalising by the area of A and
R would tend to intensify the em-
ployment peaks in downtown areas
since these have correspondingly
smaller physical sizes.
S  L Q: Although we can calcu-
late the level of concentration for a particular industry, there is, in fact,
surprisingly little consensus on what constitutes a signiﬁcant level of
concentration (i. e. an agglomeration) for an industry (O’Donoghue
and Gleave, 2004). Is it a  of 2, which is twice as concentrated as the
regional average, or a  of 20, which is twenty times as concentrated?
Many studies of industrial concentration use arbitrarily-selected thresh-
olds for identifying agglomerations—these typically range from 1.25 to
3—but O’Donoghue and Gleave (2004) note that these values lack any
statistical, or even rational, justiﬁcation.
The issue is that the degree of concentration that is meaningful ulti-
mately depends on the sample size and on the overall distribution of an
industry: in the case of ’s banking sector, the  rises to more than
15 times the metropolitan average, but this grouping does not necessar-
ily constitute a statistically-signiﬁcant level of concentration because there
are not many areas that contain any high ﬁnance. So whereas basic retail
establishments tend to be fairly common and evenly distributed because
everyone needs to shop for groceries, investment banking tends to be
quite rare and quite unevenly distributed since only a few corporations
or clients require their services. So in the former case, a  greater than
1.5 could be an important clue that there is a site of particular interest
to retailers that is worth investigating in more depth, while for ﬁnance
the tiny sample size and uneven distribution may not oﬀer any insight
at all into whether these groupings are deliberate or the product of mere
chance.
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Figure 6.12: The Normal Distribu-
tion (Wikipedia, 2007; reproduced
with permission)
So to determine if a particular  value has any statistical signiﬁ-
cance, we therefore need to know the overall distribution of s. Fol-
lowing O’Donoghue and Gleave (2004, p.422), we can calculate a Stan-
dardised Location Quotient (14) and test for normality. If the overall
14 More accurately, if were to
keep with the method set out
Hall (1962) then these would
be Standardised Local Location
Quotients (s), but this is
becoming quite a weighty acronym
and so I have used  as short-
hand for this approach throughout
the text.
distribution is normal, then we can look to the standard deviation as a
guide to whether there is signiﬁcant over- or under-representation of an
industry in a particular area. However, as Figure 6.12 shows, standard
deviations do not quitemap cleanly on to the conﬁdence levels normally
used in statistics, and remember too that a 5% conﬁdence level implies
a 2.5% probability of ﬁnding a value below the lower boundary and a
2.5% probability of ﬁnding a value above the upper one.
The two most commonly used conﬁdence levels are 95% (equiv-
alent to the range between ≊ −1:96 and ≊ +1:96 standard deviations)
and 99% (equivalent to ≊ ±2:58 standard deviations15). But before 15 Oen, instead of speaking of
standard deviations, analysts speak
of z-values or z-scores, which are
functionally equivalent.
we can work with these standard values, we need to conﬁrm that the
distribution is actually—or at least plausibly—normal. O’Donoghue
and Gleave suggest checking the raw s for normality using the 1-
Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (- Test) 16. If the raw s are not 16 Implemented in  under:
Analyze→Non-Parametric Values→ 1 Sample - Testnormally distributed, then they suggest taking the log of each  and
testing the resulting distribution for log-normality using the Monte
Carlo method within the 1-Sample - Test17. 17 Implemented in the  appli-
cation under: Analyze→Non-
Parametric Values→ 1 Sample K-S
Test→ Exact TestsAdditional research, however, suggested that the Lilliefors test wouldbe a more appropriate solution since this test uses the mean and variance
of the observed data to create a normal distribution that can be tested
against the empirical one18. Finally, although it is possible to adjust 18 Implemented in  as lil-
lietest(x,alpha,dist,mctol),
where x is the input vector, alpha
is the signiﬁcance level, dist is
the type of distribution for which
to test (normal, exponential, or
extreme value), andmctol forces
 to calculate a Monte Carlo
approximation for p instead of
using a lookup table.
the  to control for the predominance of large ﬁrms (O’Donoghue
and Gleave, 2004, p.423), however the  business data from the
U.K. and the standard business data from the U.S. do not support this
process.
Telecommunications Quotient
In much the same way that we can measure the relative concentration of
employment, we can also calculate a concentration/specialisation metric
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for telecommunications. Using what I will call the ‘Telecommunica-
tions Quotient’ (), we can compare the share of traﬃc to/from a point
of interest anywhere in the world for which a given area A is responsible
against the regional average (i. e. R). The basic calculation is therefore as
follows:
(TraﬃcpA/TraﬃcA)/(TraﬃcpR/TraﬃcR)
where, p is a place of interest (e.g. Los Angeles or Japan), A is an area-
of-interest (i. e.  or ) within region R, and R the benchmark
region. This calculation would work equally well with either the num-
ber of calls, or their duration.
I anticipate that we will need to include both domestic and inter-
national traﬃc in this calculation because this will contextualise the
 within the overall level of activity. For instance, an area with little
international traﬃc could demonstrate large shis in the  with only
small shis in the relative intensity of calling to a particular country.
Using this approach, it transpires that many suburban and rural areas
place or receive so few international calls—and, conversely, that urban
areas place so many—that the majority of s have s of less than one.
Consequently, the idea that unity represents an overall regional average
is misleading in this case, and we ﬁnd that few of the s calculated for
British s have a normal or log-normal distribution. Accordingly, the
concept of a standardised  () is of rather limited analytical value
here.
Nonetheless, this approach has several advantages: ﬁrst, much like
the , it controls for widely varying levels of telecoms usage; second, it
yields a singular metric which could be compared with the ﬁgures cal-
culated for employment; and third, its simplicity means that we can test
a variety of approaches quickly and easily. Signiﬁcantly, this is rather
a diﬀerent approach to the data from what was found in the seminal
early work by Graham and Marvin (1996) and, to a lesser extent, by
Sassen (2002) which tended to focus on raw numbers at the urban scale.
Limitations in the data to which these and other researchers had access
made more subtle comparisons diﬃcult, or even impossible, but nor-
malisation is crucial if we are not to simply ﬁnd that cities are global
telecommunications hubs.
Eigenplace Analysis
O: While the concept of s provides one approach to the
telecoms data, we have not yet taken advantage of its temporal aspects.
To do so, we will need turn to computational methods that draw on
techniques used in signal analysis and remote sensing. Eigendecom-
position operates in a manner similar to factor analysis, and this, in the
form of a ‘matrix analysis’, has notably been previously used by God-
dard in a ‘regionalisation’ analysis of taxi ﬂows within London (1970;
and see also Goddard, 1973, pp.25–29). The process enables us to con-
vert a large number of unique, noisy ‘signatures’ into a much smaller
number of place-speciﬁc coeﬃcients that are suitable for both man-
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ual and automated categorisation. In combination, these eigenvectors
and eigenvalues enable us to extract and categorise the underlying, re-
current features of the observed data from each area, and to generate a
telecommunications-based classiﬁcation of space.
T: We can think of each  or exchange as a kind of probe that
returns a set of observations—that there were x calls to Canada and y
minutes to Indonesia, for instance—about its environment. The chal-
lenge is that each area will show a diﬀerent level of overall usage that re-
ﬂects both the density and the mix of local activity. How, for instance,
do we recognise that there is a similar—but not identical—pattern of
activity in the City of London (where the activity would be driven by
dozens of ﬁnancial institutions) and in Cambridge (where the activity
might be driven by a single large ﬁnancial ﬁrm embedded amongst
several other sectors)? We need a way to simultaneously manage two
eﬀects: a scale-eﬀect that encompasses the concentration of activity, and
a mix-eﬀect that captures the way that a blend of causes can contribute
to the observed signal.
Eigendecomposition enables us to address both of these issues: the
process yields an ordered set of linearly independent19 vectors (termed 19 Linear independence is important
since it means that the derived
vectors are all orthogonal and,
much like the coordinates obtained
from multidimensional scaling
(), ‘may be treated as separate
dependent variables’ (Barnett and
Choi, 1995, p.254).
eigenvectors) and linked coeﬃcients (termed eigenvalues). Because the
eigenvectors are independent, each one accounts for a diﬀerent aspect
of the observed signal, enabling us to grapple with the mix-eﬀect;
because each vector has an associated coeﬃcient, we can also address
the scale-eﬀect of concentration. Furthermore, by performing the
eigendecomposition for the entire data set at once, we obtain a single set
of eigenvectors that are the same for all locations; only the eigenvalues
vary from place to place.
However, this process is easier described than done: for each 
we have 7 days × 24 hours observations for each dimension used in
the analysis. So even if we choose just three dimensions—minutes
to Canada, calls to Continental Europe, and minutes to Brazil, for
instance—as the basis for classifying an exchange, then we are looking
at a minimum of 700,000 data points for the  (7 days × 24 hours ×
3 dimensions × 1,400 s), and more than 1.8 million observations for
all of Britain. In fact, we have many, many more dimensions than this
from which to choose and so the ‘problem space’ is even larger than
this.
K D  D: Moreover, we cannot expect a
single usage dimension (or even several diﬀerent dimensions) to yield
a categorisation that ‘works’ for all sectors and all activities because
many uses overlap in both space and time: an area might easily be both
residential and ﬁnancial, with both ‘activities’ happening throughout the
day and night. So instead of performing a single analysis and deriving
one set of clusters, we will approach the analysis iteratively and may well
ﬁnd that the output of one ﬁltering or clustering process becomes the
input to another, subsidiary one.
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Fortunately, we have a relevant analytical model in interactive
Knowledge Discovery in Databases (oen abbreviated to i). This
approach has already been applied to large spatial data sets: Rinzivillo
et al. (2008) employ an iterative clustering approach to analyse trip data
from Milan in order to understand the relationship between journey
origins and destinations. Their approach successfully balances both the
computational impossibility of analysing all dimensions simultaneously
with the analytical risk that 300 clusters proves to be the ‘mathemati-
cally correct’ result but has no value as an interpretative tool.
As well, an entirely automated analysis might select data dimensions
that have useful analytical characteristics but no underlying meaning.
To try to put this in more concrete terms: if were to feed into the
data mining process aggregate calling to and from two countries of
very diﬀerent sizes—France and the Turks and Caicos Islands, for in-
stance—then the results might prove rather misleading because there
may be just a few exchanges or s with high-levels of calling to the
Turks and Caicos and a large number with very little calling. Unfortu-
nately, this distribution might seem like a good ‘spread’ to an algorithm
while, in contrast, the French calling data seems less relevant because it
has less variation. We can control for this issue (the signiﬁcance of very
small numbers and very large variations) by taking the log of the raw
data, but to a human it is still obvious that small variations in the French
data will generally be more ‘meaningful’ than large variations in the
Turks and Caicos data, and that small-samples should be handled with
care.
I: The number of calls to or from a given place (i. e. an
individual exchange or ) can be represented as a 1 × 168 vector; that
is, we have data for 1  (1 row) with 7 days × 24 hours of observation
(168 columns). We can then vertically stack the descriptive vector for
each  to create a singlem × 168matrix, wherem is the number
of exchanges in the data set (see Table 6.5 for an abbreviated exam-
ple). This is now a covariance matrix suitable for eigendecomposition
(Joliﬀe, 2002).
The process is illustrated in schematic form in Figure 6.13, but note
how two quite diﬀerent signals can be reconstructed from just two
eigenvectors: exchange #1 is composed entirely of the 1st eigenvector
(with magnitude 1.5), while exchange #2 is composed of a mixture of
the 1st and 2nd eigenvectors, both with magnitude 1.
Exchange Day 1/Hour 1 Day 1/Hour 2 ⋯ Day 7/Hour 23
NYC 397.65666 257.56666 ⋯ 1359.03750
NYC 431.01333 232.11000 ⋯ 584.67500⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋮
NYC 1285.56331 826.78334 ⋯ 2127.89166
NYC 5899.10332 3897.76335 ⋯ 792.09167
Table 6.5: Sample Input Data
Matrix for Duration of Calls
In more technical terms, aer eigendecomposition each  or
exchange’s original signal can be expressed as a sum of the global eigen-
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vectors Vi, for i = 1; : : : ; n, each modiﬁed by a set of -speciﬁc
coeﬃcients Ci, for i = 1; : : : ; n. So if Si is the signature observed at a
randomly selected exchange i, then aer eigendecomposition its origi-
nal signal can now be described by the equation:
Si = Ci1:V 1 +Ci2:V 2 + : : :+Cin:V n
where C is the coeﬃcient or eigenvalue and V the eigenvector. Fur-
thermore, these are ranked such that Ci1 ∗ V1 is the most important
principal component in the original signal Si.
Exchange  #22nd Eigenvector
Exchange #1
1.5 * 1st  Eigenvector
0 * 2nd  Eigenvector
1 * 1st  Eigenvector
1 * 2nd  Eigenvector
1st Eigenvector Figure 6.13: Illustration of the
Eigendecomposition Process
However, since we have performed the eigendecomposition on all
exchanges simultaneously, the signature of a second exchange Sj can
also be described with the same set of vectors V1 through Vn, but with
diﬀering coeﬃcients Cj1 through Cjn (i. e. Sj = Cj1:V 1 + Cj2:V 2 +
: : :+Cjn:V n). So now we have compressed thousands of unique, noisy,
complex, time- and space-varying signals into just one set of vectors
shared by all s, and we can now distinguish between them using
only the eigenvalues since the vectors are the same for all s. In eﬀect,
if we want to compare and categorise the exchanges, then we have only
to examine the eigenvalues and, as we will see in the following section,
this a much simpler process computationally and analytically.
Figure 6.14 draws on mobile data from Rome used in earlier research
(see Reades et al., 2007) to illustrate the application of eigendecompo-
sition to a simpliﬁed version of a real data set. In the top half of Figure
6.14 are the raw data (measured in Erlang20) fed into the eigendecom- 20 The Erlang is a unit of telecom-
munications traﬃc usage. Roughly,
the Erlang is the average call ‘den-
sity’ over some period of time, and
so one Erlang is the equivalent of
one call lasting the duration of the
time period. Normally, the time
unit is an hour, meaning that 1
Erlang is 3,600 seconds of phone
usage during in one hour; how-
ever, note that this value could be
achieved in many diﬀerent ways:
it could mean one call than lasted
3,600 seconds, or 360 calls that
each lasted just 10 seconds. See
SearchNetworking.com (2000) for
more information.
position process, in the bottom half are the derived eigenvalues for each
day of the week. At this point, the eigenvectors are no longer strictly
relevant to the comparison of the signals at each site because the vectors
are the same for all three locations.
The magnitude of the eigenvalue is related to the importance of the
eigenvector in the original signal, so in this case the ﬁrst eigenvalue
(of magnitude 2 in nearly every location for most of the week) is con-
nected to the most prominent common feature of the data set: the daily,
double-peaked cycle of phone usage. We can also infer this relationship
without needing to refer to the eigenvector because the ﬁrst eigenvalue
is positive for weekdays and only changes on weekends when lower
overall usage is visible in the plots. The second eigenvalue can be seen
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Figure 6.14: From Signals to
Coeﬃcients (Reades et al., 2009)
to capture a diﬀerent aspect of how usage changes on weekends be-
cause its value also changes quite signiﬁcantly on Saturday and Sunday
aer remaining steady throughout the week. The third eigenvalue ap-
pears to record an evening surge in activity since it rises at Olimpico on
Wednesdays and Saturdays when sports ﬁxtures occur.
Feature Selection
Although eigenvalues oﬀer some basic insight into patterns of activity,
the most important reason for calculating them is that they are simple
scalars and so are also amenable to standard types of dimensional anal-
ysis. In eﬀect, we can treat each eigenvalue as a dimension, and will
eventually be able to group each exchange by its degree of similarity
to all of the others across the diﬀerent values. There are many ways to
group observations (or, in this case, eigenvalues) into categories but the
principal issue that we need to consider is whether and to what extent
to guide the categorisation process. Since telecommunications data and
its use in this context are largely new to built environment research, I
felt that it was best to employ an unsupervised approach in which no a
priori assumptions are used to structure the analysis.
In real-world data sets, eigendecomposition produces dozens, or
even hundreds of eigenvalue/eigenvector pairs. The issue that this in-
troduces is that we can’t know which eigenvalues are the most signiﬁcant
for our analysis, we only know which are the most important for recon-
structing the original data. Fortunately, this problem is well-understood
as one of ‘feature selection’ in which we examine the distribution of
eigenvalues along each dimension and discard ones that add little to our
understanding of the data so as to retain only a smaller, representative
set of eigenvalues from the data.
In many ways, the feature selection process employed here is simi-
lar to the clustering process that will be discussed in Section 6.6 (page
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245), in that we are grouping values according to their degree of simi-
larity. For instance, imagine that we ﬁnd that the 1st, 5th, and 7th eigen-
values have similar distributions across all of the locations captured data
set, then for the purposes of examining calling activity across the region
R we only need one of these three eigenvalue sets and can safely ignore
the other two. This step would radically simplify the subsequent phases
of the analysis, and is exactly what we accomplish using a -based
implementation of an algorithm for unsupervised feature selection.
The idea here is to partition (i. e. group) the features into a num-
ber of homogeneous subsets, and then select a representative feature
from within each group. The approach developed by Mitra et al. (2002)
manages this by leveraging the concept of ‘maximal information com-
pression’ (2002, pp.303–304); it takes a data matrix (x; y) and calculates
the smallest eigenvalue—which it terms the maximal information compres-
sion index (2)—such that:
22(x; y) = var(x) + var(y)−√(var(x) + var(y))2 − 4var(x)var(y)(1 − (x; y)2)
where  is given by the covariance matrix over the square root of the
variance between the two variables (i. e. (x; y) = cov(x;y)√
var(x)var(y)
).
The process can be summarised as follows:
• we compute the k nearest (most similar) features of each subset (fea-
ture similarity is deﬁned by the maximal information compression
index 2(x; y));
• the feature having the most compact subset is selected and its k
neighbouring features are discarded.
• the process is repeated for the remaining features until all of them are
either selected or discarded.
Implicitly, the value of k is user-speciﬁed such that we retain only
the 5, 10, or 50 most relevant features from the 20, 100 or 500 original
features extracted from the data set via eigendecomposition. Applying
this algorithm to a small data set of wireless and landline international
calling to and from New York City, and specifying the selection of 20
features, results in the features listed in Table 6.6 being selected for the
subsequent clustering process.
Data Source # of Features Features Selected
Outbound
Wireline
5 (25% of total) Eigenvalue 1, Eigenvalue 2, Eigenvalue 5,
Eigenvalue 6, Eigenvalue 10
Inbound
Wireline
6 (30% of total) Eigenvalue 1, Eigenvalue 3, Eigenvalue 4,
Eigenvalue 5, Fourier Transform 8, Fourier
Transform 33
Outbound
Wireless
2 (10% of total) Eigenvalue 4, Fourier Transform 1
Inbound
Wireless
7 (35% of total) Eigenvalue 1, Eigenvalue 3, Eigenvalue 4,
Eigenvalue 5, Eigenvalue 8, Eigenvalue 9,
Fourier Transform 8
Table 6.6: Selected Features for
Calling to and from New York
City
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It is worth noting that in this particular example both the data se-
lected and the feature selection algorithm have functioned quite well for
our purposes: the majority of the features listed in Table 6.6 are higher-
ranked ones—i. e. the lower-numbered eigenvalues and Fourier Trans-
form frequencies—meaning that there are only a few that are likely
to represent quite minor behavioural patterns or cycles (e.g. Fourier
Transform 33 from Inbound Wireline), and no one data set dominates
the ﬁnal selection. What this indicates is that the input data varies in
signiﬁcant ways and that the algorithm is not being ‘misled’ by the noise
that characterises the lesser-ranked features.
Cluster Analysis
Since we want to allow urban structure to emerge from the data, rather
than imposing our preconceptions upon what it should show, we want
a ‘bottom-up’ classiﬁcation and the k-Means method is an appropriate
approach. The method partitions (i. e. groups into parts) a set of obser-
vations (x1, x2, x3, : : : , xn) into k sets (where k < n) such that each
observation is as much like the other members of its own group, and
unlike members of any other group, as possible. Similarity is measured
by the distance between each observation xj and the mean vector i
for the set Si of which it is a member. In other words, we calculate the
centroid for a group Si using all of its members, and can then measure
the distance of every x from that centroid.
In practice, there are a number of ways to measure the distance
between a vector xj and the mean vector i. However, the simplest
approach is to use the multi-dimensional Euclidean distance, and then
sum this value for all members of the cluster using the following for-
mula (Wikipedia, 2005b):
argmin
S
k∑
i=1
∑
xj∈Si ∣∣xj − i∣∣2
So we are trying to ﬁnd which cluster centroids (i. e. mean vectors i)
would produce the smallest possible within-cluster sum of squares dis-
tance for all n observations. In (more) plain English, we start oﬀ not
knowing which observations belong in which groups, so we take k
random starting points, assign every observation to the closest starting
point, and then calculate the mean value of each cluster. If, aer calcu-
lating the mean vector i we ﬁnd that some observations are actually
closer to a diﬀerent group’s mean vector j , then we reassign it from
one cluster to another and recalculate the mean vectors once more.
Over many iterations, we gradually converge on a stable distribution in
which we cannot reassign any observations from one group to another
without increasing the size of one or more of the mean vectors. Conse-
quently, the best clustering is the one for which the sum of the distances
within each group is at a minimum (i. e. argmin).
However, we need to repeat the entire process multiple times because
it is nearly impossible to calculate an optimal clustering in just one go,
even for a data set of very modest size. As a result, computer scientists
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have adopted an iterative approach to clustering since, over many, many
iterations, the centroids gradually converge on a stable distribution and
no further reassignments take place. With only a single pass at the data
the results would be highly sensitive to the initial conditions (i. e. the
coordinates selected for the ﬁrst centroids), so by repeating the entire
clustering process multiple times with diﬀerent random seeds each time
it becomes possible to derive a stable set of clusters such that each x is
assigned to the best S in a globally optimal way.
The one major drawback of the k-Means approach is that the value
of k is a user-speciﬁed input and is not derived from the data itself. In
other words, we decide how many clusters there are in the data, and
while we may think that there are four groups, perhaps there are actually
ﬁve. Or ten. Or just two. Consequently, we need a way to evaluate
which value of k provides the best ﬁt for the data. Fortunately, the
appropriateness of a clustering solution can be gauged both mathemat-
ically and visually using the silhouette values (Rousseuw, 1987). An
s-value close to +1 means that the element is appropriately clustered,
while an s-value close to -1 suggests the element is not a good ﬁt for
its cluster. So the silhouette plot simply shows the s-value for each
and every observation, and the average silhouette value measures how
appropriately the data has been clustered overall.
Figure 6.15A shows the s-plot for a clustering of the eigenvalues
derived fromWiFi hotspots on ...’s campus. So in this ﬁgure, the
data making up Clusters #1, #2, #3, and 5 appear to be well-grouped
while Cluster #4 shows substantial internal variation, suggesting that it
is rather more weakly clustered. The s-value calculation was performed
using the following formulation in :
S(i) =
(min(b(i; :);2))
max(a(i);min(b(i; :);2))
where a(i) is the average distance from the ith point to all other points
in the cluster, and b(i; k) is the average distance from the ith point to all
points in another cluster k.
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for WiFi Hotspot Eigenvalues
(Calabrese et al., 2010)
We can mathematically compare the silhouette plots obtained for
each k using the total area in the right half of the s-plot (i. e. s > 1) in
order to determine the optimal value of k. Since the clusering process
is run iteratively, what it actually yields is a probability density function
() that is calculated for each value of k from multiple passes across
the data. At this point, interactive collaboration between humans and
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computers becomes invaluable, because although two clusters may
be the mathematically optimal solution—it picks up on a fairly basic
distinction between high- and low-volume s—it also seldom yields
much in the way of new insight. Experimentation during the analysis
phase suggests that the range 3 ≤ k ≤ 6 yields the best balance between
mathematical optimality and human interpretability: less than three and
the diﬀerence is so basic as to be obvious, more than six and the clusters
cease to have any kind of meaning or abstraction value (i. e. you tend
towards a situation where every exchange is in its own cluster and so no
generalisation is possible).
We can also use each cluster’s mean vector i to generate an average
signal for the cluster. Figure 6.15B shows the average signal for each of
the clusters obtained from the k-Means clustering whose results are
shown in Figure 6.15A. This demonstrates how the process has cap-
tured distinct behaviours in each cluster: we can infer that Cluster #1
shows the regular weekly usage of undergraduate dormitories because
it remains high over weekends when those are the only fully-occupied
buildings, while Cluster #2 shows the sudden, massive surges in usage
within auditoria whenever a big lecture takes place.
Cluster 5 (Public Spaces)
Cluster 3 (Low-Volume Residential Spaces)
Cluster 1 (High-Volume Residential Spaces)
Cluster 4 (Academic/Research Spaces)
Cluster 2 (Large Group Meeting Spaces)
Academic
Residential
Service
Figure 6.16: Eigenplace Anal-
ysis Results for ... Campus
(Calabrese et al., 2010)
Finally, we can take the results from the k-Means analysis and
project the clusters back on to the original geography from which the
observations were drawn. Figure 6.16 shows the results of an analysis
undertaken on ...’s campus using data collected from more than
3,000 WiFi hotspots. Working from the silhouette analysis shown
above in Figure 6.15, we were able to show that from the standpoint of
network usage ...’s campus had ﬁve distinct types of activity, and not
the three land uses determined by the university’s administration. The
university campus is a fairly controlled and deﬁned space, but if we can
extend this analysis to the urban, regional, and even national scales, then
this technique could change the way that we approach the collection of
data—the low latency of telecommunications data (as little as 24 hours
aer collection) could, for instance, be used to identify areas where the
census appears to be signiﬁcantly out-of-date, enabling governments to
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prioritise them for sampling over those where there is little evidence of
change.
Soware Implementation
The application employed in this analysis was jointly-developed with
Francesco Calabrese of the able Lab at ...21, and the full pro- 21 In fact, credit for the imple-
mentation should go principally to
Francesco Calabrese and Amedeo
Buonanno of ...; I have focussed
on data aggregation and man-
agement, extensions to the basic
application, and aspects of usability
and dimensional selection.
cess is illustrated in Appendix C: Eigenplace Analysis (see page 419).
However, the basic sequence is as follows:
• Select call data for one or more continents, regions, countries, or
exchanges/s of interest—there is one ﬁle for each geography (e.g.
a continent or country of interest), and one row per ﬁle for each 
or exchange such that each row contains 7 × 24 columns of data;
• Calculate the principal components of the data (speciﬁcally, the
eigenvalues and Fourier frequencies) for each input ﬁle;
• Calculate the ‘spread’ of the data across each of the derived features
and retain only a representative subset of the full feature set so as to
improve the clustering results (see Feature Selection below);
• Repeatedly cluster the remaining features for all locations using
diﬀerent values of k (i. e. diﬀerent numbers of clusters) in order to
generate a probability distribution function that enables us to identify
the most meaningful number of clusters to use for a mapping;
• Select a value for k and map the clusters to see if signiﬁcant relation-
ships emerge.
Summary
Calabrese and I have termed the results of the eigendecomposition, fea-
ture selection, and clustering process an ‘eigenplace’ (2009; 2010) since
it uses the principal components derived via eigendecomposition from
an area’s telecommunications usage to create a usage-based description
of place. The analytical beneﬁt of eigenplaces is that they are quanti-
tatively comparable to any other places described with the same set of
characteristic vectors. Since the coeﬃcients are simple scalars, we can
cluster areas based solely on the similarities and diﬀerences between the
coeﬃcients and then examine how these groups are distributed across
space, using them to illuminate structural diﬀerences in telecommuni-
cations usage. By comparing eigenplaces with socioeconomic measures
such as the  we can see if diﬀerent industries and activities leave char-
acteristic traces in the ‘space of ﬂows’.
6.7 Conclusions: Analysing Telecommunications Data
This chapter has sought to show how telecommunications data can
be—and, in fact, already is—applied to the study of human society
and of our urban systems. Thanks to the generous involvement of
two major networks in this research, data has been collected on an
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unprecedented scale and with unparalleled detail—together, the data
sets represent the combined calling patterns of more than 70 million
people—ﬁrmly positioning this work within the evolving ﬁeld of com-
putational social science research. What I have sought to make clear,
however, is that  does not exist in a vacuum and that, as such, it is
simply one axis along which research into these systems can advance:
this data oﬀers critical insight into behaviour but can only try to explain
motivation indirectly. In short, such work demonstrates the ongoing
value of “integration between qualitative and quantitative methods in
similar spatial studies” (Pain and Hall, 2008, p.1074).
The theoretical distinction between the LaGrangian and Eulerian
analyses also points to the continued importance of attacking new types
of data and new research challenges from several directions at once.
To date, the majority of telecommunications network analysis has
come exclusively from the LaGrangian perspective, but through the
use of the eigenplaces analysis I hope to shi some of this focus on to
the Eulerian approach. If this eﬀort is successful, then this would put
the comparative and relational components of inter- and intra-urban
telecommunications ﬂows on an equal footing in research.
The eigenplace analysis also has signiﬁcant advantages from a privacy
standpoint because it does not rely on the sharing of any individually-
identiﬁable (not even pseudonymous) interactions. One possibility is
that data in this form might constitute an interesting half-way point on
a journey from the existing situation of highly circumscribed and piece-
meal access by privileged teams to a future where more ﬁne-grained
data—stripped of its identiﬁers to a societally-acceptable level—is more
freely shared between corporations and academe. Data in this form
would be more readily intelligible to both Institutional Review Boards
and regulators (cf. Lazer et al., 2009, p.722), and might therefore stim-
ulate innovation in products and services—see, for instance, Sense
Networks’ CitySense application (2008)—that would generate incre-
mental revenue for operators as well as new means of understanding
urban environments for social science researchers.
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7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will explore telecommunications activity at the ur-
ban and regional scales with a view to determining whether aggregate
usage across space and over time reﬂects underlying activity, or mixes of
activity, in a systematic way. Our objective is to see whether telecoms
activity can be used to prove or disprove the theory of informational
ﬂows elaborated across the previous six chapters, and we will be exam-
ining four diﬀerent scales: urban, regional, national, and international.
We can, for instance, examine where calls originating in London ‘go
to’, or where calls terminating in that city ‘come from’. We can also
look at the timings of these calls throughout the day or week. Ulti-
mately, we will consider if the intersection of these two dimensions can
be used to extract greater detail from this abundance of interaction data.
So what should we expect? Based on the summary and hypotheses
set out in the Methodology (see page 207), we expect the distribution
of ﬁrms to break down along three axes. So ﬁrms employed in predom-
inantly Analytical activity such as &, and to a lesser extent , should
show more in the way of long-distance ﬂows than, say, the ‘creatives’ in
Soho because their outputs are more readily codiﬁable; they should also
show higher levels of dispersion because their reliance on 2 interac-
tion is thought to be lower, although they may obviously beneﬁt from
agglomeration eﬀects in the sourcing of resources.
In contrast, Symbolically-oriented ﬁrms involved in cultural and
artistic outputs should demonstrate high levels of clustering in core
cities because it is there that multilateral ﬂows operate most cheaply
and eﬀectively. Finally, Synthetically-oriented ﬁrms with a reliance
on bilateral interaction may be expected to show a mix of scales and
ﬂows—they should be concentrated, but not necessarily in the Central
Business District (). Underlying this sectoral dynamic, we should
also expect to see increasing levels of internationalisation across all
sectors as we move towards core activity areas, and we should expect
to see greater use of telecommunications as ﬁrms seek to coordinate
increasingly complex activities.
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7.2 Spatial Data Overview
In order to answer the ﬁrst half of the hypotheses—those to do with
industrial location—we will examine sectoral spatial structure in Britain
at two scales: London, and the Greater South East of England. The
latter, oen referred to by the acronym , is composed of three large
Government Oﬃce Regions: London (1,600km2), the South East
(19,000km2), and the East of England (19,600km2). Together, these
regions contain one-third of Britain’s population (21,010,194 using the
mid-2005 estimates), and nearly 10,000,000 workers across an enor-
mous range of industries. Increasingly, the  is seen as the true eco-
nomic ‘heart’ of Britain since employment growth within these three
regions has consistently out-paced the rest of the U.K. (see Figure 5.5
on page 201). Moreover, unlike much of the North, jobs growth here
has been driven primarily by private sector instead of public sector hir-
ing. The intention is that this overview will improve our interpretation
of the results contained in the subsequent sections.
Employment Distribution
London’s general socioeconomic geography is probably well-known
to most readers; however, comparing absolute and relative levels of
employment—relative to the number of residents in the same area, that
is—yields a more nuanced picture since we can expect large imbalances
to highlight in- and out-commuting areas. Figure 7.1a emphasises
the sheer scale of London’s labour market, with 3 public exchange
areas (s) containing more than 100,000 employees, 9 s with
more than 50,000 employees, and a staggering 30-odd s with more
than 25,000 staﬀ. Although employment is distributed widely across
London, there is a pronounced western bias for the largest centres.
This dynamic is reinforced in Figure 7.1b, which shows the ratio of
employees to residents: although it is disproportionately high in the
traditional  of the City and West End, there is a clear ‘wedge’ shape
to the West.
Number of Employees
0 - 12,500
12,500 - 25,000
25,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 - 200,000
0         5        10                   20 Kilometres
(a) Absolute Employment Levels
Employees : Residents
0.5 - 1.0
1.0 - 2.5
2.5 - 5.0
5.0 - 10.0
10.0 - 20.0
20.0 - 300.0
0         5        10                   20 Kilometres
(b) Ratio of Employment To Population Levels
Figure 7.1: Employment by  in
London
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Absolute employment in the  is also widely distributed (see Fig-
ure 7.2a), although the East of England contains rather fewer major
centres of employment. And while the London metro area is still the
most prominent at this scale, important concentrations of workers can
now also be seen at Milton Keynes, Oxford, Reading, Basingstoke,
Cambridge, Guildford, and Maidstone. Figure 7.2a also highlights the
importance of airports: Heathrow, Gatwick, and Luton are all promi-
nent employment centres in absolute terms. Switching to the ratio of
employees to population (see Figure 7.2b) modiﬁes this picture slightly,
although the East is still notable for the absence of major centres. In
particular, the widespread density of employment to the West and
South of Central London seems likely to be of interest, but we can also
see a smaller number of seemingly important sites towards Cambridge.
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Figure 7.2: Employment by  in
the 
Sectoral Distribution
Total employment can broken down in a variety of ways using the Stan-
dard Industrial Classiﬁcation () codes. These codes are available with
four levels of precision and are designed to be hierarchically nested.
At the highest level (labelled with letters, though they could as easily
be called 1-digit  codes), within the  sectors of interest there are
789,000 in manufacturing ( D); 653,000 in transport and commu-
nications ( I); 2.63 million in banking, ﬁnance, insurance, and real
estate ( J, K); and, ﬁnally, 566,000 in other services ( O, P, Q).
However, to explore the more ﬁnely-tuned hypotheses advanced over
the course of the literature review we will need to drill down into the
ﬁner employment divisions.
The 3-digit  codes may oﬀer a good balance between generali-
sation and speciﬁcity, but the 4-digit level will be particularly useful
for illustrating some particularly important points regarding location
choice. Table 7.1 shows how these  codes have been combined to
create groups that are representative of the three principal Knowledge
Bases we considered in Chapter 5. A full list of the relevant  cate-
gories can be found in the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation on page
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Name Details
Symbolic 744 (Advertising), 921 (Motion Picture & Video), 922
(Radio & Television), 925 (Library, Archives & Other
Cultural)
Synthetic #1 651 (Monetary Intermediation), 652 (Other Financial
Intermediation), 660 (Insurance & Pension), 671 (Auxiliary
to Financial Intermediation), 672 (Auxiliary to Insurance &
Pension)
Synthetic #2 7411 (Legal), 7412 (Accounting), 7413 (Market Research),
7414 (Business and Management Consultancy), 7415
(Management of Holding Companies), 7420 (Architectural
& Engineering)
Analytical 721 (Hardware Consultancy), 722 (Soware Consultancy),
723 (Data Processing), 731 (Natural Sciences &)
Material Flows D (Manufacturing), I (Transport & Communications)
Immaterial Flows 7486 (Call Centre Activities), 7230 (Data Processing)
Table 7.1: Top-Level Groups
The higher-level groups reﬂect the Knowledge Bases typology
explored in Chapter 5 (see page 166) and are, accordingly, labelled
Symbolic, Analytical, and Synthetic. Because the Synthetic grouping
contains Finance as well as -type activity, it is much larger than the
other two bases and so has been unbundled to illustrate particular points
made in the The Knowledge Economy chapter regarding face-to-face
interaction (2) and multilateral communication for synthetic ﬁrms.
Finally, with a view to testing the impact of ubiquity in the ﬂow of
standardised goods and services, I created separate Material and Im-
material Flow groups containing manufacturing, call centre, and data
processing employment.
We can also use the 3-digit and 4-digit codes to distinguish between
diﬀerent types of logistical or ﬁnancial activity and merge employment
across some of the larger divisions in order to create custom sub-groups.
So in addition to the bases listed above sectors, I also developed sev-
eral compound groups with which to further explore the patterns of
activity predicted in the Methodology. The categories set out in Table
7.2 are designed to reﬂect the predicted variation in interaction needs
within each knowledge base that was set out in the Hypothesis Gen-
eration section (page 210). In all cases, the Location Quotients (s)
were calculated by summing together employment for each of the in-
dividual sectors and then dividing, as with simpler  values, by total
employment in each .
The ﬁner-grained groups are designed to reﬂect the basic divisions
used by globalisation researchers studying world cities (see Table 6.1
on page 213); amongst these are: Advanced Producer Services (1), 1 Although the 2nd Synthetic group
might appear to be deﬁned in
the same way as the  group, it
should be noted that the 3-digit
 groups contain more than the
4-digit sectors included in the
calculations.
Information & Communications Technology (), Research & De-
velopment (&), Cultural Activity, and Logistics. However, to try
to tease out more ﬁne-grained diﬀerences, there are several additional
groups that are nested within these; the higher-level  group contains
two subgroups: the Legal and Accountancy group and a broader ‘Con-
sultancy’ group and, similarly, the Cultural Activities group contains a
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Name Details
Logistics 6311 (Cargo Handling), 6312 (Storage &
Warehousing), 6321 (Other Support Land
Transport), 6322 (Other Support Water
Transport), 6323 (Other Support Air
Transport), 6210 (Scheduled Air Transport),
6220 (Non-Scheduled Air Transport), 6110
(Sea & Coastal Water Transport), 6120
(Inland Water Transport), 6010 (Transport
via Railways), 6024 (Freight Transport by
Road)
Financial Services† 651 (Monetary Intermediation), 652 (Other
Financial Intermediation), 660 (Insurance &
Pension Funding), 671 (Auxiliary to Financial
Intermediation), 672 (Auxiliary to Insurance &
Pension Funding)
 7210 (Hardware Consultancy), 7221
(Publishing of Soware), 7222 (Other Soware
Consultancy), 7240 (Data Base Activities)
& 7310 (Natural Sciences Research)
Legal & Accountancy 7411 (Legal), 7412 (Accounting)
 741 (Legal, Accounting, etc.), 742
(Architectural & Engineering), 744
(Advertising)
Consultancy 7413 (Market Research), 7414 (Business &
Management Consultancy), 7415
(Management of Holding Companies), 7420
(Architectural & Enginerring)
Cultural Activity 921 (Motion Picture & Video), 922 (Radio &
Television), 925 (Library, Archives & Cultural
Activity)
Cultural Production 9211 (Motion & Video Production), 9212
(Motion & Video Distribution), 9220 (Radio &
Television), 9231 (Artistic & Literary Creation),
7440 (Advertising)
† This is the same composition as Synthetic Group #1.
Table 7.2: Lower Level Groups
‘high-value’ Cultural Production subgroup that includes those working
in Advertising.
Table 7.3 makes clear the unevenness in employment distribution
across the three regions that make up the . So, only 29% of Logistics
employment falls within the London metro area, but 70% of Cultural
Activity employment does. And although two-thirds of Material Flows
employment, and nearly four-ﬁhs of &, are based in the , Fi-
nancial Services work is very much the opposite since 61% of workers
can be found within the London metro area. We will explore these
groupings in more detail in subsequent sections.
Constraints
Because of the sampling method used to collect  employment
data, the more speciﬁc the industry of interest, the greater the likeli-
hood that available data may fail to adequately capture the scale and
distribution of employment. This issue is particularly relevant in the
case of fast-evolving sectors, or in the case of sectors where certain types
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Group London  Percent Central
Total Employment 3,987,780 9,849,160 40.5%
Symbolic 104,671 157,657 66.4%
Synthetic 1 314,108 513,052 61.2%
Synthetic 2 309,420 528,640 58.5%
Analytical 87,121 202,784 43.0%
Material 504,600 1,441,280 35.0%
Immaterial 7,320 21,000 34.9%
Logistics 72,080 246,300 29.3%
 83,720 161,960 51.7%
& 12,600 57,440 21.9%
Legal & Accountancy 136,620 200,860 68.0%
 365,612 688,215 53.1%
Consultancy 172,800 327,780 52.7%
Cultural Activity 72,840 104,442 69.4%
Cultural Production 95,240 117,720 80.9%
Table 7.3: Selected Sectoral Break-
down of Employment in London
and the 
of diﬀerentiation between activities were not previously understood or
fully appreciated by data collectors. For instance, hedge funds, which
are now seen as integral to London’s ﬁnancial services activity, seem
to have been lumped in with ‘Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial interme-
diation not elsewhere classiﬁed’ ( 6713), but there are indications
that in some cases they may also be found under ‘Other ﬁnancial in-
termediation not elsewhere categorised’ ( 6523). Similarly, does
‘Data processing’ ( 723) describe a skilled profession (such as that
performed by database mining ﬁrms), or the less skilled set of tasks
increasingly performed by low-cost staﬀ in India?
7.3 Call Data Overview
In order to answer the second set of hypotheses about communication
patterns, we will also need to turn to patterns of phone usage. Since this
terrain is largely unmapped, it is sensible to begin with the ‘big picture’
and then, over the course of this chapter, narrow the focus progressively
towards the speciﬁc. So, for comparative purposes, this section explores
the ways in which world cities such as London and New York interact
with the rest of the globe and with their respective hinterlands, not only
in terms of the magnitude of the ﬂows, but also their timing, and we
will see how these provide important clues to the nature of the activity
occurring within each .
Spatial Aspects
G  C: In their focussed qualitative research,
Wellman and Tindall (1993) found that the relationship between call
frequency and call duration tends to vary with geographical distance:
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we call most those who are closest, but speak longest to those who
are further away. In data of the scale captured here, this relationship
is (understandably) less immediately evident: Figure 7.3 shows the
number of calls (7.3a) and number of minutes (7.3b) for traﬃc that
began or ended on a landline in London or New York.
In eﬀect, we are here comparing the diversity of calling for these two
cities at the continent-scale. The extent to which London’s ﬂows are
dominated by its interactions with Europe is stunning: for both metrics,
communications with continental Europe are more than the rest of
the world combined! Also striking is the imbalance between London
and New York in terms of communications with Central and South
America; although we might have expected New York City to have
proportionally stronger ties, the diﬀerence is enormous.
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Figure 7.3: Normalised Interna-
tional Landline Traﬃc
An additional surprise is the diﬀering proportion of calls to and
from Asia—New York places far more on a normalised basis than
London—which is altogether unexpected given Britain’s long associ-
ation with former colonies there and the city’s temporal overlap with
the Asian stock markets. This ﬁnding may ﬁt with a broader piece of
research by Barnett and Choi (1995, p.255) which found that global
telecommunications interactions, as measured by bandwidth usage,
tended to break down into three groups of well-interconnected re-
gions—Latin America, Europe, Asia/Southwest Paciﬁc—linked by a
common American (or North American?) hub.
On the surface of things, although this comparison should handled
with some care, it nonetheless appears to conﬁrm similar ﬁndings by
Ratti (2008, p.9)—drawn only from Internet Protocol (..) data—that
New York may, ‘communicationally’ at least, be the more cosmopolitan
of the two cities. Or, at the very least, we can say that its ﬂows are
relatively less dominated by one particular set of contacts. However,
we must also recognise that the number of calls and the number of
minutes sampled from the British network are more than four times
those sampled from the American one, and so it is possible that the
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American telecommunications company is providing only a partial view
of New York’s total activity.
D  D: Historically, the disaggregation of inbound
and outbound calling hasn’t been possible, but what Figure 7.3 makes
clear is that, in aggregate, the diﬀerences are fairly modest. Moreover,
common sense dictates that the distinction between ‘inbound’ and
‘outbound’ cannot be that important since phone communication
requires two (or more) people to participate simultaneously and in
real-time. This is a very diﬀerent communications dynamic from the
asynchronous capabilities of, for instance, email.
Moreover, we can’t use call initiation—i. e. who placed the call—to
determine whether someone is ‘giving the orders’ or is ‘receiving the
instructions’: a junior employee might be ringing to ask ‘what should
I do next?’ or a senior staﬀ member might be calling to ask ‘have you
ﬁnished the project yet?’ In short, in most cases it will be sensible to
work with the sum total of calls or minutes and to ignore directionality.
Figure 7.3 also serves to emphasise another aspect of telecoms usage
that will be useful to our analysis: that while the speciﬁc relationship
between aggregate calls and minutes along any one link vary, they
nonetheless tend to vary in tandem. So even if the exact relationship
between calls and minutes for any one link is unpredictable, the ob-
vious implication is that more calls naturally entail more minutes of
communication. We can also approach the issue in a pragmatic man-
ner by assuming that some proprotion of calls might be a mis-dial, an
unwanted communication (“We’d like to make you an oﬀer…”), or a
cost-related behaviour (“Call me back…”) of some kind; however, this
eﬀect will have less impact on the number of minutes between locations
since these communications will tend to be quickly terminated.
Consequently, working with minutes will tend to reduce the impact
of marketing call centres and other activities that involve a lot of calls
but not much actual ‘communication’. Moreover, if we return to the
thinking on knowledge-intensive work set out in Chapter 5 then it
seems likely that more complex information and more intensive interac-
tions will require more time to communicate. There is a risk that this
approach will emphasise long-distance links at the expense of nearby
ones, but if there is a systematic bias it should emerge in the course of
this analysis. Accordingly, with only a few notable exceptions, I will
focus on ‘minutes of talk’ (also referred to as ‘call volume’ or simply
‘calling’) in preference to ‘total calls’ (or ‘total number of calls’) in this
analysis.
I C: We know from Figure 7.3b that London and
New York’s international communications footprints diﬀer in impor-
tant ways. In Figure 7.42, although the United States is the dominant 2 See page 339 for a version using
data from New York City; and
see page 339 for the unweighted
version of Figure 7.4.
partner for communications with London—it has more than twice the
number of minutes that Ireland, the next most talked-with country,
does—its equally large population reduces its signiﬁcance when the
data is weighted with its 2005 population. Figure 7.4 highlights British
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overseas territories such as Gibraltar, the Falklands/Malvinas, and sev-
eral South Paciﬁc islands, and its colonial heritage is also obvious in
the links with Africa, Australia (22% of minutes to America), Canada
(17%), and India (16%).
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Figure 7.4: Normalised Call
Volumes to and from London
Rather more obvious is the magnitude of intra-European ﬂows in
both absolute and per capita terms. The list of top 10 most talked-with
countries is composed largely of European entries: Ireland (44% of total
minutes with America), France (36%), Germany (34%), and Spain
(25%) ﬁll out second through ﬁh place on inbound, outbound, and
total minutes to London. Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
(rather more surprisingly) Sweden also put in appearances in the top
ﬁeen. There are also obvious connections to the Middle East, and in
particular with the United Arab Emirates.
What is striking to me about this map of global communications is
that, while it reﬂects the dual globalisation processes posited by authors
such as Sassen (cf. 1991, 2002, 2008), it also suggests that a more nu-
anced understanding is required around how these processes manifest in
communicational terms. Informational ﬂows seem to be strengthened
along several discrete axes: economic, linguistic, and social/historical.
So the economic eﬀect embodied in ﬂows between global ﬁnancial
centres is clear—even though Japan is not particularly prominent in this
‘telegeography’—and the strength of connections to countries of origin
for recent migrants is also clear; however, we can also ﬁnd the lingering
traces of the British Empire, as well as a surprisingly strong set of trans-
linguistic connections between London and the largest economies of
continental Europe. Although a much more detailed analysis would be
required, the magnitude of this last type of link does lend at least indi-
rect support to a suggestion by Hall (2002b) that, in some sectors, the
rest of Europe is a kind of ‘hinterland’ to London’s economy—much
as the rest of America and Canada can be considered to be to New
York’s—though it is also undoubtedly connected to migration through
visa-free intra- migration (see also Ratti, 2008, p.9).
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U G: We can also look at how intensely diﬀerent cities
within Britain connect to the rest of the world, giving us some sense of
the extent to which London, as a primate city on a nearly unparalleled
scale, might be unique. Depending on where you draw the boundary,
London contains nearly 1-in-5 people in Britain, so it is not just more
people, more ﬁrms, and more activity, it is vastlymore people, ﬁrms,
and activity. Consequently, a straightforward ‘percentage of all ﬂows’
comparison between British cities, similar to the one for Australia
found in Graham and Marvin (1996, pp.133–134) or to the ﬁgures in
de Goei et al. (2009), is largely meaningless.
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Figure 7.5: Percentage of Interna-
tional Minutes and Phones (Top &
Bottom 10 British Cities)
Figure 7.5 illustrates the magnitude of the problem: the London
deﬁned by the ‘Larger Urban Zone’ () accounts for 37% of all in-
ternational minutes to or from landlines in Britain (35% of inbound
and 38% of outbound)3, and the next biggest s are Manchester (3% 3 This number includes calls not
placed or received within an
—if we exclude non-
minutes then London’s dominance
rises to 60% of all international
calls to or from s.
of minutes) and Bradford-Leeds (2%). Narrowing the focus does not
fundamentally alter this structure: at the Urban Audit area () scale
London still accounts for 27% of all international minutes, while Birm-
ingham is a distant second at just over 1%. These ﬁndings lend strong
empirical support to a claim by Graham (2002, p.77) that:
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It is important to stress that global cities dominate much broader realms
of telecommunications activity than those usually addressed in global
cities literature: ﬁnancial services, corporate ﬁnance, and trading. Such
is their concentration…that global cities also dominate phone, mobile
phone, media communications, and Internet use outside the corporate
and ﬁnancial sectors.
This diﬀerence in scale means that it is helpful—and indeed neces-
sary—to normalise the raw totals extracted from the data with a mea-
sure of how many people there are in each area to actually place or
receive calls. Normalising the data can mask the importance of the very
largest ﬂows in absolute terms, but it also enables us to develop a more
ﬁnely-tuned understanding of areas that are punching above, or below,
their weight in terms of communications activity.
Regardless of how exactly we treat the public exchange areas (s)—i.
e. separately or as groups within towns and cities—we have several
choices for normalising the calling data: 1) within England and Wales
we can divide the results by the number of residents in a ; 2) we
can divide the results by the sum of workers and residents; or 3) we
can divide by the number of active phones in the area. The ﬁrst op-
tion would emphasise areas dominated by industrial activity because
these tend to have smaller populations (i. e. a smaller denominator); the
second option would tend to underemphasise urban s by double-
counting people in dense, mixed-use areas (i. e. a larger denominator);
and the third option may marginally over-emphasise areas dominated
by residences because these may, on average, have more distinct phone
numbers per person than a business-dominated area (especially areas
dominated by large businesses).
However, this last option also enables us to examine the entire U.K.
since, unlike the Census data (which has not been joined to the ex-
change geography of Scotland), this metric is embedded in the data
itself. The results from this type of normalisation of international call-
ing data are presented in Figure 7.6. This approach reduces the ‘London
eﬀect’ and highlights the range of calling behaviours across the country:
Stoke-on-Trent makes less than 20% the volume of international calls
that Bracknell does on a per phone basis. Signiﬁcantly, we now ﬁnd that
every Urban Area () in the top ten ‘most international’ group can be
found in the . The ﬁrst city from outside the  is Warwick (13th
place), and Liverpool (15th place) is the ﬁrst major city not from the
South in the list.
Interestingly, the least international cities contain a mix of deprived
and comparatively well-oﬀ areas: Stoke-on-Trent and Middlesbrough
might be expected to show little evidence of international linkages, but
Exeter, Plymouth, and Swansea are rather more of a surprise. Taken
with caution, this ﬁgure appears to imply that on an aggregate level
the relationship between information ﬂows and deprivation may be
quite complex, possibly even more so than was suggested by the social
network analysis undertaken by Eagle et al. (2010), which focussed only
on domestic calling behaviour as it relates to deprivation.
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Figure 7.6: Normalised Interna-
tional Minutes per Phone (Top &
Bottom 10 British Cities)
D C: Because the data covers an entire country, we can
investigate not only how London interacts with other British cities,
but also how those other cities interact with one another. This second
dimension will be pursued in more depth near the end of this chapter,
but Figure 7.7 provides an interesting comparison of call volumes,
normalised by the number of phones in the counterparty city4 for 4 So each ﬂow was divided by the
population of the city with which
the city-of-interest if speaking: so
in the ‘London Map’ we divide
calls to/from Stoke-on-Trent by
the number of active phones in
Stoke-on-Trent, but in the ‘Stoke-
on-Trent Map’ we divide calls
to/from London by the number
of phones in London. In cleaning
the data underlying these ﬁgures,
some centres of telemarketing
activity (i. e. Christchurch and
Rothbury) were identiﬁed and
suppressed, although this did not
prove necessary in the subsequent
 and eigenplace analyses.
London, Manchester, and Stoke-on-Trent. Maps of the total volumes
scaled against the largest ﬂow can be found on page 346.
In the case of London, although the inﬂuence of major cities is
clear—Birmingham is the most talked-to city, with Manchester a
fairly distant second—when we normalise against the number of phones
we actually see a preponderance of regional calling: smaller cities nearby
receive far more calls on a per phone basis than larger, more distant ones.
If we look at Manchester’s pattern of calling activity, then although
London is by far the dominant absolute ﬂow, aer normalisation it is
the local links to areas such such as Stockport, Diggle, Marple, Long-
dendale, and Salford that dominate. Stoke-on-Trent shows a similarly
distribution: London is again the dominant unweighted link, with
Birmingham, Crewe, Manchester, and Market Drayton rounding out
the top ﬁve, but following normalisation it is the local geography that
matters.
Domestically, the importance of London is at least in part a func-
tion of its massive population; however, Figure 7.8 adds to our under-
standing of how this changes when we consider the average number
of minutes per phone. In comparison to Figure 7.6 above, the totals are
much larger: the diﬀerence between the highest domestic phone use in
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Figure 7.7: Normalised Call Vol-
umes to/from London, Manchester
& Stoke-on-TrentMaidstone and the lowest in Stevenage is vastly greater than the largest
international average in Bracknell. And yet, on a percentage basis the
diﬀerence is much less: 200% between greatest and least number of
domestic minutes, compared with 700% for international traﬃc.
Interestingly, the top ten in Figure 7.8 have nothing in common
with either the top or bottom callers from the international league table,
while the bottom ten are a mix of both ends from Figure 7.6. More
research would be required to ﬁll in this picture, but it seems that dif-
ferent processes may be at work here: some areas are more ‘plugged
in’ to international ﬂows in a way that reduces their local connectiv-
ity or, at least, does not stimulate it (e.g. Cambridge, Luton, Oxford,
and Reading), while others areas may simply talk less, full stop (e.g.
Middlesbrough and Exeter).
Temporal Aspects
We’ve looked at the spatial component of communications usage, but
examining the temporal dimension will help us to understand how
the cycles of calling help to deﬁne the spaces and places of information
ﬂows. As we saw in Figure 6.10 (see page 234 in the Methodology),
there is a strong weekly cycle in telecoms usage with a peak during the
working week and marked drop-oﬀ over the weekend; however, in
that ﬁgure we did not attempt to distinguish between diﬀerent types
of usage. So although the ﬁndings below are in line with results from
a range of other cities and telecoms sources and are not particularly
‘new’ (cf. Reades et al., 2007, 2009), understanding them is nonetheless
important for this analysis, and in particular to understanding how the
eigenplaces analyses will function later in this chapter.
In order to show how diﬀerent areas have diﬀerent temporal signa-
tures that can be used for categorisation purposes, I arbitrarily selected
several ‘neighbourhoods’ to proﬁle in London: Central London, Eal-
ing, and North London/Enﬁeld5. Each of these areas has a diﬀerent
5 Croydon, which was not mea-
surably diﬀerent is shown in the
appendix. I also chose neigh-
bourhoods in New York: Lower
Manhattan/Wall Street, Upper
Manhattan/Inwood Hill Park, East
Corona/East Elmhurst, and East
Flatbush/Prospect Park South; the
results for these areas are reported
on page 348.
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Figure 7.8: Normalised Domestic
Minutes per Phone (Top & Bottom
10 British Cities)
makeup, though one area is obviously the traditional  while the
other three are predominantly residential areas. The idea is to show
that there are some underlying commonalities alongside some major
structural diﬀerences in terms of how the use of telecoms varies in each
place.
D C T: We can begin by comparing the average
number of domestic calls for each hour of the day over an entire week,
as shown in Figure 7.10. In all cases the scale has been removed to pro-
tect conﬁdential operator data, and is not the same across all of the loca-
tions shown. This ﬁgure provides strong evidence in support of the idea
that there are important behavioural diﬀerences between neighbour-
hoods: Central London is obviously following a very diﬀerent pattern of
activity from North London and Ealing. Wireline calls show dramatic
fall-oﬀs over the weekend in the business-dominated area—on average,
more than 80%—and a prominent double-peak on either side of the
lunch hour when compared with more residential areas. The residential
areas also show a much slower decay in calling activity in the evenings,
whereas in Central London calling falls oﬀ quickly aer 5 p.m.6 6 Data for New York City, which
show a similar pattern of activity,
are available on page 348, and that
section also shows the relationship
to aggregate international calling for
both cities.
Although one might reasonably expect that plotting the average
number of minutes over the same time period would provide much
the same information as the average number of calls, but in Figure 7.11
we actually see something quite diﬀerent at this ﬁner scale. In the ﬁrst
place, there is an increase in the number of minutes to and from Central
London at 10 p.m. that is not reﬂected in the number of calls. Given
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Figure 7.9: Location of Selected
Neighbourhoods
Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
Figure 7.10: Number of Domestic
Calls in London
that this coincides with the close of markets in New York (5 p.m. ),
it is possible that the surge is connected to the type of ‘synchronisation’
activity described by Clark and Thri (2003) in the ﬁnancial services
sector, though this would be implying a domestic inter- or intra-bank
process. The other obvious features in North London and Ealing are:
ﬁrst, the increase in minutes aer 6 p.m. (even as the number of calls
continues to fall); and, second, the way that weekend and weekday
minutes track each other quite closely (at least, they do compared to
what happens in the ).
What these trends reinforce is the idea that, to some extent, we can
distinguish between residential and business areas based solely on the
timing of calls. As well, the contrasts between Figures 7.10 and 7.11
emphasise that while both calls and minutes could be used to examine
behaviour diﬀerences, the minutes plots demonstrate more substantive
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variation. In sum, based on the information gathered so far it is possible
that, armed with nothing more than weekend and weekday usage pat-
terns, we could laboriously create a map of Great Britain’s business and
residential areas.
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Figure 7.11: Volume of Domestic
Calls in London
Sassen (2008, p.10) suggested that “…at the top is increasingly,
though not fully, a permanent twenty-four hours of talking, with
rapidly shrinking ‘nights’”, but again we see that the situation is a good
deal more nuanced: the ‘nights’ are not shrinking, nor are City and Wall
Street workers giving up their evenings and weekends for ever-larger
bonuses. It is possible that, on weekends, this activity shis to other
platforms (e.g. mobile), but the way in which usage here tracks market
openings and closings suggests that this may only be the case in a lim-
ited way. There is also intriguing evidence of activity that falls outside
of the regular workday bounds, but exploring that would require more
detailed investigation than is possible, or appropriate, here.
I C T: For Figure 7.12 I have rescaled interna-
tional and domestic volume to make it easier compare diﬀerences in the
patterns of usage between the weekends and weekdays for the  and
one residential area in each of London and New York City7. Clearly, 7 To compare the two cities in the
format used above please see page
353.
the rescaling adds noise to the ﬁgures (especially for ‘Lower Manhattan
Weekend’ and ‘Central London Weekend’), but it also highlights the
commonalities: both s have very similar patterns of domestic call-
ing, and the overall trend for international calling is similar, save for the
diﬀerence over the lunch hour. In residential locations, the clear trend is
for the number of minutes used in the evening to match or exceed the
daytime peak, a very diﬀerent pattern from the business locations.
On a ﬁnal note, Figure 9.4, on page 343, records a fascinating mo-
ment in history: the near collapse of the global ﬁnancial system in
September of 2008 discussed in Chapter 3 (see page 94)8. Broadly
8 A helpful day-by-
day timeline can be found at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/-
September_2008-
#2008_September_17
speaking, on Wednesday the 17th and Thursday the 18th the massive
increase in outbound calls (amounting to a 120% increase over normal
analysis 267
Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
(a) Weekday International
Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
(b) Weekend International
Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
(c) Weekday Domestic
Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
(d) Weekend Domestic
Figure 7.12: Comparison of
Normalised Volumes in London
and New York
levels), and the smaller increase in minutes (roughly 110% of normal),
mark the onset of the crisis in the ﬁnancial markets when the Dow
Jones Industrial Average fell by 440 points on fears of ’s imminent
collapse. However, notice too that while the impact is most visible in
outbound calling, inbound international calling shows a more gradual
but equally signiﬁcant rise over the two weeks following the crisis.
Summary
We began this chapter with an exploration or international calling activ-
ity and, tentative though the conclusions must necessarily be because of
the scale at which we’ve been examining the data, we found evidence to
support the idea that calls are driven by three types of homophily (Lee
et al., 2007, p.418); or to put it in the terms that I have used in Chapter
5 (see page 177), three types of proximity: geographic, social/historical,
and economic (cf. Barnett and Choi, 1995; Barnett, 1999). In the case
of London, there is clear evidence of the importance of the economic
and geographic proximity of continental Europe, and of the historic
importance of the former colonies, but the strongest links observed in
the data stems from the conﬂuence of all three factors. Similar data for
New York City alters the picture in subtle ways, since the notion of
geographic proximity is clearly relative—it is further from New York to
Toronto than from London to much of the rest of Europe, but the ﬂows
are, proportionally, still very high.
Taking in the broader picture of phone usage in Britain, the level of
calling varies signiﬁcantly, and proximity to London is a clear predictor
of the internationalisation of activity. The same was not, however,
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Figure 7.13: Regionalisation of
Britain using Social Network Data
(Ratti et al., 2010; reproduced un-
der Creative Commons Attribution
License)
found to be true of domestic calling in Britain: London actually falls in
the lower half of a ranked, normalised list. We did ﬁnd indications that
regionalisation exists, and that calling is distributed according to speciﬁc
social and economic dynamics. This result is broadly consistent with
more detailed evidence advanced from a social network analysis (Ratti
et al., 2010), and it is clear that such data puts paid to the persistent
notion that the costlessness of long-distance communications means
that distance is ‘dead’.
Incorporating the temporal aspect of telecommunications usage
allowed us to ﬂesh out the portrait of telecoms usage developed in
previously-published works (cf. Reades et al., 2007, 2009; Calabrese
et al., 2010). The prominent double-peak on either side of 2 p.m.
seems, in the main, to be more closely connected to business activity
than to residential; but more interesting from the standpoint of being
able to characterise spaces using telecommunications is the fact that
international calling activity varies dramatically between residential and
business areas. The data from New York also ﬁlls in the picture of what
might be happening with mobile phone usage in terms of international
calling: it shows a distinct surge in the post-9 p.m. ‘free weekends and
evenings’ period even though international calling is not covered by
such plans. Logically, it is therefore connected to the timezone of the
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people being called and to particular patterns of social reproduction and
historic migration.
The results from this section also emphasised the importance of
data normalisation to aid with interpreting the data. For instance, al-
though America is the dominant communications partner for London,
this has to be contextualised by the fact that there are more than 300
million Americans with whom Londoners can speak. Similarly, al-
though the importance of links between the Caribbean and New York
City is already evident in the raw data, aer normalisation the relative
importance of the region is much more clear. And this issue applies
domestically as well: taking the number of phones as a baseline enables
us to identify less obvious, but no less signiﬁcant, ﬂows buried within
the dominant absolute ones. So while is is perfectly accurate to think of
London as dominating Britain’s telecommunications activity, this is not
necessarily helpful since it transpires that other parts of the country use
their phones relatively more than London does.
7.4 Globalisation
Telecommunications Quotients
We have developed a high-level understanding of distribution of spa-
tial and temporal calling activity, and it is now sensible to turn to a
more detailed geography in order to begin investigating the internal
functioning of London and the . We will begin with the simpler
Telecommunications Quotient (), before turning to the full-ﬂedged
eigenplace analysis. In both cases we will use only aggregate interna-
tional and domestic traﬃc, since this coarsest grain should provide us
with an immediate indicator of the utility of each approach.
L: The small size of exchange areas and high level of functional
specialisation in London contribute to a dearth of normally-distributed
data when we convert the total number of minutes for each  to a
. However, the distribution is much wider, and much more obvi-
ously skewed, in the case of international calling. In other words, while
London is, on average, much more international in its calling behaviour
than the rest of the U.K., this globalisation of activity is not distributed
evenly across the metro region. A small number of s account for
much of this total call volume: the  with the largest volume of in-
ternational calling uses 14× as many minutes as the area with the least,
although the per phone diﬀerence is ‘just’ 2.7.
In eﬀect, Figure 7.14b provides a partial view of globalisation by
comparing the level of international calling minutes to the total amount
of calling at the exchange area scale. The ﬁgure shows a marked
East/West gradient: many areas in the East (Barking & Dagenham,
Havering, etc.) and the South (Bromley, Bexley, and to a lesser extent
Croydon) have relatively low international s, but these values rise
as we move Westwards. The most visible international areas in Figure
7.14b are clearly intimately associated with Financial Services activity in
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Figure 7.14: London s
the City and Canary Wharf, as well as with the activity of sectors such
as Advertising and Government/s in the West End, Westminster,
and Kensington.
G S E  E: At the larger scale of the  call
volumes are still not normally distributed across the relevant areas of
analysis. In Figure 7.15a there are just a few areas that generate vastly
greater levels of international traﬃc as a proportion of their total com-
munications activity. Here we begin to see a regional knowledge econ-
omy in operation—particularly if we focus on the top two categories
(i. e. the 1.95–3.23 and 3.24–8.04 ranges)—in terms of the levels of
global information exchange across a geographic area containing more
than 20 million inhabitants. What is particularly promising about these
 maps, however, is that they appear to map neatly neither on to total
levels of employment (Figure 7.2a), nor on to the employment ratio
(Figure 7.2b), which suggests that we are picking up on something
diﬀerent.
Especially evident in Figure 7.15a is the high level of international
calling activity along the  and the edge of the —in Figure 7.14b
we could only see hints of the full scale of this activity to the West and
Southwest. Although there is a secondary grouping of intense inter-
national activity around Cambridge, it is really the ‘Western Wedge’
running in an arc between, roughly, Guildford and Amersham that
is the central feature here. In addition, the area surrounding Milton
Keynes should also garner our attention: its lower levels of international
calling activity are quite noticeable when compared to the activity out
towards Reading and Bracknell. This result is consistent with Milton
Keynes being a more minor, back-oﬃce node in the  networks ex-
amined by the a group (cf. Pain and Walker, 2005; Taylor et al.,
2009).
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Figure 7.15:  sEigenplaces
T G S E  E: Figure 7.16 presents tripartite
clusterings of the  based on international (Figure 7.16a) and domestic
(Figure 7.16b) call volumes normalised by the number of phone in each
. In both cases, the darkest colour connotes the highest average signal
over the course of the week, and the lightest colour the lowest average.
Note that, because of the way that the analysis works, this does not
mean that all s in, say, Cluster #2 of Figure 7.16a have higher peaks
than all s in Clusters #1 and #3, merely that the mean suggests that
there are more s with larger call volumes in this cluster.
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Figure 7.16: International &
Domestic Eigenplaces (Vol-
ume/Phones)
The silhouette plot for the international data (Figure 7.17) suggests a
mixed clustering result: Cluster #1 forms a particularly coherent group
of s, whereas Clusters #2 and #3 contain some s that are poorly
clustered. Consulting the representative signals (see Figure 11.20 on
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440) explains this classiﬁcation: Cluster #2 contains s will radical
variation in the overall level of international calling activity, and in par-
ticular in the magnitude of the aernoon rise in call volumes; Cluster
#3 is more poorly clustered less because of diﬀerences in magnitude
than because it tends to contain s with very diﬀerent patterns of
activity over the course of the day.
There are several notable features of Figure 7.16a that merit further
discussion: ﬁrst, the strong Westward bias of international calling is par-
ticularly obvious, as is the fact that East Anglia generally has lower per
phone levels of activity; second, is the existence of small internationally-
oriented clusters around each of the major outlying cities (Oxford,
Milton Keynes, Cambridge); and third is the fact that domestic per
phone calling has no obvious links to either urban or industrial hierar-
chy. However, the more important, underlying conclusion here is that
international and domestic calling are not correlated when processed
in this way: if we were to ﬁnd that the areas that made the most in-
ternational calls on a per phone basis alsomade the most domestic calls
then this would tend to imply simply that some areas called more than
others; instead, we see here that there are marked diﬀerences in calling
behaviour at the same  that will undoubtedly be useful when we use
both data sets in the classiﬁcation process.
As well, there is a clear extra-metropolitan link between high
levels of international calling and two very particular sets of activi-
ties—transport and defense—and especially with areas connected to
inﬂexible network nodes such as ports and airﬁelds/airports. It is also
worth remarking that Cluster #2, which represents lower overall call-
ing activity, is concentrated in East Anglia, suggesting that beyond
Cambridge much of this area is relatively domestic in its orientation9.
9 The notable exceptions are ...
Lakenheath, ... Mildenhall, and
their surrounds, the existence of
which can also be easily inferred
from the 2001 Census data.
This does, however, seem like
a prudent time to repeat the
statement that it is impossible
to trace calls to individual users
within these data sets and that
one objective of this research is to
demonstrate the ability to perform
commercially and academically
valuable parametric analyses on call
data in a way that does not pose a
privacy or security risk.
Juxtaposing Figures 7.16a and 7.16b highlights the very diﬀerent na-
ture of the two types of calling data: the structure that is so self-evident
in international calling is largely missing from the domestic call data,
and this emphasises the fact that although the clustering process is in-
ﬂuenced by the density of people and activity, it is not dominated by
them.
Figure 7.17: International Volume
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At the  scale we can also iteratively exclude data that is extraneous
to the behaviour of interest, progressively narrowing the focus until only
those areas that are of interest are retained. For example, taking only
calls to America we could ﬁrst use an eigenplace analysis to partition the
s into two subsets—one with typically high-volume usage and one
with typically low-volume usage—and then take only the high-volume
areas as the input to a new eigenplace analysis that would tease out
ﬁner-grained details in the timing and magnitude of ﬂows. Repeating
this process with the silhouette tests as a guide would gradually tease
out ﬁner and ﬁner distinctions (and more and more partitions) until the
diﬀerences cease to be meaningful and all that is le is essentially noise.
analysis 273
Summary
We have now taken a ﬁrst look at the ways in which telecommunica-
tions can be used to map out industrial activity at the urban and re-
gional scales. We have also brieﬂy examined international and domestic
usage, and seen how these provide clues that enable us to decipher the
once enigmatic spatiotemporal signatures. As well, an initial exploration
of international calling has picked up several geographic areas known
to be associated with the process of globalisation, especially the City of
London and the West End.
One issue that we encountered with the use of the , and with
s derived from international data in particular, is that as we broaden
the base region R, deviations from the expected overall regional mean
of 1 became worse, and the overall distribution less normal! In this
sense, directly equating the  to the  is problematic; however the
diﬃculties with non-normality do lend deﬁnite empirical support
to Castells’s claim that “[much] of the ‘global city’ is actually quite
local (e.g. Queens, Hampstead or Brixton) except for their immigrant
populations” (2009, p.7).
As well, because the  lacks a temporal dimension, we cannot dis-
tinguish between, say, calls that are inﬂuenced by familial relationships
(in which case there should be more calling on weekends) and those
that are inﬂuenced by business relationships (in which case there should
be more calling during the period between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on week-
days). That said, the  is nonetheless very easy to calculate, enabling
analysis to be performed in aggregate and without the need for complex
technical applications or infrastructure beyond the reach of basic social
science. Signiﬁcantly, the  also yields a scalar value that is potentially
suitable for comparative analyses.
The eigenplace approach addresses the gaps noted with the , and
the geography that emerges from a simple analysis of international
calling seems to capture very quickly the overall urban hierarchy. This
is possible because the decomposition and clustering approach not only
factors in the scale of the calls to and from each , but also gives
weight to the similarities and diﬀerences between the ebb and ﬂow of
these interactions. But what the structure extracted in Figure 7.16 does
make clear is that naïvely including all s from within the  means
that major diﬀerences—such as those between residential and business
calling cycles—swamps the diﬀerences within the business category, and
so a more sophisticated method is required.
7.5 KDDi and Location Filtering
So in spite of the capabilities of the  and eigenplace approaches, we
still face the challenge of extracting a meaningful signal from a great
deal of background noise: amongst the more than eight billion phone
calls are all manner of personal and professional communications, but
in this analysis we are only interested in the latter. So we need to nar-
row the focus of the analysis to only those s that we have reason to
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believe are involved in a particular type of industrial activity. There are
two obvious ways to do this: by the characteristics of the caller, and by
the characteristics of the place from which calls are placed, or at which
they are received.
Filtering on Call Volumes
To date, the majority of social network research either ignores the im-
pact that business networks have on their results entirely, or simply sub-
sumes them under a generic ‘social interaction’ label. Only the a
group at Loughborough has explicitly tackled the network character-
istics of professionals in diﬀerent sectors (cf. Taylor and Walker, 2001;
Taylor et al., 2006, 2008, 2009). However, in the rich data set available
for Britain, we can actually segment callers into diﬀerent groups using
the aggregate volume to and from each anonymised number, and then
use this to draw inferences about the impact of globalisation and scale
on businesses of varying sizes.
Table 7.4 sets out the categorisation developed in order to ﬁlter out
the least frequent users of landline connections: each group interval
is double the one below it, rising from a base average of just 30 min-
utes a day, up to more than 256 hours of talking every day, including
weekends! This approach has the advantage of reducing the noise of
the overall system dramatically; however, it should also be noted that
non-geographical numbers (e.g. 0800-numbers) cannot be included
in this approach for obvious reasons and that, depending on the exact
conﬁguration, ﬁrms where each employee has a separate number may
not be included amongst the large volume users.
Category Name Monthly Threshold (Seconds) Caller Group
Percentage of All
Callers
Less Than 30 Minutes per Day 55,800.00 Household & Small Business 1 Suppressed%
Less Than 1 Hour per Day 111,600.00 Household & Small Business 2 Suppressed%
Less Than 4 Hours per Day 446,600.00 Small & Medium Business 1 Suppressed%
Less Than 8 Hours per Day 892,800.00 Small & Medium Business 2 Suppressed%
Less Than 16 Hours per Day 1,785,600.00 Medium Business 1 Suppressed%
Less Than 32 Hours per Day 3,571,200.00 Medium Business 2 Suppressed%
Less Than 64 Hours per Day 7,142,600.00 Large Business 1 Suppressed%
Less Than 128 Hours per Day 14,284,800.00 Large Business 2 Suppressed%
Less Than 256 Hours per Day 28,569,600.00 Very Large Business 1 Suppressed%
More Than 256 Hours per Day 10,000,000,000.00 Very Large Business 2 Suppressed%
Table 7.4: Caller Category Distri-
bution
For the purposes of our analysis, it is sensible to focus only on num-
bers responsible for an average of more than 4 hours of calling per day
because these are unlikely to be residential users. At the other end of
the scale, some of the ‘Very Large Businesses’ may well be call cen-
tres, but they may be indistinguishable from major back-oﬃce facilities
in sectors such as ﬁnancial services, insurance, and telecommunica-
tions. There is strong evidence for this overlap to be found in Figure
7.18, which shows the number of Medium to Very Large callers by 
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across Great Britain: Leeds, Glasgow, and Liverpool are all particularly
prominent, and these cities are also associated with large telecoms fa-
cilities10. From this point onwards, the results will all be drawn from a 10 For privacy reasons, s con-
taining fewer than 5 such numbers
in the relevant range have been
suppressed entirely from the map.
data set that excludes the two groups of users who make the least use of
telecommunications.
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Figure 7.18: Number of Medium
to Very Large Volume Callers by

Filtering on Industrial Concentration
Filtering a wide-scale areal analysis by some measure of employment
is unusual—most such analyses tend to work with contiguous re-
gions—but since employment data is both well-understood and readily
available, this is another logical ﬁlter to apply to the  selection pro-
cess. In the subsequent sections I will use  values to si out areas
lacking signiﬁcant employment in a particular sector or sectoral group-
ing, and this means that the resulting  and eigenplace analyses will be
representative of only those areas where a particular industry or group
of industries can be found. In other words, where we ﬁnd meaningful
communicational diﬀerences between, for instance, two groups of ar-
eas that both contain Financial Services activity then we can construe
these diﬀerences to be representative of underlying diﬀerences in their
operating environments.
I have deﬁned a category of ‘Signiﬁcant Locations’ to help focus
the telecommunications analysis on just those areas where not only
is there a statistically-signiﬁcant concentration of activity, but there
is also a signiﬁcant percentage of employment in a given sector. The
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deﬁnition of this process is quite simple where the distribution of a
group or individual sector is lognormal11: 11 Note that we exclude areas with
no employment in a sector from
the lognormal calculation so as to
avoid a le-skewed distribution
with values of −∞.
xsi − s
s
> 1:5 ∩ Empsi
Empi
> 0:10
Here, on the le-hand side we calculate the z-score for sector s in 
i using the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of the s for
sector s across the entire study area, and we require that it exceed a sta-
tistical signiﬁcance threshold of 1.5 deviations from the mean. On the
right-hand side we require only that at least 10% of the employees in
 i work in sector s, although this obviously tends to mean that indi-
vidual 4-digit sectors are less likely to exceed this cutoﬀ. By taking the
intersection (∩) of the two sets of s we maximise the likelihood of
selecting locations where the activities of a ﬁrm will leave a measurable
impact on telecommunications usage.
Where the data is not lognormal, the le-most constraint must be
relaxed since the standard deviation is meaningless and, accordingly,
in those cases I have used the 95th percentile as the cutoﬀ. Finally, it
should be emphasised that we will be working here with areal data and
not subscriber-level data, so we cannot deﬁnitively link telecommuni-
cations activity to individual ﬁrms. Nor, for privacy reasons, would we
wish to do so. Although alternative approaches could theoretically en-
able this level of detail in the future, on a practical level this means that
when we talk about the ‘behaviour’ of a sector we are really discussing
the range of activities within a  where there is a high proportion
of employment in that sector. Consequently, the dynamics captured
below in the form of ‘internationalisation’ and ‘globalisation’ do not
necessarily refer to the degree of globalisation of individual ﬁrms or sec-
tors, and are best understood as the ‘outlook’ of the local environment in
which the ﬁrm or sector operates.
7.6 Symbolic Industries
Spatial Distribution
In Chapters 5 and 6 we predicted that Symbolic knowledge work would
tend to involve: a particularly strong need for multilateral, 2 interac-
tion; a relatively strong resistance to substitution by ubiquitous telecom-
munications; and a preference for amenity-oriented locations. We have
already seen in Table 7.3 (page 256) that Symbolic workers’ distribution
suggests a general bias towards Central London. However, we can fur-
ther subdivide the workers according to specialty, and subdivide space
into four ‘rings’ of employment: Central London (the ‘Central Activity
Zone’ deﬁned in the 2004 London Plan which is, is essence, the City
and West End); Inner London (the parts of the inner 12 boroughs not
incorporated in Central London); Outer London (the remaining 12
boroughs of the Greater London Authority); and the Outer Metropoli-
tan Area (those parts of the  which have economies widely presumed
to be directly dependent on Greater London based on commuting
patterns).
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Table 7.5 shows the percentage of workers in each of the four sub-
regions by  code. Several distinctions are immediately obvious:
roughly 20% of Video Projection and Library workers are in Central
London, and 60% are in the two outer zones, whereas for Arts Facil-
ities, Museums, and Historic Buildings it is nearly the reverse. These
two results are unsurprising since we’d expect consumer-oriented ser-
vices to be distributed in parallel with residential densities, and major
cultural infrastructure to be found mainly in the capital city. Rather
more more interesting is the diﬀerence amongst high-skill knowledge
workers: over 70% of news-related activity and nearly 50% of ﬁlm pro-
duction and distribution is centrally-located, while for radio, television,
artistic and literary activities the ﬁgure is nearer to 40% and there is a
much more signiﬁcant proportion of employment in the next two rings
out from the centre.
Sector 
Central
London
Inner
London
Outer
London
Outer
Metro
Area
Advertising 7440 51.2% 10.0% 15.5% 23.2%
Motion Picture & Video Production 9211 54.7% 14.6% 15.1% 15.5%
Motion Picture & Video Distribution 9212 48.1% 34.0% 11.1% 6.8%
Motion Picture Projection 9213 18.1% 17.0% 31.8% 33.0%
Radio & Television Activities 9220 39.9% 33.3% 19.7% 7.2%
Artistic & Literary Activities 9231 39.3% 20.6% 20.9% 19.1%
Arts Facilities Operation 9232 60.6% 9.2% 10.9% 19.4%
Other Entertainment 9234 34.6% 19.6% 18.4% 27.4%
News Agency Activities 9240 71.8% 19.3% 4.8% 4.0%
Library & Archive Activities 9251 20.7% 12.1% 31.2% 35.9%
Museums & Historic Buildings 9252 62.8% 4.8% 12.6% 19.9%
All Sectors 26.0% 11.0% 25.6% 37.4%
Table 7.5: Symbolic Group
(adapted from Smith, 2011)
There is strong evidence here to suggest that Inner London plays an
important, but less visible role than Central London in this Symbolic
economy: even for highly-centralised sectors such as Film Distribution,
Radio, Television, and Artistic activities there are, on average, still
more than 20% of workers in each of the next rings. We can see this
process more clearly in Figure 7.19, which highlights the importance
of White City (near Shepherds Bush) as the centre of an axis of activity
running from Soho all the way to the limits of Greater London. Pulling
back to the  scale in Figure 7.19b, although the picture becomes
more complex, it nonetheless reinforces the evolving interpretation of
the preferences of ﬁrms working with this knowledge base: Symbolic
knowledge workers tend to be found in a relatively small number of
very highly-concentrated areas where their  exceeds 10, or even 20,
times the regional average. That said, it is very interesting to note that
these ﬁrms are more widely distributed than expected: some of the
highest concentrations are outside of London.
Because Figure 7.19a is dominated by the high staﬃng levels of Ra-
dio and Television Activities, disaggregation of this group reveals a more
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Figure 7.19: Symbolic  Results
ﬁne-grained structure to London’s creative community: people in-
volved in ‘Film and Video Production’ (Figure 10.12c on page 373) can
be found in three parts of London, each seemingly near to a diﬀerent
source of income, and ‘Artistic & Literary Creation and Interpretation’
(Figure 10.13a on page 374) is concentrated in Central London. What’s
interesting here is that in terms of employment there is an obvious and
absolutely critical role played by the public broadcaster, and that this
concentration seems to be having a signiﬁcant eﬀect on employment
in the surrounding s (see page 124 for a discussion of the ‘Out of
London’ strategy).
We can better understand these dynamics by turning to Figures
7.20a and 7.20b which shows the distribution of a broad group that
includes the operators of cultural infrastructure such as museums and
galleries. Two areas within London stand out as the heart of the largest
complex: the ’s White City development again, and a second group-
ing near Hounslow that is home to  Worldwide. There are are also
very high s visible in Figure 7.20b near Maidstone; these appear to be
related to small and mid-sized production ﬁrms, but they are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant when we drill down to the 4-digit levels in Figures
10.33, 10.34, and 10.35 (see pages 396 through 398).
Figures 10.30c and 10.31a (pages 391 and 394) broadly suggest that
cultural activity workers as a whole are more widely distributed than the
cultural producers group. But Figures 7.20c and 7.20d, which focus on
Motion Picture, Radio and Television Production, and the Artistic and
Literary sectors, also emphasise that the distribution of activity across
Central, Inner, and Outer London is far from random. The broader
 scale suggests that cultural producers are physically concentrated
into a smaller number of ‘signifying districts’—there is a particularly
concentrated group of statistically-signiﬁcant s shown in Figure
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Figure 7.20: Cultural  Results
10.31b—but we should note that cultural activity and production are far
from being conﬁned to the West End and Soho.
In sum, Figure 7.20 suggests that cultural work is not necessarily
centralised, but it is highly clustered. In other words, cultural work
does not, as has sometimes been suggested, happen exclusively in the
cores of world cities; instead, it crops up at locations across the region.
So although it is the Hollywoods and the West Ends of the world that
receive the research attention, these ﬁgures emphasise the existence
of a network of smaller subcentres that, I suspect, act as feeders of,
and highly-specialised suppliers to, the most sophisticated consumers
and clients. I am also suggesting that where cultural production does
happen, it tends to be highly concentrated in space, and that the small
number of places that have such employees tend to have rather a lot of
them. Because we tend to see the same small areas having statistically
signiﬁcant levels of employment across several  codes, this is strongly
suggestive of clustering behaviour and, consequently, of informational
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exchange that does not necessarily happen via telecommunications.
In contrast, the areas outside of London tend to be more specialised in
just one employment sector, suggesting less direct, face-to-face (2)
interaction between sectors.
Communication Activity
Using the methodology set out above for selecting ‘signiﬁcant’ locations
for each knowledge base, we can then consider whether and how these
areas diﬀer in terms of their communications activity. The  is the
simplest way to envision these diﬀerences, so Figure 7.21 compares
the level of international calling activity for the broader Symbolic and
narrower Cultural Producers groups. Recall that the  calculation
enables us to assess the balance between international calling and all
calling activity in the same way that the  enables us to do for relative
employment concentration. To ensure consistency, we divide each
signiﬁcant ’s international minutes by all inbound and outbound,
domestic and international, minutes for the . We then do the same
for the region as a whole so that we can see how far the signiﬁcant
locations depart from the regional norm.
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Figure 7.21: Symbolic s &
Average Signals
As we would expect, there are more signifying Symbolic s, and
they display wider variation, than the Producers’ s. In Figure 7.21a,
metropolitan London contains three areas with obviously high lev-
els of international calling relative to domestic calling, but areas near
Brighton, Oxford, and Milton Keynes are equally global in outlook. In
contrast, Figure 7.21b suggests that globally-oriented production activ-
ity is more narrowly constrained to Inner and Outer London (Central
London s are too diverse to meet the 10% employment threshold)
and, with the notable exception of an area near Oxford, the other s
all have s that are in line with the wider regional norm.
Using these same signiﬁcant activity areas to perform an eigenplace
analysis suggests a more complex relationship between telecommuni-
cations usage and Symbolic knowledge work. The input data was the
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same—in both cases we are using bidirectional domestic and interna-
tional minutes of talk time to classify the s—but in the eigenplace
analysis the timing of the minutes is also a factor in the resulting cat-
egorisation. Since we are no longer normalising the data against total
telecoms usage, I also—as discussed on page 261—adjust the signal pro-
cessing so that the hourly call volume is normalised by the number of
active phones in the area.
The time dimension is captured in both the eigenvectors and in the
related Fourier Transform process. We can see in Table 7.6 that the
discriminant features have been pulled from the latter set of calculations
alone, but that they have come from both the domestic and interna-
tional calling activity. Since the feature selection process is designed
to extract representative features, this implies two possible scenarios:
either that the eigenvectors are not particularly useful in ﬁnding diﬀer-
ences between the signiﬁcant locations in this particular data set, or that
some of the s in this set have particularly unusual patterns of activity
which give the Fourier Transform features a broader spread, and thus
greater utility to the k-Means clustering.
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Table 7.6: Symbolic Eigenplace
Classiﬁcation
The silhouette plot in Table 7.6 suggests that 7 clusters are needed to
adequately categorise the range of calling behaviours from signiﬁcantly
Symbolic areas. Given that there are just 16 s in the Symbolic group
this is quite a striking result since it suggests substantial variation in call-
ing activity. But as we can see in Figure 7.22, the large number of clus-
ters does not mean that the results become spatially meaningless. The
representative signals shown in Figure 11.22 (see page 444) can help
us to further decipher these ﬁndings: Cluster #7 contains Soho and,
as such, contains very high levels of international and domestic calling.
In fact, these levels of activity are so high that no other area remotely
compares, highlighting the unique nature of this neighbourhood.
Furthermore, we can infer from the pattern of international calling
that the dominant interaction partner for Soho is North America: note
the aernoon uptick in communications on weekdays that is largely
absent from other  signals. This timing dimension simply cannot be
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picked up by a  analysis at the same level of granularity and it would
be necessary to unbundle calling to the country level in order to see
any signs of this eﬀect. Note too, that the representative signals from
the clusters in Figure 11.22 also enable us to infer that some of the s
contain cultural infrastructure for performances: Clusters #2 and #4
(one of whose s is centered on Glyndbourne) have measurable levels
of domestic and international calling on the weekends, especially on
Saturday and Sunday evenings, that mark them out from both the Soho
 and from the more modest calling levels in Clusters #1 and #5.
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Figure 7.22: Symbolic Eigenplace
Results
In contrast to these other categories, Cluster #6 suggests something
altogether diﬀerent: although domestic calling strongly follows the
weekly work cycle, international calling is substantially higher Friday
through Monday. The timing of the data extract (August) and the lo-
cation of this particular  (the Cotswolds) helps to explain why this
particular area was classiﬁed this way: it encapsulates activity at a tourist
destination with a long-weekend dynamic. Cluster #5 also proves to
have unique characteristics that cause it to be classiﬁed separately:
Thame is home to one division of a global advertising conglomerate,
explaining why its international calling level is so high during the week,
but drops precipitously over the weekend. More tentatively, Cluster #3
has interesting links to predominantly domestic attractions: Woburn is
home to Woburn Abbey and its associated Safari Park, while Norfolk
hosts Banham Zoo and a range of other, lesser cultural activities.
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Summary
In Table 6.2 (page 214) we predicted that Symbolic work would tend to
be clustered in high-amenity areas, especially those in the core city or
cities of the region, and that some ﬁrms would also attach a particular
importance to access to clients and suppliers. The result was expected
to be a predominantly local pattern of interaction with a strong pref-
erence for 2 communication, possibly in a way that undermined the
importance of telecommunications. It is, of course, impossible to fully
validate the last part of this hypothesis, but the results provide promis-
ing evidence in support of the principal ideas advanced in Chapter 5.
The highest-level group—Cultural Activity—showed wide variation
in a way that is consistent with wildly divergent interaction and location
requirements. The importance of major cultural infrastructure to em-
ployment in this sector was amply demonstrated by the concentration
found in Central London, but the large number of clusters identiﬁed
from just 16 signiﬁcant areas suggested major diﬀerences, with a strong
spatial ﬂavour, in telecommunications usage. In contrast, the more
ﬁne-grained Cultural Producers group demonstrated substantial overlap
between sectors within the  area, especially around the  facilities
and in Soho, which I take to be strong evidence of clustering behaviour:
sustained interaction across sectors involved in multilateral exchanges.
Beyond London, the degree of inter-sectoral agglomeration appears
to decline signiﬁcantly, even though high s appear throughout the
 region. Proximity to London appears to correlate with the in-
ternationalisation of communications activity, suggesting that these
secondary, and seemingly specialised, agglomerations vary in terms of
their global client base or ownership structure. This overall dynamic,
however, is what makes the particular pattern seen in Advertising in-
dustry so peculiar: agencies are widely assumed to be the dominant
actors of the Soho cultural landscape (see, for instance, Nachum and
Keeble, 2003a and Nachum and Keeble, 2003b). Instead, while there
is a tendency towards a  location, there are major concentrations of
employment much further out, with strong evidence of international
links near Oxford, Chelmsford, and Luton.
The particularly prominent site in Thame highlights what may be a
new locational strategy in the advertising sector: this single-oﬃce facil-
ity appears to focus employment in some of the non-creative aspects of
the industry, suggesting that we may be seeing here the ﬁrst signs of an
emerging front-/back-oﬃce dynamic in this sector where  ﬁrms are
concerned. In-depth qualitative research with the large agencies would
be required to validate this tentative conclusion, but it would not be
inconsistent with the picture that I have painted in the preceding chap-
ters: the increasing power of  may be allowing less client-intensive
work to be shied outwards, to less costly locations than those required
by the ‘creatives’ and the account managers.
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7.7 Synthetic Industries
Spatial Distribution
The Synthetic group is much larger than the equivalent Symbolic and
Analytical groupings, so I have divided it in two: the sectors dominated
by ﬁnancial services activities, and those presumed to be organised
around the provision of consultancy services. Of course, it could be
argued that there are aspects of each group, especially in insurance and
ﬁnancial intermediation, that are more Analytical in nature than they
are Synthetic; however, the inability to distinguish between types of
activity at a ﬁner scale within each  category is a basic limit of the
typology and, as we have seen in previous chapters, a good deal of
high-end ﬁnance is surprisingly ‘high touch’ and involves close col-
laboration between ﬁnanciers, accountants and legal specialists. And
even though many of the details of a particular transaction are unique,
they are nonetheless part of a relationship expressed through ongoing
interaction. Consequently, I have kept the majority of consultancy em-
ployment—with the exception of Advertising, which I categorised as
Symbolic work—within the Synthetic Industries category in the hopes
that this will make clear the locational tendencies.
Sector 
Central
London
Inner
London
Outer
London
Outer
Metro
Area
Central Banking 6511 95.2% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8%
Other Monetary Intermediation 6512 51.9% 12.7% 15.1% 20.2%
Financial Leasing 6521 21.6% 4.8% 14.1% 59.5%
Other Credit 6522 23.5% 5.7% 15.8% 54.9%
Other Financial Intermediation 6523 54.6% 35.2% 3.5% 6.7%
Life Insurance 6601 31.6% 0.5% 10.8% 57.1%
Non-Life Insurance 6603 40.7% 1.3% 21.6% 36.4%
Finance Market Administration 6711 65.5% 5.9% 10.7% 17.9%
Brokering & Fund Management 6712 76.7% 13.6% 1.8% 7.9%
Financial Intermediation Auxiliary 6713 42.0% 23.4% 10.9% 23.7%
Insurance Auxiliary 6720 50.3% 3.1% 14.9% 31.7%
All Sectors 26.0% 11.0% 25.6% 37.4%
Table 7.7: Synthetic Group #1:
Finance (adapted from Smith,
2011)
Table 7.7 makes it fairly clear that the dominant tendency for ﬁnan-
cial services is to have a  focus: many of the activities listed show
more than 50% of all employees working in Central London. For a
regulatory body such as Central Banking it is hardly surprising to see
that 95% of staﬀ are based in Central London (the remaining 5% of
staﬀ are actually involved in the physical printing of money), but in the
case of select industries such as Fund Management, the percentage of
employees within Central and Inner London also exceeds 90%! The
obvious exception to this ‘rule’ is the distribution of insurance and leas-
ing activities since these sectors have just 25% of employees in Central
London and as much as 60% in the Outer Metro Area.
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In the case of Financial Leasing, it seems reasonable to infer that
this is a relatively higher-volume and lower-margin ‘retail’ business. In
other words, I assume here that the users of leasing services have little
need to coordinate complex interactions and so this would be a good
candidate industry for the kind of ‘deterritorialisation’ that  enables.
But why is the behaviour of insurance so diﬀerent from the other types
of high-ﬁnance? Clearly, some insurance is consumer-oriented and so
might be expected to follow the people, but some insurers are engaged
in complex, hedging transactions—the failure of  highlights the
extent to which they are implicated in high ﬁnance—but they seem to
have been able to shi a good deal more activity outwards to lower-cost
areas than the other sectors in this group (see especially Figures 10.37c
and 10.37e on page 400).
In spite of this puzzling anomaly (to which we will return later), the
overall pattern of activity is strongly suggestive of a front-/back-oﬃce
distribution: high-level, interaction-intensive activity is focussed in
the heart of the , while more technical ‘support’ functions have
shied outwards to cheaper properties beyond the . The natural
implication of this distribution is that the insurance sector does not, on
the whole, have the same interaction requirements: many insurers will
have substantial risk analysis and client/claim management teams that
have little need to work with others, but this would be in sharp contrast
to the analysts of investment banks or hedge funds who need to meet
with lawyers, accountants, clients, and ﬁrms in which they hold, or are
taking, positions.
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Figure 7.23: Synthetic Group #1Turning again to an -based map enables us to establish whether
the distribution follows a particular spatial logic. Figure 7.23a highlights
the extent to which Synthetic employment in the ﬁnancial services
sector is highly-concentrated: the City and Canary Wharf dominate,
with lesser sub-centres around Bromley, Croydon, and extending
Southwards towards Reigate. Expanding this picture to take in the rest
of the  in Figure 7.23b emphasises the concentration of ﬁnancial
286 the place of telecommunications
activity in Central London but also throws up several surprises: Tad-
worth/Coulsdon, Redhill, and Haywards Heath/Burgess Hill are not
sites well-known for their ﬁnancial services; Bexhill and Castle Acre
still less so.
A more ﬁne-grained view suggests that very particular dynamics
are in operation here. The lognormal version (see Figure 10.28d on
389) highlights s containing statistically-signiﬁcant levels of activity
across a much broader section of the  than normally envisioned by
the globalisation literature. Is it the case that these are domestic cen-
tres, or has the globalisation literature got it wrong? What seems to
unite the sectors outside of metropolitan London is that they are all
highly-accessible from Central London, and especially so by rail: the
Gatwick/Brighton line, the Reading line and, to a lesser extent, the
Woking/Guildford/Portsmouth line. In addition, there are concentra-
tions of activity around the , which would seem symptomatic of
facilities not directly engaged in trading or deal-making activity.
Generally speaking, it is the Intermediation activities that seem to
attach the most importance to Central London when we look at statisti-
cally signiﬁcant over-representation in s across the . In contrast,
Non-Life Insurance and its Auxiliary functions appear to be the most
dispersed, while Brokering and Fund employment oﬀer the strongest
hints of a front-/back-oﬃce division. This pattern is strongly suggestive
of the type of locational strategies discussed in the theoretical portion
of this thesis: complex support functions adhere to agglomerations of
clients with speciﬁc interaction requirements, while ﬁrms with more
standardised communications needs exploit the ubiquity of telecom-
munications to move outwards from the  when the opportunity
arises.
The implication then is that ﬁnancial services activity tends to be
clustered (many ﬁrms operate in proximity) but that only some func-
tions are centralised (not all ﬁrms cluster in the ). What distin-
guishes the two dynamics is the degree of complexity and specialisation:
the more complex and specialised the activity the greater the likelihood
that it will be found in Central London. However, in order to verify
this conclusion it will be rather helpful to examine the telecommuni-
cations ﬂows in greater detail since the  employment data does
not enable us to distinguish between front- and back-oﬃce work di-
rectly: workers at both ends of the knowledge work spectrum within
a ﬁnancial services ﬁrm are all lumped in together under a single 
code. Nonetheless, even with this static view of the data there is strong
evidence here of trade-oﬀs amongst ﬁrms operating in the ﬁnancial
services sector between accessibility to Central London and the need to
house large numbers of people, not all of whom are directly involved in
deal-ﬂow and transactions.
Table 7.8 helps us to further ﬁll in this picture of synthetic knowl-
edge work since it contains sectors strongly associated with consultancy
to multi-national enterprises (s). These companies are also ex-
pected to have substantial  oﬃce presences and to be involved in
iterative, interaction-intensive transactions with s in ﬁnance and
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Sector 
Central
London
Inner
London
Outer
London
Outer
Metro
Area
Legal Activities 7411 64.3% 7.0% 11.9% 16.8%
Accountancy 7412 51.2% 5.0% 15.9% 27.9%
Market Research 7413 38.1% 5.3% 19.7% 37.0%
Business Management Consultancy 7414 38.8% 10.1% 16.5% 34.6%
Management Holding Companies 7415 30.4% 4.2% 16.0% 49.4%
Architecture & Engineering 7420 34.0% 8.4% 16.9% 40.7%
All Sectors 26.0% 11.0% 25.6% 37.4%
Table 7.8: Synthetic Group #2:
Support (adapted from Smith,
2011)
ancillary industries. However, they may also be engaged in more ‘tradi-
tional’ forms collaboration—such as product development—with clients
either elsewhere in the  or, indeed, elsewhere in the world. This
dichotomy may help to explain why the distribution of ﬁrms in the
second group is broadly bimodal, with substantive presences in Cen-
tral London and in the Outer Metro Area, but comparatively little in
between.
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Figure 7.24: Synthetic Group #2Signiﬁcantly, many of these sectors are the same as those identiﬁed
by globalisation researchers (see Table 6.1 on page 213), but Table 7.8
indicates that some of these have nearly as many (and in some cases,
more) employees in the outermost activity ring as they do in the .
Logically, in these cases we are unlikely to be dealing with ‘back oﬃce’
activities of the sort that characterise the retail and support divisions
of large ﬁnancial services and insurance ﬁrms since, although these
ﬁrms may have teams providing  and logistical support, they are
not providing a transactional service for clients. In fact, the majority
of consultants in these industries spend a great deal of time ‘on site’
with clients and so what we are logically seeing is a distinction between
services that require frequent and direction interaction with other sectors
that are -based, and those that have no such constraints; either
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because their most important clients are not centralised, or because they
have clients across a range of sectors and need to prioritise access to
areas other than the .
Within London, Figure 7.24a suggests that these ﬁrms congre-
gate heavily near ﬁnancial services, lending support to the claim that
access to the Square Mile is a critical locational feature for some con-
sultancy ﬁrms. This would seem to be particularly true of the legal and
accountancy sectors that work most closely with ﬁrms in the City of
London. In view of the London-wide distribution, however, there is a
suggestion that access to Westminster may also play a role in locational
decisions. At the  scale the picture is murkier: only Cambridge has
an  greater than ﬁve and so there is no obvious relationship between
this type of synthetic work and the ﬁnance sector.
These results would appear to suggest that some ﬁrms are serving a
wider range of clients regionally, or that they are less specialised than
the ones concentrated in Central London (see Figure 10.40 on page
403, and the discussion of Knowledge Intensive Business Services
on page 183). To unpick this relationship we can, of course, further
unbundle the second Synthetic category into two subgroups: the Legal
and Accountancy subgroup (Figures 10.10d and 10.31c on pages 371
and 394) and the Consultancy subgroup (Figures 10.10a and 10.31e).
The latter contains sectors such as Market Research, Business and
Management Consultancy, Management Activities, and Architectural
and Engineering services.
We can see from Figure 10.40a that the Legal sector is extraordi-
narily tightly-clustered in the City, meaning that we can consider it be
highly centralised as well. In contrast, Figure 10.40c (page 403) shows
that Accountancy is agglomerated, in as much as there are a small num-
ber of statistically signiﬁcant areas with very high s, but shows evi-
dence of dispersal, possibly because it regularly serves clients in a much
wider range of industries. The  group as a whole (Figure 10.30a on
page 391), and Business Management Consultancy in particular (see
Figure 10.40d on page 403), shows some evidence of concentrations
to the South and West of metropolitan London, but the absence of sig-
niﬁcant centres seem striking—there is, in other words, nowhere that
consultants congregate at levels far above the regional norm. Finally,
Architecture and Engineering (Figure 10.20a on page 381) appears
fairly decentralised, especially when we consider its dispersion around
the . That said, proximity to motorways and the existence of a small,
concentrated employment area to the West of Central London suggest
that access to clients is a locational factor.
Communication Activity
When we select only those locations that have have signiﬁcant levels of
employment (i. e. more than 1.5 standard deviations above the mean
for lognormally-distributed s and more than 10% employment) a
pattern of global communications emerges: proximity to London is
clearly a strong predictor of an increase international calling activity.
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In the case of Synthetic Group #1, the congregation of multinational
ﬁnancial services ﬁrms in the City is obvious, but additional research
was required to uncover the fact that the southern edge of the 
is home to the marketing, customer services,  and administrative
divisions (i. e. back oﬃces) of several American ﬁnancial services ﬁrms.
Tonbridge, Royal Tunbridge Wells, and Cranbourne/Ascot also display
quite high levels of international calling activity relative to the  as a
whole, but the sites dotting the South coast and East Anglia are clearly
much more domestic in their telecoms usage. What Figure 7.25a draws
out is the existence of one or two ‘corridors’ of activity running South
into Kent. The existence of these has not, to my knowledge, been
broached in the existing literature and their exact function is unknown.
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Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
(b) Synthetic Group # 2
Figure 7.25: Synthetic s &
Average Signals
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Figure 7.25b emphasises the extent to which Synthetic Group #2
is concentrated in just a few areas. Fewer, in fact, than ﬁnance! And,
whereas areas with signiﬁcant levels of ﬁnancial services employment
exhibited a range of calling behaviours, with this group there is a clear
dichotomy between ﬁrms operating in highly-globalised environments
in Central London and around the , and those operating in second-
or third-tier cities and towns elsewhere in the . In the latter case,
levels of international calling are only slightly higher than the regional
norm which, given their location, also suggests that they are more
domestically-oriented.
Nonetheless, we should also note that there is a clear suggestion of
three distinct agglomerations here, and that there is a concentration
of professional services activity in the vicinity of Cambridge where no
less than four s have statistically signiﬁcant levels of employment in
these industries. It will be interesting to see in the subsequent sections
whether these marginally less internationalised ﬁrms have correspond-
ingly diﬀerent patterns of interaction, or if this is simply a good base
from which to serve clients in the East of England and parts North.
Turning to the eigenplace results, it is sensible to start with the ob-
vious in Figure 7.26: Cluster #3 captures the importance of the City,
and it shows not only the impact of post-2 p.m. calling as the American
ﬁnancial markets open, but also the extent to which such calling does
not occur on weekends. It may well be that traders and other ﬁnancial
workers engage in continued activity over the weekend from mobile
platforms and from home, but they manifestly do not do so from the
oﬃce. Similarly, Clusters #2 and #4 highlight areas near to London
known to have signiﬁcant back oﬃce employment—Croydon, Brom-
ley, Reigate, Kingswood, and Royal Tunbridge Wells—as well as the
more remote activities of ﬁrms in the insurance sector in Peterborough
and Norwich. Note too that the average signal in both clusters (see Fig-
ure 11.24 on page 447) also contains a small, but signiﬁcant increase in
international communication late in the day.
In contrast to these, Figure 11.24 indicates that Cluster #1 has much
lower volumes of both domestic and international calling. So where
Cluster #2 appears to contain ﬁnancial services subcentres with strong
domestic and non-domestic links, the s in this other group tend to
be much less connected in general. The remaining clusters, numbers
#5--#7, show strong variation in calling activity, and only one of the
remaining groups contains more than a single , so these area areas
with quite distinctive patterns of usage. The sustained levels of activity
over the weekend in Clusters #5 and #7 are strongly suggestive of sup-
port activities. Cluster #6 has much more in common with Cluster #2,
save for the fact that international calling activity accelerates late in the
day instead of declining.
We should note too here that the feature selection process docu-
mented in Table 11.4 suggests two things: ﬁrst, that the waveforms are
more strongly diﬀerentiated than they were in the Symbolic analysis
since the low-numbered eigenvectors form an important part of the se-
lection process; second, that we were forced to select a large number of
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Figure 7.26: Synthetic Group #1
Eigenplace Results
features in order to select more than a single feature. What this means
in terms of diﬀerences in activity is that the Synthetic group’s telecoms
usage is, on the whole, more diﬃcult to tell apart but that, once we es-
tablish a high enough threshold for similarity, then the diﬀerences are
more extensive.
As might be expected, the distribution of activity in Synthetic Group
#2 shows a pattern that is related to that of the ﬁnancial services sector
upon which so many ﬁrms in this group depend, but it nonetheless
diﬀers in signiﬁcant and interesting ways. The silhouette plot (page
449) indicates a fair result from the eigenplace process, and Clusters
#1, #2 and #5 all demonstrate the markers of internationally-oriented
communication, especially with America. For Clusters #2 and #5 this
behaviour is to be expected since the s are located in Central Lon-
don and are adjacent to the major centres of global ﬁnancial activity.
Interestingly, Cluster #1 shares these characteristics, including locations
elsewhere in London—the centre-most of which has massive levels of
international calling—and near Reigate, but there is also evidence here
of ﬁrms with little connection to the ﬁnance industry located on the
 near Cambridge.
Clusters #3 and #4 both contain s with rather less in the way of
international interaction—they diﬀer in the extent to which domestic
telecommunications are employed—and so it is reasonable to conclude
that the ﬁrms in these areas may be rather less global. Altogether dif-
ferent, however, are the activities in Clusters #6 and #7. Both of these
s have modest international activity but are easily distinguished
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Figure 7.27: Synthetic Group #2
Eigenplace Results
from the other s by virtue of their domestic activity: Cluster #6
shows a surge in call volumes between midnight and 6 a.m. while Clus-
ter #7 shows signiﬁcant levels of per phone level calling throughout the
night. Neither of these behaviours is, strictly speaking, intelligible if we
assume that people are responsible; however, the timing of the com-
munications suggests that some of these calls may well be automated
exchanges of information or that there are ﬁrms in this area to the
South of Cambridge that have unique interaction requirements.
Summary
Combining the , , and eigenplace analyses yields several important
conclusions, the ﬁrst of which is that the City of London remains the
absolutely critical site for ﬁnancial activity in the . There is strong,
direct evidence of clustering here: not only is the City a statistically
signiﬁcant site for one sector, it is oen the most signiﬁcant site in the
entire sample for many specialties within the ﬁnancial services sec-
tor. This is particularly important evidence of multilateral exchanges
having been a driving force of agglomeration in this tiny portion of
metropolitan London, but it does not address the question of whether
this physical proximity remains important today.
Further out from London there is much less geographical overlap
between the activities associated with this group, suggesting greater
specialisation and less 2 interaction. The lack of direct interaction
may, however, be matched by a higher rate of mediated interaction.
Although every  associated with the ﬁnancial sector uses inter-
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national and domestic communications channels, the biggest users of
domestic telecoms are nearly all outside of London. In Table 6.2, I pro-
posed that ﬁnancial ﬁrms would be predominantly global or very local
in their telecoms usage, but what these ﬁndings suggest is the existence
of a wide-ranging regional ecology that involves extensive domestic
communications as well.
Where the global ﬁnancial services industry shows strong evidence
of clustering behaviour, the same is not true of the second Synthetic
group explored in this section. Here, concentration near the centre of
London and around the  seems to be driven by access considera-
tions, with little evidence across the majority of industries of a need to
interact closely with other sectors. There is also a strong demonstration
of the disposition considered earlier (see page 183); speciﬁcally,
centrally-located -dominated areas have far more intensive inter-
national communications than do s further out from the . The
general locational and communication pattern would be consistent with
a distinction between ﬁrms which operate in highly competitive, global
environments around the  and those which operate across the re-
gional ‘periphery’. Elsewhere in Britain the periphery might be a weak
source of revenue, but the scale of employment across the  makes
this a lucrative proposition.
Intriguingly, we found that the Legal industry is the most highly
concentrated sector in the entire sample. The sector is tightly clustered
in the very centre of London’s core, suggesting that this agglomera-
tion is the most highly specialised service-provider of all. In contrast,
Accounting oﬀered evidence of signiﬁcant agglomeration near each
of the ’s largest cities (and a particularly high concentration near
Southampton), and this may reﬂect the oﬃce structure of the sector’s
near-oligopolies since just four ﬁrms are able to provide accounting
services on a truly global scale. Finally, Architecture, Engineering and,
more surprisingly, Management Consulting showed strong evidence of
regional dispersal: the ﬁrst two in particular indicate a lack of a agglom-
eration across the sector but, rather, large oﬃces having relatively little
to do with one another.
7.8 Analytical Industries
The ﬁnal group of intensive knowledge workers—the Analytical
group—is principally composed of scientiﬁc and computing ﬁrms. As
such, this group is markedly diﬀerent from the other knowledge bases
studied. Firms operating in these sectors are generally presumed to have
much more modest interaction requirements thanks to the power of
codiﬁcation, and many of their outputs are easily transmitted either
physically or electronically around the world. In the Methodology, I
suggested that, based on the picture assembled over the previous four
chapters, ﬁrms involved in ‘high-tech’ work would tend to prefer sites
that have traditional types of amenity, especially the residential ones
such as good schools, large properties, and access to nature. We also
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anticipated that, as a result, such ﬁrms would of necessity be amongst
the most global in their communications proﬁles.
Spatial Distribution
An examination of Table 7.9 quickly reveals a markedly diﬀerent distri-
bution of employment from the Symbolic and Synthetic ﬁrms consid-
ered above. Here, in stark contrast to the Symbolic workers considered
on page 277, there are just two groups with much more than 25% em-
ployment in Central London, and none have employment levels of note
within Inner London. Instead, Analytical workers are far more abun-
dant in the  region: nearly all  groups have more than 50% of
staﬀ concentrated in the outer-most ring.
On the surface of things, we might initially conclude that this distri-
bution is—much as it was for the Synthetic workers examined on page
284—indicative of front-/back-oﬃce relationships. However, the tiny
amount of employment in Central and Inner London, together with the
strong tilt towards the  region actually suggests that a very diﬀer-
ent dynamic is at work. There are two altogether diﬀerent possibilities:
either many ﬁrms have no presence at all in Central London and there
are only a small number of specialised suppliers to be found there, or the
largest ﬁrms have small sales outposts in the  so that they can meet
with clients and close deals but the bulk of the ‘real’ work is done far
from London.
Sector 
Central
London
Inner
London
Outer
London
Outer
Metro
Area
Hardware Consultancy 7210 11.9% 10.0% 17.0% 61.1%
Soware Publishing 7221 14.2% 6.7% 24.0% 55.2%
Other Soware Consultancy 7222 24.3% 6.0% 17.6% 52.1%
Data Processing 7230 23.1% 4.8% 21.9% 50.2%
Database Activities 7240 43.3% 4.3% 16.7% 35.7%
 Maintenance 7250 12.8% 3.2% 24.7% 59.4%
Other Computer 7260 25.6% 8.4% 20.6% 45.5%
& (Natural Sciences) 7310 14.7% 6.0% 13.7% 65.6%
Defence Activities† 7522 44.6% 0.7% 12.9% 41.8%
All Sectors 26.0% 11.0% 25.6% 37.4%
† This sector not included in maps or analysis.
Table 7.9: Analytical Knowledge
Base (adapted from Smith, 2011)
The two most notable exceptions to the general distribution of activ-
ity in Table 7.9 help us to understand in more detail what is happening:
in terms of their allocation of employment, Database and Defence Ac-
tivities (s 7240 and 7522) look much more like the Synthetic ﬁrms
studied in the preceding section than they do like the soware and
hardware ﬁrms contained in this table, while the Soware Consultancy
sector falls somewhere in between. Firms in these sectors may oen
operate more like consultancies than they do like producers of a stan-
dardised good and, consequently, require much more iterative interac-
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tion. In the case of defence there is also, of course, the requirement to
be close to government, but there is no sense in which the production
and distribution of military hardware is a standardised process.
Similarly, the increasing reliance of all sorts of ﬁrms on the process-
ing and management of data—from sales and customer information, to
transactional and exchange systems—has created the need for a cadre of
professionals who design and implement customised storage and analy-
sis capabilities for clients. From personal experience, I can vouch for the
fact that database mining is a ‘high-touch’ profession involving a great
deal of 2 interaction with staﬀ drawn from across a ﬁrm’s manage-
ment and divisional structure. As such, this sector is more truly a form
of consultancy entailing both a dedicated back oﬃce of specialists who
deal with technical processes, and a substantial front-oﬃce to meet with
clients to draw up requirements and deliver reports and analyses.
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Figure 7.28: Analytical  ResultsAt the highest level of analysis, this group is most noticeable in Lon-
don by where it is not: Figure 7.28a shows that there are modest levels of
activity across much of the western half Greater London, but very little
to the East. The highest concentration of Analytical activity is actually
on the very edge of London itself, close to the , with slightly lower-
intensity subcentres near Richmond, Kingston-upon-Thames and,
more intriguingly, in Harringay. Only the Soware Consultancy group
seems to have a signiﬁcant central component. It is, however, at the 
scale that the true magnitude of the diﬀerence in locational strategies
between this and other knowledge bases becomes evident: high con-
centrations of Analytical activity occur near Cambridge, Reading, and
Guildford, while lesser levels of employment concentration crop up
near Ashford, Faversham, and Wrentham.
Narrowing the focus to & in the natural sciences12 in Figure 7.29b
12 Social science & has been
excluded on the basis that most of
this will be university employment.
brings forward the existence of a pronounced Westward tilt with a
second major concentration near Cambridge. Note, however, that both
the general and the signiﬁcant distributions suggest proximity to the
major radial routes connecting with the , though not to the ones
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Figure 7.29: &  Resultsused by ﬁnancial services. This distribution would, broadly speaking,
ﬁt with the expectation we have that & activity tends to occur at
accessible, but not central locations since the need for 2 interaction is
lower, so there is less need to pay -level rents. Interestingly, there
is also a seeming lack of statistically signiﬁcant & activity in the area
between Oxford and Milton Keynes, and even the normal measures
suggest quite low concentrations in comparison with the areas due West
and North.
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Figure 7.30:   ResultsTurning to  employment, although overall levels of concentration
are lower, the spatial distribution is more marked: the ‘Western Wedge’
posited by Hall (1987) is particularly evident in an arc that is centered
on Reading, but which swings from the  in the South to the 
in the North (see Figure 7.30b, and also Figure 10.32b on page 395).
These dynamics are highlighted in the map of signiﬁcant s on page
387, which suggests that  location is characterised by proximity to
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motorways and to airports in a way that & activity is not.
Some of the highest concentrations of & activity occur in rela-
tively less accessible areas such as Sandwich, Royal Tunbridge Wells,
and Sharnbrook, whereas even the Soware Publishing sector (
7221), which should have relatively little in the way of external depen-
dencies, is still located close to major motorways and within striking
distance of an airport. For Other Soware Consultancy ( 7222),
there are a high number of signiﬁcant locations to the West/Southwest,
but equally interesting are the areas that have signiﬁcantly lower levels of
activity: the  region has many areas where the distribution is more
than 1.5 standard deviations below what we’d expect given the regional
norm!
Communication Activity
The  maps in Figure 7.31 provide additional perspective on the dis-
tribution of Analytical workers. Figure 7.31a highlights two particularly
important dynamics: ﬁrst, that there is a lot of analytical activity tak-
ing place to the West of Greater London, and that quite a bit of it is
operating in a very international context; second, that there is a visibly
important secondary cluster of analytical activities in the vicinity of
Cambridge. Comparison of Figures 7.31a and 7.30b makes it clear that
some of this dynamic originates with the  industry, but note that
industrial concentration is not, in and of itself, a suﬃcient cause of the
level of international calling levels seen in the  map (compare the de-
gree of internationalisation in Figure 7.31a with the levels of statistically
signiﬁcant concentration seen in Figure 10.32b on page 395).
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Figure 7.31: Analytical s
Most obvious in Figure 7.31b is the extraordinarily high level of
relative international activity in Sandwich, home (until recently) to a
major pharmaceutical research centre. More subtly, we should note that
the majority of statistically signiﬁcant & sites seem quite far removed
from Central London when compared with the other two knowledge
bases, and that distance from London also seems to have little impact
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on their use of international communications. This seems to ﬁt with
the predictions developed over the course of the previous chapters, ex-
cept that the levels are oen lower than we anticipated—the ﬁrms are
using telecoms to communicate internationally, but the codiﬁability
may be being expressed through a reduction in voice communica-
tions/coordination and an increase in Internet-enabled interaction that
is largely invisible.
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Figure 7.32: Analytical Group
Eigenplace Results
The ﬁrst thing to notice about the results from the eigenplace analy-
sis is that that the representative signals (see Figure 11.28 on page 451)
indicate that there is, on the whole, less interaction in the s where
analytical ﬁrms locate, and that none of them approach the massive
per phone volumes seen in the Synthetic groups. Clusters #1, #2 and #3
diﬀer principally in the extent to which they use telecommunications
at all: the averages for domestic volumes are only just distinguishable
to the eye, and only Cluster #2 shows modestly higher rates of call-
ing across the board and a noticeable aernoon skew in international
volumes.
This pattern is, however, nothing compared to what we see for
Cluster #4 where the levels of international calling can exceed domestic
volumes for much of the aernoon. This surge has no counterpart in
any other group, and so it is strongly suggestive of a uniquely Analytical
behaviour linked to communications with America in general, and the
West Coast in particular. As before, Clusters #5, #6, and #7 contain
just a single , signalling that their patterns of usage are very diﬀerent
from the much larger Clusters #1 and #2. In particular, Cluster #6
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shows the same, puzzling pattern seen in the Synthetic analysis, while
Cluster #7’s massive usage levels show why the patterns observed for the
Synthetic group were less pronounced.
The fact that we have the same  acting as a signiﬁcant area for
both the Analytical and Synthetic groups points to one limitation of this
approach: although I have required that at least 10% of employment
in a  be from the sector of interest, that could still leave 80% of
employees uncounted. In other words, the distinctiveness of the inter-
actions found here could indicate the inﬂuence of a third large sector in
the vicinity. If that is the case, then the aggregate results could be mis-
leading if we were to attach too much importance to them in isolation.
However, the ﬂip side of this very same issue is that without the inter-
action data we would have no idea that such a situation even existed and
warranted further investigation.
Summary
The ﬁndings from the , , and eigenplaces analyses highlight the
Westward tendency of this group, and it seems signiﬁcant that the
majority of sites with lower levels of telecommunications activity—and
especially international telecoms activity—are to the East and South.
One of the eigenplace clusters, Cluster #4, seems to have captured
what appear to be critical anchor points in the globalisation of this
type of activity: their usage of international calling suggests signiﬁcant
informational ﬂows from abroad and, most importantly, from America.
The high number of statistically signiﬁcant sites suggests large facilities
such as oﬃces and oﬃce parks, but little in the way of spatial overlap
between the individual sectors. Unlike the conjunction of activities
seen in some of the Synthetic and Symbolic sectors, Analytical ﬁrms
largely appear to physical prefer separation.
Moreover, the communications results suggest that if interaction is
occurring between the oﬃces of Analytical ﬁrms then it is not taking
place via voice calls in this data set. Given that the data is taken from
2005, this data set may post-date the transition from traditional voice
calling to application-based o products such as Skype. As well, the
formal constraints of programming languages mean that it is much eas-
ier to share work across national and even, though to a more limited
degree, linguistic boundaries. Modern coding environments (e.g. In-
tegrated Development Environments) and distributed version control
systems mean that physically remote groups can each work on a diﬀer-
ent part of the entire system or application but synchronise their output
at the end of the workday automatically, without the need to actually
discuss the day-to-day workstream.
There are indications that some  employment occurs in close
proximity to the , and I wonder if (as discussed earlier) this is a
manifestation of the distinction between soware as a product (de-
centralised) and soware as a service or project output (centralised).
Unfortunately, the  and census data are not suﬃciently detailed
to support this type of examination but, in general, despite taking less
300 the place of telecommunications
central locations, Analytical ﬁrms are still most oen found in sites that
are accessible—especially to private vehicles—and so they are only pe-
ripheral relative to the , but not to employee housing or to airports.
In fact,  betrays the stronger bias towards global access via airports,
and the particularly strong use of telecommunications at a few sites is
suggestive of high levels of globalisation amongst some ﬁrms.
The & sector shows much wider dispersal across the —some
of it clearly connected to pre-existing research centres in places such as
Cambridge, but some of it with little obvious connection to anything at
all (e.g. Sandwidch). International & also appears to be a much larger
user of global telecoms, and this is perhaps the only sector for which
distance from the  is no predictor of overall internationalisation of
communications. In fact, the majority of external links here seem to be
uniquely global—most likely to the other oﬃces of the same ﬁrm—and
there is little regional or local interaction. Indeed, it was the overall lack
of communication that was surprising here: I had expected these ﬁrms
to make stronger use of telecoms than their counterparts in every sector
except global ﬁnance, but instead they make comparatively little use of
voice calling. Perhaps this is, as I have suggested above, a sign of things
to come and a marker of a shi to other interaction channels?
7.9 Material & Immaterial Flow Industries
Finally, because I have drawn such a strong distinction in this thesis be-
tween knowledge work and the locational preferences of ﬁrms involved
in material and immaterial ﬂows of a standardised, ubiquitous nature, I
felt that it would be helpful to examine these sectors separately. Broadly
speaking, the ﬁrms in this section fall into one of two categories: dis-
tribution (broadly understood to be either physical or electronic) and
production (of physical goods alone).
Spatial Distribution
It is immediately obvious from Table 7.10 that we are dealing with
an utterly diﬀerent spatial structure. Although the Analytical group
discussed above has signiﬁcant  employment, the ﬁgures do not
approach the levels seen here. Many of the distributions are to be ex-
pected: with the exception of the much smaller City Airport, London’s
major airports are all in the Outer London or  regions and so air
transport-related employment naturally follows this distribution. The
2.4% of centrally-located Scheduled Air Transport workers are likely
to be the employees of the Civil Aviation Authority (), which is
based in Holborn, but the location of the remaining 96.7% make it
abundantly clear where the ‘work’ is done. The parallel distribution of
Packaging and Warehousing activities is also notable here, though it too
is not unexpected.
However, some of the more unusual distributions require some ex-
planation. The high proportion of Other Land Transport and Other
Water Transport in Central London are connected to the provision
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Sector 
Central
London
Inner
London
Outer
London
Outer
Metro
Area
Call Centre Activities 7486 26.8% 3.7% 26.5% 42.9%
Telecommunications 6420 33.5% 5.5% 18.5% 42.5%
Packaging Activities 7482 3.4% 4.4% 29.9% 62.3%
Pharmaceutical Manufacture 2442 1.3% 1.6% 14.5% 82.5%
Computer Manufacture 3002 5.9% 7.5% 41.6% 45.0%
Scheduled Air Transport 6210 2.4% 0.9% 73.0% 23.7%
Non-Scheduled Air Transport 6220 3.8% 1.7% 18.9% 75.6%
Cargo Handling 6311 1.8% 0.2% 46.7% 51.3%
Storage Warehousing 6312 4.3% 4.0% 29.7% 62.0%
Other Land Transport 6321 54.8% 9.9% 19.3% 16.0%
Other Water Transport 6322 20.6% 3.4% 19.4% 56.5%
Other Air Transport 6323 0.9% 0.2% 57.1% 41.8%
All Sectors 26.0% 11.0% 25.6% 37.4%
Table 7.10: Material & Immaterial
Flow Sectors by Region (adapted
from Smith, 2011)
of London’s massive public transit system: in addition to its operation
centres, the majority of Transport for London’s (f ) employees can be
considered to be working ‘from’ London, and the water-based group
is undoubtedly connected to the tourist boats that ply the Thames
between Greenwich and Westminster. The abundance of Telecom-
munications staﬀ in Central London is related to head oﬃce activ-
ity—marketing, ﬁnance, and management—of the major network
operators (e.g. Orange, ), but the presence of 26.8% of Call Centre
Activities employees is entirely unforeseen.
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Figure 7.33: Material Flows 
Results
Figure 7.33 demonstrates the basic validity of the analysis above: the
only notable concentration of Material Flow employment within Lon-
don occurs at Heathrow Airport (Figure 7.33a), while at the  scale
even this concentration is ‘ironed out’ such that employment in the
creation and distribution of physical goods occurs nearly everywhere.
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In fact, it is only by identifying areas of signiﬁcant total employment
that any kind of general locational pattern becomes evident (see Figure
10.26e on page 387): airports (e.g. Luton, Stansted, and Heathrow) and
ports (e.g. Southampton, Harwich, and Tilbury) are obviously major
employers, but the majority of signiﬁcant locations are in East Anglia
between Cambridge and Norwich. We will return to these later, but it
is worth noting here that that is also a good deal of rail infrastructure in
the area that is not visible in Figure 7.33b.
For Immaterial Flows, the concentrations within London are made
more intelligible by projection in Figure 7.34a: a high concentration
of workers in Hayes, and lesser centres in Richmond, Erith and, lower
still, near Bethnal Green. With the notable exception of Richmond,
what seems to unite these areas is the combination of relatively higher
levels of deprivation (oen characterised by the dominance of immi-
grant groups) and cheaper land. In that sense, it would seem that data
processing and call centre activity has replaced manufacturing within
metropolitan London as a source of employment opportunity for more
recent arrivals and less skilled workers. At the  scale, the cluster of
s with high s in the vicinity of Milton Keynes represents the ﬁrst
time that we have seen anymajor concentration of knowledge base
employment in that portion of the region.
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Figure 7.34: Immaterial Flows 
ResultsAside from the Thames Estuary’s ports, some of the most visible
centres of Logistics activity (see Figure 10.32e on page 395) fall to the
Southwest of Norwich (roughly: Thetford, Downham Market, Diss,
and Attleborough), but it may be more of a surprise to see concentra-
tions of manufacturing close to Cambridge as well. We can see here
again the limitations of the  data: the manufacturing near Cam-
bridge appears to have a strong ‘high-tech’ component, while Thetford
seems to have a high proportion of precision-engineering output13. It
13 So in Cambridge outputs include
ﬁbre optics, research equipment,
automation systems, and the like,
while Thetford seems tilted towards
plastics and types of machining.is therefore possible that certain types of particularly complex or in-
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novative manufacturing are tightly coupled to & employment and
that, while they may be more remote from the source of innovation,
accessibility to knowledge-producing sites may be a requirement.
Communication Activity
Figure 7.35 enables us to contrast the distribution of international call-
ing by knowledge-intensive activities with that of two sectors that are
widely believed to be much less so. The Material Flows group in Figure
7.35a indicates, not surprisingly, that higher levels of international call-
ing are associated with proximity to major entry/exit points for goods (i.
e. ports, airports) and, to a much lesser extent, with production. Note,
however, that the internationalisation of ‘high-tech’ manufacturing
in the vicinity of Cambridge contrasts visibly with the level of inter-
national calling across the rest of East Anglia, and note too the level of
activity to the West and Southwest of Heathrow Airport.
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Figure 7.35: Flow s
The small number of signiﬁcant sites for Immaterial Flows in Fig-
ure 7.35b makes it diﬃcult to draw meaningful conclusions about this
group. The only thing that can be said with any certainty is that con-
centrations of this type of employment seem unrelated to international
calling activity in the area. The lack of internationalisation in what is
widely believed to be a highly globalised industry suggests two possible,
and potentially complementary, interpretations: the ﬁrst is that the scale
at which this analysis has been undertaken is insuﬃcient to capture the
areas (e.g. Glasgow, Leeds) where international calling activity might
be more signiﬁcant; the second is that these operations might have rel-
atively little need to interact globally since they exist solely to process
informational inputs and outputs connected with the operations of the
 economy. Since there are just four signiﬁcant Immaterial Flows
sites there was little value to be had in clustering them according to
usage.
The large number of features produced by the eigenplace process
indicates some diﬃculty in reducing them to just a few characteristic
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Eigenplace Results
features. A quick glance at the representative signals in Figure 11.30
(see page 454) shows enormous variation, not just in the magnitude
of the signals, but also in their timing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
best selection comes from Cluster #2, which clearly contains several
locations associated with the international movement of freight: two
airports and a port form part of this group.
Rather more interestingly, this process also groups with these loca-
tions two s with little obvious reason to have comparable ﬂows. In
fact, the site in this cluster that is near Cambridge throws up an issue
similar to the one identiﬁed in the previous section: it transpires that
this area contains both major construction works and several technology
parks and so we may have a degree of confusion here. So although we
constrained the eigenplace process to operate solely on large volume
callers, there is no guarantee that the  and employment percentage
ﬁltering process used to select s for additional study will pick areas
with signiﬁcant employment only in the sector of interest. While not
signiﬁcant enough to warrant inclusion in the Analytical group, the
oﬃce park may still be large enough to leave a measurable impact on
aggregate calling.
Summary
In Chapter 2, I had discussed the impact of congestion and poor in-
frastructure on the possible rise of the aerotropolis (Kasarda, 2000a,b).
However, what is clear at this point is that airport access seems to be
important principally for Logistics activity (see Figures 10.11c and
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10.32e on pages 372 and 395), and that the only other sector with even
limited evidence of this need is . Away from this particular case,
Logistics shows a bias towards the Northeast of the  that would be
consistent with a preference for cheap land and labour. However, we
should also note the high concentrations of employment around the
 which leads me to suspect that, in spite of frequent congestion, the
orbital acts as a staging area for metropolitan London.
From a communications standpoint, there is more sustained inter-
action over weekends than we have seen elsewhere, except tourism
areas, but much as with the Analytical ﬁrms, the levels of international
calling are surprisingly low when we take into account the scale of the
supply chains that keep Britain fed and entertained. The wide varia-
tion in communications activity makes testing my predictions diﬃcult,
but there is a suggestion of a link between more sophisticated types of
manufacturing and & centres, especially around Cambridge. This
could be taken to indicate that complex production processes, includ-
ing prototyping of the sort described by Scott (1983b) in Los Angeles,
still require frequent interaction in spite of, for example, the supposed
impact of the electronic data exchange and  printing for example
(Economist, 2011). This could also be a sign that ‘high-tech’ produc-
tion is being triggered here by spin-oﬀs from the Cambridge research
centres, and that the ﬁrms possess a locational inertia that creates path
dependency in the later evolution of the industry.
7.10 Combining Knowledge Bases
In the ﬁnal part of the Analysis, I wish to recombine the industrial
geographies considered in the ﬁve preceding sections above and to
explore the larger locational and communicational dynamics since we
have, until now, treated each one in isolation. The objective here is to
see whether an integrated perspective will bring out new insights, or
if it simply reﬂects the knowledge developed so far through Location
Quotients, Telecommunications Quotients, and Eigenplaces.
Spatial Distribution
I have argued in Chapter 4 that clusters can be distinguished from mere
agglomeration by the proximity of ﬁrms employed in fundamentally
diﬀerent types of knowledge work, giving them exposure and access to
varied informational inputs. However, the maps on the preceding pages
have not made it easy to see where one or more industries overlap,
especially since the selected ‘signiﬁcant locations’ were designed to
(ideally) exclude other sectoral activity. So in Figures 7.37a and 7.37b
I have deliberately relaxed these original criteria in order to take in the
bigger picture.
These two maps show only those locations where more than one sec-
tor has a statistically signiﬁcant . The size of the circle is proportional
to the number of sectors with statistically signiﬁcant s in the . As
with the earlier maps, to determine signiﬁcance I took the logarithm of
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the s, and then selected any  where the standard deviation () was
greater than 1.5 in at least two separate groups. Because of the num-
ber of calculations involved, and because the previous work had shown
that many of these sectors were lognormally distributed, I did not sup-
press or otherwise control for the few sectors which had not shown a
lognormal pattern of activity. I also did not enforce the 10% employ-
ment threshold requirement since just three of the original ‘signiﬁcant
locations’ had overlapping knowledge bases.
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Figure 7.37: Number of Overlap-
ping Sectors by 
Figure 7.37a uses the ﬁve knowledge base groups—Symbolic, Syn-
thetic #1 (Finance), Synthetic #2 (Professional Services), Analytical, and
Flows—to show that there are three clear spatial clusters of particular
prominence: the London , the Southwestern edge of the , and
in the vicinity of Cambridge. Clearly, the existence of the  clus-
ter is inﬂuenced by the impact of dividing the Synthetic group in two;
however, the co-occurence between these two groups—which have,
aer all, little need to overlap quite so intensively—is remarkable. It also
seems signiﬁcant that the composition of the Cambridge cluster is quite
diﬀerent: it contains s with predominantly Analytical and Flows
employment.
However, both of these areas seem comparatively specialised when
compared to the exuberant diversity of activity contained within Lon-
don’s —ﬁrms from every major knowledge base can be found here
at signiﬁcant levels. In a few cases, all four categories can be found
above the +1:5 threshold. Interestingly, Material Flow concentrations
only seem to overlap with the core knowledge categories within a single
 that is far from London. The value of Figure 7.37a therefore lies
in the fact that it highlights areas with statistically signiﬁcant activity
across a very broad range of activities and thereby picks out areas where
proximity may be driven by factors other than specialisation or vertical
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agglomeration. Figure 7.37b then ﬂeshes out this picture using all 53 of
the selected 4 employment categories to provide a broader view
of all locations where distinct types of knowledge work co-occur.
Unsurprisingly, London’s  emerges, again, as the dominant
centre of Figure 7.37b, but the dynamic that should be abundantly
clear here is that there is much more overlap of employment in the
sectors that I chose to study in this work to the West and South of
London than there is to the North and East. The clear implication is
that the Western and Southern edges of the  are absolutely critical
to the wider regional economy since there are particularly sizeable
concentrations of several sectors near Reading, Redhill, and Haywards
Heath/Burgess Hill. To the North, the Cambridge cluster has been
substantially reduced in spatial extent, though expanded in industrial
scope. We can also clearly see the impact of accessibility on this type
of work through the radial distribution of the more narrowly focussed
clusters.
Communication Activity
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Figure 7.38: Signiﬁcant Locations
and  Results
Returning to the original 184 signiﬁcant locations, we can now con-
sider the extent to which patterns of telecommunications activity are, or
are not, distinct when cast into the larger mix. Figure 7.38a shows the
complete map of signiﬁcant locations as a reference point, reinforcing
our understanding of how knowledge work is distributed across the
: some ﬁnancial and symbolic work is tightly clustered in the cen-
tre of London, and the rest is distributed to the South, the Northwest,
and the extreme Northeast; Professional Services and Analytical work
has a strong Westward orientation, with a secondary cluster around
Cambridge; Material Flows dominate East Anglia, the airports, and the
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seaports; and Immaterial Flows have no obvious logic other than that
inferred earlier from their distribution within London.
The  results in Figure 7.38b are not surprising, but they are
nonetheless signiﬁcant since they emphasise the extent to which rel-
ative international calling intensity is disproportionately concentrated
in a small number of regions within the : Central London, Read-
ing, Epsom/Redhill and Cambridge. We should also take note of the
general decline in international call volumes heading into East Anglia
from Cambridge, in the vicinity of Milton Keynes, in East Kent, and
beyond Oxford. Taken together, these trends suggest a clear boundary
for the globalisation processes expected of knowledge-intensive ﬁrms,
especially s. The leading edge of this process may be much further
from the  than sometimes imagined, it is also far from being the
entire . Again, the ease of interpreting the  analysis suggests that
is has real value as an analytical tool in spite of the absence of a temporal
dimension from this view of the data.
Figure 7.39 presents the results from a i approach to the eigen-
place analysis. In each step of the analysis, the number of clusters is
doubled, yielding two, then four, and then eight discrete clusters. For
brevity, the results of the ﬁrst clustering are not presented here; how-
ever, the results in Table 11.8 (page 455) suggest that decomposition
process has produced a good mix of useful features and that there is rel-
atively little to choose between in terms of the viability of two or seven
clusters. The silhouette plot emphasises the consistency of the clusters,
and the representative signals in Figure 11.31 suggest that a principal
deciding factor has been the magnitude of domestic and international
calling.
Taking Cluster #1 from the ﬁrst analysis, and submitting only the
s assigned to that cluster to a new eigenplace analysis, we now ﬁnd
that two clusters is the optimal outcome but that the increasing number
of features selected indicates that the selection process is having more
diﬃculty extracting distinctive behaviours. The larger number of fea-
tures also means that more substantive diﬀerences are identiﬁed during
the k-Means clustering, and so while Cluster #1 in Figure 7.39a is fairly
coherent, Cluster #2 contains some wide variation. The representative
signals for Clusters #1 and #2 help to explain this dichotomy: Cluster
#1 contains s which have a strong aernoon surge in international
calling, while Cluster #2 shows much more obvious noise.
The same process, when applied to Cluster #2 from the ﬁrst cut of
the data, suggests that this group contains a small number of s with
very diﬀerent behaviours, and the silhouette plot (page 309) highlights
this. Cluster #3 now shows obvious bias in international calling, but has
a strong drop-oﬀ in aernoon domestic volumes, while Cluster #4 is
deﬁned principally by its massive surges in domestic and international
calling, though not at the same s! Broadly speaking, this second
pair of clusters seems to allow us to distinguish between two types of
areas, neither of which seems to have a particularly strong reliance upon
intensive telecommunications, based largely on the small number of
s with abnormal levels of calling activity.
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Figure 7.39: Signiﬁcant Eigenplaces
ResultsGeographically, Figure 7.39a’s four clusters break down in an inter-
esting manner: Clusters #1 and #2 are clearly connected to the s
with high s covered in Figure 7.38b and, as such, can be implicitly
connected to the activities of s. Tentatively, their diﬀerent disposi-
tions suggest a rough hierarchy: Cluster #1 is generally the more central
of the two (note the densities in Central London and Cambridge),
while Cluster #2 suggests marginally less information-intensive activ-
ity in terms of the magnitude of interactions. Cluster #3 is, perhaps,
more easy to describe in contradistinction to Cluster #4, which picks
up calling activity at Heathrow and Stansted together with altogether
more puzzling activity near Cambridge and Bedford. Accordingly, we
can roughly categorise Cluster #3 as encapsulating the ‘background’
economy from a communications standpoint—this is not to suggest
that these areas don’t have international interactions since, as we’ll see on
page 313, the  as a whole is more informationally active than most
of the rest of Britain. Rather, I wish only to emphasise that these areas
are much less intensive users of telecommunications infrastructure than
their ‘neighbours’ in the other clusters.
We can, if we so choose, redouble the analysis by taking each of the
four clusters extracted in the previous round of processing and submit-
ting them to a new round of eigenplace analysis (see page 459 for the
representative signals and clustering results). This step produces the
map shown in Figure 7.39b, enabling us to elaborate on the interpreta-
tions advanced in the preceding paragraphs. In this ﬁgure, Clusters #1
and #2 visibly diﬀerentiate between the main oﬃces of global, and espe-
cially American, s with a strong informational exchange component
(Cluster #2), and the oﬃces of ﬁrms with substantially less American
inﬂuence as well as less domestic calling intensity. Similarly, Clus-
ters #3 and #4 appear to elaborate a distinction along the international
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axis—the domestic dynamic appears similar for both groups—between
what we might term ‘core’ back oﬃce facilities (again, of predominantly
American ﬁrms) in locations such as Croydon and around the ,
and a range of facilities further out that appear much less involved in
trans-Atlantic interaction.
Applying the same process to the remaining two clusters from Figure
7.39a yields more ambiguous results (see also page 461): Clusters #5 and
#6 are distinguished mainly by their domestic call volumes, since both
lack an international pattern that would suggest an obvious aﬃliation
with another part of the world. What is noticeable about both of these
clusters is that they experience much less of a drop-oﬀ in calling vol-
umes over the weekend. So, unlike the highly internationalised ﬁrms
operating in the s considered in Clusters #1--#4, ﬁrms in this group
operate on more of an ‘around-the-clock’ basis, with the intensity of
calling oﬀering the suggestion that we are seeing here a distinction be-
tween more and less intensive production and coordination sites. Note
that Cluster #5 is in most cases on the periphery of the , while Clus-
ter #6 tends to co-occur with areas of more intensive activity in other
clusters. Clusters #7 and #8 are rather more perplexing, especially since
they already had quite distinct patterns of communications in Figure
11.32 (page 458). It is the location of the s in this cluster that give
them away: two are at airports, and one of the remaining s seems to
be port. So Cluster #7 contains strong domestic and international call
volumes, which is consonant with their placement at major airports,
while Cluster #6 has uniquely strong domestic interactions which, more
than any other group in this analysis, appear to indicate hubs—e.g. a call
centre service—of some sort.
In sum, the results are hardly conclusive since it transpires that the
diﬀerences between the observed signals for signiﬁcant locations are
such that several clusters contain only one or two s, while others
contain dozens. However, we can tentatively conclude that the op-
erations of some ﬁrms, and most especially of logistics and call-centre
type operations, do have distinctive and measurable impacts on per phone
calling levels at the ﬁner scale. The communications footprint of U.S.-
based s is also particularly obvious in the representative signals but,
given the obvious importance of America in the total ﬂows mapped out
in Figure 9.1b (page 339), this too is hardly surprising.
Distance Decay
A ﬁnal dimension of calling behaviour that we can examine is the re-
lationship between distance and call volumes. It has been previously
demonstrated that, in aggregate, call volumes between any two points
within a country can oen be predicted using a variation on Newton’s
law of universal gravitation (Krings et al., 2009). The ‘gravity model’
of telecommunications holds that total call volumes are given by the
formula:
Vij = 
Pi × Pj
dnij
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Here, Pi is the number of phones (or people) in  i and Pj is the
count from  j. The product of these two populations is divided by
the distance dij between them, raised to some power n, and all of this is
then multiplied by a constant  to obtain the predicted ﬂows. Using a
similar approach, Krings et al. (2009) obtained a distance exponent of 2,
and a gravitational constant of 1:07 × 102 seconds per day.
Here, since we already have the total ﬂows from the data set, the ob-
jective of this part of the analysis is to understand how well this model
ﬁts real world data. We can make the results easier to analyse by rear-
ranging the equation to give us a linear relationship:
log − n logdij = logVij − log (Pi × Pj)
In this new equation, the y intercept is given by log and the slope
of the line (if any) by n. Conceptually, the y intercept is the volume
of communication when distance is 0, which in this case would be
the predicted volume of calls within the . The slope gives us an
indication of how quickly this volume of calls drops over distance, all
other things being equal. Note that we expect the slope to be negative,
meaning that communications volumes decline with distance. A fuller
explanation of this process, together with the analysis and ﬁgures that
generated the summary results presented in Table 7.11, is given on page
464.
Gradient Intercept Details Normalised Reprojection
Knowledge Bases
Symbolic -1.198 +3.776 Page 465
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Material
Synthetic Group #1 -1.203 +3.781 Page 466
Synthetic Group #2 -1.150 +3.174 Page 467
Analytical -1.504 +6.994 Page 468
Material Flows -1.619 +8.781 Page 469
Nomis-based Subgroups
Cultural Production -1.120 +2.764 Page 470
 -1.160 +3.217 Page 471
Legal & Accountancy -1.143 +3.100 Page 472
Consultancy -1.199 +3.608 Page 473
& -1.658 +8.972 Page 474
 -1.640 +8.645 Page 475
Logistics -1.223 +4.295 Page 476
Table 7.11: Derived Intercept and
Slope by Type of Knowledge Work
Table 7.11 suggests the existence of two markedly diﬀerent groups.
The ﬁrst group, composed of the Symbolic, Synthetic #1, and Syn-
thetic #2 Groups and their various subgroupings (Cultural Production,
, Legal & Accountancy, Consultancy), has a negative slope in the
range of −1:20 ≤ n ≤ −1:15 and an intercept in the approximate range
+3:20 ≤  ≤ +3:80. The second group, composed of the Analytical and
Material Flows groups, together with the subgroupings of &, , and
Logistics, have a much steeper slope (−1:50 ≤ n ≤ −1:70) and a much
higher intercept in the range +6:90 ≤  ≤ +9:00.
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Counterintuitively, what this suggests is that ﬁrms in the Analyti-
cal and Material areas spend a great deal more time talking to people
locally than do the ﬁrms in Symbolic or Synthetic s. More work
will be required to understand whether this is because of the predicted
substitutive eﬀect or if some other dynamic is in play. In other words,
are workers in Analytical environments apparently talking more because
they are able to exchange information electronically rather than meeting
2? What is promising here is that this bimodal distribution is similar
to the broad categories identiﬁed in the eigenplace analysis, suggesting
that & and  do, in fact, have a great deal in common communi-
cationally. The fact that the Synthetic and Symbolic groups—which
are associated with more extensive 2 interaction and less codiﬁca-
tion—are so obviously similar in behaviour here (as they are in the
eigenplace results) suggests a similar set of factors inﬂuencing their use
of telecommunications. Additional work would be required to under-
stand the shi in the observed slope and intercept in the transition from
‘Material Flows’ to the narrower ‘Logistics’ group.
The Big Picture
The rich data from Britain has enabled us to expand upon the approach
outlined in Calabrese et al. (2010): we found that multi-stage (i)
and ﬁltered clustering approaches could deliver additional insights
by progressively eliminating irrelevant data. Through normalisation
by the number of phones, and in combination with the eigenplace
method, it becomes possible to zero-in on ﬁner and more meaningful
variations, but more research is needed to understand which types of
normalisation, ﬁltering, and clustering deliver the best analytical results.
I remain, as I will detail in the conclusion to this chapter and in the
Reﬂections section (page 326), unconvinced that k-Means clustering is
necessarily the best approach, though it was certainly the right one to
take in this early work.
Regardless, the signiﬁcant location-ﬁltered eigenplaces highlighted
a Western bias for a great deal of international calling activity (i. e. that
ﬁrms to the West of London place more international calls than any-
where except the ), and this ﬁnding is entirely consonant with
long-standing research into the ‘Western Wedge’ (Hall, 1987). This
tendency was especially pronounced for the  and & sectors, but
was common across nearly all sectors. However, we need not stop this
work the  scale, and Figures 7.40a and 7.40b point towards the next
step in the development of the eigenplace approach: this last data set is
much larger than anything previous analysed using this technique, but
the results visibly demonstrate that it copes well with wildly varying
volumes from multiple input data streams.
What makes these ﬁgures important is the clear hierarchy captured
by the dual-analysis of international and domestic volumes. This is
exactly what we would expect if, as we saw in Figure 7.16, many busi-
nesses tend to use the phone domestically in broadly comparable ways,
but internationally-oriented businesses place and receive calls in a mea-
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Figure 7.40: British Eigenplace
Results (Volume/Phone)surably diﬀerent manner. The key point, however, is that we have used
an automated process to extract and categorise this information—it is
neither an artefact of the data, nor the product of a basic bias in feature-
selection or factor-analysis.
In the past three years, the eigenplace analysis has scaled from a lim-
ited test for a single city (Reades et al., 2009), through a larger analysis
of a university campus involving many more data points (Calabrese
et al., 2010), and now to the exploration of an entire country and its
telecommunications usage. At this last scale, we see results that would
tend to support the work done by Eagle et al. (2010) that sought to con-
nect deprivation to diversity in social networks. However, the eigen-
place analysis gives these an explicitly spatial cast, as evidenced by the 4-
and 8-part categorisations, in which low (on average) domestic volumes
and very low (on average) international volumes seem to map on to
areas of England, Scotland, and Wales known to suﬀer from economic
deprivation.
However, the link between economic activity and internationali-
sation in not simple and merits further research. For instance, the top
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two clusters in Figure 7.40b correspond, within the , to s that
emerged—again and again—as the sites of  operations. And the
density of the top three clusters reinforces the idea that this type of
globalisation is a dominant feature of the South, and that it is having,
with the notable exception of Edinburgh, a more limited impact North
of Warwick. This implication is more obvious in Figure 7.40a, in which
the lower two volume clusters clearly map on to parts of Devon, Wales,
the Northeast and Northwest of England, and the Highlands.
There are, however, two points worth noting about the eigenplace
approach which place some important constraints on how the results
can be interpreted. More work is needed to understand the compara-
bility of the results, as well as whether there might be a means to derive
results that are more directly comparable across countries or regions.
The second weakness is that a good deal more work will be needed to
determine whether there is a deﬁnitive correlation between the eigen-
places and business or non-business activities. The evidence to-date
suggests that the eigenplaces pick up many of the dynamics at work, and
enable us to quickly extract areas with distinctive, highly-concentrated
sets of activities (see page 430 for an application to residential analysis),
but whether this approach can be used in the absence of, say, Census or
 data remains an open question.
7.11 Conclusions
In the Prediction & Empirical Veriﬁcation portion of the Methodology
I put forward a series of predictions for how the theory developed in the
preceding chapters might be borne in out in locational and commu-
nicational behaviours. These predictions were rooted in the typology
of knowledge work advanced in Figure 6.1, which suggested that the
choice of location would be inﬂuenced by three factors: the degree of
ubiquity or localisation, the degree of creative or role work, and the
degree of multilateral or bilateral interaction. It is now time to review
this typology in light of the evidence developed over the course of this
chapter.
Ubiquitous & Localised Information
I have argued that inputs with the characteristics of a ubiquitous good
would have much less impact on ﬁrm location than localised inputs.
Consequently, I anticipated that ﬁrms operating in ubiquity-oriented
sectors would exploit increasing infrastructure ﬂexibility to reduce
costs, while ﬁrms reliant upon localised knowledge transfers would
prefer to locate at ‘central’ locations near to major transport nodes or
to the sectors upon which they depend for inputs. Furthermore, I then
suggested that this behaviour would be expressed in the telecommuni-
cations data in the following manner: ﬁrms working with ubiquitous
inputs would make greater use of the phone to communicate with more
distant suppliers, while their compatriots working with localised inputs
would interact with far fewer areas.
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At the coarsest level, the evidence for this ﬁrst pair of predictions was
surprisingly mixed. Logistics and manufacturing, whether considered
together or separately, were clearly inﬂuenced by the available infras-
tructure in each area and demonstrated a preference for more ‘remote’
but well-supplied locations. The key exception to this rule proved to be
those most of inﬂexible of infrastructures: the international airport and
deep-water terminals. So in spite of the high cost of land in the vicinity
of Heathrow, the area is dominated by logistics providers, and the im-
portance of Felixstowe can be estimated from its massive concentration
of employment in this sector.
So in terms of location, the industries involved in the creation and
movement of physical goods seemed to ﬁt well with the more nuanced
theory developed in Chapter 3. Where the prediction proved much
less accurate was in terms of this sector’s impact on communications:
although many sites had more modest levels of telecoms usage, four
locations were constantly selected by the eigenplace analysis on the
basis of their uniquely unbalanced communications patterns. These
four sites—Heathrow, Stansted, Felixstowe, and Bedford—evidently
act as major nodes in a global supply chain, and leave correspondingly
massive footprints in the communications infrastructure. Paradoxically,
however, this impact is not on international calling—though it is still
substantial—but on domestic volumes.
The second area where I expected ubiquity to be a factor was in
the case of analytical ﬁrms such as those involved in  and &. And
although the locational diﬀerences between these two sectors might
be expected to be marginal—both industries are broadly organised
around codiﬁable knowledge and the activities of many small ﬁrms
and a smaller number of s—the  data suggests otherwise.
The ‘Western Wedge’ of -related employment has been particularly
visible throughout this work. The data suggests that employment is
localised along and between the westward -class roads from London,
but not clustered in any traditional sense.
In contrast, & ﬁrms showed much greater dispersal, with statis-
tically signiﬁcant concentrations of employment emerging in places as
far removed from London as Sandwich and Wellingborough. These
locations suggest much less reliance on information exchange with
other sectors, and far more self-containment, though this is not nec-
essarily surprising since the purpose of primary & is to develop
market-leading technologies, methods, and drugs. More than any
other knowledge-intensive sector, & ﬁrms appear to be making the
most of  to remove themselves from urban locations.
As a result, it is hardly surprising to ﬁnd that these ﬁrms appear to
make extensive use of telecommunications. They do not, however, use
it so much to interact with other ﬁrms in the area as to communicate
with (one presumes) their sister oﬃces overseas. The evidence from the
 analysis supports this conclusion: & areas had amongst the highest
international s of any sector studied. The evidence therefore suggests
that the analytical base as a whole comes closest to operating in a kind of
global/local network whereby knowledge is locally-generated but can be
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eﬀectively transferred through long-distance arrangements14. In short, 14 Matson and Prusak (2010,
p.4) report the example of a
pharmaceutical ﬁrm that designated
a small group of researchers its
‘knowledge intermediaries’; they
are tasked with summarising key
ﬁndings from new research and
submitting them to an internal
database. This same approach
would have little relevance to, say,
which directors might be interested
in a project, or which actors might
be ‘right’ for a particular role.
although it seems that distance is no obstacle to globalised & ﬁrms,
equivalent  companies appear to show a slightly stronger preference
for proximity to airports and to clients in London (see also Buck et al.,
2002, p.117) which suggests an ongoing 2 interaction requirement.
Creative & Role Work
In Chapter 5, I deﬁned creative work as having to do with the gener-
ation and dissemination of new knowledge, be it symbolic, synthetic,
or analytical. So by contrasting the distribution of creative and role- or
rule-based employment and communications, I am trying to determine
whether new knowledge arises at particular points in space, or through
particular interactions across space. The working hypothesis has been
that the value attached to creative work by knowledge-intensive ﬁrms
implies that their location and communications patterns will, in aggre-
gate, leave a measurable imprint on activity in the  from which we
can develop a composite portrait.
In Chapter 5, I also suggested that the locational requirements of
the most valuable creative workers would tend to trump those of rule-
and role-based employees since, from the ﬁrm’s standpoint, the ‘cre-
ative class’ was the least ﬂexible link in the knowledge-creation and
dissemination chain. The result of this dependence upon the prefer-
ences of employees would be the dominance of knowledge-intensive
over rule-intensive ﬁrms (or divisions) in high-amenity parts of the .
However, I also noted (see page 129) that there seem to be two com-
peting trends in the deﬁnition of household amenity: for some workers
it is expressed as a preference for the ‘tamed rurality’ of the well-heeled
countryside, but for others it seems to manifest as a preference for the
riotous social life of large cities.
Since I have generally prioritised the study of knowledge-intensive
sectors in this thesis, it is relatively easy to compare the locations pre-
dicted in Table 6.2 with their disposition and relative concentration in
space as measured by the . The absence of more rule-based sectors
such as manufacturing from the city centre, or even from much of the
area within the  or the West of London (see Figures 10.26e and
10.26f on page 387), oﬀers negative evidentiary support for this hypoth-
esis insomuch as it seems that the greater the component of the role- or
rule-based work in a sector, the greater the likelihood that employment
concentrations in that sector occur at more peripheral, and frequently
less desirable, locations.
For positive support for this hypothesis we must return to the idea
that symbolic work, because of its strong social component, would
tend to occur in cities, while synthetic work, because of its iterative
component, would tend to prioritise accessible locations. In contrast
to both of these, analytical knowledge creation was expected to occur
in other sorts of high-amenity areas since there is no pressing need for
proximity or frequent 2 interaction. Since we have already seen that
& and  ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more dispersed than their symbolic
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and synthetic counterparts, this last part of the prediction is the eas-
iest to conﬁrm. The locational pattern of symbolic work also proves
relatively straightforward to verify: at both the London and  scales,
knowledge workers tend to accumulate at relatively high densities in a
disproportionately small number of locations. Signiﬁcantly, as we nar-
row the focus from the broader Symbolic Group (Figure 10.28a on page
389) to the more ﬁne-grained Cultural Producers Group (Figure 10.31a
on page 394), the concentration of workers is accentuated in Central
London, and only a few signiﬁcant locations remain outside of the .
It is the Synthetic Group, and in particular the ﬁnancial services
ﬁeld, that proves the most problematic from a locational standpoint:
although there is ample evidence of employment concentrations along
highly-accessible motorways and in less congested towns around the
, the highest density at most levels of aggregation and across most
industrial groupings remains the City of London and Canary Wharf.
This pattern of synthetic activity suggests that there must be another
dynamic of knowledge creation at work here, since if we were to naïvely
take the  data at face value we would naturally presume that the
most valuable work is being done at the seemingly more accessible sites
spread around the .
However, as I have noted at several points in this thesis, one of the
long-standing problems of  data is its inability to distinguish be-
tween the types of work being done at diﬀerent oﬃces within the same
ﬁrm. It is, for instance, widely known that in the ﬁnancial sector a great
deal of the more routine, rule-oriented work has been relocated to back
oﬃce facilities, while a good deal of the highest-value, most creative
work has remained in the . What we found in the telecommunica-
tions data simultaneously conﬁrms the ‘big picture’, while calling for
clariﬁcation at the ﬁner scale.
One of the most visible features of the  analysis undertaken on
page 289 is the way that s dominated by both types of synthetic
work become disproportionately international in their use of telecom-
munications as we move closer to the . Two groupings stand out
in particular in the s—the City of London/Canary Wharf, and Ep-
som/Redhill—but the diﬀerentiation becomes even more stark in the
eigenplace analyses on pages 291 and 292 since in both cases there are
clusters whose members are found only within Central London. The
representative signals only reinforce this view of the importance of the
City and its immediate surroundings.
However, a more nuanced approach reveals that the most inter-
nationalised areas where synthetic knowledge is employed oen use
domestic telecommunications less than some of the other clusters ex-
tracted from the eigenplace analysis. So although the general lack of
high-level internationalisation much beyond the  is signiﬁcant, and
would ﬁt with the existing  research (see page 183), this is not the
end of the story. Similarly, the Symbolic Group’s telecommunications
activity suggests at ﬁrst glance that internationalised communications
largely ends at the metro-London border but, again, closer examination
reveals signiﬁcant areas of activity at some distance from Central Lon-
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don. In particular, Advertising work near Oxford leaves a signiﬁcant
footprint in the  and clustering analyses, suggesting that some types
of creative work are no longer quite so dependent on proximity to the
amenities of major cultural infrastructure.
As a result, the communications data enables us to reﬁne the hy-
potheses advanced in the Methodology: we can say that creative work
seems to coincide with intensive telecommunications use since this has
everywhere been correlated with the presence of global ﬁrms and ‘signi-
fying’ districts where market-making work is widely understood to be
done. Given this, we also have strong conﬁrmation of the basic validity
of the knowledge bases approach itself, since for each of the three prin-
cipal bases, the pattern of intensive telecommunications usage generally
follows our understanding of how workers in each group are likely to
deﬁne ‘amenity’: dense, urban environments for cultural producers,
and spacious, idyllic environments for analytical workers. For synthetic
knowledge workers, however, the picture remains complex since we
know that many managers of leading consulting and banking ﬁrms live
beyond the , and yet the communications evidence strongly suggests
that the creative work in this base is being done in Central London,
which is comparatively congested and inaccessible by private vehicle.
Multilateral & Bilateral Interaction
The explanation of this puzzling dynamic lies, as I have argued exten-
sively in Chapter 5, in the distinction between multilateral and bilateral
interactions, especially when they are undertaken 2 instead of elec-
tronically. The expectation here is that knowledge work which relies
upon the input of diverse groups will tend to occur in  locations
since, even though they are congested and expensive, the city cores
place many diﬀerent specialisations in close proximity to one another
and enable meetings to be organised frequently as well as on short no-
tice. In contrast, where interactions are bilateral, the prediction from
Table 6.2 is that they will take place over longer distances because the
cost of coordination and meeting will be lower.
Looking back at Figure 7.37 (page 306), we can see clear evidence
in support of this claim: the greatest sectoral overlaps occur in the City
and West End, while the rest of the  shows decreasing overlap as we
move away from Central London. The value of splitting the Synthetic
Group in two, and of further subdividing the Professional Services
group into ﬁner-grained distinctions between Engineering, Accoun-
tancy, Business Consulting, and Legal Services is now clear since, al-
though both the synthetic and symbolic bases have a greater reliance on
direct, 2 interaction, the degree to which synthetic knowledge work is
associated with bilateral or multilateral interaction varies signiﬁcantly.
Generally speaking, ‘high ﬁnance’ behaves much like cultural pro-
duction in terms of its reliance on intensive multilateral ﬂows, while
Engineering and Accountancy tend to behave much more in line with
my predictions for bilateral interaction since they can be found at loca-
tions from which the rest of the  is readily accessible. The eigenplace
analysis 319
map for Synthetic Group #2 (Figure 7.27 on page 292) highlights this
dynamic: the areas of signiﬁcant activity are widely dispersed, but all
are based on -class roads or near to clients in Central London. The
bimodal distribution suggests that the ﬁrms in the centre are catering
to a global clientele with extensive and complex interaction require-
ments, while those further out are dealing with regional (though still
international!) concentrations of demand from other industries.
Another piece of evidence in support of this conclusion is the notice-
able group of less international, but still clearly agglomerated,  ﬁrms
in the vicinity of Cambridge. More than any other city outside of Lon-
don, this town appears to possess a diverse mix of sectors—Synthetic,
Analytical, and Material—all of which have important concentrations
in the vicinity. Note too that this pattern contrasts in signiﬁcant ways
with the greater specialisation of Reading in analytical activity, and that
this is reﬂected in the insights that emerged in Figures 7.39a and 7.39b
(page 309) from the communications data: the area around Cambridge
is much less ‘oriented’ towards America than the Western Wedge in
terms of international call volumes and timings.
What this ﬁnding suggests is that, in contrast to the other groups,
analytical knowledge work operates quite diﬀerently and without the
need for frequent 2 encounters. The much steeper distance decay and
higher intercept seen for the Analytical Group in Table 7.11 strongly
implies that ﬁrms in these environments employ telecommunications
as a substitute for 2 interaction, not a complement to it. This pattern of
interaction helps to explain why ‘science parks’ should be seen as a weak
foundation for localised development: these sites tend to be colonised
by ﬁrms with little interest in encouraging the wider circulation of
knowledge. Conversely, isolated cultural institutions, such as museums,
are an equally problematic basis for development since they depend
greatly on 2 interaction to stimulate symbolic knowledge generation.
Sectoral Dynamics
By pairing the results from the  and eigenplace analysis with the
earlier ﬁndings from the  research, we have developed a stronger
sense of how telecommunications and location interact for ﬁrms in
diﬀerent sectors. Returning now to the six core industries to which we
have turned again and again in this research, we can put forward a series
of conclusions that draw together the many theoretical and empirical
threads developed over the course of these seven chapters.
In Table 7.12, I draw a distinction between internationally and less
internationally-oriented ﬁrms so as to highlight the impact of global-
isation on these ﬁrms’ use of infrastructure. By this point the results
should no longer be surprising, but they do serve to emphasise the de-
gree to which London is not an isolated economy, but part of a much
larger regional system, and to highlight the way in which diﬀerential
locational patterns emerge as the result of the interactions between
the informational inputs, the nature of the work, and the types of ex-
changes that these entail.
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Sector Internationally-Oriented Less Internationally-Oriented
 Sites with near-instant access across multiple
infrastructures to internationally-oriented clients;
may be in  or edge-city locations
Sites with access via road and, to a lesser extent, rail
in  sub-centres
Cultural Inner-city sites; especially in areas near to
collaborators/clients/patrons
Mid- to high-income, amenity-oriented towns or
countryside with suﬃcient local demand
Finance  sites with historical role in ﬁnance; spillover to
‘inner edge cities’ at locations with high accessibility
for rail and air infrastructure within core metro area
Variety of locations depending on activity; oen
accessible by road and rail
 Soware-as-a-service may be , similar to 
strategy; Soware-as-a-product oriented towards
high-amenity areas with access to air infrastructure
Amenity-oriented in second- or
third-tier  sub-centres
Logistics Major inter-modal sites; some supervisory activity
in 
Sites accessible to road and rail; available space is
primary concern
& High-amenity sites with high-value complementary
infrastructure (universities, ) and access to road
infrastructure; modest air and rail access
requirements
Amenity-oriented second- or third-tier 
sub-centres
Table 7.12: Summary of Locational
Strategies for Key Sectors
8Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
We began this work by noting that planning has been largely blind to
the infrastructure of telecommunications and to the relevance of a more
nuanced grasp of ‘telegeography’ (Townsend and Moss, 2008, p.28).
Over the course of the past seven chapters, we have developed the
idea that understanding information ﬂows is integral to understanding
the spatial preferences of contemporary ﬁrms and, consequently, to
designing appropriate urban and regional developmental policies for the
coming decades. In this ﬁnal chapter I will attempt to paint the bigger
picture that this research has helped to bring into focus.
The overarching concern of this work has been the absence of a sys-
tematic attempt to synthesise thinking on locational preference and
knowledge work in a way that is in tune with the requirements of pol-
icy and planning in the 21st Century. Approaching this subject has
required traversing planning, economic, and sociological literature, but
the results have proved to be remarkably consistent with the need iden-
tiﬁed by Hall (2003, p.148) for a ‘new theory of location’ that would
“…start with a neo-Weberian model of the informational economy.
On top of this would be superimposed a Christaller-Lösch system of
central places, modiﬁed to take account of changes since they wrote…”
So although I did not set out to consider the relevance of a theoretical
tradition dating back to the late 19th Century, this is where the need to
properly contextualise the impact of telecommunications on ﬁrms and
upon urban form has taken me. I trust that the reader will have found
the journey worthwhile.
8.2 Principal Findings
Literature Review
In Chapter 2, I argued that relative infrastructure ﬂexibility is the ap-
propriate lens through which to view locational preferences. However,
at the ﬁne scale this ﬂexibility has unpredictable spatial eﬀects that are
bound up in the ‘centrality’ of places where many infrastructures meet.
Increased ﬂexibility might ‘enhance returns at big centres and reinforce
their lead’, but may also enable smaller, specialised centres to survive
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by ‘contesting only selected niches’ (Scott, 2001, p.20). However, the
risk for less developed regions is that the rising dis-beneﬁts of increasing
loadings—congestion, cost, unreliability, etc.—will overwhelm ﬂexi-
bility. The costly nodes and links of ‘upper tier’ infrastructure required
to relieve these problems may ultimately follow existing rights-of-way,
leaving less integrated regions behind and locking in existing patterns of
centrality and peripherality (Garcia, 2002, p.40).
In spite of this risk, Garcia (ibid.) argues that “…the impact of to-
day’s network technologies will—to a considerable degree—be a matter
of the social, economic, and political forces driving their evolution.”
But the fact that the location of nodes and links, and their accessibility
are oen ultimately political decisions also implies that we can think of
ﬂexibility not only as an attribute of networks, but also as an objective
for planning policy. Flexibility involves tradeoﬀs between social, envi-
ronmental, and economic factors, and it is up to us to decide what set of
outcomes is desirable.
Turning to the ﬁrm in Chapter 3, I noted that traditional location
theory was still able to shed a good deal of light on contemporary ﬁrm
preferences provided that we could account for the increasing impact
of informational inputs and outputs on the historical considerations.
Recovering the notion of ubiquity enabled us to address this issue for
some types of data, but information as a localised input could only
be understood if we conceived of the underlying market as having
characteristics that made it more or less ‘searchable’ or opaque.
The notion of opacity helps to explain why some ﬁrms are able to
relocate over vast distances, while others remain ﬁrmly place-bound,
and this too has important implications for policy: the ‘services fac-
tories’ that are oen lured to the North of England by temporary tax
incentives or expensive infrastructure provisioning rely almost exclu-
sively on relatively transparent data and codiﬁable interactions. Con-
sequently, such sites are in direct competition with equivalent facilities
anywhere in the world and a lower price will oen win the day. The
government could, of course, mandate that sensitive ﬁnancial infor-
mation cannot be discussed with an operator beyond their jurisdiction,
but a more pragmatic response would be to identify and exploit the
advantages of local knowledge in more opaque—which is to say, more
complex—interactions.
The constraints of opaque markets are therefore an important part of
what keeps ﬁrms in cities, but as I argued in Chapter 4 we also need to
consider the eﬀect of lifecycle and scale on this dynamic. Quite simply,
agglomerations provide shared access to infrastructure and services that
would ordinarily be too expensive for a ﬁrm to procure on its own from
a distance. However, clusters oﬀer something more: in particularly
opaque markets that rely on the character and ability of individuals, it
becomes necessary to somehow ﬁnd the ‘right person for the job’ when
there are thousands from whom to choose.
For this reason, I suggested that the intense socialising that seems to
characterise some industries—especially those, such as ﬁlm and ﬁnance,
with a highly customised and weakly scaleable output—is actually a
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way of managing what would otherwise be nearly insurmountable
searching and matching costs. Furthermore, the diversity of urban
environments gives individuals and ﬁrms greater exposure to novel
information, which serves as a buﬀer against a sudden, radical change
in style, technique, or technology. Against the diversity which supports
innovation, however, we must balance a degree of coherence or, as I
oen termed it, proximity that enables successful communication.
So one critical impact of  and mobility on business is the way
that they enable alternative types of proximity to weaken the require-
ment for copresence in translucent and opaque markets. The basic
distinction between tacit and codiﬁed knowledge further enables us
to understand why some types of work—programming and &,
for instance—beneﬁt from this dynamic while others—fashion and
ﬁnance, for instance—do not. I then additionally reﬁned this dis-
tinction through the application of the knowledge bases approach to
contemporary work, and through this model we were able to see how
telecommunications was having a diﬀerential impact on ﬁrm locational
strategies at local, regional, and national scales.
Methodology
The aim of the Methodology was to situate telecommunications re-
search within the emerging ﬁeld of Computational Social Science (),
which is characterised by the adoption of techniques from the natural
sciences for the analysis of large behavioural data sets. The Economist
(2010a) argues that “revolutions in science are oen preceded by rev-
olutions in measurement…” but, historically, social science research
has been limited by cost and complexity to small-scale surveys or to
periodic large-scale collection.  completely rewrites this equation
since collecting ﬁve billion records is no more work than collecting ﬁve
thousand.
In discussing the spatialisation of information processing, Townsend
and Moss (2008, p.28) note that businesses in world cities act as “im-
porters of raw information and exporters of ideas, decisions and new
services.” As a result, we could easily anticipate that London would be
a key axis of this research since it contains particularly high concentra-
tions of knowledge-intensive ﬁrms and knowledge-enabled workers.
However, not only did the use of traditional s highlight the need to
look beyond London and into the , it also emphasised the need to
map inter- and intra-urban communications at the scale of companies
in order to begin to understand the contemporary city and its economy.
In seeking to uncover these workings and map their resulting ﬂows,
I tested two novel indices of telecoms usage: the Telecommunica-
tions Quotient and the Eigenplace. Both techniques are very much
Eulerian in their approach to urban studies, and they therefore keep
the focus ﬁrmly on places, not people. The Eigenplace technique also
appears suitable for other types of ‘ﬂow data’: I cannot see any basic
reason why it could not also be applied to commuter ﬂows or Twitter
posts—though clearly it is sensitive to the resolution of the underly-
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ing data and to the level of aggregation—provided that there is enough
data to make for meaningful conclusions (cf. Batty, 2010). That said,
it should hardly be surprising that the most exciting results in Chap-
ter 7 emerged from the marriage of these novel methods with more
traditional approaches such as the Location Quotient.
Analysis
Kleinberg (2008, p.66) suggests that “science advances whenever we
can take something invisible and make it visible”, and in Chapter 7 I
sought to contribute to this process by presenting results that drew on
the aggregate, anonymous, and entirely invisible activities of millions
of people. The analysis sought to achieve two things: to identify and
explore meaningful concentrations of industrial activity using a statisti-
cally sound methodology, and to use the ‘signiﬁcant locations’ thereby
extracted from the employment data as the foundation for an analysis of
a telecommunications data set. As might be expected in such a case, the
results have proved exciting, but not always decisive. I believe that both
the  and the eigenplace approach have analytical value, but that more
work will be needed to understand the particular domains in which
their outputs are relevant and the constraints under which they can be
employed successfully as research or policy-making tools.
By beginning with a ‘naïve’, unsupervised approach to telecommu-
nications data we could test the ‘global cities hypothesis’ with greater
rigour and ﬁnd that, although there is a marked tendency for more
central businesses to be more international in terms of their communi-
cations patterns, this is not the same as saying that only the businesses of
the  are international in outlook. In some cases, internationalisation
in calling behaviour appears to coincide with a movement out of the
 and into accessible, high-amenity towns and cities such as Reading
and Cambridge.
 and & oﬀered the best illustration of how some knowledge-
intensive sectors are today able to pursue much more ﬂexible locational
strategies. These ﬁrms tend to show higher levels of dispersion than
the most global of cultural or ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and they oen seem to
be at their most international when in proximity to transport-rich
sites—especially airports—and to other globalised industries. More ‘ba-
sic’ ﬁelds, such as logistics and manufacturing, highlight the divergence
between immaterial and materials-based industries. In the latter case,
the areas with the highest levels of international calling activity are as-
sociated with inter- and multi-modal nodes—where ships dock, planes
land, and rail and road meet—though high-tech manufacturing may be
an important exception to this ‘rule’.
The results lend empirical support to Castells’ suggestion that “in
terms of spatial networks…these global networks do not have the same
geography [and] they usually do not share the same nodes. The net-
work of innovation in  is not the same as the network of ﬁnance…”
(2009, p.10). In short, the wider regional geography of back-oﬃces and
research parks is vital to understanding what is, and is not, happening in
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the . So whereas Sassen (2002, p.15) has argued that “cities that are
strategic sites in the global economy tend, in part, to disconnect from
their region”, I would claim the reverse: that the pre-eminent cities of
the global economy are deeply connected to their ‘hinterlands’ and that
they underpin a range of high-value activities that are equally global in
outlook.
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Figure 8.1: Summary of 
Sectoral Distribution & Interna-
tionalisation
In Figure 8.1, I have combined the geographical distribution of the
core knowledge- and ﬂow-intensive industries examined in the course
of this research with the results of  and eigenpace analyses. Although
necessarily impressionistic to some extent, the ﬁgure makes clear that
Breheny’s (1999, p.175) suggestion that “London’s role is to look both
inward and outward to connect domestic and cosmopolitan networks of
trade, information, and capital ﬂows” is no longer strictly true. Sophis-
ticated, highly-skilled activity is today spread across a broad swathe of
the , and much of it is highly international in outlook. The pattern
of activity shown here, and summarised in tabular form in Table 7.12
(see page 320), nonetheless also indicates that there is, amongst leading
ﬁrms in all ﬁelds, still a “…need for ongoing face-to-face contact, to
sustain continuous innovation and reﬂexivity…combined with excep-
tionally high use of advanced telecommunications to link relationally
and continuously with the rest of the planet” (Graham, 2002, p.77).
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8.3 Reﬂections
Although the eigenplace approach has provided important evidence of
the existence of diﬀerent locational strategies for internationally- and
domestically-oriented ﬁrms, this is only a ﬁrst step.  analysis also
holds out the possibility of detecting groups of ﬁrms that are inter-
connected by informational input and output relationships. Network
clustering algorithms can be used to identify supply-chain linkages and
interactions between front- and back-oﬃces. I believe that the most
promising approach for the next phase of this research will be the ‘link
communities’ method recently outlined by Ahn et al. (2010) since it
allows nodes (i. e. oﬃces) to bridge two or more communities (e.g.
procurement from specialised suppliers and management of production
sites) and should thereby allow a more ﬁne-grained investigation of the
relationships between sectors within the London Mega City Region
().
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Figure 8.2: Network Map of the

Ultimately, however, we should not forget that we are dealing with
an immensely complex system whose behaviour is only graspable at the
very highest level of aggregation. A LaGrangian representation of total
ﬂows on the communications network can demonstrate this in a simple
way: Figure 8.2a shows every point-to-point link between s within
the , and Figure 8.2b shows the network aer the weakest 75%
of links have been removed. The ﬁrst ﬁgure is, quite simply, nearly
illegible. But the second ﬁgure can be quite profoundly misleading
since it gives the impression that no conversations take place between
the more remote parts of the  and Central London. Naturally, taking
the per phone volume of conversation would change the picture again,
and in this case it would emphasise links along the coast and through
East Anglia where, on average, people and businesses talk more to their
neighbours than they do in urban environments where they tend to talk
more widely.
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In a very real sense, this is the critical challenge facing  research
in general, and telecommunications research in particular. The issue is
that, depending on how you cut the data, you will get diﬀerent answers
to what appears to be the same question. Part of this is a problem of
resolution: diﬀerent ﬂoors of a large building (to say nothing of an
entire ) might have radically diﬀerent calling behaviours and yet
we must, of necessity, average the results across the entire area. So in
some ways this is the return of the  (see page 217) because we are
converting between point and areal data, and are losing critical detail in
the process.
But the problem is actually more complex than this because we are
also smoothing out signals from a very noisy system, and the signal-to-
noise relationship is extraordinarily diﬃcult to understand. In Figure
8.3 we can see two exploratory eigenplace maps drawn using the infor-
mation gleaned from the Synthetic and Analytical analyses (see pages
284 and 293). These plots were created by taking the s assigned to
two clusters with substantially diﬀering levels of international calling
from the earlier eigenplace analysis of signiﬁcant locations—by which
I mean Clusters #1 and #3 from the Synthetic Group #1 analysis (page
447), and Clusters #2 and #4 from the Analytical Group analysis (page
451)—and then examining how every other  in the  commu-
nicates with those two groups of s. The question is this: what do
these results mean?
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Figure 8.3: Eigenplace Analysis of
Signiﬁcant LocationsIt would certainly be easy to develop a plausible account of these
maps but, as the attentive reader will have readily noticed, we are deal-
ing quite directly with questions of interpretation. Are patterns at this
ﬁne scale meaningful, or by drilling down to this detailed level are we
actually now analysing only noise? In eﬀect, the more ﬁne-grained the
analysis, the more likely we are to encounter the limits of such meth-
ods. This is the principal reason that I have worked with only the two
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largest types of ﬂows—domestic and international—as the results may
be harder to project down to the ﬁrm level, but they are less subject to
the type of noise that appears to be aﬀecting the results above.
An additional consideration for future research is whether or not
an alternative clustering approach might yield superior results? The
k-Means clustering is exclusive, such that an individual  or  can
be a member of one, and only one, cluster but it is clear from Figure
7.37 that this could be an important analytical issue. In contrast, a fuzzy
k-Means clustering would allow the areal unit to fall between two
or more clusters (e.g. that a particular exchange is 30% like Cluster
#1 and 70% like Cluster #4), providing an indication of how sharp
the spatial and behavioural distinctions within the data set truly are.
Neural networks and Self Organising Maps (s) oﬀer still more
categorisation options that could be pursued in subsequent research.
These are important considerations, but I nonetheless feel that the
basic validity of the eigenplace for analysis at regional and national
scales has been demonstrated. There are two areas in particular where it
seems that the eigenplace method could be of use: ﬁrst, the low latency
of the eigenplaces (they could be calculated with as little as a week’s
worth of data) when compared with Census data oﬀers substantial
beneﬁts to policy-makers trying to cope with cities and regions in
transition; second, in countries where the data-collection infrastructure
is weaker, an eigenplace analysis could help decision-makers understand
where to focus their eﬀorts. Moreover, as the contrast between the
London and New York eigenplaces made clear (see page 419 for the
more modest American analysis), in spite of the issues discussed above
we have good reason to believe that the ﬁner the spatial resolution,
the ﬁner the behavioural analysis that can be undertaken as a result.
It is easy to imagine this type of analysis being useful to users whose
objectives might range from targeted advertising or public awareness
campaigns to infrastructure planning based on patterns of activity over
time and space.
8.4 Current Trends & Coming Challenges
More broadly, the spatial and temporal dimensions of telecoms data
make them peculiarly appropriate for tackling the series of chal-
lenges—modelled on those advanced by Graham (1997, p.106)—that
I introduced in Introduction: the challenge of invisibility, and the
challenges to theory, to analysis, and to concepts of time and place.
However, to these four issues I now intend to add three more that are
rooted in current social, economic, and technical trends. The inter-
section of changes in living preferences, labour markets, and technol-
ogy—and particularly in our ability to access information and commu-
nicate from nearly anywhere on the planet, even while en route between
locations—will mean new diﬃculties for planning that will require
innovative approaches to transportation, the built environment, and
governance.
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Household Change
I have deliberately excluded any substantive analysis of household loca-
tional preferences from this work, but it is clear from Chapter 4 that the
‘milieu preferences’ of workers will have a profound impact on long-
term travel and relocation patterns. The big picture is that both the
workers and entrepreneurs are increasingly able to pursue high-amenity
and high-dispersion strategies, and so it is hardly surprising that warm,
sunny American cities outgrew their colder, wetter competitors in the
second half of the 20th century (Glaeser, 2006). To the extent that
households are able to meet their basic needs anywhere, then long-term
migration should reﬂect their environmental and social preferences.
However, at the ﬁner scale, two sub-trends are at work that may well
lead to long-term ‘mismatches’ between household and employment
location. The ﬁrst sub-trend is the rise of dual-income households in
which there are two heads-of-household and a consequent requirement
to balance potentially conﬂicting locational needs. The second sub-
trend is a rise in rates of home ownership which, when combined with
decreasing job tenure and greater job specialisation, makes it less likely
that an employee will live near their place of employment, or will be
willing to relocate in order to do so (Surowiecki, 2008).
In principle, oﬃce relocation to edge-cities can improve accessibility
for workers: according to Breheny, ’s ‘Workstyle 2000’ restructur-
ing simultaneously reduced property costs for the ﬁrm and commute
times for the staﬀ by moving most of the ﬁrm’s technical and research
facilities to points around the  (1999, p.21). But in practice, reduced
commute times for some may mean much longer orbital commutes
for others if the new ‘accessible’ location is actually on the other side
of the city: at what point does a worker sell the family home in order
to reduce their own travel if it also means an increase in their partner’s
commute and the loss of access to a good school for the children?
Technology Change
The second major trend is ongoing technology change, and in particu-
lar its eﬀect on the costs of mobility as set out in Chapter 2. Here, there
are again two interrelated sub-trends that are worth considering: the
ﬁrst is the increasing pervasiveness of technology and the way that it
enables greater ﬂexibility in work and travel; the second is the potential
for technology to substitute entirely for the need to travel. It will hardly
surprise readers of this thesis to hear that the connection between these
two issues is complex and is likely to have unanticipated consequences
for both travel and sustainability.
In A Day on the Trains, 2030, Hall (2010b) imagines an integrated
rail, bus, and bicycle network in which ticketing and alerting services
are made available to users entirely electronically via smart-phones:
goods and services can be purchased en route, reservations instantly
changed if a traveller arrives early or late, and barriers and locks remain
open unless a problem is reported. By increasing the ease with which
people can travel, technology will lower the perceived cost of doing
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so. There is no reason to believe that we will need to wait until 2030
for this to become a reality: the near ﬁeld communications systems re-
quired to enable barrier-less entry are already available in many phones,
and real-time information systems for public and private transit are
already widely deployed, what is lacking is the seamless integration.
A second aspect of this change is the overall impact of mobile tech-
nology on working habits: the combination of ongoing miniaturisation
with increasingly sophisticated systems for sensory input will mean
that workers become even less dependent on the oﬃce ‘workspace’.
Augmented reality overlays accessible on modern smart-phones are
the near-term manifestation of this change, but the long-term direc-
tion is that people will be able to work in a wider variety of contexts:
any horizontal surface might become a keyboard or input device, any
vertical one a monitor, and all of this will be linked together by omni-
present networks that obviate the need to think in a conscious way
about ‘Internet access’. With no productivity penalty for working from
the garden, the train, or the country, will there still be a need for the
traditional oﬃce? And, in a related question, might deeper immersive
virtual environments eventually replace the business meeting entirely?
8.5 Implications
Having set out what I believe to be the key trends to aﬀect planning in
the coming years, it is natural to turn to the likely implications of these
trends for people and places. I have grouped these into three categories,
elements of which have also been touched on at many points in this
research: the interaction between communication and location, the
eﬀects of increasing mobility, and the resulting ‘glocalisation’ of cities.
Communications
Historically, it has been thought that we choose a location on the basis
of time and money tradeoﬀs: the cost of travel was such that we would
choose the ‘best’ mode of travel that we could aﬀord. As a result, the
value of an infrastructure project could be gauged principally through
the time savings accruing to its users. This certainly seems a reasonable
assumption: researchers have evidence to suggest that we spend no more
time commuting now than our predecessors did ﬁy or a hundred years
ago (Bretagnolle et al., 2001), we simply commute much further, faster
and in greater comfort.
However, thanks to telecommunications, time spent travelling is
no longer simply a ‘dead time’ that we would rationally seek to min-
imise. Graham (1997, p.120) noted that physical concentration acts
“to overcome time constraints by minimising space constraints”, while
electronic concentration acts “to overcome space constraints by min-
imising time constraints.” Mobile  makes this relationship even more
complex. Figure 8.4, from Mitchell (2004, p.127), emphasises the way
in which the insertion of mobility into the mix creates another set of
relationships between place and non-place.
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I have altered Mitchell’s ﬁgure from the original for two reasons:
ﬁrst, the original unnecessarily emphasises telecoms links by placing
them at the centre of the illustration, whereas I wish to emphasise the
balance between these dimensions; and, second, the “Substitution?
Complementarity?” labels between the two types of nodes and two
types of links unnecessarily suggests a binary relationship, whereas the
simpler concept of “Negotiation” emphasises the ongoing and adaptive
process that I think this thesis has clearly established lies at the heart of
the interaction. We continue to attach importance to both virtual and
physical places, and seem to be using the one to augment, not replace,
the other.
We can imagine that at some point in the not-too-distant future the
expensive  video conferencing systems now in place at some large
companies might become widely available, aﬀordable even by small
ﬁrms and start-ups. However, as Graham (2005, p.99) has argued, we
should not underestimate the importance of copresence to eﬀective
communication, not only because of the senses that cannot operate in
virtual environments, but also because it has vital ritual or communal
dimensions as well. Copresence signals importance and exclusivity of
interaction (see Table 2.2 on page 57), as well as a level of involvement
for which there will be no substitute for the foreseeable future.
Attending a local arts festival or joining colleagues or collaborators
for an aer-work drink at the pub is not an activity that can be medi-
ated electronically. And while remote workers may come to attach less
importance to such moments, it seems likely that they will nonetheless
remain vital to many types of work. As Graham (2005, p.99) notes,
“more information or bandwidth is not the same as more knowledge,
understanding, or wisdom,” and it is these latter aspects that are still
best communicated face-to-face.
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Mobility
The second issue raised by mobile communications is that the con-
comitant decrease in the relative cost of being ‘out of the oﬃce’ may
allow people to live much further from the oﬃce, and that employee
mobility may eventually substitute for permanent proximity. As the
per-mile costs of travel have fallen, journeys—whether for work or for
recreation—that might once have been rare because of the distance
involved may become increasingly common: we are even seeing the
emergence of unprecedented ‘weekly commutes’ between cities such
as London and Amsterdam or Brussels using air and high-speed rail
() infrastructure. So instead of the knowledge economy yielding
sustainability savings through telecommuting, the situation may even
worsen.
These emerging travel patterns are, of course, intimately connected
to the trends discussed in the previous chapters. These long-distance
‘commutes’ are the province of highly-skilled knowledge workers who
are in demand, and their skills are so specialised that it is rational for
a ﬁrm to move them between countries as oen as some of us move
between cities. Moreover, the capabilities of long-range, upper-tier
infrastructure mean that such workers now also have a much broader
choice of household location: they can organise their own lives at the
city and city-regional scale around amenity, around business network-
ing, and around the needs of their ‘better half’ and their children.
Sheller and Urry (2006) have called for a ‘new mobilities paradigm’
which posits that activities that occur while on the move need to be ex-
amined in interdependence to one another. Instead of taking ‘demand’
as a given and assigning it to the “product of discrete, simple categories
such as commuting, leisure, or business” (2006, p.212), we need to
think about places in which multiple needs can be met simultaneously.
So while polycentricity may well be the ‘wave of the future’, we can
expect to see as a result higher-than-ever rates of commuting between
specialised centres along non-radial routes where public transit links
tend to be weakest (Breheny, 1999, p.183). This is a planning issue not
only because of increased infrastructure loadings and environmental
impacts, but also because it implies that those without their own vehicle
may be unable to fully participate in the knowledge economy (cf. Hall,
2009, p.815).
‘Glocal’ Cities
What does the intersection of household, technology, and employment
change with communications and mobility improvements mean for the
future of cities? The ﬁrst implication is that the density of overlapping
networks will remain a crucial developmental asset: particularly priv-
ileged sites, where transport, communications, social, and economic
networks intersect, act as magnets and draw “wealth, power, culture,
innovation, and people, innovative or not, to these places” (Castells,
2009, p.7). However, it would be a mistake to assume that such areas
are necessarily urban since, as I have argued in Chapters 4 and 5, many of
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these dynamics now exist in more peripheral locations as well where the
disbeneﬁts of urban life are far away.
Where urban sites do have an advantage over less central ones is in
the sheer diversity of networks that intersect there: Storper and Ven-
ables (2004, p.365) point out that the socioeconomic networks in ‘buzz
cities’ span: “a) creative and cultural industries; b) ﬁnance and busi-
ness services; c) science, technology, and research; d) power/inﬂuence
(e.g. government, associations, NGOs, etc.).” The sub-centres, edge
cities, and accessible rural areas that we considered in Chapter 7 all tend
to demonstrate specialisation in only a few networks, whereas central
London and New York suggest a diversity of sectors operating cheek-
by-jowl in an area just a few miles across.
So the second implication is that workers operating in sectors where
multi-lateral and cross-sectoral information and knowledge ﬂows pre-
dominate will depend more on cities, whereas those with more bilateral
or limited exchange requirements will not. More subtly, it is the in-
dustries operating in the interstices of the principal axes—at the seams
between the ﬁnancial and business, cultural, touristic, and power and
inﬂuence domains—that constitute the critical ‘ecology’ that makes it
so diﬃcult for lesser conurbations to compete with cities like New York
and London (see Figure 8.5a).
(a) Richness of Inter-Axis Activity (b) 4 Principal Axes of Global City Economies
Figure 8.5: Global/Local Urbanisa-
tions Economies (Llewelyn-Davies,
UCL Bartlett School of Planning,
and Comedia, 1996; reproduced
with permission of the authors)
Our largest cities are also built on top of synergies spanning the
global, national, and local scales (see Figure 8.5b). Again, the ﬁndings
from Chapters 4 and 7 highlight the fact that there is not a discon-
nection between the global and the local but a dynamic, mutually-
reinforcing relationship between them. In short, leading world cities
are essentially ‘glocal’. Of course, this is not a durable, unchanging
structure: as we established in Chapter 3, new industries emerge from
specialised demand in cities, stabilise, and move outwards in search
of less expensive premises and staﬀ. This dynamic only reinforces the
global/local relationship between cities and their surrounding regions.
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8.6 Recommendations
Given the broad thrust of this work and its focus on the dynamics in
play rather than probable outcomes, it is diﬃcult to generate only a few,
simple recommendations for improving planning and plan-making in
the face of challenges from  and mobility. Instead, I will here draw
on the ﬁndings from the preceding chapters to make three deliberately
provocative proposals with relevance to the main axes of contemporary
planning: transportation, the built environment, and governance. It
is not expected that these necessarily constitute realise-able policies,
but that they act as departure points for consideration of how to meet
pressing social, environmental, and economic challenges.
Transportation
The rising tide of carbon ﬂowing from homes, businesses, and trans-
port makes it clear that we need to manage emissions downwards,
and radically too, but year-on-year the use of all forms of transport is
growing. The critical point of failure, it seems to me, is that our public
transport infrastructure is geared towards historic, radial location pat-
terns—business in the  and households in the suburbs—when what
is needed is a complementary infrastructure that somehow balances
many of the ﬂexibility advantages of private vehicles with the emis-
sions characteristics and en route amenities of public transit, all geared to
increasingly orbital commuting patterns.
I have pointed out that at the micro-level, technology-enabled ﬂex-
ibility can make public transit more competitive with private vehicles
by streamlining access to information as well as to the service itself.
Systems that improve the smoothness of point-to-point travel for com-
muters will obviously be an enormous asset here. But we can go beyond
this to look at the types of synergies that might be oﬀered at inter-
modal transfer points: in the Better Rail Stations report Green and Hall
(2009) propose installing commonly-used services, such as post oﬃces
and dry cleaning shops, in a way that makes stations services, as well
as transport, hubs. This approach recalls the intersection of multiple
mobility networks and economic development that Bertolini and Dijst
(2003) termed a ‘mobility environment’.
Whereas greater ﬂexibility is unquestionably a positive for public
transport use at the micro-level, at the macro-scale this is not necessarily
true. Too much ﬂexibility may actually undermine localised develop-
mental incentives since, instead of encouraging the growth of only a
few nodes through focussed demand, all nodes develop weakly and the
existing structure remains largely unchanged. This dynamic seems par-
ticularly obvious in Britain’s air infrastructure: many airports across the
North of England oﬀer limited point-to-point connections (principally
to holiday destinations), but none of them can come close to competing
with the density of links at Heathrow and so it remains the preeminent
node for global business in Britain.
So I would suggest constraining the growth of regional airports across
Britain in favour of developing Manchester’s airport as a northern
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counterweight to Heathrow. Focussing demand on a single location
should encourage specialisation and the provision of better services
to more destinations. With the right supporting infrastructure—a
‘Northern Crossrail’ for instance—the airport could eﬀectively serve
Manchester, Leeds, and Liverpool, all of which have diﬀerent mixes
of potentially global-quality producers of research, , and cultural
outputs. Of course, such a development will not happen overnight,
and so I would also propose strengthening the region’s access to the
 economy by accelerating the rollout of  to make it possible to
reach Central London from Manchester in just 80 minutes by 2020
(GreenGauge 21, 2009).
Built Environment
Elsewhere in this thesis I have argued that the creativity that charac-
terises knowledge work ﬂows from social, economic, and institutional
cultures, but it can clearly only really ﬂourish when combined with a
built environment appropriate to the individuals and ﬁrms generating
that knowledge. The issue brings us back to knowledge bases, but it has
to be seen in the context of a ‘new urban form’ that contains many sites
of potential activity development (cf. Hall, 2003, p.145). Throughout
this work I have been developing the thesis that each of these varied lo-
cations—primary, secondary, and tertiary cores, inner- and outer-edge
cities, market towns, and on down to research parks—is likely to appeal
to diﬀerent types of ﬁrms at diﬀerent points in their lifecycle of knowl-
edge development and deployment. Many of these sites can be easily
mapped on to the preferences summarised in Table 7.12 (page 320).
If symbolic knowledge operates principally through diversity and
multilateral ﬂows then this cannot be imposed through policy, but it
can be undermined by it. Regeneration or development eﬀorts that
erase a textured, variegated local environment (however decrepit) in
favour of ‘modern’ facilities with standard ﬂoor plans and ‘new build’
rents will gut its adaptability to new, innovative uses. A more creative
approach might seek to increase the supply of informal spaces in which
interaction can occur: Currid (2007) suggests employing tax policy to
generate a new class of protected ‘arts’ tenant, but I tend to think that
this would only make New York and London’s housing situations even
worse without necessarily improving the quality of cultural outputs.
Instead, what I would suggest is that some zones already have the basic
social infrastructure in place, and that we should ensure that planned
regeneration, if any, is only conducted in a piecemeal way that preserves
the wide range of facilities and rents upon which the cultural sector
seems to thrive.
For the other knowledge bases the issues are quite diﬀerent: the re-
searchers and scientists generating analytical knowledge would seem
to beneﬁt from amenity-oriented sites together with straightforward
access to those who might employ their outputs in practical contexts. In
contrast, the engineers and consultants developing synthetic knowledge
would seem to require access to a range of transport infrastructure at a
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variety of scales: regional, national, and international, depending on the
activities of the consultancy. Both groups would seem to beneﬁt from a
mix of formal meeting spaces, and less formal encounter spaces, that are
easily reached on local and medium-distance links, with more modest
global connectivity. However, without the right kinds of complemen-
tary ‘social infrastructure’, I doubt that simply appending Regus-style
managed oﬃce spaces and meeting rooms to rail stations would be a
suﬃciently attractive solution to reduce private vehicle mileage. Fully-
developed facilities oﬀering rail and bus interchange, together with car
and bicycle parking, in an attractive setting oﬀering a range of meeting
contexts could well meet these groups’ working and networking needs.
The broader interaction between home and work dynamics is com-
plex, and I mean this here in the technical sense: the implication of true
complexity is that there is no one ‘solution’ to how best to meet the
needs of workers and entrepreneurs. Instead, we need to become bet-
ter at searching for unique solutions and to developing them iteratively
and responsively. In short, we need to be as creative in how we manage
our cities as we are in how we develop new products and services (Hall,
2002a, pp.278–279). However, the current delivery system favours
large developers and all but ensures that only a single or limited set of
approaches will be employed.
Consequently, I would suggest that there is a need to systematically
undermine the scale incentives that encourage cookie-cutter oﬃce,
retail, and residential development. Simply by virtue of their closer
connection to local communities and their potentially large numbers,
smaller builders are more likely to pursue unconventional solutions
that are nonetheless responsive to the individual context in terms of
form and substance (e.g. aﬀordability, accessibility, household sizes,
and so forth). Procurement policies should favour adaptive approaches
since, although some of them may fail spectacularly, others may oﬀer
profoundly eﬀective responses to the major societal challenges that we
face.
Governance
By 2030 the majority of people on every continent will live in ‘ur-
ban environments’ (Castells, 2009, p.2), but many of them will live in
largely unplanned and unconnected extensions—slums and suburbs
of various descriptions—created as a response to the pressing need for
access to the opportunities and services of the core cities and their com-
plementary sub-centres. The key governance challenge therefore is that
the increasingly polycentric region does not relate in any coherent way
to the traditional boundaries of historical administrative entities1 and 1 See, for instance, Jacobs (cf. 1984,
pp.109–119) for a discussion of the
problems faced by the Tennessee
Valley Authority, an administrative
region without an urban economic
heart.
that there “are nuclei of diﬀerent sizes and functional importance dis-
tributed along a vast expanse of territory following transportation lines”
(2009, p.3).
As a result of these changes, policy faces a critical test: how to recon-
cile the need to actively manage individual mobility for environmental
reasons with the fact that it is also closely correlated with economic
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opportunity? For instance, the European Spatial Development Per-
spective () is largely premised on the desirability, achievability, and
sustainability of spreading economic growth to less developed areas
across Europe using transportation and telecommunications networks.
There is a clear ‘network logic’ which holds that aer ‘plugging in’ these
regions a more balanced pattern of development will naturally follow.
The scale of spending on integrationist projects is enormous—the -
 priority transportation schemes alone involve more than e 20 billion
in public funds, and over e 300 billion in private money.
I have tried to set out ways of understanding and analysing infras-
tructure, ﬁrms, and knowledge in ways that might help policy-makers
to get to grips with the likely impact of such spending on urban and
regional development. However, perhaps the deepest failings of much
of contemporary governance are its simple-mindedness and short-
termism: we all—planners, policy-makers, and the public—seem to be
addicted to easy answers and immediate returns when the entire history
of urban develoment points in the opposite direction: towards slow,
careful, plodding work, and rare moments of synergy emerging from
complex interactions between largely unforeseen forces.
There will never be a simple answer to how cities and regions can
become the next cultural mecca (cf. critique in MacGillis, 2010), or
technological dynamo (cf. critique in O’Mara, 2010). However, by
working incrementally and adaptively in the short-term, and being
willing to wait decades for the long-term rewards to emerge—the 20
or 30 years of Japan, not the standard 10 of the West (Castells and Hall,
1994, p.75)—it seems to me that we could signiﬁcantly improve the
probable outcomes of our eﬀorts. In spite of my recommendations
above, if there is one point that bears reiteration from the Introduction,
it is that infrastructure interconnectivity makes instrumental approaches
to their development uncertain at best (Innes, 2005, p.60), and that
planning and policy are best approached with an open mind, a degree of
humility, and a great deal of creativity.
8.7 Final Thought
There is no doubt that some types of technological change stimulate
wider social change: the passenger jet gave rise to the jet-age, the jet-set,
and, of course, to jet-lag (BBC Four, 2009a). Thanks to the ‘mobili-
sation’ of , we are in the midst of another such transformation, and
change in the ways in which we experience the world is necessarily
implicated in equally important shis in the way that we perceive our-
selves and our environment. Townsend and Moss (2008, p.28) suggest
that early aerial photography marked a ‘turning point’ in our under-
standing of the city, and the mapping of telecommunications ﬂows
and of social networks has the potential do the same for us today. As
Dodge and Kitchin (2001, p.4) put it in connection with their review
of visualisations of ‘cyberspace’: “A key question thus to ask to what
extent…does a map or spatialisation change the way that we think…”
In bringing one part of the ‘space of ﬂows’ into focus—and in thinking
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not only about the space, but also about what constitutes the ﬂows—it
is my hope that this work has contributed to changing the way that we
think about the place of telecommunications in the ongoing evolution
of urban form and function.
9Appendix A: Aggregate Spatial & Temporal Calling
Data
9.1 Global, Regional & Domestic Calling
Global Calling
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Figure 9.1: International Call
Volumes
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Figure 9.1a maps out the absolute ﬂows between New York City and
the rest of the world at the country-scale, while Figure 9.2 shows how
this activity is distributed following normalisation by each country’s
population. The second map highlights distinctive groupings in New
York’s interactions: Central America and the Caribbean are particularly
prominent, as are the Philippines and islands of the South Paciﬁc such
as American Samoa; and in the Middle East/Africa there are clusters
around Liberia and Kuwait. Smaller, but no less signiﬁcant on a per
capita basis, are ﬂows to Israel, Italy and, rather surprisingly, Gibraltar1. 1 This may be a product of its small
population, but it is nonetheless
surprising.
Broadly, this distribution of minutes persists, regardless of whether we
examine inbound data, bidirectional ﬂows, or even break down the call
volumes by platform.
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Figure 9.2: Normalised Call
Volumes to and from New York
CityNew York’s strongest bidirectional (i. e. total ﬂow in both directions)
link is with Canada, followed by the Dominican Republic (87% of
Canadian minutes), the United Kingdom (76%), and Mexico (61%).
Aer this, there is a rapid drop-oﬀ, with Guatemala the next most-
called country at barely 32% of Canada’s talk-time. Since Canada
shares the same telephone addressing system, we can be fairly certain
that Toronto is the most-talked to city in Canada (35% of Canadian
minutes), followed by Montreal (13% of minutes). Vancouver, Ot-
tawa/Hull, and Calgary trail far behind, accounting for roughly 3% of
calls and 3% of minutes each, which is somewhat surprising given that
Ottawa is the nation’s administrative capital. More cautiously, we can
advance the notion that Santo Domingo is the most-called city overall
(nearly twice the minutes of Toronto), followed by London (107% of
Toronto’s total). Weighting the results by recent migration ﬂows to
New York shows a few unusually strong international links, but the
results are broadly consistent with this map (see Figure 9.3 on page
342).
More simplistic readings of ‘world cities’ literature might lead some
readers to expect that communications ﬂows to and from New York
would be organised around the activities of the ﬁnancial markets, and
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that calls to London and, to a lesser extent, Tokyo would dominate,
followed by a second tier of calling to and from the ‘home’ countries of
the migrants working at the ‘less-skilled’ end of New York’s economy.
Instead, what we ﬁnd is that two relatively small countries (population-
wise) occupy the top two slots in any list of New York’s global com-
munications patterns, and that they are countries that not only supply
large numbers of migrants (from both ends of the skills base), but also
have strong economic and cultural links. In other words, no one process
dominates these informational ﬂows, and the top ten list of New York’s
communications partners contains: Canada, the Dominican Republic,
the United Kingdom, Mexico, Guatemala, Germany, India, Ecuador,
France, and Jamaica. Canada’s total bidirectional minutes are roughly
four-and-a-half times those for Jamaica.
Emphasising the combined inﬂuence of economic and factors, Fig-
ure 9.3 demonstrates the impossibility of determining the appropriate
frame of reference for measuring an ‘expected’ level of interaction be-
tween a given city and any other arbitrarily selected place at this scale.
Here, we are assuming that it is the movement of people over time that
is the appropriate metric, and not of money or goods, both of which
can only be measured for the New York and New Jersey Port Authority
as a whole (The Weissman Center for International Business, 2009)2. 2 Note that per person results for
Monaco and the Vatican City
are based on the total French and
Italian population ﬁgures since the
relevant populations seem impos-
sibly small to generate this volume
of telecommunications. Additional
support for this approach comes
from the fact that both city states
share(d) the international dialling
code of their surrounding nation
state. Consequently, although this
data is shown for consistency, it
should probably be ignored.
Recent immigrant data is taken from Immigrants Admitted by Class of
Admission and Country of Birth available at New York City Department
of City Planning (2000); country of origin data taken fromQT-P15:
Region and Country or Area of Birth of the Foreign-Born Population: 2000
(U. S. Census Bureau, 2000). However, we have not yet accounted for
the impact of distance and time zones on call volumes, and it might be
expected that Asia would show fewer calls and minutes simply by virtue
of the diﬀerence in times of day.
I have used two sources of migration data to form a basis for com-
parison of international calling activity. Figure 9.3a uses the Country
of Birth reported in the 2000 Census for the entire New York City
population, whereas Figure 9.3b uses the Country of Birth ﬁgures only
for Immigrants admitted to New York in the 1990–1999 period; the
latter might be expected to have stronger ties to their country of origin.
The results show that the particularly strong relationship between New
York City and Canada, and between  and the United Kingdom
is retained even aer this transformation. If anything, it is accentu-
ated. But some other interesting ‘spikes’ are visible in this cumulative
data: Australia is particularly evident, which is surprising given the time
diﬀerence, and Spain and Germany also put in an appearance. The
prominence of Switzerland seems likely to be connected to the activi-
ties of ‘supra-national institutions’, particularly the United Nations in
Geneva (Sassen, 2008, p.11).
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Figure 9.3: Per Capita Wireline
Calling to/from New York City
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Figure 9.4: International Calling
Cycles to/from New York CityIn the following ﬁgure I have separately normalised the sum total of
calls and minutes for the entire month between New York City and
the appropriate state against the largest single domestic value observed
in the data set. So in the case of Figure 9.5, domestic calls have been
normalised against the monthly total calls to California, while domestic
minutes have been normalised against the monthly total time spent on
the phone with Florida. In Figure 9.5, calls and minutes have been di-
vided by each state’s population (U. S. Census Bureau, 2008) and then
normalised against the peak per person value found for Washington,
..
Several features of this plot are quite striking: the ﬁrst is the decay in
terms of both calls and minutes without taking population into account;
the second is that there is a small number of states where the relation-
ship between calls and minutes is clearly and substantively diﬀerent
from that of the rest of the country. In the cases of Florida, North Car-
olina, Colorado, and Puerto Rico the number of outbound minutes is
substantially higher than we’d expect based on the corresponding num-
ber of minutes. In other words, it seems that people spend more time
on the phone with people in these states and territories.
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Figure 9.5: Total Normalised
Domestic Telecoms Flows
However, switching to a per capita value radically changes our view of
the data: the signiﬁcance of Washington, .. can only be understood
as a function of its administrative role and of the importance of the
relationship between the ﬁrms operating in New York City and the
regulatory and legislative decisions made in .. The prominence of
New Jersey and Connecticut can almost certainly be attributed to their
role in the functioning of the larger New York-centred Mega City
Region ().
Regional & Domestic Calling
Turning now to the domestic scale, Figure 9.7 shows the total volume
of minutes, scaled against the largest ﬂow, for the three cities considered
in the Analysis. Because we are not dividing by the number of phones
in each city, London is always the predominant ﬂow (except, obviously
in the case of calls to and from London itself). This ﬁgure usefully
highlights the extent to which London truly does dominate domestic
communications; however, it also brings into relief the importance
of Birmingham, which was largely lost from the normalised analysis
undertaken in Chapter 7. More targeted work would be required to
understand whether this is a dual business/residential dynamic, or if one
of these is the dominant driver of interaction.
We can also examine New York’s links to the rest of America at the
state and inter-urban scales. Figure 9.8 shows the strength of New York
City’s links with other states, especially along the Eastern Seaboard.
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Figure 9.6: Outbound Private
Branch Call Volumes from New
York
Although some of these connections are much as we would expect,
encompassing the Tri-State area presupposed to constitute the New
York City Mega-City Region (), as well as other major regional
economies such as Illinois, Texas, and California. It is rather more sur-
prising, however, to see that the maximum telecommunications ﬂow
across land line and mobile circuits is with the southern state of Florida.
And note too the magnitude of ﬂows to states such as Arizona and Col-
orado together with the lack of interaction with the Northwestern U.S.
and Mid-West—although these are states with comparatively small
populations, the links are tiny indeed—and the relatively modest level
of interaction with California given its large population and economy.
Normalising by the number of people in each state rather dramati-
cally changes the ranking of domestic ﬂows to and from New York: for
total ﬂows, Washington, .. has nearly twice the per capita volume of
the next most-called state of Connecticut. Obviously, this dynamic can
only be understood in the context of Washington’s role as a regulatory
and administrative centre for America, but it also subtly highlights one
issue with our being unable to combine traﬃc from several operators:
this operator has important contracts to supply services to government
oﬃces in .. and so a great deal of business-to-government traﬃc
will be carried from end-to-end, possibly skewing the results towards
over-representation. At the urban scale, the dominant links for bidirec-
tional traﬃc are, in order of importance, Miami, Atlanta, Los Angeles,
Denver, Chicago, Washington .., Orlando, and Houston.
The importance of Los Angeles at the inter-urban scale goes some
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Figure 9.7: Total Call Volumes
to/from London, Manchester &
Stoke-on-Trent
way to correcting the perception generated by California’s lower level
of interaction in Figure 9.8. But in the broader picture, these con-
nections seem to fall into two categories: business-dominated ﬂows
between  and Atlanta, L.A., Denver, Chicago, .., and Houston,
and socially-dominated ﬂows with places like Orlando where many
‘snow bird’ New Yorkers retire or own property. In fact, of the top
twenty-ﬁve most talked-with cities, seven are in Florida, with Tampa,
Jacksonville, Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach, and North Dade
rounding out the state’s representation in New York’s communications
ﬂows. The importance of Miami in this table—which is not gener-
ally predicted by the world cities literature—seems connected to the
conﬂuence of several trends: retirement migration by ‘snow birds’; the
existence of large immigrant communities from Central America; and
Miami’s position as gateway to business in Central and South America.
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Figure 9.8: Percent of Maximum
Wireline & Wireless Volumes to
and from New York
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9.2 Temporal Aspects
5 Kilometers0 10
Selected Areas
Staten Island
The Bronx
Queens
Brooklyn
Lower Manhattan/
Wall Street
Mid-Town
`
`
Upper Manhattan/
Harlem
Figure 9.9: Location of Selected
New York City Neighbourhoods
International volumes to and from ‘Upper Manhattan’ diﬀer from
those elsewhere: we can determine from Figures 10.51 and 10.4 (pages
412 and 362) that this is a strongly Hispanic/Dominican neighbour-
hood, and the underlying data conﬁrms that the timing of this surge
in call volumes is connected to calls to Central and South America (the
Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Ecuador are ranked 1st, 2nd and 4th,
respectively).
appendix a: aggregate spatial & temporal calling data 349
Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
(a) New York
Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
(b) London
Figure 9.10: Volume of Interna-
tional Calls
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Figure 9.11: Domestic Calling
(London)
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Figure 9.12: Domestic Calling
()
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Figure 9.13: International Calling
(London)
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Figure 9.14: International Calling
()
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Figure 9.15: Mobile Calling ()
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Call Patterns at the Borough Level
S P: The  and  analyses for New York shown on
page 359 suggest that businesses—and especially advanced business
services—are highly concentrated in Manhattan, with relatively less ac-
tivity in the surrounding four boroughs. Figure 9.16 shows the monthly
total of calls and minutes between a borough and eight global regions.
The ﬁgure clearly shows that, over the course of a month, signiﬁcant
diﬀerences accumulate in the calling patterns and volumes of each
borough. To avoid the release of sensitive information about call vol-
umes, the data here has been converted to a logarithmic scale and then
normalised against the maximum borough/region value. This trans-
formation also helps us to control for the fact that calling within North
America (here taken to be the United States, Canada, and Mexico) is in
some cases more than 35 times greater than calling abroad.
Figure 9.16: Log Normalised
Wireless Calls by Global Region
and BoroughWe can combine these high-level observations with some details
drawn from the regional axes in the plots. For wireless calling there is
much wide variation between boroughs, with almost no outbound call-
ing to Oceania or Sub-Saharan Africa from Staten Island, the Bronx,
and Brooklyn. In contrast, there is a signiﬁcant level of calling from
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both Europe and Central America/The Caribbean in to all ﬁve bor-
oughs.
T  C  B L: Logically, the timing of calls
to and from each of the boroughs will also provide us with important
information about local activity, be it residential or business-related.
Figure 9.17 organises the data to make it clear that there are several
distinct factors coming into play for domestic calling: a remarkably con-
sistent pattern of wireline usage that strongly suggests the daily business
cycle; and wireless calling that closely tracks wireline usage but takes a
drastically diﬀerent turn aer 5 p.m. In contrast, and perhaps because of
the range of time zones covered, international calling is much more dif-
ﬁcult to interpret: note primarily that wireline and wireless calling from
Manhattan peak earlier in the day than calls from the other ﬁve bor-
oughs, and that wireline calling from the four outer boroughs remains
strong until late in evening.
Figure 9.17: Domestic & Interna-
tional Calling by Platform
The high volume of international wireline calling to and from
Queens and Manhattan shown in Figure 9.18 provide particularly
illustrative ﬁgures. Here, outbound calls to each region have been
normalised against the peak number of calls or minutes to that region
during the day; this serves to emphasise when the majority of calls are
placed and to examine whether there are material diﬀerences between
the way that calls originate in Manhattan and in one of the predomi-
nantly residential boroughs.
It should be quite clear from the shape of the two ﬁgures that the
diﬀerence in calling volumes between even the two largest boroughs
is enormous. Furthermore, there are some quite striking diﬀerences
between the two plots in terms of timing: relatively speaking, there
is less call activity originating in Manhattan aer 7 p.m. then in the
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Figure 9.18: Wireline Calls by
Time of Day and Region
period between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., and with the notable exception of
calls to Asia, Manhattan also shows a broad tendency towards rapidly
rising call frequencies to all areas of the world between 7 a.m. and 10
a.m.
Figure 9.19: Wireless Minutes by
Time of Day and Region
Calls to the rest of North America show the classic double-peaked
usage shape observed during previous research in Rome (Reades
et al., 2007). The rise in calls to Europe, the Middle East, and Sub-
Saharan Africa is oﬀset by about an hour from the uptick in calls to
South America, Central America/The Caribbean, and the rest of North
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America. Intriguingly, while calls and minutes tend to have similar
peaks and lulls, there are one or two signiﬁcant diﬀerences: there is a
large secondary peak in the duration of calls to Oceania from Manhat-
tan between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m., while calls to Central America and The
Caribbean remain quite short throughout the day.
In wireless calling we see some signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of
overall usage: higher levels of usage quite late into the evening, and
much less of the ‘double-peak’ observed for landline calling. Perhaps
the most intriguing aspect of these two plots is that the duration and
number of calls to Asia appears to have two distinct peaks in both calls
and minutes that are quite widely spread: one seems to fall late in the
morning, with a second, higher peak occurring aer midnight. For
now we can only speculate that this might actually reﬂect two types of
activity: business-related calls during the day, and personal calls late at
night.
10
Appendix B: Location & Telecommunications Quo-
tients
10.1 Location Quotients
New York City
Although the broad outline of New York City’s socioeconomic struc-
ture is undoubtedly well-known to most readers (for those uncertain of
areas being discussed, please refer to Figure 7.9 on page 265)—global
ﬁnance on Wall Street in Lower Manhattan, signiﬁcant numbers of
multinationals and retail bank headquarters in Mid-Town, and so
on—the use of wire centres as an analytical unit obviously aﬀects the
way in which we can get to grips with the distribution of ﬁrms and
households. Generally speaking, the largest numbers of residents can
be found in the Bronx and in Queens, which may have as many as two
hundred to three hundred thousand residents per wire centre, but the
densities are signiﬁcantly higher in Manhattan where they reach nearly
45,000 people/km2.
Signiﬁcantly, the residential population in Manhattan tends to be
concentrated in the northern half of Manhattan, with the notable ex-
ception of the Lower East Side/Chinatown. This distribution holds
even when we take density into account, and contrasts with the spatial
distribution of employees, the majority of whom can be found in Lower
Manhattan and Mid-Town, with slightly lower concentrations across
the Brooklyn and Washington Bridges. Figure 10.1 shows where em-
ployment is particularly highly-concentrated within the ﬁve boroughs,
and although the use of a ratio masks important employment centres in
Queens (between the Mid-Town Tunnel and Queensborough Bridge)
and Brooklyn (the ‘Downtown Brooklyn’ area around Borough Hall),
it helps to highlight areas where we might reasonably expect business
calling to predominate.
As discussed in Chapter 6 (see page 237), we can use the Localised
and Standardised Location Quotients ( and ) to move away from
the selection of arbitrary  thresholds to identify important business
clusters. So if the data ﬁts a normal distribution (whether normal or
lognormal) then we can use the standard deviation to help us identify
particularly important wire centres and exchanges. The results of the
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Figure 10.1: Ratio of Employment
To Population by Wire Centre
Lilliefors test for industries in New York—performed with a signiﬁ-
cance of 0.1 (i. e. 10%)—show that aer a logarithmic transform only
some of the major employment categories can be made to fall within a
plausibly normal distribution (see Table 10.11). The p-value is an over- 1 Non-normally distributed indus-
tries were: Retail,  (Finance,
Insurance & Real Estate com-
bined), Banking, Securities, Per-
sonal Services, Business Producer
Services (), and Legal.
all measure of how likely it is that the data was drawn from a normal
distribution, but we determine whether or not a sector is normally-
distributed by comparing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov () Statistic to
the Critical Value: if the  Statistic is greater than the Critical Value,
then we reject the ‘null hypothesis’ that the data is drawn from a nor-
mal distribution, if less then we assume that the data follows a normal
distribution.
Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
Insurance 2.863429e−1 8.412393e−2 1.000031e−1
Real Estate 5.000000e−1 6.267091e−2 1.000031e−1
Services 2.833993e−1 8.430268e−2 1.000031e−1
Hotels 2.166778e−1 9.007839e−2 1.015018e−1
Film 5.000000e−1 6.393906e−2 1.000031e−1
Manufacturing 3.739869e−1 7.928490e−2 1.000031e−1
Utilities 1.048264e−1 9.936389e−2 1.000031e−1
Wholesale 4.401926e−1 7.610477e−2 1.000031e−1
Table 10.1: Lognormal Industries
in New York City
In part, the small number of normally-distributed sectors may be
the result of low sample sizes: there are just 66 wire centres within ,
many of which have little to no employment in the sectors that are of
the most interest. For those sectors which do show a normal distribu-
tion, we can use the standard deviation to determine whether or not the
concentration of employment in sector i in area A is statistically signif-
icant relative to the region R. When we have calculated the mean and
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standard deviation, then the z-score is simply a measure of how many
deviations an area’s value is above or below the distribution’s mean.
O’Donoghue and Gleave argued that z-scores beyond ±1:96 should
be considered statistically-signiﬁcant outliers since this is equivalent to
the 5% level of signiﬁcance commonly used in social science research
(2004, p.422).
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(a)  s Securities & Commodities Brokers
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Figure 10.2:   Results
In the cases of both New York and London, aer standardising the
s many industries no longer meet the ±1:96 threshold. Since this sets
a very high threshold for signiﬁcance (and the issue is only peripherally
relevant to our exploration of telecommunications activity anyway)
I elected to show two thresholds when the distribution was found to
be normal: ±1:5 (13% conﬁdence interval) and ±2:5 (1% conﬁdence
interval) to give a sense of the range of geographical clustering. In cases
where the distribution was not normal, I selected an arbitrary, but
consistent, range based on the maximum  observed for all sectors
within the study area.
Returning our focus to , we ﬁnd that two of the sectors of most
interest to us—the trading activities associated with Wall Street, and the
business services activity in support of other ﬁrms—are not normally-
distributed. Trading activity is highly-concentrated at the southern
tip of Manhattan, largely on Wall Street, but important concentra-
tions have also emerged in Mid-Town in the area near Grand Central
Station, Times Square, and Columbus Circle (see Figure 10.2). Legal
Services (see Figure 10.5 on page 363) has largely followed ﬁnance, but
in contrast Business Services Providers (2) display greater dispersion, 2 Unfortunately, because of the way
that the New York industrial data
was calculated it was impossible
to directly compare the Business
Services group from New York
with the  group from London
and the .
with low concentrations (s of 1.0–2.5) across all of Lower Manhattan
(see Figure 10.2b). These results suggest that the data from New York
City may simply not extend far enough from Manhattan to oﬀer up a
meaningful structural interpretation of industry preferences.
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Figure 10.3: Sociodemographic
Characteristics by Wire Centre
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364 the place of telecommunications
London
Table 10.2 shows the results for the Lilliefors test against the various
knowledge base groups and top-level  codes. Note that the results
of the test are dependent upon the a user-speciﬁed threshold for reject-
ing the null-hypothesis: we could easily raise or lower this threshold
to changes the results quite dramatically. Because I was looking to
highlight areas with particularly high or low levels of industrial activity
in a non-arbitrary manner, strict normality was not essential and so I
opted for a relaxed test for normality with a signiﬁcance threshold of
0.01. Some  distributions are undoubtedly le- or right-skewed from
a purely normal distribution, but this is not considered enormously
important for interpreting the results.
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
Symbolic
Synthetic 1 (Financial)
Synthetic 2 (Support)
Analytical
Material
Immaterial
Figure 10.6: Signiﬁcant Locations
by Knowledge Base
Table 10.3 shows the positive results from the Lilliefors test for 3-
digit  codes and code groupings. In all cases, only the logarithmic
s proved to be normally distributed although here, though aer this
transformation many industries and groups were found to have a largely
normal dispersion. This result is undoubtedly at least partly a function
of the smaller spatial units and larger geographical area covered by the
London metro data set.
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Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
Symbolic 3.400000e−2 6.756472e−2 8.711307e−2
Synthetic #1 2.700000e−2 6.837871e−2 8.628341e−2
Synthetic #2 1.000000e−3 9.006813e−2 9.351312e−2
Analytical 1.980000e−1 5.387542e−2 9.243265e−2
Material 4.630000e−1 4.491930e−2 9.895010e−2
Immaterial 8.900000e−2 1.178963e−1 1.867370e−1
  8.170000e−1 7.766221e−2 1.846034e−1
  1.400000e−2 7.496562e−2 8.476711e−2
  4.200000e−2 6.609079e−2 9.444217e−2
  1.660000e−1 5.513915e−2 8.669258e−2
  6.900000e−2 6.280504e−2 9.933967e−2
  6.000000e−3 7.729631e−2 8.872986e−2
  2.000000e−1 5.329781e−2 9.430768e−2
Table 10.2: Lognormal 1-Digit
Industries & Knowledge Base
Groups in London
Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
Real Estate 7.400000e−1 3.845258e−2 8.869149e−2
 4.720000e−1 4.495272e−2 9.337105e−2
Cultural Activity 2.810000e−1 5.103897e−2 8.455986e−2
 602 3.700000e−2 6.768206e−2 9.081601e−2
 622 4.000000e−3 1.573856e−1 1.713675e−1
 651 3.900000e−2 6.734452e−2 8.882586e−2
 652 2.370000e−1 5.344637e−2 9.120638e−2
 660 1.500000e−2 9.342722e−2 1.131218e−1
 671 7.000000e−3 7.699805e−2 9.130567e−2
 672 5.090000e−1 4.543294e−2 9.702657e−2
 701 7.060000e−1 3.845258e−2 8.518390e−2
 721 5.140000e−1 4.382450e−2 8.753588e−2
 722 9.530000e−1 3.088929e−2 8.858270e−2
 723 7.000000e−2 6.542662e−2 8.669382e−2
 724 1.100000e−2 7.692361e−2 8.673970e−2
 731 1.000000e−3 9.796431e−2 9.879732e−2
 741 5.540000e−1 4.260711e−2 8.856584e−2
 742 6.040000e−1 4.196231e−2 9.510404e−2
 744 4.620000e−1 4.484201e−2 9.590550e−2
 921 6.500000e−2 6.465992e−2 9.696224e−2
 922 1.800000e−2 7.851444e−2 9.159595e−2
 925 8.000000e−3 7.511904e−2 8.343634e−2
Table 10.3: Lognormal 3-Digit
Industries in London
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Figure 10.7: London Knowledge
Base s (Part 1)
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Figure 10.8: London Knowledge
Base s (Part 2)
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Figure 10.9: London 3
Group s
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Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
Cultural Production 3.720000e−1 6.400970e−2 1.236101e−1
 3.400000e−2 7.392131e−2 1.023281e−1
Legal & Accountancy 1.470000e−1 6.525564e−2 9.646476e−2
Logistics 7.260000e−1 5.297770e−2 1.163476e−1
& 3.030000e−1 1.058321e−1 1.869025e−1
 6010 3.790000e−1 1.033604e−1 1.956083e−1
 6024 7.410000e−1 6.489555e−2 1.489214e−1
 6110 5.700000e−2 2.505669e−1 3.213004e−1
 6210 4.640000e−1 1.384792e−1 2.859780e−1
 6220 8.230000e−1 1.778165e−1 4.209183e−1
 6312 5.990000e−1 7.889068e−2 1.882985e−1
 6321 5.440000e−1 7.047760e−2 1.428104e−1
 6322 2.000000e−2 2.741673e−1 3.394388e−1
 6323 9.590000e−1 1.220596e−1 3.386641e−1
 6512 6.900000e−2 7.187157e−2 1.074469e−1
 6521 5.250000e−1 1.564900e−1 3.059370e−1
 6522 8.680000e−1 7.993685e−2 2.287873e−1
 6523 1.260000e−1 1.230549e−1 1.897315e−1
 6601 6.260000e−1 1.170421e−1 2.594921e−1
 6603 3.630000e−1 9.862195e−2 1.695903e−1
 6711 7.950000e−1 1.588443e−1 4.123659e−1
 6712 1.330000e−1 1.336660e−1 2.221808e−1
 6713 7.810000e−1 7.066747e−2 1.668538e−1
 6720 7.450000e−1 6.581914e−2 1.415627e−1
 7011 9.520000e−1 4.861497e−2 1.440064e−1
 7020 6.450000e−1 4.871314e−2 1.094285e−1
 7031 6.100000e−2 8.375348e−2 1.319683e−1
 7032 1.300000e−2 1.092458e−1 1.354521e−1
Table 10.4: Lognormal 4-Digit
Industries in London
370 the place of telecommunications
Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
 7210 2.600000e−1 1.532385e−1 2.854538e−1
 7221 5.630000e−1 1.346762e−1 2.710418e−1
 7222 9.200000e−2 7.170814e−2 1.057729e−1
 7230 6.840000e−1 9.031456e−2 2.209549e−1
 7240 2.560000e−1 1.457600e−1 2.464538e−1
 7250 7.310000e−1 9.460447e−2 2.230398e−1
 7260 2.440000e−1 8.580356e−2 1.527855e−1
 7310 2.840000e−1 1.058321e−1 2.037472e−1
 7320 5.830000e−1 2.246251e−1 4.278964e−1
 7411 1.900000e−2 9.048149e−2 1.164671e−1
 7412 1.940000e−1 7.346485e−2 1.129332e−1
 7413 5.920000e−1 8.112338e−2 1.691187e−1
 7415 9.060000e−1 4.992502e−2 1.273721e−1
 7420 4.740000e−1 5.528010e−2 1.037827e−1
 7440 3.120000e−1 8.173152e−2 1.392327e−1
 7486 1.780000e−1 1.483763e−1 2.433108e−1
 7487 9.100000e−2 6.398876e−2 9.805545e−2
 9211 7.940000e−1 7.710466e−2 2.011310e−1
 9212 4.620000e−1 1.474237e−1 2.965349e−1
 9213 8.060000e−1 7.982196e−2 1.939093e−1
 9220 4.080000e−1 9.498936e−2 1.651156e−1
 9231 2.200000e−2 1.124051e−1 1.373046e−1
 9232 3.960000e−1 1.304972e−1 2.582476e−1
 9234 4.100000e−2 2.433219e−1 3.127824e−1
Table 10.5: Lognormal 4-Digit
Industries in London (cont’d)
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Figure 10.10: London 4
Group s (Part 1)
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Figure 10.11: London 4
Group s (Part 2)
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Figure 10.12: London Symbolic s
(Part 1)
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Figure 10.13: London Symbolic s
(Part 2)
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Figure 10.14: London Symbolic s
(Part 3)
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Figure 10.15: London Synthetic
Group #1 s (Part 1)
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Figure 10.16: London Synthetic
Group #1 s (Part 2)
378 the place of telecommunications
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
sic6603
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(a) Non-Life Insurance
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
Log sic6603
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 2.1 Std. Dev.
(b) Non-Life Insurance (Lognormal)
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
sic6712
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(c) Brokering & Fund Management
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
Log sic6712
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 1.8 Std. Dev.
(d) Brokering & Fund Management (Lognormal)
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
sic6713
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(e) Financial Intermediation Auxiliary
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
Log sic6713
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 2.5 Std. Dev.
 > 2.5 Std. Dev.
(f) Financial Intermediation Auxiliary (Lognormal)
Figure 10.17: London Synthetic
Group #1 s (Part 3)
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Figure 10.18: London Synthetic
Group #1 s (Part 4)
380 the place of telecommunications
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
sic7411
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(a) Legal
Æ
0 105 Kilometers
No
t N
orm
all
y D
ist
rib
ute
d
(b) Legal (Lognormal)
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
sic7412
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(c) Accountancy
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
Log sic7412
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
(d) Accountancy (Lognormal)
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
sic7414
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(e) Business Management Consultancy
Æ
0 105 Kilometers
No
t N
orm
all
y D
ist
rib
ute
d
(f) Business Management Consultancy (Lognormal)
Figure 10.19: London Synthetic
Group #2 s (Part 1)
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Figure 10.20: London Synthetic
Group #2 s (Part 2)
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Figure 10.21: London Analytical
Group s (Part 1)
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Figure 10.22: London Analytical
Group s (Part 2)
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Figure 10.23: London Analytical
Group s (Part 3)
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Figure 10.24: London Material &
Immaterial Flows s (Part 1)
386 the place of telecommunications
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
sic6312
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(a) Storage & Warehousing
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
Log sic6312
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 2.5 Std. Dev.
 > 2.5 Std. Dev.
(b) Storage & Warehousing (Lognormal)
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
sic6322
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(c) Other Support Water Transport
Æ`
Æ`
0 105 Kilometers
Log sic6322
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 2.1 Std. Dev.
(d) Other Support Water Transport (Lognormal)
Figure 10.25: London Material &
Immaterial Flows s (Part 2)
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Figure 10.26: Signiﬁcant Knowl-
edge Base Locations (Part 1)
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Figure 10.27: Signiﬁcant 4
Group Locations
Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
Synthetic #1 1.030000e−1 2.503114e−2 3.521580e−2
Synthetic #2 2.000000e−3 4.700069e−2 4.857349e−2
Immaterial 4.860000e−1 5.151879e−2 1.047665e−1
  4.230000e−1 4.998108e−2 1.026058e−1
  3.000000e−3 4.251174e−2 4.586531e−2
  2.000000e−3 3.749822e−2 4.098666e−2
Table 10.6: Lognormal 1-Digit
Industries & Knowledge Base
Groups in the 
Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
Real Estate 6.070000e−1 1.633471e−2 3.437133e−2
 5.100000e−2 2.506412e−2 3.348447e−2
 602 3.330000e−1 1.990182e−2 3.652165e−2
 622 4.000000e−3 7.141296e−2 7.745951e−2
 631 4.900000e−2 3.252543e−2 4.471442e−2
 672 1.060000e−1 2.867493e−2 4.031588e−2
 701 6.590000e−1 1.633471e−2 3.802105e−2
 721 1.320000e−1 2.568541e−2 3.965083e−2
 722 1.500000e−2 3.038875e−2 3.768211e−2
 724 3.000000e−3 4.385602e−2 4.829530e−2
 742 2.400000e−2 2.875258e−2 3.759085e−2
 744 9.400000e−2 2.555503e−2 3.601911e−2
 921 4.200000e−1 2.279132e−2 4.535059e−2
 922 1.120000e−1 3.254360e−2 4.536390e−2
Table 10.7: Lognormal 3-Digit
Industries in the 
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Figure 10.28:  Knowledge Base
s (Part 1)
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Figure 10.29:  Knowledge Base
s (Part 2)
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Figure 10.30:  3 Group
s
392 the place of telecommunications
Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
Consulting 3.000000e−3 4.439029e−2 4.810723e−2
Cultural Production 4.820000e−1 3.903307e−2 7.367056e−2
 9.130000e−1 2.097921e−2 6.010102e−2
Legal & Accountancy 2.200000e−2 5.010564e−2 6.541148e−2
Logistics 9.870000e−1 1.664752e−2 5.761143e−2
& 6.230000e−1 4.238402e−2 1.043883e−1
 6010 4.500000e−1 6.483955e−2 1.212971e−1
 6024 5.720000e−1 3.300902e−2 7.431929e−2
 6110 6.680000e−1 9.114679e−2 2.322158e−1
 6120 9.400000e−2 3.192235e−1 4.398551e−1
 6210 2.020000e−1 1.288911e−1 2.070321e−1
 6220 3.560000e−1 1.226963e−1 2.330035e−1
 6311 7.210000e−1 1.247214e−1 2.901943e−1
 6312 6.080000e−1 3.948611e−2 8.086131e−2
 6321 2.660000e−1 6.237601e−2 1.152741e−1
 6322 5.630000e−1 9.028561e−2 1.913377e−1
 6323 5.780000e−1 9.348754e−2 1.950767e−1
 6512 4.000000e−3 5.544093e−2 6.174906e−2
 6521 8.690000e−1 8.139232e−2 2.141980e−1
 6522 1.500000e−1 7.953625e−2 1.315163e−1
 6523 2.460000e−1 8.724339e−2 1.421684e−1
 6601 9.190000e−1 4.837216e−2 1.333251e−1
 6603 5.770000e−1 5.152301e−2 1.052205e−1
 6711 9.040000e−1 1.301443e−1 3.463151e−1
 6712 4.000000e−2 1.131552e−1 1.557341e−1
 6713 4.940000e−1 5.489040e−2 1.146941e−1
 6720 3.680000e−1 4.531500e−2 8.799322e−2
Table 10.8: Lognormal 4-Digit
Industries & Groups in the 
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Group/ Code p-value  Statistic Critical Value
 7011 9.520000e−1 3.357939e−2 9.612657e−2
 7012 7.710000e−1 1.989858e−1 4.377425e−1
 7020 3.110000e−1 3.935506e−2 7.115581e−2
 7031 4.810000e−1 3.719805e−2 7.545935e−2
 7032 4.760000e−1 4.693015e−2 1.001833e−1
 7210 4.200000e−2 1.290204e−1 1.614223e−1
 7221 6.700000e−2 1.322646e−1 1.831364e−1
 7222 9.590000e−1 2.047058e−2 5.589011e−2
 7230 4.990000e−1 6.170311e−2 1.269062e−1
 7240 6.660000e−1 8.141909e−2 1.778349e−1
 7250 5.160000e−1 6.719156e−2 1.370943e−1
 7260 7.660000e−1 3.820546e−2 9.750981e−2
 7310 6.070000e−1 4.238402e−2 9.908797e−2
 7320 2.390000e−1 1.552222e−1 2.500024e−1
 7411 9.000000e−3 6.279647e−2 7.435034e−2
 7413 7.020000e−1 5.106149e−2 1.048781e−1
 7414 9.000000e−3 4.847530e−2 5.142793e−2
 7415 2.670000e−1 4.797992e−2 8.261917e−2
 7420 9.710000e−1 1.847552e−2 5.601301e−2
 7440 1.810000e−1 6.148063e−2 1.043173e−1
 7486 7.100000e−2 1.082492e−1 1.631336e−1
 7487 1.500000e−1 3.217314e−2 5.006915e−2
 9211 3.320000e−1 8.201646e−2 1.403197e−1
 9212 6.600000e−2 1.846600e−1 2.574694e−1
 9213 5.150000e−1 6.522641e−2 1.280097e−1
 9220 7.500000e−1 5.738069e−2 1.402929e−1
 9231 2.180000e−1 6.991280e−2 1.123478e−1
 9232 8.580000e−1 6.888086e−2 1.849424e−1
 9234 2.000000e−3 2.561040e−1 2.592008e−1
Table 10.9: Lognormal 4-Digit
Industries & Groups in the 
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Figure 10.31:  4 Group
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Figure 10.32:  4 Group
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Figure 10.33:  Symbolic s
(Part 1)
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Figure 10.34:  Symbolic s
(Part 2)
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Figure 10.35:  Symbolic s
(Part 3)
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Figure 10.36:  Synthetic Group
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Figure 10.37:  Synthetic Group
#1 s (Part 2)
appendix b: location & telecommunications quotients 401
Æ`
Æ`
Æ`
Æ`
Æ` Æ`
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Oxford
Norwich
Warwick
Reading
Brighton
Cambridge
Maidstone
Chelmsford
Southampton
High Wycombe
Milton Keynes
0 30 6015 Kilometers
sic6711
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(a) Administration of Financial Markets
Æ`
Æ`
Æ`
Æ`
Æ` Æ`
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Oxford
Norwich
Warwick
Reading
Brighton
Cambridge
Maidstone
Chelmsford
Southampton
High Wycombe
Milton Keynes
0 30 6015 Kilometers
Log sic6711
 < -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 1.8 Std. Dev.
(b) Administration of Financial Markets (Lognormal)
Æ`
Æ`
Æ`
Æ`
Æ` Æ`
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Oxford
Norwich
Warwick
Reading
Brighton
Cambridge
Maidstone
Chelmsford
Southampton
High Wycombe
Milton Keynes
0 30 6015 Kilometers
sic6712
0 - 1
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 500
(c) Brokering & Fund Management
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(d) Brokering & Fund Management (Lognormal)
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Figure 10.38:  Synthetic Group
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(a) Other Credit Granting
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(c) Financial Intermediation Auxiliary
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(d) Financial Intermediation Auxiliary (Lognormal)
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(e) Insurance Auxiliary
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Figure 10.39:  Synthetic Group
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Figure 10.40:  Synthetic Group
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(a) Management Activities of Holding Companies
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Figure 10.41:  Synthetic Group
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Figure 10.42:  Analytical Group
s (Part 1)
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Figure 10.43:  Analytical Group
s (Part 2)
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(b) Other Computer Activities (Lognormal)
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Figure 10.44:  Analytical Group
s (Part 3)
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(e) Other Support Water Transport
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(f) Other Support Water Transport (Lognormal)
Figure 10.45:  Flows Group s
(Part 1)
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(a) Call Centre Activities
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(b) Call Centre Activities (Lognormal)
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Figure 10.46:  Flows Group s
(Part 2)
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10.2 Telecommunication Quotients
The results in this appendix suggest that the  also has clear analytical
value was for non-business activity, and that it might be a particularly
useful tool for population and migration research. This is especially
clear amongst the results for groups where migration is principally a
means of accessing opportunity and where there is little overlap with
business calling to major trading partners. Figures 10.51, 10.54, 10.53,
10.56, and 10.57a all demonstrate remarkable consistency between the
known census demographics and the derived  for those countries. It
would be interesting to see how this metric might work at the national
scale in America, with its especially large numbers of migrants.
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Figure 10.47: New York City s
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The complex nature of international calling means that the results
need to be considered a bit diﬀerently from the industrial distributions
calculated using the same basic method. For instance, one of the ﬁrst
conceptual challenges that we encounter in Figure 10.47 is that the
highest s are in residential areas. What makes this result more puz-
zling is that I had deliberately selected only international calling between
the hours of 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. in the expectation that this would high-
light business-related links: instead, comparison with Figure 10.1 (see
page 360) shows that none of these locations have high ratios of employ-
ees to residents, and some do not even have large numbers of employees
at all (see Figure 10.3a on page 362).
Assuming that the nature of the  mapping process is not ﬂawed
(see the section Data Provision on page 226 for a fuller discussion),
then the neighbourhoods of New York with the highest proportions
of international calling are: Williamsburg, Woodside, Prospect Park
South, Jamaica, and—the only  in Manhattan—Inwood Hill/Fort
George. Comparatively wealthy areas such as Brooklyn Heights, Staten
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Island, and Pelham Bay seemingly use signiﬁcantly less international
telecoms, and all ﬁve of the ‘most internationalised’ areas are drawn
from the lower two quantiles of income distribution (see Figure 10.3b
on page 362). Furthermore, comparison with the percentage of His-
panic, Asian or White households (see Figure 10.4 on page 362) also
reveals no particularly strong relationships between internationalisation
and household composition.
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Figure 10.49: New York City s
Britain & Japan
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However, we can unbundle these calls by country, and one of the
most common assertions made about ﬁnancially-oriented indus-
tries such as banks, consultancies, and hedge funds is that they have
strong connections with the other two ‘major world cities’: London
and Tokyo. So a  map of minutes to and from these two countries
should enable us to pick out the centres of ﬁnancial activity in the ﬁve
boroughs. Figure 10.49 emphasises Wall Street and Mid-Town, as well
as the Borough Hall area of Brooklyn, all of which are known centres of
ﬁnancial services (see Figures 10.2 on page 361, and 10.5 on page 363).
Calling to and from Britain appears to be the principal driver of the
signiﬁcant linkage South of Borough Hall—this is the Midwood area
of Brooklyn, known mostly for a /ﬁlm production complex similar
to White City in West London (see Figures 10.12a and 10.12e on page
373); without being able to examine call ﬂow in greater detail, the fact
that Outer London is the dominant destination of calls—by a massive
margin—from this area certainly reinforces a tentative international
‘creative complex’ association.
For comparative purposes, a very diﬀerent communications geog-
raphy is suggested by Figure 10.51, in which calling activity to the
Dominican Republic is highly concentrated at the North end of Man-
hattan: the Washington Heights neighbourhood is the original home
of Dominican migrants to New York City (where they make up some
42% of Latinos), but the telecommunications data also picks up a more
recent movement—largely the result of gentriﬁcation in Upper Man-
hattan—out of Manhattan and across the river to the Bronx neigh-
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bourhoods of Morris Heights and University Heights (Limonic, 2008).
Again, it is worth considering the fact that this is data drawn from the
period between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. when we would expect a great deal of
calling to be business-related. Unfortunately, the data is not available to
enable me to determine whether these are Dominican-run businesses or
simply very signiﬁcant levels of household calling.
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Figure 10.51: New York City s
the Dominican Republic
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In the case of New York City it is possible that the sample size
played a role—New York is already a very international city, so to use it
as the basis for comparison (as a region R, if you will) seems problematic
even though this same approach was employed successfully with the .
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Figure 10.53:  s
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London
In the case of New York City, it was helpful to look at the distribu-
tion of calls to and from Latino countries since migrants from Central
America make up a signiﬁcant proportion of the total population. In
much the same way, over the years large numbers of people have arrived
in London from the Indian subcontinent and Figure 10.55 gives us a
sense of how ‘Hindus’—whose location was determined using surname
maps by the London Proﬁler project3—are distributed around London. 3 See:
http://www.londonproﬁler.org.ukFigure 10.54 shows the intensity of calling to and from India, and al-
though the numbers will not line up exactly since Muslim Indians make
up a signiﬁcant minority of migrants, the ﬁdelity of the  map to the
name-distribution map is quite remarkable and picks up Southall, Bark-
ing, Croydon, and Harrow, amongst others. Note too, that although
Barking did not feature for overall international calling, it does so very
prominently here.
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Figure 10.54: London s India
Figure 10.55: Concentration
of Hindi Surnames in London
(2001–2006)
Similar maps for Turkey (see Figure 10.57a on page 416) and Poland
(see Figure 10.57b on page 416) suggest that minority groups with
strong social and economic links to a ‘home’ country are particularly
amenable to mapping with a  approach. In that sense, these ﬁnd-
ings ﬁt well with observations by Barnett and Choi (1995, p.262) that
countries that share a common language and are in close proximity
tend to communicate more, but we can now extend this ﬁnding down
to the micro-scale and connect it to population migrations. In turn,
this means that we have strong, if indirect, support for some of the core
elements of the ‘global cities’ hypothesis advanced by authors such as
Sassen (1991, 2008) and now being pursued by the Globalisation and
World Cities Group (cf. Smith and Timberlake, 2002; Taylor et al.,
2002). There is, in other words, a ‘geography of talk’ that takes in both
‘elite’ and ‘opportunity’ migration, and could be used as an investigative
tool.
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Figure 10.56: London s
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(a) Turkey s (b) Concentration of Turkish Surnames
in London (2001–2006)
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(c) Poland s (d) Concentration of Polish Surnames
in London (2001–2006)
Figure 10.57: Comparison of
London s and Surnames
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Greater South East of England
Finally, for a completely diﬀerent geography of telecoms activity, we
can turn to Figure 10.58, which maps the intensity of calling to and
from Turkey. It is quite interesting to juxtapose this map with Figure
10.60 (page 418), which plots the distribution of calling to and from
India. The latter is strongly Western-oriented, taking in well-known
enclaves such as Southall, but also showing a clear bias towards centres
such as Reading, High Wycombe, Oxford, and Milton Keynes. In
contrast, although the scale should be taken into account, calls with
Turkey have a stronger eastward element, with a particularly large
grouping running North and East of Islington, through Hackney and
Haringey, but also seeming to congregate near to Luton and Stansted
airports. Asian migrants to England, particularly following their ex-
pulsion from Kenya and Uganda, tended to settle near to their point
of arrival at Heathrow Airport (BBC Four, 2009a,b), and I wonder if a
similar process might now be operating for other, more recent immi-
grant groups?
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Figure 10.58:  s Turkey
Figure 10.59: s Turkey Distribu-
tion
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Figure 10.60:  s for Other
Countries and Regions
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Appendix C: Eigenplace Analysis
11.1 New York City
The fact that there are just 66 s in New York makes it faster and
easier to compute the eigenvalues and Fourier frequencies used in the
classiﬁcation process; however, I was concerned that the larger ‘cell’
sizes of North American s would make it more diﬃcult to localise
activity and to assign it to a singular use or set of uses. This is a very real
risk since some of the s serve areas containing more than 100,000
workers during peak daytime hours!
Although I had originally intended to use dedicated () and land-
line calls as the basis for the analysis, it soon transpired that the very
distinct pattern of  usage inevitably skewed the clustering results in
much the same way that I had suggested an analysis of calls to and from
the Turks and Caicos Islands might: many s had no usage at all,
while a few had truly massive levels of inbound and outbound calling.
The result was that s with dedicated lines tended to end up in their
own cluster, and so I turned to landline and mobile data as the basis for
the New York analysis. The fact that we have information about calling
from mobile phones might also enable us to ﬁnd systematic diﬀerences
in the way that diﬀerent populations use telecoms to remain in touch
with distant colleagues, collaborators, friends, and family.
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Figure 11.1: Cluster Number
Selection
Further experimentation also demonstrated that another early idea
that I had had—to use domestic calling as a baseline data set against
419
420 the place of telecommunications
which to control for large variations in country- or region-speciﬁc
calling1—also tended to founder on the fact that important diﬀer- 1 For instance, to feed into the
eigenplace process inbound and
outbound calling data for both
wireless and wireline calls to France
and all domestic calls
ences in the much larger domestic data volumes tended to overwhelm
more modest diﬀerences in calling to and from a particular country or
state. In short, in New York City domestic diﬀerences dominated the
feature-selection process in much the same way that domestic ﬂows
could swamp the results of the  analysis.
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Figure 11.2: Representative Signals
In this example, even before projecting these clusters on to a map, we
can infer that Figure 11.2a is taken from predominantly residential areas,
while Figure 11.2b is drawn from business areas. We can predict this
because Cluster 1 shows little weekday/weekend variation (there is, in
fact, even a small up-tick on Sunday evenings), while Cluster #4 shows
an enormous fall-oﬀ in usage over the weekend even though usage levels
are still generally higher than they are in Cluster 1 at the same time of
day. The ability to measure and use variations across the entire week
as the basis for clustering is what makes the eigendecomposition and
Fourier Transform approach more powerful than a Telecommunications
Quotient—if we were to take a purely static approach then this cyclical
aspect would be entirely lost. Representative signals for the other three
clusters can be found in Appendix C: Eigenplace Analysis on page 422.
We can now turn to Figure 11.3 to see how well the eigenplace ap-
proach to urban analysis matches up with an understanding of the city
derived from more traditional sources. At the risk of overemphasising
the distinctions between the clusters, I have here (as elsewhere in this
section) coloured Cluster #4 in dark red because of its signiﬁcance, in
this case it is to highlight the cluster’s concentration in Lower Manhat-
tan and Mid-Town. Comparison to Figures 10.2b and 10.5 (see pages
361 and 363 respectively) suggests that the clustering process is, in part,
selecting for the volumes associated with ﬁnancial services and sub-
sidiary activities in Lower and Mid-Town Manhattan. It is undoubtedly
also connected to calling from high-income residential areas (see Figure
10.3b), which are more likely to place and receive direct-dial interna-
tional calls from landlines than are lower-income areas. Meanwhile, the
distinct usage pattern at  Airport (especially as captured in this data)
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results in the clustering process assigning it to its own group (Cluster
#5).
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Figure 11.3: International Eigen-
places in New York
In contrast to those two groups, Clusters 1, 2, and 3 are initially
more diﬃcult to interpret from the mix of spatial and temporal infor-
mation available to us. It seems fairly clear that the distribution is not
random, but teasing out the diﬀerences requires more careful scrutiny:
Clusters 1, 2 and 3 diﬀer in part in magnitude, but the more fundamen-
tal diﬀerence is actually the pattern of calling later in the evening. And
whereas Clusters 2 and #4 generally show constant (or even increasing)
use until quite late, Cluster 1 shows a steady decrease over the course
of the day. Since this pattern recurs across both mobile and ﬁxed line
usage as well as, to a lesser extent, inbound and outbound calling, what
the eigenplace analysis process seems to have identiﬁed is the timezone
of the parties on the other end of the call.
We will investigate this aspect of the New York City data in more
detail in the subsequent ﬁgures, but if we lump Clusters 2 and #4 to-
gether then we have—very generally speaking—identiﬁed areas associ-
ated with domestic migrants, as well as those from Central and South
America. And while Cluster 1 contains a mix of income groups (see
Figure 10.3b), the areas in the cluster are all associated more strongly
with households originating in, or with connections to, Europe, Asia,
and Africa. Signiﬁcantly, the analysis has even picked out the Lower
East Side/Chinatown and Little Italy as being distinct from the sur-
rounding areas of Lower Manhattan, which tend to be more aﬄuent
and contain fewer recent migrants.
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Figure 11.4: Internationalisation
Clustering
These are very broad conclusions, and the relatively small number
of s (though this obviously draws on an enormous underlying data
set), together with the very large number of households and businesses
in each , makes it diﬃcult to deﬁnitively link each cluster to just
one type of activity. The issue of the interaction between the scale of
the ‘analytical unit’ and the density of the built environment is one that
had previously been identiﬁed in studies of mobile calling in Rome
(Reades et al., 2007, 2009), but it is nonetheless reassuring to ﬁnd that
the New York data at least yields reasonable results in spite of its vastly
diﬀerent social and economic composition.
National Geographies
With only one example it is, of course, entirely possible that the diﬀer-
ences identiﬁed by the clustering process are not particularly important,
or that the features selected would lead to the same results being ob-
tained for every data set. In order to test this assumption—something
that has not previously been possible with aggregate data fromWiFi
hotspots (Calabrese et al., 2010) or Roman cell towers (Reades et al.,
2009)—I turned to data on calls to Britain, India, China, and the Do-
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minican Republic on the basis that these should generate markedly
diﬀerent clustering patterns. For the sake of brevity, only the maps are
produced here in Figure 11.6, and the representative signals, silhouettes,
and k-means distribution are all available in Appendix C: Eigenplace
Analysis on pages 424 to 428.
The eigenplace analysis yields four substantially diﬀerent geographies
that accord remarkably well with personal and statistical knowledge
of the city (see page 429 for country of birth by Zip Code maps using
2000 Census data). Figure 11.6a does, however, highlight one of the
challenges of analysis at this resolution: the mixing of diﬀerent activ-
ities—residential and business especially—within a single cluster. For
instance, the members of Cluster 3 in Lower Manhattan are much more
likely to be related to business calling than they are to residential, and
Figures 10.1 (see page 360) and 10.3a (see page 362) show just how
much employment is concentrated in these two areas. However, further
North in Mid-Town and on the Upper East and Upper West Sides, as
well as across the East River in Brooklyn, the situation is very diﬀer-
ent: although some of these areas have low median incomes, they are
also incorporate aﬄuent residential parts of the city such as Park Slope
(North and South) and trendy Williamsburg which are likely to use
landlines for personal calling.
Figure 11.6b highlights the Lower East Side/Chinatown, as well as
the  covering Canal Street as it extends towards the Holland Tun-
nel; it also picks up well-known ‘satellite’ areas of Chinese migration
in Sunset Park (Brooklyn) and Flushing (Queens), together with the
emerging ‘Chinatown’ in Homecrest (on Avenue U in Brooklyn).
Cluster 3 (Figure 11.6c) hewes closely to the highest residential densities
of people of Indian origin; and Cluster 3 (Figure 11.6d) picks up many
of the neighbourhoods with a strong Dominican presence. This last
ﬁgure also makes clear the link between timezones and calling cycles
discussed above: the up-tick in evening usage (because both countries
are in the same timezone) highlights the residential dimension of Clus-
ter 3 (see also Figure 11.9 on page 428) while Cluster 1 largely lacks this
dynamic.
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Figure 11.5: British Clustering
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Figure 11.6: New York Eigenplaces
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Figure 11.7: Chinese Clustering
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Figure 11.8: Indian Clustering
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Figure 11.9: Dominican Clustering
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11.2 London
Suppressed from
electronic copy at
request of research
partner
Figure 11.11: India & Pakistan
India & Pakistan
Shiing our focus to London, it is helpful to begin with equally so-
cial geographies since they will help us to quickly understand whether
the higher spatial resolution of the U.K. data is a boon or a curse in
terms of the analysis. One of the easiest maps to calculate, and one of
the distributions with which many Londoners are intimately famil-
iar, is the distribution of South Asian—by which I mean Indian and
Pakistani—populations. The distribution of Hindi names previously
shown in Figure 10.55 (on page 414) is clearly only a partial picture of
the distribution of households, but there is a clear connection to the
concentrations of calling captured in Figure 11.11. Examination of the
representative signals (see Figure 11.17 on page 436) highlights the ways
in which the behaviours diﬀer for each exchange area group.
Other National Geographies
Taking two other migrant groups in London, we can see that the ﬁner
resolution of the British exchange is providing us with a more nu-
anced social geography with, again, entirely plausible results from the
eigenplace clusters. Diﬀerences between the two geographies are per-
haps overly emphasised by the use of a chloropleth map (i. e. colourised
thematic map) since, in combination with the exclusive nature of the
k-Means clustering, it causes areas to be assigned to one, and only one
cluster. Nonetheless, the overall correspondence is clear.
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(a) Australia (CensusProﬁler.org)
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(b) Australia (Eigenplaces)
(c) Africa (CensusProﬁler.org)
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(d) Africa (Eigenplaces)
Figure 11.12: Other National
Geographies
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(f) k-Means Selection
Figure 11.13: African Clustering
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Figure 11.14: Australian Clustering
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Figure 11.15: Brazilian Eigenplaces
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Figure 11.16: Brazilian Clustering
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Figure 11.17: India & Pakistan
Clustering
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11.3 Greater South East of England
Average Signals at Signiﬁcant Locations
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Figure 11.18: Signals by Signiﬁcant
Employment Areas (Part 1)
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Figure 11.19: Signals by Signiﬁcant
Employment Areas (Part 2)
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Figure 11.20: International Eigen-
place Signals
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Figure 11.21: Domestic Eigenplace
Signals
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Figure 11.22: Symbolic Eigenplace
Signals
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Figure 11.23: Symbolic Eigenplace
Signals
446 the place of telecommunications
Selected Domestic Features Selected Int’l Features Number of Clusters Results
Eigenvector 2,
Eigenvector 4,
Eigenvector 5,
Eigenvector 6,
Eigenvector 10,
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 2,
Fourier Transform 3,
Fourier Transform 4,
Fourier Transform 5,
Fourier Transform 6,
Fourier Transform 7,
Fourier Transform 8,
Fourier Transform 9,
Fourier Transform 10,
Fourier Transform 11,
Fourier Transform 13,
Fourier Transform 14,
Fourier Transform 15,
Fourier Transform 17,
Fourier Transform 22,
Fourier Transform 23,
Fourier Transform 24,
Fourier Transform 27,
Fourier Transform 28,
Fourier Transform 29,
Fourier Transform 30,
Fourier Transform 31,
Fourier Transform 32,
Fourier Transform 34,
Fourier Transform 35
Eigenvector 1,
Eigenvector 8,
Eigenvector 10,
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 2,
Fourier Transform 3,
Fourier Transform 8,
Fourier Transform 9,
Fourier Transform 16,
Fourier Transform 29
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Silhouette Value
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
2 4 6 8
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
Number of Clusters
M
ea
n 
Si
lh
ou
et
te
2
3
4
5
6
7
Table 11.4: Synthetic Group 1
Eigenplace Classiﬁcation
Selected Domestic Features Selected Int’l Features Number of Clusters Results
Eigenvector 6,
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 2,
Fourier Transform 3,
Fourier Transform 6,
Fourier Transform 8,
Fourier Transform 9,
Fourier Transform 10,
Fourier Transform 15,
Fourier Transform 25,
Fourier Transform 29
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 2,
Fourier Transform 8
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Silhouette Value
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
2 4 6 8
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.36
Number of Clusters
M
ea
n 
Si
lh
ou
et
te
2
3
4
5
6
7
Table 11.5: Synthetic Group 2
Eigenplace Classiﬁcation
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Figure 11.24: Synthetic 1 Eigen-
place Signals
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Eigenvector 3,
Eigenvector 7,
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 2,
Fourier Transform 3,
Fourier Transform 6,
Fourier Transform 8,
Fourier Transform 15,
Fourier Transform 22,
Fourier Transform 29,
Fourier Transform 32
Eigenvector 2,
Eigenvector 9,
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 8
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Silhouette Value
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
2 4 6 8
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
Number of Clusters
M
ea
n 
Si
lh
ou
et
te
2
3
4
5
6
7
Table 11.6: Analytical Group
Eigenplace Classiﬁcation
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Figure 11.25: Synthetic 1 Eigen-
place Signals (cont’d)
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(b) Cluster 2 of 7
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(c) Cluster 3 of 7
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Figure 11.26: Synthetic 2 Eigen-
place Signals
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(b) Cluster 6 of 7
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Figure 11.27: Synthetic 2 Eigen-
place Signals (cont’d)
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(a) Cluster 1 of 7
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(b) Cluster 2 of 7
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(c) Cluster 3 of 7
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Figure 11.28: Analytical Eigenplace
Signals
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(b) Cluster 6 of 7
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Figure 11.29: Analytical Eigenplace
Signals (cont’d)
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Table 11.7: Material Flows Group
Eigenplace Classiﬁcation
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Figure 11.30: Material Flows
Eigenplace Signals
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KDDi Analysis of All Signiﬁcant Areas
Selected Domestic Features Selected Int’l Features Number of Clusters Results
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Table 11.8: Step 1: Feature Selec-
tion
Residential Activity
We can also use the i approach to explore residential geographies.
Figure 11.35a creates two clusters which very obviously reﬂect s
with lesser (Cluster 1) and greater (Cluster 2) levels of calling to India
and Pakistan. Taking only s that were assigned to Cluster 2 in the
ﬁrst eigenplace analysis, we now pass this subset of s through a new
eigenplace process to generate the four-cluster map shown in Figure
11.35b.
This multi-step approach enables us to tease out more ﬁne-grained
diﬀerences in the data since we have eliminated those s that are not
immediately relevant to the analysis. Comparing Figure 11.35b to Fig-
ure 11.11 shows that, in spite of the very diﬀerent scales involved, the
eigenplace analysis has picked out similar features and created similar
clusters to those found at the London scale (see page 430). But at the
-scale we can now see how this forms part of a much larger distri-
bution of households and businesses, with members of Cluster #4 also
being identiﬁed in Norwich, Reading, and Slough.
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Figure 11.31: Step 1: Signals &
Silhouette
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Selected Domestic Features Selected Int’l Features Number of Clusters Results
From Step 1, Cluster 1
Eigenvector 2,
Eigenvector 7,
Eigenvector 9,
Eigenvector 10,
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 2,
Fourier Transform 3,
Fourier Transform 5,
Fourier Transform 6,
Fourier Transform 7,
Fourier Transform 8,
Fourier Transform 9,
Fourier Transform 10,
Fourier Transform 13,
Fourier Transform 14,
Fourier Transform 15,
Fourier Transform 16,
Fourier Transform 22,
Fourier Transform 28,
Fourier Transform 29,
Fourier Transform 30,
Fourier Transform 32
Eigenvector 3,
Eigenvector 5,
Eigenvector 8,
Eigenvector 9,
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 8
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Silhouette Value
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
2 4 6 8
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
Number of Clusters
M
ea
n 
Si
lh
ou
et
te
2
3
4
5
6
7
From Step 1, Cluster 2
Eigenvector 2,
Eigenvector 6,
Fourier Transform 1,
Fourier Transform 2,
Fourier Transform 3,
Fourier Transform 8,
Fourier Transform 15,
Fourier Transform 22,
Fourier Transform 29,
Fourier Transform 32
Eigenvector 6,
Eigenvector 7,
Eigenvector 8,
Eigenvector 9,
Fourier Transform 1
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Silhouette Value
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
2 4 6 8
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
Number of Clusters
M
ea
n 
Si
lh
ou
et
te
2
3
4
5
6
7
Table 11.9: Step 2: Feature Selec-
tion (Clusters 1 & 2)
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(a) Cluster 1 (from Step 1, Cluster 1)
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(d) Cluster 3 (from Step 1, Cluster 2)
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Figure 11.32: Step 2: Signals &
Silhouette (Clusters 1 & 2)
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Table 11.10: Step 3a: Feature
Selection (Clusters 1, 2, 3 & 4)
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Figure 11.33: Step 3a: Signals &
Silhouette (Clusters 1, 2, 3 & 4)
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Selected Domestic Features Selected Int’l Features Number of Clusters Results
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Table 11.11: Step 3b: Feature
Selection (Clusters 5, 6, 7 & 8)
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Figure 11.34: Step 3a: Signals &
Silhouette (Clusters 5, 6, 7 & 8)
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(b) Step 2: Subclustering from Step 1
Figure 11.35: India & Pakistan
(Multi-Step Clustering)
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11.4 Distance Decay by Signiﬁcant Location
The ﬁgures on the following pages present the results from the simple
gravity model presented on page 310 in which the predicted volume of
telecommunications (measured in either minutes or calls) between two
points is given by the equation:
Vij =  :
Pi × Pj
dnij
Pi is the number of phones in  i and, similarly, Pj is the number of
phones in  j. d is the distance between them, and this value then
multiplied by a constant  to obtain the predicted ﬂows.
Since we have the total point-to-point ﬂows and wish to understand
how well this model ﬁts the data, we can rearrange the gravity equation
as follows:
log − n logdij = logVij − log (Pi × Pj)
The y intercept is given by log and the slope of the line by n.
Rather than, as has historically been done by social network re-
searchers, simply averaging the results over all places and all connec-
tions, I have below taken each of the groups of signiﬁcant s and have
measured their interaction with every other  in the rest of the 
region.
Every knowledge base and  group is presented in the same
way: Figure ‘A’ presents the density of points in the relevant data set,
where each point represents the interaction (in minutes) between two
s, one of which is an area of signiﬁcant employment in the base or
sector of interest; Figure ‘B’ provides a cumulative distribution over
distance (in metres) to give a sense of how quickly communications ac-
cumulates; Figure ‘C’ takes the density values from ‘A’ and slices them
into a series of boxplots to test the impact of the higher variance at the
longer distances on the results; and, ﬁnally, Figure ‘D’ calculates the
mean value for each distance slice (i. e. the noise is ﬁltered out through
the averaging process) with a regression line to provide a sense of good-
ness of ﬁt.
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Figure 11.36: Symbolic Distance
Decay
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Figure 11.37: Synthetic Group 1
Distance Decay
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Figure 11.38: Synthetic Group 2
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Figure 11.42:  Distance Decay
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Figure 11.43: Legal & Accountancy
Distance Decay
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Figure 11.44: Consultancy Dis-
tance Decay
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Figure 11.45: & Distance Decay
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Figure 11.46:  Distance Decay
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Figure 11.47: Logistics Distance
Decay
12
Appendix D: Data Management & Processing
12.1 Further Details on CLLIs
All Common Language Location Identiﬁers (s) are mappable on
to a set of spatial coordinates and the code can usually be broken down
into four logical groupings: a four-letter city code (e.g. for New
York City, Manhattan), a two-letter state or provincial code (e.g.  for
New York or  for New Brunswick), a two-character site code (the
facility where the equipment is located), and a three-character network-
entity code specifying the actual piece of hardware or infrastructure.
Four examples of valid s are provided below in Table 12.1, and
readers wishing to further explore this type of data can use Telcordia’s
web site and  lookup page (Telcodata, 2009a).
City Code State/Province
Code
Network Site
Code
Network-
Entity
Code
Description
NYCM NY 79 DS0 A digital switch (possibly the only one) at
site 79 in New York City (Manhattan)
NYCK NY 14 DS0 A digital switch (possibly the only one) at
site 14 in King’s County (Brooklyn)
CCGN NB SC RS0 An analogue switch (possibly the only one)
in Cocagne, New Brunswick
WAHW HI MN DS1 A digital switch (the second of two or
more) in Wahiawa, Hawaii
Table 12.1: Sample Eleven Charac-
ter  Codes
The  should not be confused with the Numbering Plan Area
() and Exchange Code/Central Oﬃce () speciﬁcation. The
 is rather better-known as an area code, and in the case of North
American numbers it is always the ﬁrst three digits of a valid phone
number; the next three digits specify the  and would once have
identiﬁed a sub-region within the . A single  can be respon-
sible for several / blocks: the Telcordia page for the Brooklyn
  shows that it covers 718–283, 718–431, 718–435,
718–436, and ten more 718-based exchanges (Telcodata, 2009b).
Readers familiar with the North American schema will be aware
that number portability (the ability to transfer a number anywhere in
the country) and mobility (the fact that there is no numeric distinction
between ﬁxed and mobile numbers) mean that the / of any
arbitrarily-selected number no longer tells us much about its actual
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location, and so calls to a given  do not necessarily terminate here,
but may be re-routed to a diﬀerent location entirely.
12.2 Further Details on Wire Centres & Exchanges
Unlike European operators, who have tended to operate ﬁxed and mo-
bile infrastructure using separate numbering, routing, and billing sys-
tems, American operators have typically supplied both types of service
to customers on the same basis. The lack of an embedded distinction
between ﬁxed-line and mobile numbers means that the two types of
data are intermingled, along with private branch exchange () traﬃc
for businesses or buildings that house their own switching equipment.
This means that there is no straightforward way to determine that, say,
 handles ﬁxed-line data while  handles mo-
bile traﬃc.
Manhattan Queens Brooklyn The Bronx Staten Island All Wire
Centres
Material Suppressed
Table 12.2: Wire Centre Averages
by Borough
Compared to the North American system, the British system is
markedly simpler to understand even if it is no less logistically and tech-
nically complex. In the ﬁrst place, because British mobile numbers use
a distinct, non-geographical numbering schema they are easy to pick
out and exclude from the spatial analysis, obviating the need for the
more challenging -to- mapping process employed in North
America. Furthermore, landline numbers in Britain are not portable,
which means that they can only be transferred between outlets or build-
ings within a more modest geographical area. A more detailed technical
explanation of how the British network functions is available from
Feather (2000).
London   England
Resident Population 7,270,525 21,410,906 50,451,657
Material Suppressed
Working Population 3,987,780 9,849,160 N/A
Table 12.3: Overview of Analysis
Subregions by 
12.3 Data Management
Overview
The American telecommunications company supplied a high-level
view of telecoms traﬃc on its network, including data indicating the
platform—wireless, wireline, dedicated, , and pre-paid calling
card—used to place the call and the ‘direction’—originating or ter-
minating in New York City—of the call. For privacy reasons, the
records do not uniquely identify customers or phone numbers and sim-
ply provide a total count of calls and minutes to unique destinations
worldwide. This level of aggregation and privacy is theoretically ideal
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for this type of research but for one thing: a single  may service an
area containing thousands of individuals and dozens of ﬁrms. In a one-
hour period, the heaviest volume of  traﬃc observed in the data set
exceeded 125,000 calls, and with such massive volumes it is impossible
to untangle overlapping users of telecommunication services such as
business and residential customers.
The U.K.-based operator supplied a more ﬁne-grained view of call-
ing activity, including information on call duration in addition to the
more usual platform details and high-level location. In this case, the
carrier had performed much of the cleaning, canonicalising, and aggre-
gating on its own servers, so what was delivered was essentially a ‘live’
copy of a pre-screened database which could be simply be copied di-
rectly into the data warehouse. Given the size of this second database
(≈ 1TB), the slightly diﬀerent approach was a valuable time and space
saver since the next three stages detailed below could be bypassed com-
pletely. However, regardless of the diﬀerences in process, the end result
outlined in the Entity-Relationship Diagram below (see Figure 12.3 on
page 481) was the same.
Record Layout & Coverage
The American telecommunications company supplied data from its
New York area voice and data operations for the entire month of
September 2008. Raw log ﬁles were cleaned and aggregated; in all,
more than 10 of plain-text data were processed, but aer aggregating
the data temporally and spatially using several diﬀerent resolutions this
became a rather more manageable.
Field Name Sample Value Description
Date 20080901 Date of observation in format yyyymmdd
Time 100000 Time of observation in format h[hmmss]
Type WIRELINE Type of call: Wireless, Wireline,
Dedicated, Pre-Paid Calling Card, VOIP
Direction TERM Originating or Terminating in New York
NYC  NYCMNY36DS1 Location within New York City
Latitude 40.XXXXXX NYC  Latitude (to 6 decimal places)
Longitude -72.XXXXXX NYC  Longitude (to 6 decimal places)
Borough Brooklyn NYC  Borough
Counterparty CHCGILFRDS0 Where applicable, the  of the counter-party
Country US Counter-party’s ISO 2-character country code
State IL Counter-party’s ISO 2-character state code
Area Chicago Counter-party’s area name (where available)
Calls 5 Number of new calls in previous hour
Minutes 27.356667 Time spent on all calls in previous hour
Table 12.4: Record Layout for
American Calling Data
A sample, formatted for easier reading, is provided to illustrate the
contents of the raw comma-delimited data ﬁles (latitude and longitude
coordinates have been edited for security reasons):
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20080901,0,DEDICATED,TERM,NYCXNYTRXXX,40.XXXXXX,-72.XXXXXX,
Bronx,APNUNK,US,No_state,,1,1.550000
20080901,0,PPC,ORIG,NYCKNYARXXX,40.XXXXXX,-72.XXXXXX,
Brooklyn,7,RU,Non_us_state,,1,7.133333
20080901,0,PPC,ORIG,NYCKNYCLXXX,40.XXXXXX,-72.XXXXXX,
Brooklyn,BEVLSCMAXXX,US,SC,BENNETTSVL,1,9.966667
20080901,0,PPC,ORIG,NYCMNY36XXX,40.XXXXXX,-72.XXXXXX,
Manhattan,WBYNNYAKXXX,US,NY,UNKNOWN,1,0.416667
20080901,0,PPC,ORIG,NYCMNY37XXX,40.XXXXXX,-72.XXXXXX,
Manhattan,BRSBCABEXXX,US,CA,SNFC CNTRL,2,0.333333
20080901,0,PPC,ORIG,NYCNNYFUXXX,40.XXXXXX,-73.XXXXXX,
Manhattan,PLTNCAAYCM1,US,CA,SAN RAFAEL,6,21.150000
20080901,0,VOIP,ORIG,NYCQNYCOXXX,40.XXXXXX,-72.XXXXXX,
Queens,9144,IN,Non_us_state,Chennai (Madras) ,1,0.000000
Cleaning
During the cleaning phase records and ﬁelds are scanned for irregulari-
ties or errors and, if circumstances warrant, rejected entirely or ﬂagged
for review by the human operator. Work by the American telecom-
munications company ensured that relatively few problem records were
identiﬁed, but some minor issues (e.g. standardising city names and
values for ‘missing’ ﬁelds) were addressed in this phase.
Canonicalising
In canonicalization we convert the raw records into a canonical form—in
this case the unique, numeric database identiﬁers that will enable us to
more easily sort and aggregate the data. This also has the signiﬁcant
advantage of reducing the working ﬁle size substantially. The basic
process involves taking each reference ﬁeld (e.g. a  or a non-U.S.
location) and creating a new database key for values that are complete
new, or retrieving an existing key for values that have been encountered
previously.
Processing of the city ﬁeld for counterparties required a good deal
more ﬂexibility with one-oﬀ matches and pattern-based substitutions.
Since we could not know what portion or portions of the city name had
been ‘mangled’ by the data collection process, I designed a recursive
process that sought to ﬁnd the simplest and shortest possible match with
a publicly-available ‘gazetteer’ (i. e. list of places). For instance, in the
case of a raw city name of ’HTSLPHRSPG’ the gazetteer search would
operate as follows:
• HTSLPHRSPG
• HTSLPHRSPG*
• HTSLPHRSP*G*
• …
• H*T*S*L*P*H*R*S*P*G*
If there were no match on this last search, then the application at-
tempts to make some logical guesses based around common abbrevia-
tions. While time-consuming, because application contained a method
for downloading a caching the results for a country or countries we
could still perform thousands of searches per second. For places that
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did not match the gazetteer, it is also possible to look for simple abbre-
viations (e.g. ‘vl’ for ‘ville’, and ‘’ for ’fort’); naturally, this challenge
extended to multilingual issues as well (e.g. ‘riv’ for ‘riviére’) and to
issues with overloaded identiﬁers (e.g. ‘’ for, seemingly,
‘Île-de-France #6’).
Storage
The cleaned, canonicalised, and sorted data ﬁle can then be loaded into
a data warehouse. Although this process can be slow for large numbers
of records it is nonetheless fairly straightforward. Both databases follow
a loose snowﬂake schema (Wikipedia, 2005c), meaning that there are
two broad classes of tables: facts and dimensions. Dimensions and fact
tables can be understood by reference to a practical example: a phone
number is unique in the entire data set and is thus a dimension of the
data we’re studying, while the calls made by that phone number are
observed facts. Similarly, exchanges, area codes, dates, times and calling
types are all dimensions, while monthly, weekly, and hourly levels of
aggregation, and summary statistics related to the number of the calls
are all facts.
Each logical entity—dates, s, domestic and international counter-
parties, and calling platforms—was stored in its own dimension table
and then further normalised as needed to increase query performance
and search-ability. Calls were stored at several levels of temporal aggre-
gation: hourly, weekly, by day of week, and monthly. This approach
enables the data to be quickly and ﬂexibly interrogated at the appropri-
ate level of detail and for the results to be easily checked back against the
raw data.
The snowﬂake design means that few, if any joins between Fact and
Dimension tables are required during aggregation. Consequently, the
process can be performed directly within the database without the need
for more complex distributed systems such as BigTable or MapReduce.
In eﬀect, we can do sorting, matching, and grouping directly within the
 query and without having to perform any kind of table join in order
to link the fact table to the location tables.
Aggregation
By grouping the data in diﬀerent ways we can compress billions of
records of raw hourly data by 50% or more. The aggregate tables help
with the analysis in diﬀerent ways: we can quickly scan the entire data
set to build a ‘feel’ for the data and to identify patterns (e.g. speciﬁc
destinations) with particularly high or low incidences; we can then
examine how calls to or from particular destinations vary by the day of
the week; and, ﬁnally, we can look at hour-by-hour changes in calling
patterns across an entire week. On a system with 32 of  and
10 of disk space it was possible to perform all aggregation tasks on the
smaller of the two data sets in less than 12 hours, while on the largest
table in the larger data set aggregation took approximately 1.5 days to
complete.
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terminating_id bigint(10) unsigned
originating_id bigint(10) unsigned
Nature: Public
Contains all 'facts' captured by the operator’s data set. Each record
represents a call logged to or from a landline. 
call_fct
tinyint(2) unsignedtype_id
tinyint(3) unsigneddate_id
tinyint(2) unsignedhours_num
tinyint(2) unsignedminutes_num
tinyint(2) unsignedseconds_num
float(10,2) unsignedduration_amt
type_id tinyint(2) unsigned
caller_id bigint(10) unsigned
Nature: Public
Each calling or called party will have one and only one entry 
in the caller_dim. Using the type/area/exchange it is
possible to localise landlines and exclude other call types.
caller_dim
exchange_id int(7) unsigned
area_id tinyint(3) unsigned
type_nm varchar(20)
type_id tinyint(2) unsigned
Nature: Public
Each phone and call is assigned a type key to enable easy 
filtering. Since at least one  side of each call is a landline, the  
type refers to the other end.
type_dim
type_dsc text
year_num int(4) unsigned
date_id tinyint(3) unsigned
Nature: Public
This bit of normalisation is designed to simplify aggregation, 
while also tracking important social aspects of the calendar  
date (e.g. Bank Holidays, Weekends, etc.)
date_dim
day_num tinyint(1) unsigned
month_num tinyint(2) unsigned
day_year_num tinyint(3) unsigned
day_nm set('Monday'...)
is_holiday boolean
is_weekend boolean
caller_id bigint(10) unsigned
caller_key varchar(40)
Nature: Private
This table contains the raw phone number captured by the operator
and used to generate new caller_ids for the rest of the data 
warehouse.
caller_lkp
area_nm varchar(60)
area_id tinyint(3) unsigned
Nature: Public
Contains information on the area code that the operator is
willing/able to share with SENSEable.
area_dim
area_dsc text
country_nm varchar(60)
caller_id bigint(10) unsigned
Nature: Public
Curr ently designed for enabling aggregation by world city or 
country . Could be converted to ids if necessary.
caller_ext_dim
city_nm text
area_id tinyint(3) unsigned
area_key varchar(6)
Nature: Private
This table contains information about the area code derived
from the calling or called party.
area_lkp
latitude float(10,5)
longitude float(10,5)
Types:
Landline
Mobile
Non-
Geographic
International
Other
Figure 12.1: Part 1 of Entity
Relation Diagram
12.4 Matlab Analysis
In computer science, heuristic applications imply not only a trial-and-
error approach to problem-solving, but also a form of machine learn-
ing which “utilize[s] self-educating techniques (as the evaluation of
feedback) to improve performance” (Merriam-Webster Online Dic-
tionary, 2009). Both of these deﬁnitions are applicable to the approach
employed in this research—not only was a trial-and-error approach
developed in response to an evolving understanding of the data and its
constraints, but the ultimate solution involved the application of auto-
mated learning algorithms, and in particular unsupervised clustering
techniques, to generate meaningful results.
In that sense, the able eigenplace toolkit falls squarely within
both  and heuristic approaches to knowledge discovery in databases
(). I also felt that it would be helpful to illustrate the user-side view
of the analytical process using screen-shots taken while the process was
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terminating_id bigint(10) unsigned
originating_id bigint(10) unsigned
Nature: Public Aggregate 
Can be populated using GROUP BY query against call_fct. 
Note that we are now counting the number of (directed)
calls between two parties in a given hour.
hourly_call_fct
tinyint(2) unsignedtype_id
tinyint(3) unsigneddate_id
tinyint(2) unsignedhours_num
int(4) unsignedcall_num
float(10,2) unsignedduration_amt
terminating_id bigint(10) unsigned
originating_id bigint(10) unsigned
Nature: Public Aggregate 
Can be populated using GROUP BY query against 
hourly_call_fct. Now counting the number of (directed) calls
between two parties in a given day.
daily_call_fct
tinyint(2) unsignedtype_id
tinyint(3) unsigneddate_id
int(8) unsignedcall_num
float(10,2) unsignedduration_amt
exchange_nm varchar(60)
exchange_id int(7) unsigned
Nature: Public
Contains information on the exchange facility that oeprator is 
willing/able to share with SENSEable.
exchange_dim
exchange_dsc text
exchange_id int(7) unsigned
exchange_key varchar(10)
Nature: Private
This table contains information about the exchange derived 
from the calling or called party.
exchange_lkp
longitude float(10,5)
latitude float(10,5)
terminating_id bigint(10) unsigned
originating_id bigint(10) unsigned
Nature: Public Aggregate
Can be populated using GROUP BY query against 
daily_call_fct. Now counting the number of (directed) calls
between two parties in a given month.
monthly_call_fct
tinyint(2) unsignedtype_id
int(8) unsignedcall_num
float(15,2) unsignedduration_amt
tinyint(3) unsigneddate_id
Figure 12.2: Part 2 of Entity
Relation Diagram
running to demonstrate the potential for this type of methodology. Par-
ticular attention should be given to the way that this approach allows a
user with only modest technical and scientiﬁc knowledge to execute the
basic code and explore various clustering alternatives in an interactive
manner.
The geography and input data to be used in the analysis are speciﬁed
in a conﬁguration ﬁle that is designed to be read and updated by users
with only modest knowledge of the underlying processes involved
in generating eigenplace clusterings. In Figure 12.3, the analytical
geography has been set to ‘Great Britain’ (i. e. ‘’), and the data will be
doubly-normalised by both the number of phones in each  as well
as by the natural log of the resulting per- calls and minutes. It is also
possible to normalise by the population of the , though this would
only work for the ﬁner geographic scales: the Greater South East of
England (), the Outer Metropolitan Area (), and London ().
Figure 12.3 also shows that it is possible to retain information about
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Figure 12.3: Conﬁguration File
previous sessions/projects that have been run, simply by comment-
ing and uncommenting code. Using a unique project name (typically
formed from the compound of the geographic scale and some user-
speciﬁed value) it is possible to quickly reload data at various stages of
processing (see Figure 12.4) and continue an analysis or try re-running
a previous analysis with slightly diﬀerent parameters. The input param-
eter ‘myFiles’ speciﬁes the raw ﬁle names to be used in the analysis, and
‘myFileNames’ allows the user to specify a friendlier label to be used on
charts and ﬁgures. In a future revision to the codebase it would obvi-
ously be helpful to move the speciﬁcation of inputs and normalisation
to a Graphical User Interface (), but this was not a priority for this
work.
Once the inputs have been speciﬁed, the rest of the user’s work
takes place within a , and Figure 12.4 presents the main processing
window in which the principal stages of the eigenplace computation
are shown. In ‘General’ the user is able to specify the sampling step of
the Discrete Fourier Transform together with the number of days of
data contained in the input ﬁle (currently this only supports values of
1 and 7). The ‘Sampling step’ value corresponds to the shortest period
for which meaningful frequencies have been found in previous telecoms
research.
The ‘Features’ section of the Main Window shown in Figure 12.4 is
where the unsupervised feature selection algorithm developed by Mitra
et al. (2002) is implemented. The maximum temporal frequency used
for the Discrete Fourier Transform and the eigendecomposition opera-
tions can be speciﬁed, as can the number of features (or a percentage of
the total number of features) to be selected. For large geographies, cal-
culating all features can take several minutes, but the process has proved
to be highly robust and scalable. Feature selection itself is quite quick,
taking less than 15 seconds for even very large geographies.
Once the desired number of features has been selected, the is able
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Figure 12.4: Main Window
to open a new ‘Clustering Window’ (see Figure 12.5) in which sev-
eral clustering options have been implemented. At this time only the
k-Means algorithm has been fully-implemented for customisable ge-
ographies, but in subsequent work I hope to update the codebase to
incorporate Fuzzy c-/k-Means clustering, and other approaches to
clustering the data. Note that the maximum number of clusterings to
generate and test is user-speciﬁable and that the user can also easily try a
diﬀerent clustering if the results prove inconclusive.
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Figure 12.5: Clustering Window
List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Details
APS Advanced Producer Services
ATM Automated Teller Machine
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BSC Base Station Controller
BPS Business Services Provider
BSU Basic Spatial Unit
CBD Central Business District
CDO Collateralised Debt Obligation
CLLI Common Language Location Identiﬁer
DNS Domain Name System
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
DVD Digital Versatile Disk
EDI Electronic Data Interchange
ETL Extract, Transform & Load
FIRE Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
FX Foreign Exchange
GIS Geographic Information System
GPRS General Packet Radio System
GPS Global Positioning System
GSE Greater South East of England
GUI Graphical User Interface
GVA Gross Value-Added
HR Human Resources
HSR High-Speed Rail
ICT Information & Communications Technology
IP Internet Protocol; Intellectual Property
ISO International Standards Organisation
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems
JIT Just In Time
KIBS Knowledge-Intensive Business Services
LQ Location Quotient
Table 12.5: List of Abbreviations
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Abbreviation Details
MNE Multi-National Enterprise
NESTA National Endowment for Science, Technology & the Arts
NOMIS National Online Manpower Information System
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA Number Plan Area
NSA National Security Aﬀairs
NXX Exchange Code/Central Oﬃce
NYC New York City
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development
OMA Outer Metropolitan Area of London
PXA Public Exchange Area
RFP Request For Proposals
ROI Return-On-Investment
SEE South East of England
SLQ Standardised Location Quotient
SNCF Société National des Chemins de Fer
SME Small or Medium Enterprise
SMS Short Messaging Service
TGV Train Grand Vitesse
TPM Technical Project Manager
TQ Telecommunications Quotient
UA Urban Audit Area
URL Uniform Resource Locator
UPS United Parcel Service; Uninterruptible Power Supply
VC Venture Capital Firm/Venture Capitalist
VoIP Voice Over IP
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation
SIC Code Details
A, B Agriculture and ﬁshing
C, E Energy and Water
D Manufacturing
F Construction
G, H Distribution, hotels and restaurants
I Transport and communications
J, K Banking, ﬁnance and insurance, real estate
L, M, N Public administration, education, health
O, P, Q Other services
Table 12.6: Alphabetical Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation Codes
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SIC Code Details
602 Other land transport
622 Non-scheduled air transport
631 Cargo handling and storage
651 Monetary intermediation
652 Other ﬁnancial intermediation
660 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social
security
671 Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial intermediation, except insurance
and pension funding
672 Activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding
701 Real estate activities with own property
721 Hardware consultancy
722 Soware consultancy and supply
723 Data processing
724 Data base activities
731 Research and experimental development on natural sciences and
engineering
741 Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax
consultancy; market research and public opinion polling;
business and management consultancy; holdings
742 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical
consultancy
744 Advertising
921 Motion picture and video activities
922 Radio and television activities
925 Library, archives, museums and other cultural activities
Table 12.7: 3-Digit Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation Codes
standard industrial classiﬁcation 491
SIC Code Details
6010 Transport via railways
6024 Freight transport by road
6110 Sea and coastal water transport
6120 Inland water transport
6210 Scheduled air transport
6220 Non-scheduled air transport
6311 Cargo handling
6312 Storage and warehousing
6321 Other support land transport activities
6322 Other support water transport activities
6323 Other support air transport activities
6511 Central banking
6512 Other monetary intermediation
6521 Financial leasing
6522 Other credit granting
6523 Other ﬁnancial intermediation not elsewhere classiﬁed
6601 Life insurance
6603 Non-life insurance
6711 Administration of ﬁnancial markets
6712 Security broking and fund management
6713 Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial intermediation not elsewhere
classiﬁed
6720 Activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding
Table 12.8: 4-Digit Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation Codes
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SIC Code Details
7011 Developing and selling of real estate
7012 Buying and selling of own real estate
7020 Letting of own property
7031 Real estate agencies
7032 Management of real estate on a fee or contract basis
7210 Hardware consultancy
7221 Publishing of soware
7222 Other soware consultancy and supply
7230 Data processing
7240 Data base activities
7250 Maintenance and repair of oﬃce, accounting and computing
machinery
7260 Other computer related activities
7310 Research and experimental development on natural sciences and
engineering
7320 Research and experimental development on social sciences and
humanities
7411 Legal activities
7412 Accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax
consultancy
7413 Market research and public opinion polling
7414 Business and management consultancy activities
7415 Management activities of holding companies
7420 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical
consultancy
7440 Advertising
7481 Photographic activities
7486 Call centre activities
7487 Other business activities not elsewhere classiﬁed
9211 Motion picture and video production
9212 Motion picture and video distribution
9213 Motion picture projection
9220 Radio and television activities
9231 Artistic and literary creation and interpretation
9232 Operation of arts facilities
9234 Other entertainment activities not elsewhere classiﬁed
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Group/ Code Description London 
Total Employment All sectors 3,987,780 9,849,160
 631 Cargo handling and storage 10,217 43,054
 651 Monetary intermediation 131,735 202,475
 652 Other ﬁnancial intermediation 42,484 66,037
 660 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 29,912 80,529
 671 Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial intermediation, except insurance and
pension funding
73,845 94,179
 672 Activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding 36,132 69,832
 721 Hardware consultancy 3,603 12,278
 722 Soware consultancy and supply 66,357 182,957
 724 Data base activities 3,868 7,549
 731 Research and experimental development on natural sciences and
engineering
13,293 60,617
 741 Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy;
market research and public opinion polling; business and management
consultancy; holdings
276,099 494,728
 742 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy 57,682 140,272
 744 Advertising 31,831 53,215
 921 Motion picture and video activities 18,750 26,335
 922 Radio and television activities 37,282 42,985
 925 Library, archives, museums and other cultural activities 16,808 35,122
Table 12.9: Selected Sectoral
Breakdown of Employment in
London and the 
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